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Abstract	
	This	thesis	examines	the	relationship	between	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	and	theatrical	performance.		This	type	of	performance	has	emerged	from	marginalized	origins	in	community	arts	and	therapeutic	practices	in	the	1960s	to	a	place	at	the	forefront	of	commercial	and	alternative	theatre	in	the	first	two	decades	of	the	twenty	first	century.	This	form	of	theatre	provokes	an	interrogation	of	agency,	presence,	the	construction	and	performance	of	the	self,	and	the	ethics	of	participation	and	spectatorship	that	locates	it	at	the	centre	of	debates	current	in	performance	studies	and	performance	philosophy.		It	is	a	form	of	theatre	that	fundamentally	challenges	how	to	assess	the	aesthetic	values	and	political	efficacies	of	theatrical	performance.	It	offers	possibilities	for	thinking	about	and	exploring	theatrical	performance	in	a	conceptual	and	practical	space	between	incapacity	and	theatricality	that	looks	toward	new	and	different	ecologies	of	meaning	and	praxis.			The	methodology	of	the	thesis	is	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	presence	and	participation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	specific	performances	that	include	a	1963	US	film,	a	1980	Australian	documentary,	the	collaboration	of	Robert	Wilson	with	autistic	poet	Christopher	Knowles,	and	recent	performances	by	Christoph	Schlingensief,	Back	To	Back	Theatre	and	Jérôme	Bel’s	collaboration	with	Theater	HORA.			I	examine	the	working	relationships	and	the	aesthetic	and	political	strategies	of	these	performances	in	specific	geographical	and	historical	contexts	in	order	to	explore	what	kinds	of	efficacy	and	affective	engagement	this	form	of	theatre	can	offer	to	people	with	and	without	intellectual	disabilities.	
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Introduction	The	first	theatrical	performance	by	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	that	I	attended	was	in	2004.		It	was	a	large	cast	version	of	Sadako	and	the	
Thousand	Paper	Cranes	performed	by	residents	of	a	community	for	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		The	audience	was	composed	of	other	residents,	staff,	and	friends	and	family.		I	was	there	as	I	had	been	asked	to	organize	some	drama	workshops	for	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	the	community.			The	performance	was	different	to	anything	in	my	previous	experience	of	theatre.		The	director	stood	at	the	front	of	the	audience,	narrating	and	sometimes	prompting	or	correcting	the	performers.		The	performers	seemed	distracted,	unengaged	and	struggled	to	remember	what	it	was	they	were	supposed	to	do.		Some	of	their	bodies	moved	in	the	agitation	of	involuntary	or	compulsive	movements.				 My	memories	of	that	event	are	of	being	bored,	and	of	being	embarrassed	for	all	present	when	performers	delivered	lines	of	dialogue	intended	for	other	characters	to	the	director,	to	the	ceiling,	or	to	the	floor,	and	yet	there	were	performers	on	that	stage	that	engaged	and	held	my	attention	with	their	presence	in	ways	that	I	had	very	rarely	experienced	in	other	theatres.			In	that	room	there	was	a	strange	mixture	of	incapacity	and	theatricality	that	both	fascinated	me	and	prompted	me	to	try	to	do	something	better	for	these	people.		At	that	time	I	understood	that	‘something	better’	as	something	that	was	both	better	theatre	and	that	could	help	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	live	better	lives:	more	engaged,	more	empowered	and	more	included.			That	continuing	fascination,	and	
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the	desire	to	discover	what	‘to	do	better’	might	mean,	has	led	me	to	set	up	Different	Light	Theatre	Company	in	Christchurch	and	to	ask	the	questions	that	now	form	the	basis	of	this	thesis.	What	can	theatre	bring	to	the	lives	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities?		Does	it	offer	the	potential	for	greater	equality,	empowerment	and	emancipation?	What	can	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	bring	to	theatre?	Does	their	involvement	question	what	is	meant	by	theatre	and	what	it	means	to	be	an	actor?		What	potentially	emerges	in	the	encounter	between	the	two?			Does	it	cause	a	rethinking	of	what	is	meant	by	the	capacity	to	be	an	actor	both	onstage	and	off,	and	do	the	perceived	incapacities	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	provoke	a	rethinking	of	what	is	meant	by	theatrical	performance	and	what	its	aesthetic	and	political	efficacy	might	be?		In	this	thesis	I	intend	to	show	how	the	involvement	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	theatre	provokes	a	reconsideration	of	some	of	the	aesthetic	principles	and	political	efficacies	of	theatre.	This	theatre	might	be	said	to	be	located	between	incapacity	understood	as	an	inability	to	achieve	norms	that	is	yet	productive	of	innovation,	and	theatricality	as	a	wavering	between	the	symbolic	systems	of	theatre	and	the	free	play	of	performance.		I	prefer	not	to	settle	upon	any	ontological	definition	of	‘intellectual	disability’	as	this	is	a	term	that	will	be	contested	throughout	this	thesis,	whilst	at	the	same	time	I	will	be	seeking	to	acknowledge	the	lived	experience	of	those	people	subjected	to	this	diagnosis.	I	will	be	concentrating	on	what	emerges	in	the	relationship	between	people	who	are	diagnosed	as	intellectually	disabled	and	those	who	are	not	in	the	theatre:	performers,	directors	(and	other	theatre	creative)	and	audiences.		I	will	be	speaking	from	the	perspective	of	someone	who	is	not	diagnosed	as	being	
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intellectually	disabled,	as	this	is	the	perspective	from	which	I	can	speak	with	some	experience.		I	am	using	the	term	incapacity	rather	than	disability	because	in	the	pragmatics	of	everyday	usage	this	lexical	choice	is	one	that	is	more	dependent	on	context.		There	is	a	difference	between	the	statements	‘She	is	disabled’	and	‘She	is	incapable’:	the	latter	usually	requires	accompaniment	by	the	conjunction	‘of’	and	a	context.		‘She	is	disabled,’	rightly	or	wrongly,	suggests	something	definitive:	subject	verb	predicate:	end	of	story.		‘She	is	incapable’	suggests	at	least	the	possibility	for	resistance	to	the	judgment	of	incapacity:	that	the	incapacity	can	change.	Incapacity	is	egalitarian.		Any	body	is	capable	of	being	incapable.	This	is	particularly	the	case	in	the	theatre:	anybody	is	capable	of	making	mistakes,	breaking	the	illusion	or	the	theatrical	contract	with	the	audience.		I	am	interested	in	how	this	incapacity	on	stage	changes	the	relationships	between	all	bodies	present	and	how	those	bodies	react	to	this	incapacity.	This	issue	relates	very	much	to	the	investigations	in	Nicholas	Ridout’s	
Stage	Fright,	Animals	and	Other	Theatrical	Problems,	a	work	on	incapacity	and	theatricality	that	informs	this	thesis.			I	am	also	seeking	to	avoid	further	metaphorization	of	‘disability’	in	the	face	of	the	lived	experience	of	people	with	disabilities.			I	choose	to	use	the	term	‘incapacity’,	however,	primarily	because	of	how	it	becomes	an	interesting	term	when	it	is	connected	to	theatre.		In	this	thesis	I	will	explore	what	happens	when	incapacity	is	rendered	as	theatre.		When	the	perceived	incapacities	of	a	person	with	intellectual	disabilities	is	presented	or	displayed	on	stage	does	it	become	a	kind	of	capacity	in	the	aesthetic	space,	or	do	we	become	aware	of	and	focus	on	that	person’s	capabilities?	Does	this	affect	the	
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perception	of	what	that	person	is	capable	of	outside	the	theatre?				When	theatre	is	incapacitated,	when	something	or	someone	goes	wrong	in	theatrical	performance	what	happens?		Does	this	reveal	the	incapacities	and	contingencies	on	which	the	process	of	theatre	is	based,	does	theatre	temporarily	collapse	to	let	in	something	‘real’?		Can	this	going	wrong	itself	be	framed	as	performance	and,	if	it	is,	does	this	empower	or	exploit	the	performers?	When	incapacity	is	rendered	as	theatre	and	when	theatre	is	incapacitated	–	often	at	one	and	the	same	time	in	the	involvement	in	theatre	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	-	the	potential	for	something	aesthetically	and	politically	interesting	emerges.		Incapacity	encompasses,	moreover,	issues	of	power	and	agency	that	cross	the	binary	of	able	and	disabled.		These	issues	of	power	and	agency	are	particularly	at	stake	in	the	lived	experience	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	–	they	are	‘human	but	more	so’1	–	but	also	connect	to	subject	positions	for	able	and	disabled	alike	in	contemporary	economic	and	political	formations.		Incapacity	is	one	way	of	reconfiguring	the	hierarchical	binary	of	able	and	disabled.		It	encompasses	the	creative	political	potential	inherent	in	powerlessness	and	in	things	not	working.		Incapacity	in	one	area	can	enforce	creativity	in	another.				To	answer	the	question	of	what	theatre	brings	to	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	entails	going	back	to	more	basic	questions	of	motivation,	methodology	and	efficacy,	and	the	politics	of	visibility2	and	performance3.	Why	make	theatre	with	people	with	intellectual	disabilities?	How	should	this	theatre																																																									1	Berger	cites	Matthew	Belmonte’s	“Human	but	More	So:	What	the	Autistic	Brain	tells	us	about	the	Process	of	Narrative”	(166)	2	I	refer	here	to	McHenry,	“Beyond	the	Visible:	Disability	and	Performing	Bodies.”	3	Peggy	Phelan’s	Unmarked:	The	Politics	of	Performance	could	be	read	as,	in	part,	a	study	in	the	politics	of	theatricalizing	incapacity	and	the	incapacities	of	perception	of	the	visual	field.		
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be	made?		What	are	the	expectations	of	this	form	of	theatre?		How	can	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	be	involved	in	theatrical	performance?	How	can	they	be	presented	or	represented?			Most	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	within	the	United	Kingdom,	the	United	States	of	America,	Europe	and	Australasia	from	the	1980s	onwards	has	emerged	from	therapeutic	and	community	arts	environments.		This	practice	follows	a	model	in	which	non-disabled	therapists,	facilitators	and	directors	help	such	people	to	express	themselves	creatively.	This	is	seen	as	giving	access	to	the	arts	for	a	disadvantaged	sector	of	society	and	at	the	same	time	reintegrating	those	who	are	excluded	back	within	the	community,	to	heal	a	perceived	rift	in	the	social	bond.			Until	very	recently	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities	have	only	had	their	presence	and	representation	negotiated	for	them	by	non-disabled	directors	and	other	facilitators.		These	practitioners	then	choose	the	terms	by	which	the	theatre	production	seeks	to	engage	an	audience	that	is	generally	assumed	not	to	be	intellectually	disabled.		Devised	or	scripted	theatrical	performance	has	been	largely	filtered	through	the	perceptions,	sensibilities	and	apprehensions	of	people	who	are	not	identified,	or	do	not	identify	themselves,	as	‘intellectually	disabled.’		One	problem	faced	by	such	practitioners,	myself	included,	is	how	to	make	theatre	from	the	subjective	experience	of	others	who	may	have	a	limited	or	impaired	access	to	spoken	and	written	language	and	other	symbolic	or	semiotic	systems.		However	sympathetic	or	empathetic	the	non-disabled	director	may	be,	how	is	it	possible	to	make	theatre	or	performance	out	of	such	peoples’	experience	without	thematizing,	appropriating	or	in	some	way	exploiting	them?		This	raises	further	questions.		Is	not	all	theatre,	or	indeed	mediated	representation,	exploitative	of	those	involved	in	some	way?		Any	number	of	
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people	involved	in	theatre	may	be	subjected	to	various	forms	of	exploitation,	financial	or	emotional,	but	is	there	a	particular	danger	of	exploitation	for	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities?		Is	there	a	difference	between	the	perceived	exploitation	of	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	and	any	other	actor?			
I	will	address	some	possible	answers	to	these	questions	in	this	thesis	by	considering	performances	in	different	historical,	geographical	and	cultural	locations.		I	will	not	directly	give	an	account	of	my	own	eleven	years	experience	of	making	theatre	with	Different	Light	Theatre	Company	in	Christchurch,	New	Zealand.			I	have	made	this	decision	in	an	effort	to	avoid	adopting	an	authorial	voice	on	work	in	which	I	have	been	intimately	and	substantially	involved.		A	separate	book	is	being	produced	in	collaboration	with	Different	Light	members.	My	experience	of	our	mutual	collaborations	and	friendships	inform	every	aspect	of	this	investigation.			
In	pragmatic	terms,	theatre	may	occasionally	bring	a	means	of	living,	or,	infrequently,	a	career,	to	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities,	but	I	will	not	be	focusing	primarily	on	commercial	theatre	in	this	investigation.		I	will,	rather,	limit	discussion	to	performances	that	represent	a	highly	selective	genealogy	of	theatre	practices	in	the	period	from	1963	to	2013	that	have	generated	an	interrogation	of	what	theatre	can	be.			These	theatre	practices	developed	from	origins	in	institutions	and	community	arts	and	I	now	wish	to	consider	some	of	the	assumptions	on	which	such	practices	were	based,	as	they	still	inform	the	methodologies	of	participation	and	the	perceptions	of	efficacy	of	this	form	of	theatre.			
In	“The	Facilitation	of	Learning-Disabled	Arts”	in	Sandahl	and	Auslander’s	
	 7	
Bodies	in	Commotion:	Disability	and	Performance,	Giles	Perring	outlines	three	paradigms	of	artistic	and	therapeutic	methodologies	in	which	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	participate	in	the	arts.		He	uses	‘learning-disabled’,	the	preferred	British	term,	and	refers	to	a	study	he	undertook	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	1999	of	general	arts	practice.		The	methodological	distinctions	he	outlines	are	useful	to	give	a	context	for	the	investigation	of	the	practices	of	the	artists	and	theatre	companies	working	with	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	discussed	in	this	thesis,	so	I	will	cite	them	in	full:		
Normalizing:	a	methodological	standpoint	and	aesthetic	outlook	that	resonates	with	normalization	theory	and	social	role	valorization.		It	focuses	on	bringing	performers	with	learning	disabilities	into	mainstream	performance	discourse,	often	through	the	application	of	mainstream	production	values	and	aesthetic	criteria.	
Post-therapeutic:	a	methodological	approach	informed	by	therapeutic	standpoints.		Although	it	may	be	applied	in	nontherapeutic	(i.e.,	creative)	settings,	it	deals	with	the	personal,	perhaps	emotional	“issues”	presented	by	a	person	with	learning	disabilities.		It	affords	an	opportunity	for	these	issues	to	be	expressed	and	explored.		This	approach	often	sets	itself	at	odds	with	external	or	organizational	imperatives	for	work	to	be	exhibited	or	performed.	
Countercultural:	An	objective	that	challenges	mainstream	cultural	and	aesthetic	precepts	and	views	about	disability.		It	often	flows	from	a	perception	of	the	value	of	transgressive	and	nonnormative	qualities	in	learning-disabled	people’s	creation	and	a	concern	with	addressing	their	marginalization/institutionalization.	(185-6)	Perring	himself	recognizes	that	these	distinctions	are	not	discrete	or	mutually	exclusive.		Indeed,	a	number	of	the	performances	discussed	in	this	thesis	do	not	
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fit	easily	into	just	one	of	these	categories,	as	they	involve	approaches	that	exceed	or	cross	between	them.		These	three	categories	do,	however,	represent	a	useful	starting	point	for	a	discussion	of	questions	of	the	agency	and	capacity	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	theatrical	performance.			
What	is	immediately	apparent	is	that	the	emphasis	of	Perring’s	survey	is	on	the	non-disabled	facilitators:	they	are	the	ones	assumed	to	be	the	agents	of	the	three	methodologies.		Perrin	recognizes	that	there	is	a	difference	between	arts-and-disability	projects	in	which	non-intellectually	disabled	artists	are	involved	that	‘express	disabled	subjectivity’	(187)	and	those	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	and	non-disabled	facilitators	where	a	division	of	subjectivities	occurs:	
Arts-and-disability	projects,	particularly	if	the	work	facilitated	is	by	artists	without	learning	disabilities,	must	address	this	dichotomy	of	subjectivities.	(187)	
	His	reference	to	the	‘dichotomy	of	subjectivities’	in	‘learning-disabled	arts’	is	significant.		While	this	may	capture	certain	problems	of	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	abled	and	disabled	agency	in	this	work,	it	reinforces	this	highly	problematic	binary	and	also	presupposes	what	Lalita	McHenry	has	termed	‘the	acceptance	of	a	disabled	ontology’	(“Beyond	the	Visible”	53):	that	there	is	a	distinct	and	unitary	disabled	or	intellectually	disabled	subjectivity	or	‘self’	that	can	be	expressed	in	arts	or	performance.	This	assumption	is	problematic	as	it	sets	up	a	binary	of	‘self’	and	‘representation’	that	does	not	take	into	account	the	construction	of	the	self	in	representation	nor	take	into	account	how	subjective	experience	is	to	some	extent	determined	by	its	mediatization	in	a	
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language	and	symbolic	systems.		This	issue	is	particularly	crucial	if	a	person’s	access	to	theatre	as	either	participant	or	spectator	is,	in	effect,	impaired	by	a	limited	or	‘special’	access	to	education	and	a	consequent	social	marginalization,	as	is	the	case	with	many	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.			
Perrin’s	categorizations	also	limit	or	deny	agency	for	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		The	methodological	and	aesthetic	‘standpoints,	outlooks	and	objectives’	are	positions	of	power	that	are	assumed	not	to	be	occupied	by	people	with	intellectual	disabilities,	who	are	not	ascribed	agency	in	meaning-making,	creative	or	aesthetic	decision-making,	or	determining	the	aesthetic	and/or	political	relationship	of	the	work	to	an	audience.		The	methodologies	are	not	from	their	‘standpoint’	or	‘outlook.’	They	are	the	subject	of	these	methodologies,	in	as	much	as	they	are	subjected	to	them.		They	are	either	normalized,	subjected	to	therapy	or	thematized	as	an	anti-normative	other.			At	the	same	time,	these	methodologies	that	deny	them	agency,	seem	to	presuppose	an	intellectually	disabled	‘self’	that	may	be	expressed	unproblematically	through	arts	and	performance.		Perrin	may	have	been	giving	an	account	of	the	state	of	learning-disabled	arts	in	the	UK	in	1999	but	it	is	possible	to	see	in	his	model	the	kind	of	representational	‘double	bind’	that	continues	to	recur	in	the	theatrical	performances	discussed	in	this	thesis.		People	with	intellectual	disabilities	are	both	ignored	as	meaningful	agents	and	thematized	as	mere	representatives	of	their	disability.		I	will	analyze	how	different	practitioners	of	theatrical	performance	have	attempted	to	negotiate	this	‘double	bind’	and	to	seek	emancipation	from	it.		
In	theatre	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	there	is,	in	
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addition,	a	kind	of	doubling	of	power	relationships	that	disadvantage	such	people.	Until	very	recently,	they	have	only	been	cast	in	the	role	of	actor	or	performer,	a	role	with	the	appearance	of	agency	but	that	is	equally	subjected	to	the	demands	of	the	director,	the	script	and	the	obligations	of	performance	before	an	audience.	This	subjected	subject	position	is	complicated	further	by	the	power	relationship	between	people	deemed	‘abled’	and	‘intellectually	disabled’,	as	the	director	and	other	creative	personnel,	those	responsible	for	the	construction	of	the	script	or	other	performance	texts,	and	the	audience	are	all	generally	located	in	the	domain	of	the	abled.		It	must	also	be	acknowledged	that	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	still	in	order	to	participate	in	theatre	need	support	and,	precisely,	facilitation.			The	question	that	remains,	however,	is	how	the	participation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	theatrical	performance	is	to	be	facilitated	-	on	whose	terms?		
‘Facilitation’	is	a	word	that	attempts	to	reconfigure	a	perceived	inequality	in	a	power	relationship.	In	terms	of	my	own	theatrical	practice	with	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	I	would	like	to	think	that	I	have	developed	from	being	a	director	as	a	tyrant	to	a	director	as	a	facilitator.		In	terms	of	the	power	relationships	of	creating	theatre,	this	is	the	desire	to	move	from	telling	people	what	to	do,	to	creating	a	frame	in	which	they	can	do	what	they	do,	or	explore	what	they	can	do.		A	facilitator’s	role	is	to	empower	others,	but	this	function	itself	is	highly	problematic	in	the	context	of	the	arts	with	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		How	can	power	be	given	to	those	who	have	so	long	been	deemed	powerless?		Often	denied	agency	on	the	most	basic	levels	-	where	to	live,	how	to	work,	express	desire	and	procreate,	how	can	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	
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be	given	power	in	a	theatrical	context?		
Facilitation	from	its	etymological	roots	means	making	something	easier.		In	terms	of	the	facilitation	of	the	participation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	theatre,	the	question	needs	to	be	asked:	for	whom	is	this	facilitation	rendering	the	making	of	theatre	‘easier?’	Is	it	facilitating	a	theatre	that	is	easier	for	the	performers,	the	director,	or	the	audience?	There	is	no	easy	answer	to	this	question	of	ethics	and	politics	and	I	will	seek	to	examine	its	implications	in	each	of	the	performances	under	discussion.		
All	three	of	the	methodologies	Perrin	describes	are	predicated	on	the	remediation	of	a	lack:	they	are	all	ways	of	dealing	with	incapacity.	The	normalizing	methodology	brings	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	into	the	mainstream,	remediates	their	exclusion	by	seeking	to	render	their	incapacities	as	the	capacities	of	professional	performers.		The	post-therapeutic	methodology	offers	a	kind	of	healing,	an	acceptance	of,	and	coming	to	terms	with,	incapacity.		The	countercultural	methodology	situates	the	incapacities	of	the	performers	in	the	wider	frame	of	institutional	and	social	oppressions.		Incapacity	is	reconfigured	as	the	subversion	of	conforming	to	norms	and	is	offered	up	as	a	critique	of	more	encompassing	forms	of	incapacitation.		All	three	methodologies	and	the	various	theatre	practices	that	they	continue	to	inform	have	good	intentions,	the	intention	that	theatre	should	bring	something	to	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		Perhaps,	though,	it	is	the	intentionality	implicit	in	this	assumption	that	is	itself	part	of	the	problem.		The	terms	of	the	question	need	to	be	reassessed:	the	expectation	that	theatre	should	bring	something	to	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	is	based	on	an	assumption	of	inequality.		Behind	this	
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expectation,	however	well	intentioned,	is	the	desire	that	they	should	be	helped	to	be	more	like	us.		If	there	is	an	assumed	inequality	in	the	basic	motivating	principles	of	such	theatre	how	can	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	achieve	any	kind	of	political	or	aesthetic	emancipation?		Is	it	not	possible	to	facilitate	theatre	democratically,	based	on	an	assumption	of	equality?		These	are	questions	in	which	the	politics	of	performance	intersect	with	the	ethics	of	the	relationship	between	people	with	and	without	disabilities	in	theatre.			
The	assumed	ethical	import	of	the	participation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	theatre	has	led	a	number	of	critics	to	frame	this	encounter	between	abled	and	disabled	in	terms	of	Levinas’s	‘infinite	responsibility’	for	the	Other	(Entre	Nous	74).	There	are	problems	with	this	framing	as	it	is	in	danger	of	eliding	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	and	denying	them	the	possibility	to	be	the	subjects	of	ethics,	reducing	them	to	a	thematized	or	essentialized	Other.		These	problems	of	politics	and	ethics	will	be	investigated	more	fully	in	the	third	chapter	of	this	thesis.					
There	is	another	approach	to	facilitating	theatre	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	that	I	would	characterize	as	a	kind	of	‘negative	capability’	methodology.	The	eighteenth	century	poet	Keats,	who	coined	this	phrase,	defines	it	thus:	
I	mean	Negative	Capability,	that	is,	when	a	man	is	capable	of	being	in	uncertainties,	mysteries	doubts,	without	any	reaching	after	fact	and	reason.	(277)		The	term	is	generally	understood	in	literary	criticism	as	the	Romantic	poet’s	attempt	to	abnegate	all	assumptions	and	theories	of	knowledge	to	let	the	
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external	world	of	nature	and	its	objects	pass	through	him.		The	poet	contemplates	the	song	of	the	nightingale	or	the	Grecian	urn	in	the	state	of	receptiveness	and	enhanced	sensibility	that	is	‘negative	capability.’		In	terms	of	creating	theatre	with	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	I	designate	the	‘negative	capability’	approach	one	in	which	the	abled	artist	or	facilitator	tries	not	to	impose	any	specific	methodology	for	the	creation	or	devising	of	performance,	but	rather	desires	to	step	back	as	much	as	possible,	to	get	out	of	the	way	of	what	the	person(s)	with	intellectual	disabilities	may	express.		I	will	argue	that	Robert	Wilson	attempts	to	take	this	approach	with	Christopher	Knowles	in	A	Letter	for	
Queen	Victoria,	referred	to	in	Chapter	Two,	and	that	it	informs,	to	a	certain	extent,	strategies	employed	by	both	Christoph	Schlingensief	in	FreakStars	3000	and	Jérôme	Bel	in	Disabled	Theater,	both	referred	to	in	Chapter	Three.		Each	of	these	practitioners	operate	according	to	stated	desires	to	learn	from,	imitate	or	simply	to	empower	the	‘what	is	there’	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.	In	this	approach	the	perceived	incapacities	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	are	met	with	a	‘negative	capability’	of	understanding	and	experience	in	the	abled	person.		I	will	show	how	this	approach	is	inflected	with	the	Romanticism	of	its	origins	and	the	tropes	of	idiocy	and	of	the	enfant	sauvage	of	the	Romantic	period.		From	another	perspective	this	approach	may	be	seen	as	an	embodiment	of	what	Avital	Ronell	in	Stupidity	has	suggested	as	a	kind	of	condition	for	an	ethical	relation:	
If	one	were	to	state	in	ethical	terms	the	only	possible	position	.	.	.	it	would	have	to	be	this:	I	am	stupid	before	the	other.	(60)	Is	it,	however,	still	possible	to	be	stupid	before	the	other,	if	the	other	is	
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designated	as	stupid?		In	this	case	again	questions	of	intersubjectivity,	the	reflexive	and	dialectical	relationship	between	Self	and	Other,	are	complicated	by	cultural	and	historical	tropes	and	the	metaphorization	of	intellectual	disability,	stupidity,	incompetence	and	incapability.	4		
Another	attempt	to	undo	and	reconfigure	the	binaries	of	disability	and	ability	has	emerged	in	recent	developments	in	disability	studies.		Jasbir	Puar	in	“The	Cost	of	Getting	Better:	Suicide,	Sensation	and	Switchpoints”reconfigures	ability	and	disability	as	capacity	and	debility	as	a	way	of	dealing	with	the	complexity	of	the	relationship	between	ability	and	disability	in	new	economic	and	political	landscapes	of	neoliberalism.	For	example,	some	forms	of	disability	experience	and	some	people	with	disabilities	are	what	she	terms	‘exceptional’	and	what	Mitchell	and	Snyder	in	their	recently	published	The	Biopolitics	of	
Disability:	Neoliberalism,	Ablenationalism	and	Peripheral	Embodiment	term	‘ablenationalism’:	their	presence	and	behaviour	may	be	used	to	enhance	neoliberal	agendas.	The	right	kind	of	disabled	people	can	be	folded	into	life,	others	are	deemed	not	worthy	of	full	access	and	inclusion.	Puar	also	argues	that	even	the	debility	of	those	excluded	can	be	made	profitable	in	the	development	of	medications	and	institutions	and	mechanisms	of	surveillance	by	the	medical	industrial	complex.		
Mitchell	and	Snyder	2015	draw	on	Puar’s	debility	and	capacity	model	to	formulate	a	conception	of	the		‘capacity	of	incapacity’	as	an	aesthetic	and	political	strategy	of	resistance	to	neoliberalism.		Their	use	of	‘incapacity’	is	already	caught	up	in	a	dialectic	of	capacity	and	incapacity.	This	is	the	‘crip	art	of	failure’	(37)																																																									4	The	metaphorization	of	intellectual	disability	in	the	particular	tropes	of	the	eighteenth	century,	of	Surrealism	and	Modernism	is	extensively	analyzed	in	Berger,	Chapter	Two.	
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modeled	on	Halberstam’s	‘queer	art	of	failure’	whose	definition	they	cite:	
the	queer	art	of	failure	allows	us	to	escape	the	punishing	norms	that	discipline	behavior	and	manage	human	development	with	the	goal	of	delivering	us	from	unruly	childhoods	to	orderly	and	predictable	adulthoods	.	.	.	(83)	
This	represents	both	an	art	of	living	and	an	art	in	the	aesthetic	sense	as	active	resistance	to	the	new	normals	of	neoliberalism,	in	particular	the	assumption	of	normative	cognition.		In	the	fields	of	neuroscience	and	philosophy	there	is	also	a	current	questioning	of	existing	concepts	of	normative	cognition,	the	autonomy	of	self	and	the	coherent	integrity	of	the	individual.		In	The	New	
Wounded:	From	Neurosis	to	Brain	Damage	and	other	works	Catherine	Malabou	has	proposed	‘plasticity’	to	oppose	models	of	thought	and	behaviour	based	on	the	formulations	from	the	physical	sciences	such	as	resilience	that	neoliberalism	favours.		People	with	intellectual	disabilities	can	be	more	meaningfully	included	and	valued	in	such	models	that	look	more	towards	the	flows	and	interrelationships	of	an	ecology5	than	the	assumed	cause	and	effect,	profit	and	loss,	and	emphasis	on	the	individual	of	a	market-led	model	of	an	economy.		This	rethinking	of	models	of	thinking	and	behaving	has	potentially	profound	implications	for	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	terms	of	reassessing	prevailing	assumptions	of	their	agency,	value	and	capacity	for	mutually	beneficial	relationships.	I	believe	that	these	recent	developments	at	the	intersection	of	philosophy	and	neuroscience	map	out	not	only	new	ways	of	reconfiguring	the	capacities	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	but	also	a																																																									5	Mitchell	and	Snyder	2015	cite	Braidotti’s	‘Alternative	ecologies	of	belonging’	as	‘alternative	ways	of	being-in-the-world	as	disabled’	(172)	
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reconfiguration	of	thinking	about	agency,	autonomy	and	shared	vulnerabilities	of	people	with	and	without	intellectual	disabilities.	This	is	an	interesting	potential	efficacy	of	this	theatre	that	may	be	the	surprising	thing	that	the	involvement	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	can	bring	to	theatre.			
One	final	reconfiguration	of	the	binary	of	able	and	disabled	that	underlies	the	investigation	in	this	thesis	of	theatre	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	is	what	might	be	termed	the	binary	of	the	mirror.		I	mean	by	the	binary	of	the	mirror	the	assumption	that	the	disabled	body	and	disability	is	a	poor	and	deficient	reflection	of	the	able	body	and	ability.		In		‘Nude	Venuses,	Medusa’s	Body	and	Phantom	Limbs’	in	Mitchell	and	Snyder’s	The	Body	and	
Physical	Difference:	Discourses	of	Disability	Lennard	Davis	analyses:	the	desire	to	split	bodies	into	two	immutable	categories-	whole	and	incomplete,	abled	and	disabled,	normal	and	abnormal,	functional	and	dysfunctional.		(53)	He	traces	this	desire	back	to	Lacan’s	theorization	of	how	the	infant	experiences	their	body	at	the	earliest	stages	of	development	as	fragments,	limbs,	parts	and	surfaces	or	what	Lacan	terms	imagos	of	the	fragmented	body.		At	what	Lacan	terms	the	mirror	stage	of	development	the	child	(mis)recognizes	the	unified	image	in	the	mirror	as	their	‘self.’		Davis	then	connects	the	encounter	with	disabled	bodies	as	a	return	to	seeing	the	fragmented	body	under	the	armour	of	he	unified	self	of	the	whole	body:	.	.	.the	disabled	body	is	a	direct	imago	of	the	repressed	fragmented	body,	a	hallucination	of	the	mirror	stage	gone	wrong.	(60)	he	continues:	.	.	.the	“real	body,”	the	normal	body,”	the	observer’s	body,	is	in	fact	always	already	a	“fragmented	body.”	(61)	
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From	this	Davis	is	able	to	recompose	the	binary	of	the	abled	and	disabled	body,	a	binary	in	which	it	is	assumed	that	the	body	that	takes	priority,	the	a	priori	body	is	the	abled	body.		This	leads	him	to	reconfigure	the	perception	of	the	disabled		body:	 The	disabled	body,	far	from	being	the	body	of	some	small	group	of	victims	is	an	entity	from	the	earliest	of	childhood	instincts,	a	body	that	is	common	to	all	humans,	as	Lacan	would	have	it.	(61)	I	wish	to	extrapolate	from	Davis’s	reconfiguration	of	the	binary	of	the	disabled	and	abled	body	a	conceptualization	that	I	will	apply	to	theatre	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		This	theatre	is	often	perceived	as,	or	constructed	to	appear	as,	a	mirror	version	of	‘normal’	theatre.		I	understand	that	the	formulation	‘normal’	theatre	is	highly	problematic	but	I	would	like	to	use	it,	not	just	as	a	kind	of	straw	man	‘theatre’	with	which	to	oppose	my	own	idea	of	theatre,	but	to	represent	the	phantasm	of	a	normal	theatre	that	I	would	argue	the	spectator	holds	in	their	mind’s	eye	in	the	process	of	viewing	theatre	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		I	would	argue	that	this	phantasm	of	theatre	appears,	a	kind	of	mirror	stage	theatre,	a	narcissistic	theatre,	like	the	armour	of	normative	illusion	that	the	child	dons	in	the	mirror	stage	and	then	is	disrupted	by	the	encounter	with	the	theatre	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities,	a	theatre	that	is	a	kind	of	imago,	or	‘hallucination	of	the	mirror	stage	gone	wrong.’			Thus	far	I	have	been	referring	to,	and	will	be	referring	in	the	main	body	of	the	thesis	to,	theatre	to	encompass	many	different	forms	of	performance	from	therapeutic	and	community	arts	projects	to	commercial	mainstream	theatrical	performance	to	avant-garde	postdramatic	performance	that	seeks	to	blur	the	boundaries	between	theatre,	performance	art	and	intermedial	performance.		There	are	also	many	different	concepts	of	theatre,	such	as	Badiou’s	distinction	in	
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Rhapsody	for	the	Theatre	between	what	he	terms	‘theatre’	and	Theatre.6	(21)		In	this	thesis	I	will	only	be	referring	to	performances	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	that	take	place	in	theatres	or	theatrical	spaces	but	I	will	argue	that	each	offers	a	performative	interrogation	of	the	political	and	aesthetic	underpinnings	of	theatre.		As	Nicholas	Ridout	reveals	in	Stage	Fright:	Animals	and	Other	Theatrical	
Problems,	incapacity	on	stage	is	highly	theatrical:	visible,	perceptible,	causing	an	affective	grimace	or	shudder	of	embarrassment	in	an	audience	–	or	an	intake	of	breath	at	the	irruption	of	something	that	feels	real	into	the	aesthetic	space.		Incapacity,	theatrically	affective,	has	the	potential	to	render	theatre	effective	in	unexpected	ways.		Incapacity	suggests	the	contract	of	theatre	between	performer	and	audience	temporarily	breaks	down	to	reveal	the	limits	of	theatre	from	within	theatre.		Usually,	however,	theatre	hangs	on	in	there	in	these	moments.		Once	performers	and	audience	are	configured	within	theatrical	space	it	is	very	difficult	to	break	the	theatrical	contract	terminally.	The	question	then	emerges:	is	there	a	theatricality	of	breaking	the	contract	of	theatre?	The	meanings	of	‘theatre’	and	‘performance’	and	the	intersections	and	distinctions	between	the	two	are	highly	contestable.		The	subject	of	Performance	Studies,	as	delineated	in,	for	example,	Jon	McKenzie’s	Perform	or	Else:	From	
Discipline	to	Performance	is	extremely	wide	ranging,	covering	performance	in	theatres	and	other	forms	of	what	he	calls	‘cultural’	performance.	He	also	distinguishes	‘organizational’	performance,	closely	connected	to	Marcuse’s	performance	principle	and	technological	performance,	a	meaning	encompassing																																																									6	Badiou	defines	Theatre	as	pronouncing	‘itself	about	itself	and	about	the	world,	and	such	that	the	knot	of	this	double	examination	summons	the	spectator	at	the	impasse	of	a	form	of	thought’	(21)	and	‘theatre’	as	kind	of	mutual	narcissistic	self-assurance	between	performance	and	audience.	
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the	‘performance’	of	substances,	objects	and	machines.		He	connects	performance	to	Goffman’s	presentation	of	the	self	in	everyday	life	and	Judith	Butler’s	development	of	the	concept	of	performativity.	The	meaning	of	performance	also	includes	‘performance	art’	or	live	art.		I	will	show	how	all	of	these	meanings	intersect	in	the	investigation	of	the	performance	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	this	thesis.			I	will	be	employing	a	very	specific	meaning	of	‘theatricality,’	locating	the	analytical	methodology	of	this	thesis	in	Performance	Studies.	In	“Performance	and	Theatricality:	The	Subject	Demystified”	in	Murray’s	Mimesis,	Masochism	and	
Mime:	The	Politics	of	Theatricality	in	Contemporary	French	Thought	Josette	Féral	traces	the	emergence	of	the	‘performance’	of	performance	art,	referring	to	Michael	Fried’s	much-cited	critique	of	‘theatre’	in	‘Art	and	Objecthood.’		She	summarizes	the	two	thrusts	of	his	argument:		 	1. The	success,	even	the	survival	of	the	arts	has	come	increasingly	to	depend	on	their	ability	to	defeat	theatre.	2. Art	degenerates	as	it	approaches	theatre.	(294)	In	attempting	to	understand	this	critique	she	connects	it	to	Derrida’s	assertion	that	theatre	cannot	escape	from	representation	and	Peter	Brook’s	assertion	in	
The	Empty	Space	‘In	the	theatre	every	form	once	born	is	mortal.’	(295)	She	goes	on	to	argue	that	performance,	as	understood	in	the	relations	to	time,	space,	objects	and	the	subject	of	performance	art,	however,	is	not	a	formalism.		It	rejects	form,	which	justifies	her	trying	to	show	‘how	the	two	modes	complement	each	other	and	stress	what	theatre	can	learn	from	performance.’		One	aspect	of	what	she	feels	theatre	can	learn	from	performance	is	outlined	in	the	following	passage:	
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As	long	as	performance	rejects	narrativity	and	representation	.	.	.it	also	rejects	the	symbolic	organization	dominating	theatre	and	exposes	the	conditions	of	theatricality	as	they	are.		Theatricality	is	made	of	this	endless	play	and	of	these	continuous	displacements	of	the	position	of	desire,	in	other	words,	of	the	position	of	the	subject	in	process	within	an	imaginary	constructive	space.	(296)	‘Theatricality’	incapacitates	the	symbolic	systems	of	theatre	to	allow	the	play	of	desire	that	is	performance,	although	that	performance	still	relies	on	the	frame	of	theatre.		In	another	passage	she	describes	performance	as	indicating	‘theatre’s	
margin’	but	it	is	margin	in	Derrida’s	sense	of	parergon	meaning	that	which	is	at	the	same	time	margin	and	centre,	‘what	in	the	subject	is	most	important,	most	hidden,	most	repressed	yet	most	active	as	well.’(297).		Her	specific	meaning	of	‘theatricality’	emerges	as	a	play	between	‘theatre’	and	‘performance’:	Theatricality	can	therefore	be	seen	as	composed	of	two	different	parts:	one	highlights	performance	and	is	made	up	of	the	realities	of	the	
imaginary	and	the	other	highlights	the	theatrical	and	is	made	up	of	
specific	symbolic	structures.	The	former	originates	within	the	subject	and	allows	his	flows	of	desire	to	speak,	the	latter	inscribes	the	subject	in	the	law	and	in	theatrical	codes,	which	is	to	say	in	the	symbolic.		Theatricality	arises	from	the	play	between	these	two	realities.	(297)	This	recomposition	of	‘theatrical’	as	a	play	between	‘theatre’	and	‘performance’	is	very	productive	for	the	types	of	theatrical	performance	by	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	that	are	the	subject	of	this	thesis.		Her	formulation	that	theatricality	is	‘for	the	Other’	(297)	is	manifest	in	her	descriptions	of	performance	as	‘an	authorless,	actorless,	and	directorless	infratheatricality.’		She	refers	to	a	kind	of	performance	assemblage:		what	takes	place	on	stage	comprises	flows,	accumulations	and	connections	of	signifiers	.	.	.	Performance	can	therefore	be	seen	as	a	machine	working	with	serial	signifiers:	pieces	of	bodies.	(298)	
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that	seems	to	connect	directly	to	Davis’	formulation	of	the	perception	of	the	disabled	body	as	imago	or	hallucination	of	the	mirror	stage.		She	also	refers	to	the	absence	of	narrativity	and	qualifies	whatever	narrativity	that	may	be	present	in	performance	in	the	following	terms:	If	the	performer	should	unwittingly	give	in	to	the	temptation	of	narrativity,	he	does	so	never	continuously	or	consistently,	but	rather	ironically	with	a	certain	remove,	as	if	he	were	quoting	or	to	reveal	its	inner	workings.		(298)	This	fragmentation	and	disruption	of	forms	and	strategies	of	undermined	narrativity	are	all	embodied	in	the	theatrical	performances	I	will	analyse	in	Chapter	Three:		in	the	work	of	Schlingensief,	Back	to	Back	and	Jérôme	Bel	and	Theater	HORA,	and,	I	argue,	are	anticipated	and	prefigured	in	the	earlier	performances	discussed	in	Chapters	One	and	Two.		Féral	summarizes	the	productive	incapacitation	of	theatre	by	performance	in	‘theatricality’	in	the	following	terms:		Performance	can	thus	be	seen	as	an	art-form	whose	primary	aim	is	to	undo	“competencies”	(which	are	primarily	theatrical).		Performance	readjusts	these	competencies	and	redistributes	them	in	a	desystematized	arrangement.		We	cannot	avoid	speaking	of	“deconstruction”	here.		(298)		It	is	my	contention	that	the	involvement	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	is	a	radical	undoing	or	deconstruction	of	the	“competencies”	of	theatre,	a	process	in	which	theatre	and	performance	operate	dialectically,	in	Marvin	Carlson’s	description	in	“The	Resistance	to	Theatricality”:	‘each	undoing	the	other	and	thus	establishing	a	wavering	field	of	reception	in	the	tension	between	them.’	(245)	Relatively	little	has	been	written	so	far	on	theatre	and	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	within	performance	studies,	although	in	the	last	few	years	this	situation	is	beginning	to	change.	A	key	work	in	the	study	of	disability	
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performance	that	also	considers	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	is	Petra	Kuppers’	Disability	and	Contemporary	Performance:	Bodies	on	
Edge.		Bodies	in	Commotion:	Disability	and	Performance	edited	by	Carrie	Sandahl	and	Philip	Auslander	contains	two	contributions	on	performance	and	intellectual	disability:	Giles	Perring’s	The	Facilitation	of	Learning-Disabled	Arts:	A	Cultural	Perspective	that	I	have	referred	to	previously	and	‘Beyond	Therapy:	“Performance	Work	with	People	Who	Have	Profound	and	Multiple	Disabilities’	by	Melissa	Nash	which	gives	an	account	of	work	undertaken	with	the	group	Entelechy	in	the	creation	of	an	‘Ambient	Jam’	between	people	with	and	without	disabilities.	In	Unimaginable	Bodies:	Intellectual	Disability,	Performance	and	
Becomings	Anna	Hickey-Moody	offers	a	Deleuzian	reading	of	the	devising,	choreographing	and	performance	processes	of	Restless	Dance	from	Adelaide,	a	group	with	whom	she	was	also	a	collaborator.		In	the	same	year	Jen	Harvie’s	contribution	to	the	Palgrave	McMillan	series	Theatre	and	the	City	opens	with	an	account	of	viewing	Back	to	Back	Theatre’s	small	metal	objects,	a	performance	to	which	a	section	is	devoted	in	Chapter	Three	of	this	thesis.	The	same	production	was	analysed	by	Matt	Hargrave	in	‘Pure	Products	Go	Crazy’	an	article	that	is	referred	to	in	this	thesis.		This	appeared	in	the	journal	Research	in	Drama	Education,	which	devoted	a	special	issue	to	learning	disabled	performance.		I	will	also	be	referring	to	Tara	Forrest’s	‘Productive	Discord:	Schlingensief,	Adorno	and	Freakstars	3000’	and	to	the	collection	it	comes	from	Christoph	Schlingensief:	Art	
Without	Borders	(2010)	edited	by	Tara	Forrest	and	Anna	Teresa	Scheer,	one	of	the	first	major	studies	in	English	to	appear	on	the	work	of	Schlingensief.			It	is	only	in	the	last	three	years	that	there	has	been	a	relative	increase	in	the	amount	of	literature	on	the	specific	subject	of	theatre	involving	people	with	
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intellectual	disabilities.		This	occurred	in	the	wake	of	the	international	success	and	debate	surrounding	the	work	of	Back	to	Back	Theatre	and	Jérôme	Bel	and	Theater	HORA’s	Disabled	Theater.	This	includes:	‘We’re	People	Who	Do	Shows’:	
Back	to	Back	Theatre:	Performance,	Politics	and	Disability	edited	by	Helena	Grehan	and	Peter	Eckersall	(2013),	Theron	Schmidt’s	‘Acting	Disabled:	Back	to	Back	Theatre	and	the	Politics	of	Appearance’	in	Postdramatic	Theatre	and	the	
Political:	International	Perspectives	on	Contemporary	Performance	(2013),	Bree	Hadley’s	Disability,	Public	Space	Performance	and	Spectatorship:	Unconscious	
Performers	(2014),	Disabled	Theater	edited	by	Sandra	Umathum	and	Benjamin	Wihstutz	(2015)	and,	very	recently,	Theatres	of	Learning	Disability:	Good,	Bad	or	
Just	Plain	Ugly	by	Matt	Hargrave	(2015).		All	of	this	recent	literature	is	discussed	in	the	main	body	of	this	thesis.			There	is	comparatively	more	literature	on	disability	performance	that	includes	performers	with	physical	disabilities	that	I	have	consulted	but	I	have	generally	focused	on	the	specific	challenges	that	are	presented	in	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities,	even	though	in	many	cases	there	is	a	crossover	between	the	two	types	of	disability.		I	am	also	approaching	this	thesis	from	the	perspective	of	theatre	and	performance	studies	and	how	that	intersects	with	disability	studies	and	critical	disability	studies	rather	than	vice	versa	even	though	my	practice	is	grounded	in	disability	performance.		The	field	of	Theatre	and	Performance	Studies	is	huge	so	I	have	only	included	in	the	works	cited	those	most	relevant	to	the	subject	of	this	thesis	in	the	areas	of	postdramatic	theatre,	the	ethics	of	spectatorship,	the	‘social	turn’	in	theatre	and	performance,	relational	aesthetics,	theatres	of	immanence	and	posthumanism,	all	of	which	offer	different	configurations	of	what	‘political	
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theatre’	might	mean	in	the	second	decade	of	the	twenty	first	century.	Specific	works	that	inform	the	writing	of	this	thesis	include	Nicholas	Ridout’s	Stage	
Fright,	Animals	and	Other	Theatrical	Problems	is	at	the	center	of	discussions	that	concern	this	thesis	and	his	Theatre	and	Ethics	is	also	important	in	the	sections	of	the	thesis	that	deal	with	this	subject.		I	will	be	referring	to	Jacques	Ranciere’s	writings	on	theatre,	that	include	The	Emancipated	Spectator	and	Aisthesis:	Scenes	
from	the	Aesthetic	Regime	and	to	his	works	on	the	recongfiguration	of	aesthetics	and	politics,	specifically	The	Politics	of	Aesthetics	and	Malaise	dans	l’Esthetique.	The	methodology	of	the	thesis	is	an	examination	of	specific	case	studies	of	theatrical	performances	that	take	place	within	specific	historical	and	geographical	contexts	but	this	thesis	is	not	intended	as	a	history	of	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		To	embark	upon	such	a	project	would	entail	going	back	into	a	shadowy	history	of	freak	shows	and	carnivals	and	might	even	include	the	involvement	of	what	are	now	termed	people	with	disabilities	as	jesters	and	performers	at	the	royal	courts	of	earlier	historical	periods.		Fascinating	and	worthy	of	research	as	this	may	be,	it	would	be	beyond	the	scope	of	the	present	work.		I	have	decided	to	construct	a	highly	selective	genealogy	of	such	performance	that	chooses	a	comparatively	recent	starting	point	in	1963.		I	have	done	this	because	a	consideration	of	this	specific	performance	establishes	a	number	of	paradigms	of	motivation,	approach	and	practice	that	inform	the	subsequent	development	of	this	form	of	theatre	as	it	has	emerged	over	the	last	fifty	years	from	a	marginal,	institutional	context	to	a	central	place	in	contemporary	avant-garde	and	commercial	performance.				This	genealogical	approach	allows	me	to	explore	transversal	connections	between	and	across	a	range	of	forms:	commercial	film,	documentary	and	live	and	
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intermedial	performance.	Choosing	such	a	range	of	forms	of	representation	then	allows	me	to	explore	the	meanings	of	theatre	or	theatricality	and	intellectual	disability	or	incapacity	from	a	variety	of	different	perspectives.		It	allows	me	to	show	how	different	meanings	of	theatricality	and	incapacity	are	constructed	in	mediatization	and	to	explore	the	complex	relationships	between	presence,	presentation	and	representation	at	the	heart	of	what	is	assumed	to	be	a	socially	concerned	form	of	theatre.		Another	reason	that	I	have	chosen	a	genealogical	rather	than	a	historical	approach	is	that	there	is	a	danger	in	establishing	‘history’	as	a	dominant	narrative	or	master	discourse	with	regard	to	the	participation	of	a	section	of	the	population	that	are	marginalized	and	excluded	from	histories	that	are	always	written	about	them	and	for	them,	but	never	by	them.		In	addition,	the	construction	of	histories	in	this	area	can	far	too	often	take	on	the	aspect	of	an	account	of	a	utopian	transition	to	the	‘present’	enlightened	and	progressive	treatment	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	contrasted	with	an	unenlightened	‘past.’			This	can	be	seen	in	the	changes	in	terminology	at	various	historical	junctures	within	the	chronological	scope	of	this	thesis:	descriptors	change	from	‘mentally	retarded’	to	‘mentally	handicapped’	to	‘intellectually	disabled’	or	‘learning	disabled’	to	the	various	designations	of	being	‘challenged’	that	occur	in	the	parlance	of	some	in	the	second	decade	of	the	twenty	first	century.			The	terminology	may	change	as	markers	in	a	supposed	narrative	of	progress	but	the	stigmatization	is	actually	rather	more	persistent	in	the	counter-narrative	of	the	lived	experience	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		I	wish	to	investigate	how	these	works	from	different	periods	speak	to	each	other:	how	they	intersect	with	wider	histories	of	theatre	and	with	the	history	or	mythology	
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of	the	aesthetic	and	political	representation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	as	either	a	teleological	narrative	of	progression	toward	utopian	inclusion	or	a	melancholy	mourning	of	trauma,	loss	and	lack.	The	intention	of	the	genealogical	approach	taken	by	this	thesis	is	to	show	how	a	close	reading	of	moments	of	theatrical	performances,	taking	into	account	specific	historical,	geographical	and	cultural	contexts,	can	interrogate	how	the	‘intellectual	disability’	of	that	particular	time	was	understood,	framed,	positioned	and	constructed	from	within	these	performances.		This	gives	a	highly	particular	focus	to	the	thesis	but	it	is	hoped	that	this	is	a	focus	that	can	allow	for	various	forms	of	contextualization.		The	thesis	has	a	focus	on	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	but	these	actors	are	obviously	caught	up	and	constructed	in	other	intersectional	subjectivities	that	include	ethnicity,	gender	and	gender	preference.	They	operate	in	institutional	and	working	environments	within	changing	patterns	of	economic	and	labour	relations	over	the	period	1963	to	2013,	a	period	that	sees	a	transition	from	economies	of	care,	of	a	welfare	state	and	of	social	and	curative	therapies	to	those	of	laissez	faire	models	of	precarity	and	autonomy	under	neoliberalism.			In	 a	 similar	 way	 the	 case	 studies	 of	 this	 thesis	 are	 of	 theatrical	performances	 that	 take	 place	 at	 specific	 points	 in	 the	 wider	 context	 of	developments	in	theatre	and	performance	during	this	period.	The	development	of	theatre	involving	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	is,	of	course,	caught	up	in	the	 development	 of	 theatre	 involving	 actors	without	 disabilities.	 Over	 the	 last	fifty	 years	 these	 developments	 include	 a	 movement	 away	 from	 the	 theatre-director	 as	 tyrant	 and	 spoken	 text-based	 model	 of	 theatrical	 performance	 to	modes	 of	 ensemble	 practice,	 non-linear	 narrative	 and	 a	 deconstructing	 of	 the	
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centrality	and	privileging	of	the	script	or	spoken	text	as	primary	site	of	meaning.	These	 developments	 have	 been	 classed	 as	 a	 move	 away	 from	 a	 ‘dramatic	theatre,’	that	still	operates	to	a	great	extent	in	accordance	with	the	principles	of	Aristotelian	 dramatic	 aesthetics,	 to	 what	 Lehmann	 has	 termed	 ‘postdramatic	theatre.’	 In	 many	 ways	 theatre	 involving	 actors	 with	 intellectual	 disabilities	might	 seem	 well	 suited	 to	 this	 stage	 in	 the	 development	 of	 theatrical	performance	with	its	de-prioritization	of	 linear	narrative	and	deconstruction	of	the	 certainties	 of	 characterization	 and	 other	 coherences	 of	 theatrical	meaning	making.	 	 A	 note	 of	 caution,	 however,	 needs	 to	 be	 sounded	here.	 Both	 ‘theatre’	and	 ‘intellectual	 disability’	 are	 not	 givens	 or	 ontological	 essences	 that	 might	afford	 a	 conceptual	model	 in	which	 one,	 theatre,	 may	 be	 use	 to	 represent	 the	other,	intellectual	disability.		They	are	both	terms	that	are	highly	contentious	and	both	implicated	in	the	problems	of	the	politics	of	representation	and	this	is	one	of	 the	 reasons	 why	 I	 choose	 to	 include	 the	 shifting	 meanings	 of	 these	 terms	within	a	consideration	of	 ‘theatricality’	and	 ‘incapacity’	 terms	that	 I	believe	are	indicators	of	processes	rather	than	of	fixed	categories	or	identities.			The	 second	 performance	 that	 I	 have	 selected	 in	 this	 genealogical	approach,	 the	 performance	 documented	 in	 Chris	 Noonan’s	 Stepping	 Out	 is	included	 as	 it	 represents	 an	 example	 of	 a	 community	 theatre	 approach	 to	 the	devising	of	 performance	based	upon	 the	premise	 that	 an	 introduction	 to	 ideas	and	practices	of	creativity	to	a	disadvantaged	section	of	the	population	leads	to	emancipation	 and	 empowerment.	 	A	 close	 reading	of	Stepping	Out	reveals	 that	this	 emancipation	 and	 empowerment	 is	 of	 a	 particular	 idea	 of	 ‘self’	 and	 the	methodology	of	the	director,	Aldo	Gennaro	in	fact	facilitates	the	emancipation	of	his	own	conception	of	‘self’	as	outsider	and	deviant	and	is	inflected	with	his	own	
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sense	of	self-discovery,	self-disclosure	and	urge	to	self-annihilation	 in	drag	and	camp.	 	 	 The	 amateur	 theatricality	 he	 imposes	 upon	 the	 lead	 performer	 in	 a	process	of	rote	mirroring	and	imitation	is	in	tension	with	those	moments	of	the	presence	 of	 the	 body	 in	 desire,	 a	 repressed	 homosexual	 desire.	 	 Conventional	theatrical	representation	and	the	assumed	therapeutic	and	social	efficacy	of	this	form	of	theatre	is	subverted	by	both	the	‘crip	art	of	failure’	and	the	‘queer	art	of	failure’	and	their	intersection.			The	 second	 chapter	 also	 explores	 a	 comparison	 between	 Gennaro’s	methodology	of	 imitation	with	 that	of	Robert	Wilson	 in	his	collaborations	with	Raymond	 Andrews	 and	 Christopher	 Knowles.	 	 Wilson	 seeks	 to	 imitate	 the	assumed	creativity	of	the	young	men	with	disabilities	who	stand	as	both	muses	and	preceptors	of	his	exploration	of	his	sense	of	his	own	‘intellectual	disability’	and	of	performance.	 	 I	argue	that	he	 invests	Knowles	with	the	attributes	of	 the	
enfant	 sauvage	 and	 the	 idiot	 savant,	 tropes	 that	 continue	 to	 inform	 the	subsequent	 involvement	 of	 people	 with	 intellectual	 disabilities	 in	 theatre.	 	 A	consideration	of	Wilson’s	work	is	also	important	in	that	it	is	an	early	example	of	the	positioning	of	people	with	 intellectual	disabilities	within	the	avant-garde	of	theatrical	 performance	 rather	 than	 within	 commercial	 cinema	 or	 community	theatre.			In	 chapter	 three	 I	 then	 show	 how	 all	 three	 of	 these	 discourses	 and	practices	of	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	within	different	frames	of	 theatrical	 performance	 are	 radically	 disrupted	 in	 Schlingensief’s	 2000	work	
FreakStars	 3000.	 This	 is	 a	 mock	 documentary	 that	 leads	 to	 a	 risible	 but	provocative	public	performance	in	a	respected	theatrical	venue	and	at	the	same	time	Schlingensief	offers	 a	pranksterish	 take	on	 the	 fashionable	 ‘social	 turn’	 in	
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contemporary	 performance	 exemplified	 by	 the	 Reality	 Trend	 and	 other	relational	aesthetic	practices.		His	project	is	intermedial:	it	generates	a	confusion	or	anxiety	over	who	constitutes	 the	public	or	audience	of	 the	project	and	over	what	 constitutes	 the	 performance	 and	 in	 particular	 explores	 the	 ethics	 of	 the	participation	 and	 agency	 of	 people	 with	 intellectual	 disabilities	 by	 presenting	what	 appear	 to	 be	 highly	 unethical	 performance	 practices	 which	 are	 in	 fact	provocative	 interrogations	 of	 the	 ethics	 of	 performance	 of	 people	 with	intellectual	 disabilities.	 	 Through	 postmodern	 parody	 he	 renders	 explicit	concerns	 over	 the	 mediatization	 of	 the	 presence	 of	 people	 with	 intellectual	disabilities	 that	 are	merely	 implied	 in	 close	 readings	 of	A	Child	 is	Waiting	and	
Stepping	 Out.	 	 Although	 FreakStars	 3000	 is	 chronologically	 prior	 to	 the	performances	 by	 Back	 to	 Back	 Theatre	 and	 Jérôme	 Bel	 and	 Theater	 HORA	considered	 in	 this	 thesis	 it	 is	 in	many	ways	more	radical	 in	 its	approach	to	 the	challenging	of	 the	 aesthetics,	 the	 ethics	 and	politics	 of	 this	 form	 than	 the	 later	performances.		The	three	performances	by	Back	to	Back	Theatre	need	to	be	 included	in	this	genealogy	as	they	represent	the	work	of	possibly	the	world’s	leading	theatre	company	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		Their	work	has	reached	a	global	audience	and,	in	response	to	audience	feedback,	they	bring	the	debates	on	the	agency	of	people	with	intellectual	disability	in	theatrical	performance	on	to	the	stage	where	arguments	and	counter-arguments	are	made	by	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	both	textually,	as	spoken	dialogue,	and	performatively	by	their	 presence.	 	 The	 final	 section	 of	 chapter	 three	 consists	 of	 a	 detailed	consideration	 of	 critical	 and	 academic	 responses	 to	 Jérôme	 Bel	 and	 Theater	HORA’s	Disabled	Theater.	This	is	included	as	it	illustrates	how	the	debates	about	
	 30	
the	 aesthetics	 and	 efficacy	 of	 theatre	 involving	 people	 with	 intellectual	disabilities	 have	 entered	 the	 academy.	 Although	 Bel’s	 project	 is	 the	 last	 to	 be	considered	 in	 many	 ways	 it	 reiterates	 and	 revisits	 the	 concerns	 of	 the	productions	 previously	 discussed	 in	 the	 thesis,	 in	 particular	 the	 work	 of	Cassavetes	 and	 Wilson.	 	 His	 attempt	 to	 stand	 back	 and	 create	 a	 Duchampian	social	and	aesthetic	experiment	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	he	undertakes	this	experiment	with	experienced	performers	 from	an	established	 theatre	company	of	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities.	 	Since	Cassavetes	discovered	the	children	in	 the	 Pomona	 State	 Hospital,	 or	 Gennaro	 discovered	 the	 residents	 of	 the	Sunshine	 Home	 or	Wilson	 discovered	 Knowles	 the	 field	 has	 moved	 on:	 	 Bel’s	discovery	is	much	more	problematic.		While	the	notion	of	history	or	tradition	is	problematic	in	this	field	of	performance,	part	of	the	raison	d’être	of	this	thesis	is	that	 it	 is	 time	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 achievements	 of	 actors	 with	 intellectual	disabilities	over	the	past	fifty	years	and	to	recognize	their	contribution	not	only	to	disability	culture	but	also	their	resistant	and	subversive	interventions	in	more	dominant	theatrical	cultures	and	discourses.		The	 analytical	 methodology	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 taken	 from	 performance	studies	and	theatre	studies.	 	I	employ	a	close	reading	of	theatrical	performance	that	focuses	on	the	analysis	of	elements	such	as	the	dramaturgy,	the	movements	of	 bodies	 in	 space	 and	 time,	 the	 use	 of	 theatrical	 technology	 and,	 where	appropriate,	 the	 configuration	 of	 the	 performance	 to	 the	 audience	 and	 an	investigation	of	 the	transmission	of	affect	between	performers	and	audience.	 	 I	pay	particular	 attention	 to	how	 the	presence	 and	 the	 representation	of	 people	with	 intellectual	 disabilities	 is	 negotiated	 within	 the	 dispositifs	 of	 theatre,	documentary	 or	 performance	 art.	 	 While	 I	 refer	 to	 the	 archive	 around	 the	
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devising,	rehearsal	and	reception	of	 these	 theatrical	performances,	 the	 focus	of	the	 thesis	 is	 on	 how	 politics	 and	 aesthetics	 play	 out	 within	 the	 theatrical	performance.			Questions	 of	 what	 constitutes	 the	 presence	 and	 participation	 of	 people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	theatrical	performance	are	asked	throughout	the	thesis,	but	it	 is	my	intention	to	employ	a	methodology	of	sustained	questioning	as	an	acknowledgement	that	there	is	no	one	discourse	of	truth	that	can	provide	definitive	 judgments	 and	 answers.	 	 The	 politics	 and	 aesthetics	 of	 this	 type	 of	theatre	emerge	from	within	a	network	of	discourses,	imperatives	and	responses	that	 includes	 the	 stated	 or	 implicit	 intentions	 of	 a	 director	 or	 company,	 the	negotiation	 of	 relationships	 in	 the	 devising	 and	 rehearsal	 process,	 the	connections	between	performers	and	audience	 in	the	moments	of	performance	and	the	archives	of	experience,	critical	and	otherwise,	that	continue	to	exist	after	the	performance	event.		While	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 thesis	 is	 on	particular	methodologies	 taken	 from	performance	studies,	the	thesis	has	also	been	informed	by	disability	studies	and	the	growing	body	of	analysis	of	the	categorization	and	lived	experience	of	people	with	 intellectual	 disabilities	 and	 the	 development	 of	 movements	 for	 self-advocacy	and	of	disability	culture	that	has	resulted	in	an	increasing	presence	of	the	 voices	 of	 those	 deemed	 to	 be	 cognitively	 different.	 	 My	 primary	 focus,	however,	 is	 on	 the	 specific	 presentation	 and	 representation	 of	 people	 with	intellectual	 disabilities	 within	 the	 aesthetic	 space	 and	 time	 of	 theatrical	performance	 and	 how	 this	 intersects	 with	 the	 experience	 and	 perception	 of	people	with	 intellectual	disabilities	outside	 this	aesthetic	 space	and	 time.	 	This	intersection	 is	 also	 a	 confounding	 or	 overlapping	 of	 aesthetics	 and	 politics	 in	
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what	Rancière	terms	‘the	distribution	of	the	sensible.’	 	 I	mean	by	the	politics	of	theatre	 involving	 people	 with	 intellectual	 disabilities	 not	 merely	 the	 issues	 of	social	exclusion	and	access	to	civil	and	human	rights	for	such	people,	important	though	these	are,	but	also	the	politics	of	performance	and	representation	which	is	a	politics	that	plays	out	at	the	level	of	the	negotiations	of	power	and	practices	of	creating	theatre	that	are	deemed	aesthetic.			 The	emphasis	of	 the	 thesis	 is	on	performance	studies	approaches	 to	 the	consideration	 of	 presence	 and	 representation.	 	 There	 are	 of	 course	 other	methodologies,	even	within	performance	studies,	 that	could	be	brought	to	bear	to	investigate	the	question	of	the	agency	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	theatrical	performance,	 including	broadly	ethnographic	approaches:	 interviews	with	participants,	performers,	creative	and	audience	members.		I	have	chosen	to	concentrate	 on	 close	 observational	 analysis	 of	 the	 various	 forms	 of	 texts	 in	operation	 in	 performance	 as	 I	wish	 to	 explore	 the	discussion	of	 agency	within	the	subjunctive	mode	of	theatrical	performance.	 	 	The	considerations	that	often	coalesce	around	the	notion	of	the	‘agency’	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	 performance	 are	 complex,	 given	 that	 the	 ‘agency’	 of	 the	 actor	 or	 even	 the	deviser	 is	 only	 a	 part	 of	 a	 much	 bigger	 picture	 in	 the	 aesthetic	 and	 political	efficacy	 of	 a	 piece	 of	 theatre.	 How	much	 ‘agency’	 does	 any	 non-disabled	 actor	have	within	a	much	wider	process	of	performance	creation	and	reception?			The	situation	 of	 the	 actor	 with	 intellectual	 disabilities	 is,	 admittedly,	 one	 that	 is	perceived	to	be	fraught	with	greater	possibilities	of	exploitation.	 	This	thesis	is,	however,	 centrally	 concerned	with	 examining	 and,	 to	 some	 extent,	 challenging	this	 perception:	 firstly	 because	 ‘agency’	 is	 a	 problematic	 term	 with	 regard	 to	theatrical	 performance	 where	 the	 ‘actor’	 is	 somebody	 who	 both	 appears	 in	
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control	but	is	also	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent	following	the	dictates	of	a	script	or	process	 imposed	 by	 others,	 and	 secondly	 because	 ‘agency’	 in	 terms	 of	 having	power	 or	 autonomy	 is	 a	 concept	 that	 is	 being	 fundamentally	 and	 radically	challenged	in	recent	political	and	philosophical	reconfigurations	of	the	‘subject.’		The	performances	discussed	in	the	third	chapter	of	the	thesis	specifically	refer	to	this	 reflexive	 questioning	 of	 subjecthood	 and	 how	 questions	 of	 the	 agency	 of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	reflects	back	on	the	assumed	agency	of	those	people	without	those	disabilities.	 	 Indeed,	I	will	argue	that	the	 ‘performance’	of	intellectual	disability	and	 the	 ‘performance’	of	 inclusion	 is	at	 stake	 in	all	of	 the	productions	discussed	in	this	thesis.		By	the	performance	of	intellectual	disability	I	 mean	 how	 much	 is	 intellectual	 disability	 a	 performance	 that	 requires	performative	evidence	of	its	presence	or	absence,	that	requires	the	complicity	of	an	 audience	 of	 the	 normal	 and	 that	 in	 fact	 confirms	 the	 normality	 of	 that	audience.	 	 By	 the	 performance	 of	 inclusion	 I	 wish	 to	 refer	 to	 how	 often	 the	exclusion	 of	 people	 with	 intellectual	 disabilities	 is	 reiterated	 in	 what	 are	assumed	to	be	increasingly	progressive	and	enlightened	attempts	to	include.			The	focus	of	this	thesis	is	primarily	concerned	with	how	the	presence	and	participation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	is	mediatized	in	performance	and	the	politics	and	aesthetics	of	this	mediatization.	I	am	not	hoping	to	find	authenticity	or	the	authentic	experience	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		I	wish	to	avoid	too	reductive	a	separation	of	performance	and	‘reality’	and	this	is	a	methodological	emphasis	from	performance	studies.	The	object	of	study	of	performance	studies	may	be	difficult	to	define	or,	especially,	to	delimit,	but	I	believe	the	methodology	is	particularly	suited	to	the	analysis	of	the	complex	intersection	of	the	aesthetic	and	the	everyday,	the	intersection	of	presentation	
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and	representation,	and	the	network	of	performances	of	not-self	and	self,	and,	after	Richard	Schechner,	of	not	not	self	that	are	all	at	stake	in	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.						 	
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Chapter	One	
A	Child	is	Waiting	
‘	To	throw	a	spotlight…	on	the	subject	of	retardation’	
	 In	this	chapter	I	will	be	referring	in	detail	to	the	1963	film	A	Child	is	
Waiting	directed	by	John	Cassavetes	and	produced	by	Stanley	Kramer.		The	film	is	a	fictionalized	account	of	the	treatment	of	a	young	autistic	boy,	Reuben	Widdicombe,	at	the	fictional	Crawthorne	State	Training	School	for	the	Mentally	Retarded.		Cassavetes	chose	to	cast	twenty	young	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	from	the	Pomona	State	Hospital	as	residents	of	the	institution.		Kramer	insisted	on	using	a	professional	child	actor	for	the	role	of	Reuben	and	continued	his	relationship	from	previous	films	with	established	film	actors	Burt	Lancaster	and	Judy	Garland.		A	close	analysis	of	a	scene	of	a	theatrical	performance	in	the	film	will	be	used	to	introduce	the	investigation	of	a	number	of	issues	in	the	representation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	at	this	period	in	the	United	States	of	America.	This	is	a	period	that	has	been	very	influential	on	subsequent	movements	in	disability	activism	that	seek	the	political	and	artistic	emancipation	of	people	with	disabilities	as	part	of	wider	movements	for	human	rights.	I	will	argue,	however,	that	an	analysis	of	this	performance	and	its	context	also	reveals	an	ethical	impasse	or	aporia	within	this	movement	to	liberation.		I	wish	to	present	this	scene	as	a	paradigm	of	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	to	reveal	the	epistemological	bases	of	such	performance,	an	epistemology	that	informs	the	subsequent	development	of	the	theatrical	performances	that	will	be	considered	in	this	thesis.	By	placing	
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this	scene	and	the	film	in	context	I	hope	to	show	the	particular	aesthetic,	ethical	and	political	tensions	at	play	in	terms	of	incapacity	and	theatricality	in	this	type	of	performance.		Towards	the	end	of	A	Child	is	Waiting,	there	is	a	seven	and	a	half	minute	scene	of	a	theatrical	performance,	the	narrative	for	which	is	based	on	the	myth	of	the	first	Thanksgiving,	enacted	by	a	group	of	residents	of	an	“institution	for	mentally	retarded	children.”		Within	this	scene	there	is	a	short	sequence	of	a	ten-year-old	African	American	girl	in	seventeenth	century	Puritan	costume	sitting	at	an	onstage	table.		Her	participation	in	the	performance	consists	of	replying	to	another	performer,	who	says	that	he	is	hungry,	by	saying,	“I’m	hungry	too.”	She	then	says	something	unintelligible,	and	then,	“I	hope	there’ll	be	lots	to	eat	at	our	Thanksgiving	feast.”	She	smiles	throughout,	regardless	of	what	she	is	saying,	with	no	modification	of	tone	or	facial	expression.	When	she	has	finished	speaking,	the	camera	stays	on	her	as	she	repeatedly	and	rapidly	twitches	her	knees	closer	together	and	farther	apart.	It	stays	on	her	as	she	then	stares,	without	smiling,	to	her	right,	and	then	straight	ahead,	and	then	to	her	left.	How	her	brief	moments	of	performance,	moments	that	are	part	incapacity	and	part	theatricality,	may	be	viewed	and	interpreted	might	stand	as	a	paradigm	of	the	issues	at	stake	in	the	processes	of	production,	performance	and	perception	of	contemporary	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		Her	construction	as	a	subject	is	as	an	‘actor’-	a	strange	kind	of	subject,	formed	within	a	specific	space,	before	the	gaze	or	scrutiny	of	others.		In	the	context	of	the	film	she	is	a	‘mentally	retarded’	actor.	She	is	also	a	‘mentally	retarded’	person	(to	use	the	terminology	of	the	time	and	place	of	the	film)	a	construction	of	her	as	a	subject	that	also	takes	place	within	a	specific	
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institutional	space	where	she	is	subjected	to	scrutiny.		She	is	of	course	significantly	constituted	within	other	discourses	-	as	‘African	American’	and	as	‘female’,	for	example.	In	addition	any	perception	or	interpretation	of	her	performance	includes	not	only	the	construction	of	her	as	subject	but	the	construction	of	an	‘I’	as	a	viewing	subject	who	some	fifty	years	after	the	release	of	the	film	occupies	the	place	of	‘I’	in	the	writing	of	these	words	to	other	subjects	who	will	temporarily	occupy	the	place	of	the	addressed	of	this	writing.		Any	attempt	I	make	to	describe	‘what	is	there’	in	the	scene,	as	in	the	first	paragraph,	is	inevitably	caught	up	in	the	subjectivity	of	the	‘I’	who	is	viewing,	interpreting	and	analyzing.	There	is	no	interpretative	framework	that	is	adequate	to	the	phenomena	of	‘performance’	or	‘intellectual	disability’.	There	is	no	certain	object	of	study	that	is	‘performance’	-	performance	studies	has	been	described	by	Simon	Goldhill,	a	scholar	outside	the	field,	as	aiming:	.	.	.to	cover	a	huge	range	of	social	interaction	(to	the	degree	that,	when	performance	becomes	such	an	all-embracing	term,	it	becomes	difficult	to	maintain	it	as	a	useful	and	specific	analytic	category).	(11)			‘Intellectual	disability’	is	a	disputed	and	politicized	term	that	determines	as	much	as	it	describes	a	stigmatized	identity.	Both	are	highly	contentious,	shifting	and	indeterminate	categories.	Once	the	hope	of	an	assurance	and	certainty	in	the	ontology	of	both	subjects	is	given	up,	the	possibility	emerges	of	responding	to	the	haecceities	of	the	contingent,	the	specific	contexts	in	which	instances	of	performance	and	intellectual	disability	are	constituted.		I	argue	that	a	consideration	of	‘incapacity’	and	‘theatricality’	offers	a	way	of	thinking	and	acting	beyond	the	binaries	of	‘ability’	and	‘disability’	and	‘aesthetic	performance’	and	‘social	performance’	to	reveal	what	is	political,	in	the	sense	of	what	is	potentially	
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emancipating,	in	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		What	I	am	attempting	to	do	is	to	consider	what	Rancière	has	termed	the	‘distribution	of	the	sensible’	(Dissensus	57-60)	with	regard	to	such	theatrical	performance.	This	includes	the	political	implications	of	the	relationships	and	mechanisms	of	representation	or	meaning-making	and	the	transmission	of	affect	in	and	around	such	performance.	This	also	includes	the	political	dimension	of	what	can	be	apprehended	by	the	senses	and	turned	into	‘sense’	or	meaning.		There	are	other	meanings	around	the	idea	of	‘the	sensible’	that	are	also	in	play	–	sensibility	in	its	eighteenth	century	meaning	as	sensitivity,	and	sensible	in	the	more	everyday	sense	of	the	doxa	of	‘good	sense’,	‘common	sense’	-the	sensible	as	what	is	assumed	to	be	reasonable	or	competent.		The	distribution	of	the	sensible	is	already	caught	up	with	‘aesthetics,’	one	of	the	definitions	of	which	is	‘pertaining	to	the	apprehension	of	the	senses’	and		‘aesthetics’	as	it	relates	to	notions	of	what	constitutes	the	beautiful,	the	well	ordered	and	the	sense	of	taste	and	judgment	that	is	of	course	largely	socially	and	politically	constructed	and	policed.			To	return	to	my	attempted	description	from	the	first	paragraph,	when	the	African	American	girl	says	something	unintelligible,	and,	what	is	more,	her	unintelligible	words	or	sounds,	have	been	deliberately	left	in	the	film’s	final	edit,	is	the	film	asking	us	to	judge	her	or	to	sympathize	with	her		-	or	to	try	not	to	do	either,	and	instead	to	attend	to	her	more,	or	differently?		Her	gestures	with	her	legs	could	be	interpreted	within	a	diagnostic	discourse	as	stereotypy,	repetitive	and	ritual	movements	found	in	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	or	might	be	read	as	symptoms	of	her	unease	within	the	theatrical	performance	of	the	film’s	
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narrative	or	in	front	of	the	film	cameras,	or	both.		The	gestures	might	be	interpreted	as	symptomatic	of	the	unease	of	an	untrained	and	inexperienced	performer	who	has	been	thrust	into	performance.		They	might	be	read	as	her	resistance	to	performing	or	her	refusal	to	perform	as	required.		I	will	argue	that	her	framing	within	the	film	causes	the	viewer	to	question	her	agency	in	the	performance	and	it	opens	up	other	possibilities	of	spectatorial	response	to	her	aberrant	or	unusual	movement.			The	camera	focuses	on	her	face	at	the	end	of	her	spoken	words,	on	her	now	unsmiling	face	looking	to	the	right,	out	front,	to	the	left.	The	camera	seems	to	stay	on	her	face	longer	than	is	‘necessary’	according	to	Hollywood	cinematic	conventions	-	as	in	‘necessary’	to	show	us	the	speaker	for	the	duration	of	her	playing	of	her	part,	of	her	recital	of	her	lines	of	dialogue.	This	lingering	gaze	of	the	camera	encourages	the	viewer	to	take	another	look	or	a	longer	look.	It		provokes	a	questioning	in	the	viewer	of	what	it	is	they	are	seeing.		The	lingering	of	the	gaze	is	perhaps	long	enough	that	her	actions	-	her	mistakes	and	her	misperformances	-	stop	being	‘cute’	and	become	concerning,	provoking	anxiety	or	unease	in	the	viewer.		In	these	brief	moments	of	an	encounter	with	her	incapacity	–	or	her	perceived	incapacity	-	the	voice,	the	body	and	the	face	become	sites	of	multiple	interpretations,	a	confusion	and	profusion	of	readings	and	potential	missed	readings	and	over-readings.		Her	incapacity	–	or	her	perceived	incapacity	–	provokes	a	surplus	of	interpretation	that	ultimately	reveals	a	kind	of	incapacity	underlying	interpretation.		When	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	are	involved	in	theatrical	performance	there	is	a	desire	in	the	assumed	non-disabled	observer	to	recuperate	the	lack	that	they	represent,	a	desire	to	recuperate	the	
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idea	of	cognitive	disability	with	a	kind	of	interpretative	surplus	in	cognitive	terms.		This	often	results	in	cognitive	dissonance.			This	dissonance	is	evident	in	the	contradictory	desire	both	to	hold	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	off	as	the	Other	while	at	the	same	time	wanting	to	assimilate	their	Otherness.	Such	people	or,	more	accurately,	what	such	people	represent,	become	equated	with	the	Lacanian	Real,	which,	as	Žižek	delineates	it	in	The	Sublime	Object	of	Ideology:	is	not	a	transcendent	positive	entity,	persisting	somewhere	beyond	the	symbolic	order	like	a	hard	kernel	inaccessible	to	it,	some	kind	of	Kantian	‘Thing-in-itself’	–	in	itself	it	is	nothing	at	all,	just	a	void,	an	emptiness	in	a	central	structure	marking	some	central	impossibility	.		.		.	(173)	So	if	I	am	looking	for	the	Real	in,	or	the	reality	of,	intellectual	disability	in	the	voice	or	the	bodily	gestures	or	the	face	I	am	chasing	an	impossibility.	As	Timothy	Murray	articulates	in	the	Introduction	to	Repossessions:	Psychoanalysis	and	the	
Phantasms	of	Early	Modern	Culture:	The	Real	signifies,	in	this	context,	an	impossibility	of	the	confident,	cognitive	recuperation	of	the	Other	on	either	the	visual	plane	of	the	Imaginary	or	the	linguistic	register	of	the	Symbolic.	(xv)	What	will	become	readable	or	visible	in	this	impossible	pursuit	will	be	relational	modalities,	social	relations	in	which	I	am	also	always	already	implicated.			If	I	posit	myself	as	a	sort	of	Cartesian	viewer:	I	am	the	viewing	subject	and	the	African	American	girl	and	her	performance	are	the	object	of	study	or	scrutiny,		then	I	will	fail	to	see	how	her	performance	also	scrutinizes	or	reads	me.	When	I	posit	myself	viewing	the	performance	of	the	African	American	girl,	I	am	implicated	in	an	even	earlier	philosophical	underpinning	of	this	act	of	spectating.			I	am	holding	up	some	imagined,	intended,	Platonic	ideal	version	of	what	she	is	saying	and	playing.	Do	I	somehow	measure	and	judge	her	performance	against	that	idealized	one?	Is	this	aesthetic	judgment	implicated	in	a	wider	judgment	of	
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her	behavior?		Given	that	I	know	this	play	is	meant	to	be	taking	place	in	a	training	institution	for	the	‘mentally	retarded,’	am	I,	the	presumed	able	viewer,	likewise	aware	of	the	phantasm	of	‘normal’	behaviour	and	thus	alert	to	any	differences	or	arresting	variations	in	her	demeanour	or	actions?	Am	I	waiting	to	recognize	signs	and	indicators	of	‘mental	retardation?’	Is	my	spectatorial	gaze	already	implicated	with	a	diagnostic,	voyeuristic	or	even	teratological	gaze?			To	provide	an	immediate	context,	the	girl’s	performance	is	framed	not	only	within	a	naïve	theatrical	narrative,	akin	to	that	of	a	primary	school	nativity	play,	but	also	within	what	Goffman	has	termed	an	‘institutional	theatrical’	(Asylums	99-100),	a	ceremonial	performance	in	the	life	of	a	‘total	institution’	designed	to	display	the	social	efficacy	and	ethical	probity	of	that	institution.		Because	of	these	frameworks	of	‘school	nativity	play’	and	‘institutional	theatrical’	our	expectations	of	the	performance	will	presumably	not	question	the	representational	verisimilitude	of	an	African	American	female	settler	amongst	the	Pilgrim	Fathers	in	seventeenth	century	New	England,	just	as	we	will	presumably	accept	the	naivety	of	the	stage	setting,	the	costuming	and	the	musical	accompaniment	of	a	poorly	tuned	piano.		What	of	the	girl’s	‘performance’	as	‘acting’?	If	we	consider	her	delivery	of	the	spoken	text	in	terms	of	the	conventions	of	naturalistic	acting,	which	is,	after	all,	the	representational	currency	of	the	rest	of	the	film,	then	her	performance	is	problematic.		The	tenets	of	naturalistic	acting,	of	even	a	rudimentary	kind,	would	prescribe	that	there	should	be	some	sort	of	qualitative	difference	between	expressing	hunger	(“I’m	hungry	too”)	and	expressing	hope	(“I	hope	there’ll	be	lots	of	food	.	.	.”)	which	would	need	to	be	marked	by	some	change	in	the	voice,	through	a	variation	in	tone	or	pitch,	variations	which	are	singularly	absent	in	the	
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girl’s	performance.		Likewise,	the	girl’s	smiling	throughout	all	her	lines	would	not	be	deemed	to	be	appropriate	to	communicating	either	the	assumed	feelings	or	the	‘objectives’	of	the	character	of	the	Early	Settler.		These	factors,	in	combination	with	the	words	that	the	girl	speaks	that	are	lost	to	intelligibility,	would	seem	to	indicate	the	girl’s	‘bad	acting’	or	her	failure	to	act	within	the	terms	and	conventions	of	the	theatrical	performance	in	which	she	is	participating.		Judged	on	these	terms	her	performance	is	a	failure,	or	manifests	a	lack	of	acting	ability.			Her	‘excess’	gestures,	movements	and	stares	after	she	has	finished	speaking	could	be	read	as	evidence	of	awkwardness	in	the	gaze	of	the	audience.	These	elements	of	her	performance	could	also,	however,	be	put	together	with	her	affectless	tone,	her	inappropriate	smiling	and	her	unintelligibility	as	evidence	of	her	‘mental	retardation.’		Is	her	performance	then	to	be	viewed	as	that	of	an	inexperienced	actor,	a	childish	actor,	a	‘mentally	retarded’	actor,	or	some	combination	of	all	three?		To	address	one	aspect	of	this	question	it	is	instructive	to	focus	for	a	moment	on	the	girl’s	stares.	In	Staring:	How	We	Look,	Rosemarie	Garland	Thomson	discusses	the	‘blank	stare’	in	relation	to	people	with	certain	disabilities:	The	visual	comportment	of	people	with	significant	disabilities	–	often	those	with	cognitive,	developmental,	or	perceptual	impairments	–	catalog	them	as	blank	starers.		The	supposed	dumb	look,	blind	eye,	and	idiotic	expression	are	highly	stigmatized	ways	of	appearing	that	draw	interrogative	stares	from	those	who	are	properly	focused.		This	type	of	purportedly	empty	stare	demands	no	response,	inititiates	no	interchange,	and	produces	no	knowledge.		Blank	stares	function,	then,	as	visual	impotence		.	.	.	(23)	
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This	would	suggest	a	reading	of	the	girl’s	stares	as	indicators	of	her	alienation	or	lack	of	agency:	the	eyes	as	mirrors	of	the	soul	incapacitated.		Garland-Thomson’s	analysis,	however	is	abstracted	from	a	range	of	possible	encounters	in	the	social	sphere	and	may	need	to	be	modified	to	take	account	of	the	specific	context	of	theatrical	performance.	Is	a	blank	stare	still	‘visual	impotence’	if	framed	within	a	theatrical	performance	where	an	audience	is	more	inclined	to	give	some	kind	of	response?		Given	her	position	on	the	stage,	in	the	theatron	or	place	of	looking,	what	else	might	be	at	stake	in	her	movements	and	her	stares?	A	more	radical	reading	of	how	we	see	the	young	girl’s	performance,	and	how	we	respond	to	her	stares	in	response	to	the	audience	gaze,	is	suggested	in	Peggy	Phelan’s	Unmarked:	The	
Politics	of	Performance:	one	always	locates	one’s	own	image	in	an	image	of	the	other	and,	one	always	locates	the	other	in	one’s	own	image.	(19)	We	engage	her	with	our	gaze	and	we	look	to	her	for	evidence	of	ourselves	but	are	met	with	her	unengaged	gaze:	we	look	in	a	mirror	in	which	our	own	‘visual	impotence’	is	reflected	back	at	us.		How	is	the	‘we’	of	an	audience	composed	in	looking	at	an	actor	in	performance	and	how	is	the	‘we’	of	supposedly	‘able’	viewers	composed	-	or	discomposed		-	in	looking	at	a	‘mentally	retarded’	person?			At	a	number	of	points	in	the	seven	and	a	half	minute	sequence,	the	film	encourages	us	to	question	what	it	is	that	we	are	seeing	and	feeling	-	and	questions	who	‘we’	are.		To	go	back	to	the	shots	of	the	African	American	girl,	the	fact	that	the	camera	stays	on	her	longer	than	is	necessary	to	communicate	her	short,	three	line	participation	in	the	Thanksgiving	Play	suggests	to	the	viewer	that	there	is	a	certain	‘presence’	of	this	
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young	woman	that	is	potentially	more	interesting	than	her	participation	in	the	Thanksgiving	play.			Her	presence	is	a	kind	of	‘punctum’	(Barthes’	Camera	Lucida,	(27))	as		Matt	Hargrave	applies	this	term	to	disability	performance	as	‘tear	marks	in	the	fabric	of	performance’	in	“Pure	Products	Go	Crazy”		(41)	that	go	against	the	grain	of	the	‘studium’	of	the	various	homogeneous	Hollywood	narratives	of	the	film.	These	narratives	of	the	film’s	studium	include:	the	reconciliation	of	the	father	and	the	child	of	the	title,	the	healing	of	wounds	in	the	social	bond	provoked	by	the	social	issue	of	‘mental	retardation’,	the	efficacy	of	training	institutions	for	the	‘mentally	retarded’	and	the	making	visible	of	the	‘mentally	retarded’	in	ways	that	are	deemed	ethically	sound	and	aesthetically	tasteful	in	the	judgments	of	the	time.		Other	possibilities	open	up	in	this	‘punctum’	of	excess	and	obtuse	meaning.	Are	we	attracted	to	her	‘presence’	because	it	speaks	of	a	deeper	absence	in	her?	–	or	in	us?	Underlying	all	of	these	questions,	of	course,	is	the	question	of	who	the	‘we’	is	in	all	this.			Are	‘we’	assumed	to	be	in	the	discourse	of	Disability	Studies	an	‘abled’	or	‘normate’	(Garland	Thomson	Freakery	8)	audience?		Are	‘we’	imagined	to	be	autonomous	subjects	or	constructed	subjectivities?		This	questioning	in	turn	is	part	of	a	much	wider	context	of	what	the	relationship	is	between	theatrical	performance	and	audience.		Does	an	audience	read	a	performance	(a	semiotic	reading),	feel	a	performance	(a	broadly	phenomenological	reading),	participate	in	the	autopoetic	feedback	loop	of	performance	(pace	Fischer-Lichte	in	The	Transformative	Power	of	Performance	(47)),	or	are	all	participants	in	a	performance	parts	of	an	assemblage	in	which	the	transmission	of	affects	takes	place	in	a	rhizomatic,	Deleuzian	model	of	performance	and	reception	that	is	
	 45	
explored	in	Deleuze	and	Performance	and	Laura	Cull’s	Theatres	of	Immanence?	All	of	these	questions	are	themselves	implicated	in	an	investigation	of	the	aesthetic	and	political	efficacy	of	theatrical	performance.		From	the	outset,	the	Thanksgiving	play	is	disrupted	by	the	presence	of	‘the	children’.		The	play	opens,	the	curtain	draws	back	and	the	audience	is	presented	with	a	tableau	of	Early	Settlers	sat	around	a	table,	facing	the	audience:	a	moment	of	stasis,	an	invitation	to	the	contemplative	gaze,	a	stylization	aspiring	to	the	condition	of	a	framed	painting	–	but	this	moment	is	immediately	disrupted	by	one	of	the	boys	taking	off	and	playing	with	his	hat,	and	by	another	joining	in	from	the	stage	the	audience	applause	that	greets	the	intended	tableau.	Petra	Kuppers	in	Disability	and	Contemporary	Performance:	Bodies	on	Edge	refers	to	the	challenging	of	the	‘complacency	of	the	frame’	(3)	that	gives	a	sense	of	the	disruption	the	presence	of	these	young	people	with	disabilities	brings	to	a	viewer’s	clear	and	unproblematic	gaze	at	a	theatrical	narrative.			When	the	applause	stops	there	is	a	silence	as	all	wait	for	the	performance	to	begin.	There	is	a	pause.	It	lasts	longer	than	audience	expectation.	The	next	shot	shows	Jean	Hansen,	the	music	teacher,	played	by	Judy	Garland,	at	the	side	of	the	stage,	script	in	hand.		She	forcefully	whispers	a	prompt,	“I’m	hungry.”	The	next	shot	returns	to	the	boy	who	was	playing	with	his	hat,	the	intended	recipient	of	the	prompt.		He	looks	straight	ahead.		We	hear	the	prompt	repeated.		Another	boy	at	first	nudges	him	and	then	grabs	him	by	the	chin	and	turns	his	head	to	indicate	he	should	speak.		The	prompt	is	repeated	for	a	third	time.		The	boy	whose	chin	is	being	held	eventually	says,	“Hungry.”		The	performance	of	the	play	is	not	working:	this	is	incapacitated	theatre.	What	possible	responses	emerge	from	this	incapacity?		It	is	possible	to	interpret	
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this	‘not	working’	in	a	number	of	different	ways.		The	failure	indicated	by	the	repeated	prompting	could	be	an	indication	of	the	inability	of	one	of	the	performers	to	remember	lines	of	text,	the	rules	of	cueing	or	turn-taking.		It	is	also	possible	to	interpret	the	failure	as	the	inability	of	the	teacher-director	to	give	a	task	that	is	manageable	to	a	particular	actor,	as	clearly	someone	else	on	stage	knows	what	is	meant	to	be	happening.	It	is	possible	to	interpret	it	as	the	teacher-director’s	failure	to	engage	the	performer	in	the	process,	and,	therefore,	of	the	disablement	of	the	performer	by	the	process.		Within	A	Child	is	Waiting	there	are	two	levels,	at	least,	of	conventional,	dramatic	performance.			The	first	is	that	of	the	residents	of	the	fictional	Crawthorne	State	Training	School	performing	as	Early	Settlers,	in	which	representational	mode	the	boy’s	performance	might	be	deemed	a	failure.		Underlying	that,	though,	is	the	performance	of	the	residents	of	the	Pacific	State	Hospital	in	Pomona	as	the	residents	of	Crawthorne	State	Training	School,	in	which	quite	a	sophisticated	and	elaborate	cinematic	presentation	of	failed	performance	or	mis-performance	successfully	takes	place.	Even	if	judged	in	terms	of	conventional,	naturalistic	acting	skills,	this	mis-performance	is	itself	still	highly	effectively	and	convincingly	performed	by	a	cast	of	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities.		The	film	takes	care	to	show	us	the	audience	responses	to	the	performance	at	the	time	of	the	event.		The	audience,	composed	of	staff,	other	residents	and	family,	is	shown	to	be	highly	supportive	of	the	cast	up	on	stage.		The	film	shows	us	that	the	audience	are	indulgent	of	errors	and,	indeed,	apt	to	enjoy	such	errors	and	to	laugh	along	with,	rather	than	at,	the	performers’	mistakes.			The	audience’s	expectations	of	the	performers’	technical	virtuosity	is	low	but	their	
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expectations	of	the	performers’	commitment	to,	and	enjoyment	of	their	participation	is	high.		The	audience	appreciates	that	the	residents	of	the	institution	are	being	gainfully	occupied	and	that,	for	the	duration	of	the	performance	at	least,	a	kind	of	community	in	performance	will	be	established	which	will	include	people	normally	excluded	from	the	wider	community.		After	the	sequence	of	the	African	American	girl,	the	Thanksgiving	Play	continues	with	a	shot	opening	out	from	a	focus	on	her	to	reveal	one	of	the	boys	standing	at	the	table	behind	her,	his	eyes	cast	down,	rocking	back	and	forth	on	his	feet.		Another	boy	points	at	him	to	indicate	it	is	his	turn	to	speak.		He	says,	“I’m	pleased	that	.	.	.”	A	boy	standing	beside	him,	rocking	from	side	to	side,	prompts	him	with	the	line,	“…today.”		He	continues,	“today…”	then	“have…”	and	another	hesitation.		Another	boy	puts	one	hand	under	the	chin	of	the	speaker	to	lift	his	head,	and,	with	his	other	hand,	directs	the	speaker’s	eyes	and	what	he	is	saying	toward	the	audience.		The	boy	whose	turn	it	is	to	speak	says	“today”	again.	The	shot	switches	to	Jean	Hansen,	the	music	teacher.			She	mouths	a	word	and	then	rapidly	prompts	him,	loudly	stage	whispering	the	words	“A	little	piece	of	turkey”.		The	boy	says	“a	piece	of	TURKEY!”	-	with	a	strong	emphasis	on	the	last	word	and	at	the	conclusion	of	this	line	purses	his	lips	firmly	and	looks	out	at	the	audience.		He	then	lifts	his	hat	off	his	head	and	slams	it	down	on	the	table	and	looks	toward	the	boy	who	had	previously	lifted	up	his	chin,	who	also	slams	down	his	hat	on	the	table	and	they	confront	each	other.		The	audience	in	the	institution	laughs.		What	the	actors	are	doing	in	terms	of	conventional	naturalistic	theatre	is	‘dropping	out	of	character.’		What	the	film	encourages	the	viewer	to	consider,	though,	is	what	emerges	from	this	‘dropping	out’	:	that	the	two	boys	are	resisting	
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representational	narrative	and	character	and	reintroducing	‘play’	into	the	performance	of	the	Thanksgiving	play.		At	this	point	the	camera	shows	us	the	main	body	of	the	audience	laughing,	then	focuses	on	an	older	female	resident,	the	piano	player	(the	film	has	previously	informed	us	that	she	is	twenty	eight)	who	is	smiling,	and,	behind	her,	two	of	the	female	staff	of	the	institution	who	also	laugh	at	the	unscripted	actions	of	the	two	boys.		At	one	moment	in	the	ensuing	chaos	a	young	male	performer	onstage	turns	to	the	audience	and	asks,	as	he	smiles	broadly	and	breaks	into	laughter	himself:	“What	are	you	laughing	at?”	At	this	time,	the	visible	or	palpable	strain	of	all	concerned	–	the	performers,	the	struggling,	prompting	music	teacher,	the	audience	-	to	try	to	keep	the	learnt	and	pre-planned	performance	‘together’	breaks	down.		The	fictional	audience	in	the	institution	and	the	viewers	of	the	film	are	both	disarmed	and	relieved	by	these	moments	of	the	breakdown	of	representational	theatre,	a	breakdown	that	has	the	potential	to	release	powerful,	if	unintended,	affects	and	energies.	In	Stage	Fright,	Animals	and	Other	Theatrical	
Problems,	Nicholas	Ridout	characterizes	these	moments	as:	.	.	.the	apparently	marginal	or	unwanted	events	of	the	theatrical	encounter,	that	will	turn	out,	of	course,	to	be	somehow	vital	to	it:	stage	fright;	embarrassment;	animals;	the	giggles;	failure	in	general.	(14)	What	is	interesting	about	these	specific	moments	of	breakdown	of	the	naïve	theatrical	narrative	is	that	it	is	difficult	to	ascribe	agency	as	to	how	these	breakdowns	occur.	Does	the	Thanksgiving	play	break	down	because	the	performers	are	incapable	of	following	the	agreed,	scripted,	of	events	in	the	play	or	are	they,	for	whatever	reason,	deliberately	resisting	this	sequence	and	going	off-script,	or	is	there	somewhere	else	along	the	continuum	between	incapability	
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and	conscious	choice,	in	a	complicity	of	performers	and	audience,	that	agency	might	be	ascribed?			 There	is	more	general	laughter	subsequently	at	the	premature	arrival	of	a	group	of	Red	Indians	onstage	that	sets	in	motion	a	panic	backstage.	The	music	teacher	and	another	teacher	try	to	get	the	production	back	on	track.		They	hurriedly	shepherd	another	older	boy	dressed	as	a	Puritan	Settler	and	a	group	of	Indians	through	the	onstage	door,	handing	them	their	props	before	they	make	their	entrances	and	urging	them	to	‘remember	their	lines’.		The	older	boy	opens	the	onstage	door,	he	introduces	the	Indian	Chiefs	by	name	as	they	come	through	the	door.			The	next	shot	switches	to	close-ups	of	the	performers,	who	are	dressed	in	headdresses	and	warpaint,	carrying	bows	and	arrows,	making	their	way	in	Indian	file	behind	the	onstage	windows	to	make	their	entrances.		While	one	of	the	boys	waits	in	line,	his	mouth	opens	and	his	arms	jerk	in	spasmodic	movements.		The	others	look	out	at	the	audience,	some	warily,	some	searching	for	the	faces	of	their	family,	some	staring	blankly.		The	gaudy	warpaint	and	elaborate	headdresses	only	seem	to	highlight	the	varying	degrees	of	the	children’s	non-engagement	in,	or	alienation	from,	the	conventional	theatricality	of	characterization	and	costuming.		Their	incapacity	to	inhabit	their	costume	or	the	conventional	drama	renders	their	behavior	visually	compelling	and,	possibly,	disturbing.			After	the	entrance	of	the	Indians	the	camera	switches	back	to	a	wider	perspective	taking	in	the	whole	stage.		The	onstage	narrative	then	appears	to	find	some	of	its	intended	flow.	Lines	are	spoken	in	sequence	and	on	cue.		A	boy	dressed	as	an	Indian,	seated	on	stage,	his	eyes	shining,	uplit	from	the	footlights,	
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and	his	voice	breathy	and	seemingly	inspired,	speaks	of	the	gifts	of	the	earth	they	are	thankful	for,	and	this	alignment	of	visual	and	auditory	indicators	of	his	engagement	makes	it	seem	as	if	he	really	means	what	he	is	saying.		During	his	speech	there	is	an	intercut	to	the	music	teacher,	the	director	of	the	play,	but	this	time	she	is	smiling,	her	head	nodding	in	approval	as	she	urges	on	his	intended	progress	from	the	side	of	the	stage.	The	staged	performance	then	steps	out	of	the	historical	Settler/Indian	narrative	framework.		The	older	boy	who	introduced	the	chiefs	invokes	those	on	stage	to:	“Show	them	what	you	have	made”	The	next	sequence	is	filmed	from	just	behind	the	shoulders	of	the	performers	onstage,	from	their	point	of	view,	looking	into	the	audience	as	Indian	and	Settler	alike	each	holds	up	the	object	they	refer	to:	“I	made	a	shoebox”,	“I	made	these	beads”,	“I	made	this	place	mat”,	“I	made	this	basket.”	Each	individual	display	is	greeted	with	applause	by	the	audience	as	the	Thanksgiving	Play	narrative	is	temporarily	suspended	to	facilitate	the	display	of	goods	or	products	the	residents	of	the	training	institution	have	made	in	their	occupational	therapy	classes.	This	allows	the	audience	of	the	institution	itself	and	families	and	friends	to	acknowledge	and	applaud	this	useful	employment.	There	is	an	interesting	tension	in	this	sequence	between,	on	the	one	hand,	the	display	of	another	type	of	performance	by	the	residents,	the	performance	of	social	and	economic	usefulness,	performance	as	the	‘performance	principle’	of	Marcuse	(35),	and,	on	the	other	hand,	the	switch	in	the	camera’s	perspective	to	the	point	of	view	of	‘the	children.’		This	switch	in	perspective	could	be	inviting	
sympathy	from	the	cinematic	audience:	put	yourselves	in	the	place	of	the	‘mentally	retarded’	children,	take	a	moment	to	see	things	from	their	point	of	
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view,	they	are	like	you,	the	assumed	able	audience,	they	labour	and	make	things	and	achieve	things	according	to	the	performance	principle.	More	radically,	it	could	be	inviting	empathy:	you	the	assumed	able,	non-institutionalized	audience	are	already	in	the	position	of	the	‘mentally	retarded’	children,	your	alienated	labour	is	of	a	kind	with	the	basket	weaving	of	the	institutionalized	children,	you	
are	like	them,	alienated	labour	is	what	you	have	in	common.			At	this	point	there	is	another	shift	in	the	narrative	strategy	of	the	film,	back	to	the	central	family	story,	a	variant	on	the	Abraham/Isaac	myth,	a	tale	of	the	conflicts	of	the	generation	gap	typical	of	that	period	of	Hollywood	cinema,	but	with	an	added	twist	of	the	spreading	of	the	guilt	of	‘mental	retardation.’		At	the	back	of	the	auditorium	the	camera	shows	the	arrival	of	Ted	Widdicombe,	the	father	of	Reuben,	the	largely	non-verbal,	‘autistic’	boy	who	is	the	central	child	character	of	the	film.		Reuben,	named	after	the	eldest	son	of	the	patriarch	Jacob,	an	eldest	son	denied	his	birthright	(in	favour	of	his	younger	brother,	Joseph),	Reuben	from	the	Hebrew	‘Reu’	meaning	look	or	see	and	‘ben’	meaning	son.		Reuben’s	arrival	at	the	institution	opens	the	film	and	in	some	ways	he	is	the	‘child’	of	the	film’s	title.		Reuben’s	father	goes	up	to	where	Dr	Clark,	the	director	of	the	institution,	played	by	Burt	Lancaster,	is	sitting	watching	the	play.		With	knowledge	from	the	scene	immediately	prior	to	this	one	the	viewer	knows	that	the	father’s	intention	is	to	withdraw	Reuben	from	Crawthorne,	with	its	emphasis	on	training	and	education	and	communal	living,	to	place	him	in	another	more	costly	institution	where	he	will	receive	more	‘support’	but	be	more	isolated	and	dependent	and	where	a	lot	less	will	be	expected	of	him.		The	father	asks	Dr	Clark	where	Reuben	is	and	receives	the	reply:	“He’s	up	there	on	stage.		He’s	one	of	the	Indians.”		
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The	play	on	stage	has	been	continuing	in	the	background	while	the	two	men	have	been	talking	and	after	Dr	Clark	answers	the	father’s	question	we	hear	the	sound	of	some	chords	on	the	out	of	tune	piano	and	the	camera	then	switches	to	a	close-up	of	Reuben	seated	onstage	in	his	Indian	costume.		This	is	followed	by	a	matchshot	of	a	close-up	of	Reuben’s	father	who	leans	forward	to	get	a	really	good	look	at	him,	and	then	back	to	a	close-up	of	Reuben	and	then	back	to	the	father	again.	Reuben	looks	out	straight	ahead;	does	he	see	his	father	or	is	this	another	blank	stare?	Another	Indian	whispers	in	Reuben’s	ear	that	it	is	time	for	him	to	perform.		Reuben	gently	and	falteringly	begins	to	recite	a	poem	during	which	the	camera	intercuts	to	his	father’s	face.		He	pauses.		The	boy	behind	him	whispers	in	his	ear	to	prompt	him.		Reuben	continues	to	recite	in	a	voice	that	sounds	unused	to	forming	words,	but	seems	to	be	growing	in	confidence	by	the	moment.		We	then	see	Jean	Hansen,	the	teacher	with	whom,	after	initial	difficulties,	he	has	established	a	special	rapport,	mouthing	along	to	the	words	he	is	reciting,	words	that	she	has	put	in	his	mouth	and	drilled	him	to	recite.		Her	eyes	are	moist.		He	is	on	his	own	now	and	apart	from	one	prompt	from	the	music	teacher	he	makes	it	through	to	the	end.		When	he	does	we	see	one	of	the	residents	in	the	audience	smiling	and	shouting,	out	of	turn,	“Yeah!”	in	the	beat	before	the	whole	audience	bursts	into	applause.		This	applause	is	intercut	with	a	close-up	of	Jean	Hansen	smiling	and	on	the	verge	of	tears.		It	is	then	intercut	with	a	shot	of	Reuben’s	father’s	amazed	gaze	as	he	subsides	into	his	seat.		This	is	the	climactic	moment	of	the	foreground	or	central	narrative	of	the	film,	the	moment	of	reconciliation	of	father	and	son.		This	father,	a	kind	of	Abraham,	wields	the	power	of	institutional	life	or	death	over	the	disabled	son,	but	through	the	power	of	theatrical	performance	he	can	now	see	and	acknowledge	Reuben	not	as	a	
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source	of	shame	or	somebody	who	is	dead	to	him,	but	as	more	of	an	image	of	himself,	somebody	he	might	look	upon	as	his	son:	Reu	ben,	albeit	a	son,	like	the	Biblical	one,	denied	his	birthright.				The	whole	cast	then	join	in	a	rendition	of	‘Snowflakes’,	a	song	that	in	a	previous	scene	they	had	been	trying	and	struggling	to	learn	under	the	instruction	of	Jean	Hansen,	the	music	teacher.		Their	singing	has	not	recognizably	improved	from	the	previous	scene	-	it	is	still	out	of	tune	and	harsh	–	but	they	get	the	words	out	more	or	less	on	time	and	they	sing	with	great	commitment.		The	affective	charge	of	the	music	and	the	performers’	efforts	are	reflected	in	the	reaction	shots	of	audience	members	with	their	smiles,	moist	eyes	and	sympathetic	nodding	and	marking	of	the	beat.		We	can	hear,	cutting	through	the	cacophony,	Judy	Garland’s	trained	but	emotional	voice	trying	to	provide	support,	to	guide	pitching	and	to	keep	the	group	to	tempo,	but	her	efforts	do	not	meet	with	much	success.		The	moment	stands	out	because	of	the	tension	between	the	trained,	experienced,	emotionally	expressive	singing	voice	of	Judy	Garland	and	the	flat,	out	of	tune,	affectless	voices	of	‘the	children.’	It	stands	out	because	Jean	Hansen’s,	or	Judy	Garland’s,	reactions	as	the	teacher	are	so	ambivalent.		It	is	her	face	we	keep	seeing	during	and	after	the	singing,	her	expressions	suggesting	a	mixture	of	both	compassion	and	frustration	at	the	children’s	performance.	We	have	previously	seen	Jean	Hansen	note	bashing	and	teaching	the	song	by	means	of	demanding	the	children	repeat	what	she	sings.		This	is	something	that,	understandably,	they	are	singularly	incapable	of	doing.	The	moment	also	stands	out	because	it	so	emphatically	goes	against	and	disrupts	the	expected	linear	narrative	progression	of	Hollywood	cinematic	representations	of	theatrical	
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performance:	from	the	struggles	of	rehearsal	to	the	success	and	joy	of	performance.		This	is	one	of	the	counter-narratives	the	resistant	presence	of	‘the	children’	generates,	counter	to	the	central	narrative,	which	is	one	of	optimism	and	belief	in	the	efficacy	and	progress	of	the	treatment	of	‘the	children’.			In	the	immediate	context	of	the	film	this	particular	scene	of	musical	performance	is	highly	ambivalent	with	regard	to	one	of	the	fundamental	premises	of	the	central	narrative	of	Reuben’s	story:	that	he	is	‘better	off’:	more	gainfully	or	usefully	employed	or	occupied	in	Crawthorne	State	Training	School	than	elsewhere,	better	off	than	at	the	other	expensive	‘warehouse’	institution	his	father	proposes	where	his	physical	needs	will	be	taken	care	of,	but	where	so	much	less	will	be	expected	of	him.		If	this	singing	is	a	display	of	the	efficacy	of	the	institution	in	performance	then	what	is	to	be	made	of	the	fact	that	the	singing	is	so	bad,	so	difficult	to	listen	to	that	the	viewer	is	flinching	along	with	Jean	Hansen/Judy	Garland?			The	group	singing	of	Snowflakes	that	concludes	the	Thanksgiving	Play	despite,	or	perhaps	because	of,	its	lack	of	technical	proficiency,	does,	however,	carry	a	powerful	affective	charge.	It	achieves	this	affective	power	in	terms	of	a	‘theatre’	that	has	been	characterized	by	Ridout	as	one	which:	.	.	.	conceives	itself	as	an	apparatus	for	the	production	of	affect	by	means	of	representation,	in	the	expectation	that	the	most	powerful	affects	will	be	obtained	at	precisely	those	moments	when	the	machinery	appears	to	break	down.		(Stage	Fright	168)	As	a	viewer	or	listener	we	hear	the	song,	the	melody	of	which	is	carried	by	Judy	Garland’s	voice	somewhere	there	in	the	mix.		We	appreciate	the	efforts	of	‘the	children’	to	commit	to	the	singing.	There	is	a	coming	together	of	sorts,	it	is	not	fluent	and	harmonious,	but	rather	precarious	and	fragile.		In	addition	to	this	we	
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come	to	recognize	that	there	are	more	ways	of	viewing	this	scene	than	as	one	of	people	singing	and	not	hitting	the	right	notes.		The	failure	of	one	type	of	performance	opens	up	possibilities	of	a	questioning	of	what	this	performance	is	hoping	to	achieve.		The	children’s	incapacity	to	sing	well	stands	out.		How	an	audience	might	deal	with	such	incapacity	is	a	crucial	question	that	will	be	explored	in	this	thesis.	As	the	narrative	proceeds,	doubt	or	ambivalence	as	to	the	efficacy	of	the	institution’s	arts	practices	implied	in	the	film’s	presentation	of	the	children’s	singing	is	swept	away	in	the	enthusiastic	applause	of	the	audience	in	the	institution.	This	response	will	be	familiar	to	anybody	participating	in	community	theatre	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		The	audience	show	their	appreciation	for	the	work	of	all	concerned,	regardless	of	the	skill	or	virtuosity	of	the	outcome.		The	Thanksgiving	Play	takes	place	within	a	segregated	community,	and	those	in	the	audience	who	are	not	part	of	this	segregated	community	are	in	all	likelihood	related	to	those	who	are.		The	‘mentally	retarded’	residents	make	theatre,	after	a	fashion,	and	by	doing	so	they	make	community,	after	a	fashion.		They	tell	a	story	that	everybody	already	knows,	a	naïve	Early	Settler	colonialist	narrative,	a	myth	of	the	origins	of	the	USA,	that	supposedly	connects	them	to	the	wider	community	outside	the	institution,	to	which	they	have,	for	all	practical	purposes,	no	connection.		Community	is	perhaps	always	a	myth,	a	myth	of	the	loss	of	a	previous	‘golden	age’	of	community	or	a	myth	of	a	community	to	come,	but	especially	so	here	within	a	segregated	simulacrum	of	community.		Along	the	way	there	have	been	times	when	the	performance	has	departed	from	the	intended	scripted	format	or	when	the	linear	progress	of	the	narrative	has	broken	down	in	singular	resistances,	detours	or	laughter,	but	as	Goffman,	in	
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Asylums:	Essays	on	the	Social	Situation	of	Mental	Patients	and	Other	Inmates,	noted	of	the	‘institutional	theatrical’	in	total	institutions:	The	very	tolerance	of	this	skittishness	is	a	sign	of	the	strength	of	the	establishment	state.	(109)	The	laughter	at	the	incapacity	of	the	theatrical	performance	in	A	Child	is	Waiting	is	clearly	shown	to	be	laughter	sanctioned	by	the	staff	and	the	institution.		The	performance	is	a	temporary	disruption	to	the	routine	and	the	regime	of	the	asylum.	Each	evening	after	the	filming	ended,	‘the	children’	left	the	fictional	Crawthorne	State	Training	Institute	and	went	back	to	the	Pacific	State	Hospital.			They	were	one-off	actors:	this	was	their	only	film	performance.		They	were,	in	all	probability,	one-off	actors	in	other	ways	as	well.		At	the	Pacific	State	Hospital	in	Pomona	and	in	other	parts	of	California	enforced	sterilization	of	the	‘mentally	enfeebled’	continued	until	the	mid-1960s.		In	fact	California	had	been	a	world	leader	in	this	field,	and	is	on	record	as	providing	inspiration	for	the	German	National	Socialist	programme	of	large-scale	eugenic	sterilization.	7	This	history	is	referred	to	later	in	the	film	in	a	crucial	scene	when	Dr	Clark	takes	Jean	Hansen	into	an	actual	locked	ward	for	adults	in	the	Pacific	State	Hospital.	This	is	the	adult	asylum	as	‘snake	pit’	8a	scene	that	resembles	Goya’s	Madhouse.	He	has	taken	her	there	after	an	argument	in	his	office	over	who	it	is	that	knows	how	the	children	feel,	a	strand	of	the	narrative	that	explores	the	conflict	between	the	supposedly	sentimental,	loving,	maternal	attitude	of	Jean	Hansen	to	Reuben,	versus	the	detached,	unemotional	professionalism	of	Dr	Clark.			He	makes	the	following	speech	as	they	walk	through	the	adult	locked	ward:																																																									7	See	for	example	Kline	and	Braslow.	8	The	1948	film	The	Snake	Pit	presented	a	vision	of	the	mental	hospital	as	nightmare.				
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There	are	your	Reuben	Widdicombes	twenty	years	from	now,	if	we’re	not	careful.	People	loved	them	too.	Some	of	them	were	sheltered	from	everything	till	they	came	here.		Others	treated	them	with	their	emotions,	they	locked	them	up	in	closets.		Some	were	sterilized	by	the	State,	they	used	to	sterilize	them	the	way	they	sterilize	cattle.		No	one	ever	needed	to	succeed	in	any	little	way	as	much	as	they	do.	(A	Child	is	Waiting)	He	both	accuses	her	of	over-emotionalizing	her	response	and	affirms	his	and	the	institution’s	commitment	to	the	performance	principle,	however	minimal	its	efficacy:	‘to	succeed	in	any	little	way.’		In	a	strange	turn	the	debate	over	personal	ethical	behavior	takes	place	within	the	framework	of	the	central,	nuclear	family	narrative	of	Reuben-Dr	Clark-Jean	Hansen	relegating	the	issue	of	the	eugenic	sterilization	of	the	‘mentally	enfeebled’	to	the	background	and	to	the	past	in	a	scene	filmed	within	an	institution	that	was	still	participating	in	that	practice.		At	the	conclusion	of	the	Thanksgiving	Play	as	we	hear	the	applause	for	the	group’s	singing	of	‘Snowflakes,’	the	camera	shows	the	reactions	of	one	of	the	boys:	he	screws	his	eyes	up	tight,	smiles	and	grips	his	hands	together,	his	fists	clenched.	He	bows	his	head	but	it	seems	to	be	not	so	much	in	a	return	of	the	acknowledgement	of	the	audience	applause	but	rather	suggestive	of	taking	the	feeling	of	validation	or	admiration	into	himself.		The	next	shot	shows	a	girl	blowing	a	kiss	towards	the	audience	but	then	immediately	covering	her	face	as	if	trying	to	erase	the	gesture.		We	see	another	girl,	seated	on	the	stage,	smiling	and	rocking	backwards	and	forwards,	her	eyes	not	looking	at	the	audience	but	up	to	the	ceiling,	her	mouth	open.	There	is	an	ambiguity	to	the	framing	of	these	shots	of	the	reactions	of	‘the	children’	to	the	applause,	their	actions	appear	to	be	of	a	somewhat	different	order	to	theatrical	conventions	of	the	curtain	call.	
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In	Stage	Fright,	Animals	and	Other	Theatrical	Problems,	Nicholas	Ridout	discusses	the	curtain	call	as	a	kind	of	liminal	part	of	the	performance	event	where	the	‘machinery	of	representation’	while	appearing	to	be	switched	off,	is	in	fact	‘just	winding	down	and	still	generating	sparks	of	representation.’	(162).		His	contention	is	that	the	audience,	by	applauding,	are	trying	to	recompose	the	economy	of	the	market	transaction,	in	which	they	have	paid	for	performance,	into	a	different	economy,	that	of	the	gift.		Perhaps	it	is	the	part	of	the	performance	where	the	audience	expects	to	see	performers	‘as	themselves’	but	what	their	applause	is	met	with	is	‘a	particular	kind	of	appearance,	certain	kinds	of	performance,	even.’	He	gives	the	following	example	of	this	kind	of	performance	of	the	curtain	call:		 The	actor	.	.	.	might	play	up	her	exhaustion,	tropes	of	self-deprecation	and			 modesty	may	be	deployed,	smiles	of	pleasure,	with	maybe	even	the	hint	of			 a	blush,	may	be	bestowed	upon	the	audience.	.	.	(164)	So	at	the	time	in	the	performance	when	the	audience	most	expects	to	see	the	actor	as	herself,	they	are	instead	given	another	performance,	the	actor	in	repose	after	labour,	supposedly	taking	off	the	mask	of	character,	but	in	fact	still	performing.			In	A	Child	is	Waiting	at	the	end	of	the	Thanksgiving	Play	we	do	in	fact	get	‘tropes	of	self-deprecation,	modesty,	smiles	and	the	hint	of	a	blush’	but	it	feels	different	to	the	professional	actor’s	playing	up	of	the	performance	of	the	curtain	call.		One	obvious	material	difference	is	that	the	professional	actor	is	being	paid	and	will	get	to	go	home,	whereas	this	is	not	the	case	for	the	actors	from	the	Pacific	State	Hospital.	This	may	be	a	contributory	factor	to	a	tendency	to	read	the	reactions	of	‘the	children’	to	the	applause	as	somehow	more	‘genuine’	and	‘authentic’:	they	really	appear	to	take	the	applause	to	heart	and	are	very	awkward	in	their	acknowledgement	of	the	audience’s	applause.			
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Another	possible	interpretation	is	that	they	are	not	authentically	just	‘being	themselves’	they	are	still	performing:	performing	‘cute.’		This	might	well	be	a	coping	strategy	in	the	face	of	repeated	infantilization.	‘The	children’	in	the	1963	film	A	Child	is	Waiting	are	clearly	explicitly	infantilized,	their	actual	ages	not	taken	into	account	so	much	as	their	mental	age,	based	on	the	now	discredited	Stanford-Binet	IQ	test.	This	infantilization	is	caught	up	in	a	desire	to	perceive	people	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	as	‘cute.’		In	“Cuteness	and	Commodity	Aesthetics,”	in	Freakery:	Cultural	Spectacles	of	the	Extraordinary	
Body	ed	Rosemarie	Garland	Thomson,	Lori	Merish	in	a	comparison	of	the	display	of	the	child	and	the	freak	in	early	twentieth	century	America	outlines	processes	of	exclusion	and	inclusion	inherent	in	the	display:	Cuteness	engenders	an	affectional	dynamic	through	which	the	Other	is	domesticated	and	(re)	contextualized	within	the	human	“family.”	(188)	She	characterizes	the	figure	of	the	cute	child	as:	The	cute	child,	unlike	the	Victorian	sacred	child,	is	pure	spectacle,	pure	display	.	.	.	(188)	and	isolates	what	is	crucially	missing	from	or	denied	to	the	displayed	figures	of	cuteness:	What	is	lost	in	this	idealization	of	the	cute	is	sexuality	and	the	danger	of	its	power:	what	is	lost	is	the	desire	of	the	Other,	absorbing	that	Otherness	into	the	logic	of	the	Same.	(188)	People	with	intellectual	disabilities	are	often	required	to	conform	to	this	trope	of	the	cute	child,	irrespective	of	their	chronological	age.		Infantilization	is	enacted	in	a	range	of	discourses	and	practices	of	patronization	through	which	such	people	become	the	objects	of	pity	or	sentimentalization,	which	as	Jung	characterized	it	in	“Ulysses:	A	Monologue”	is	a	displaced	form	of	violence:	‘Sentimentality	is	the	superstructure	erected	upon	brutality’	(7255).	
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Another	aspect	of	the	infantilization	of	people	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	emerges	in	The	New	Wounded:	From	Neurosis	to	Brain	
Damage	in	Catherine	Malabou’s	discussion	of	the	reversion	to	childhood	of	Alzheimer’s	patients:	another,	and	currently	increasingly	prevalent,	meaning	of	the	shifting	term	‘intellectual	disability’:	Even	if	Alzheimer’s	patients	seem	to	“fall	back	into	childhood”	it	would	still	be	possible	to	affirm	that	they	return	to	a	childhood	that	is	not	their	
own,	to	a	childhood	that	is	only	a	concept	of	childhood,	that	consists	in	a	set	of	stereotypical	gestures	and	postures	that	pertain	to	everyone’s	childhood	and	thus	to	no	one’s	childhood.	(61)	The	person	with	intellectual	disabilities	subject	to	infantilization	is	treated	as	if	they	inhabit	a	kind	of	generic	childhood,	which	is	not	a	regression	to	their	own	childhood	but	an	oppressive	holding	pattern	from	which,	even	if	they	have	by	now	escaped	sterilization,	they	may	never	be	allowed	to	emerge	into	active	sexuality.		At	the	end	of	the	Thanksgiving	Play,	immediately	after	the	curtain	call,	the	performers	are	reunited	with	families	and	loved	ones	as	actors	and	audience	intermingle.		Reuben’s	father	also	makes	moves	towards	physical	contact	with	his	son.		Even	though	it	seems	he	cannot	quite	bring	himself	to	do	so,	the	repeated	switching	of	the	camera’s	perspective	from	father	to	son,	underscored	with	a	soundtrack	of	sentimental,	swelling	strings,	leaves	the	viewer	in	little	doubt	that	the	performance	that	caused	the	father	literally	to	sit	up	and	take	notice	of	his	son	has	led	to	a	guarded	reconciliation.	This	reconciliation	is	a	fulfillment	of	the	film’s	narrative	arc	that	starts	with	Reuben’s	arrival	at	Crawthorne	in	the	back	of	his	father’s	car.	During	the	course	of	the	film	we	learn	that	Reuben’s	family’s	trauma	is	that	of	many	
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families.		We	see	the	tearful	guilt	of	parents	abandoning	their	children.		We	see	the	parents	on	family	days	giving	extra	money	to	staff	to	treat	their	child	just	a	little	better.		We	see	their	continuing	and	unabandoned	hope	to	see	some	improvement,	or	a	glimpse	of	a	cure	for	the	offspring	they	have	abandoned	to	the	institution.		If	the	child	could	only	attend	Mass	or	somehow	learn	their	catechism,	things	might	improve.		We	see	Dr	Clark	respond	by	dismissing	such	hopes	and	demands	of	the	parents	with	the	phrase	‘Oh,	the	pageant,	the	pageant!’	This	is	an	interesting	expression,	etymologically	of	a	theatrical	provenance,	but	suggestive	of	‘theatricality’	in	its	meaning	of	an	empty	show.		The	empty	show	Dr	Clark	refers	to	is,	in	effect,	the	performance	of	hope,	the	parents’	hope	against	hope.	This	is	a	performance	in	which	the	staff	of	the	institution	are	complicit.	Even	though	they	know	it	is	without	justification,	they	are	unwilling	to	dismiss	the	parents’	hope	or	to	reveal	the	emptiness	of	this	particular	show.		At	the	same	time	Dr	Clark	advocates	to	Jean	Hansen	that	whatever	can	be	done	to	educate	the	children	must	be	done,	regardless	of	what	little	effect	this	might	have.		He	seems	to	veer	between	a	commitment	to	the	performance	principle,	a	desire	to	change	and	educate,	and	a	mournful	acceptance	of	futility,	powerlessness	and	his	own	incapacity	as	doctor	and	teacher.			This	tension	in	Dr	Clark,	and	the	wider	social	and	ethical	malaise	of	which	it	is	indicative,	is	strikingly	exemplified	in	a	scene	in	an	art	class	in	which	Dr	Clark	inspects	the	therapeutic	artwork	of	the	children.		He	asks	them	questions	about	the	three	primary	colours,	how	to	combine	them	to	make	other	colours,	and	then	he	comes	across	Mike.		Mike	is	painting	intently,	applying	the	paintbrush	to	the	paper	with	great	purpose	and	deliberation,	getting	lost	in	the	flow	and	rhythm	of	his	actions.	He	seems	totally	absorbed	in	the	action	of	putting	
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brush	to	paper,	making	brushstrokes	of	varying	intensities,	creating	patterns.		The	camera	then	pulls	back	to	reveal	that	there	is	no	paint	on	either	the	brush	or	the	paper.		Mike	paints	on,	lost	in	the	action.		There	is	a	reaction	shot	of	Dr	Clark.		He	says	gently,	resignedly,	“That’s	very	good,	Mike”,	pats	him	on	the	shoulder,	and	walks	away.			This	moment	with	Mike	is	significant	in	a	number	of	ways.		It	is	part	of	the	ethical	message	of	the	film	that	says	that	what	is	important	is	that	something	is	being	done	for	these	children,	however	small,	however	limited.		This	is	encapsulated	in	the	concluding	line	of	Dr	Clark’s	speech	in	the	adult	asylum:	‘No	one	ever	needed	to	succeed	in	any	little	way	as	much	as	they	do.’	At	the	same	time	there	is	a	melancholia	and	sense	of	futility	in	the	scene	and	in	Dr	Clark’s	reaction.	Here	is	another	of	his	‘spectacular	failures’:	Mike	is	performing	painting,	but	no	paint	ever	touches	paper:	‘Oh	the	pageant,	the	pageant’	indeed.		This	is	the	melancholia	of	the	performance	principle	coming	up	against	an	image	of	its	own	ultimate	futility.		The	presence	and	intent	of	the	actor	and	Pacific	State	Hospital	resident	playing	Mike,	the	concentration	and	absorption	with	which	he	paints	is	compelling,	it	has	a	kind	of	aesthetic	appeal	that	yet	reveals	a	troubling	of	the	politics	of	how	to	view	him.		It	could	be	argued	that	while	the	Training	Institution’s	teaching	methods	might	have	sold	him	short,	in	terms	of	finding	ways	to	teach	him	how	to	paint,	he	has,	in	the	course	of	this	failed	process,	instead	learnt	how	to	develop	his	own	practice	of	movement	by	coming	at	‘painting’	on	his	own	terms	in	which	he	creates	movement	of	great	purpose,	absorption	and	grace.		A	reading	of	the	scene	as	an	example	of	the	melancholy	of	the	‘pageant’	of	succeeding	in	any	little	way	–	this	form	of	participation	in	the	art	
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class	is	the	best	that	we	can	hope	for	from	this	‘mentally	retarded	child’	–	is	in	tension	with	the	beauty	of	his	participation	on	his	own	terms	and	the	affective	power	of	the	image	of	somebody	lost	in	the	action	of	painting	without	paint.		There	is	of	course	something	very	Romantic	about	this	image,	recalling	Keats’	“Ode	on	a	Grecian	Urn”:	‘Heard	melodies	are	sweet,	but	those	unheard/Are	sweeter’	that	possibly	connects	it	with	another	trope	of	the	Romantic	imagination:	the	“Idiot	Boy”	of	Wordsworth.			Mike’s	distibctive	participation	is	either	evidence	of	his	incapacity	to	be	educated,	a	failure	to	measure	up,	or	of	the	incapacity	of	an	educational	system	that	does	not	suit	him	to	which	his	actions	are	resistance.		Where	does	Mike	go	in	this	strange	new	space	opened	up	by	his	actions,	what	space	does	Mike	inhabit	in	his	actions	of	painting	without	paint?	It	is	not	the	space	of	conventional	education:	he	is	not	learning	anything	in	his	actions	in	the	classroom,	it	is	not	a	space	of	gainful	labour,	his	actions	have	no	use	or	value	in	terms	of	exchange,	is	it	therefore,	the	‘useless’	space	of	art,	of	the	aesthetic?		The	scene	of	Mike	painting	stands	out	in	the	film,	stands	outside	the	film	and	reveals	the	difficulties	of	assigning	a	place	for	Mike	and	the	rest	of	‘the	children’	caught	in	a	discursive	and	conceptual	space	that	is	an	impasse.	To	explore	of	what	this	impasse	was	constituted	it	is	necessary	to	locate	the	film	within	its	specific	historical,	social	and	cultural	context.	Kramer	and	screenwriter	Abby	Mann	had	adapted	the	film	from	their	1957	CBS	television	production.		Kramer	stated	that	his	intention	for	both	the	television	programme	and	the	film	was	to:		
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throw	a	spotlight	on	a	dark-ages	type	of	social	thinking	which	has	tried	to	relegate	the	subject	of	retardation	to	a	place	under	the	rocks.	(Fishgall	213)	His	rhetoric	is	one	of	enlightenment,	based	on	a	narrative	of	historical	progress:	from	the	Dark	Ages	to	the	Enlightenment	of	modernity.	To	develop	the	logic	of	the	metaphors	he	uses,	the	spotlight	will	fall	on	that	which	will	emerge	from	under	the	rocks,	but	what	might	that	be?	Insects,	creatures	that	hide	from	predators	or	visibility	and	who	when	they	emerge	scurry	to	a	new	place	out	of	sight	and	out	of	the	light?		I	think	his	mixture	of	metaphors	is	indicative	of	a	difficulty	of	knowing	what	to	do	with	‘the	subject	of	retardation.’		At	the	level	of	metaphor	his	desire	to	enlighten	‘dark	ages	thinking’	seems	to	be	already	inscribed	with	an	implicit	fear	of	the	subject	evading	the	light	again.		This	is	symptomatic	of	much	of	the	effort	of	this	period	in	aesthetic	and	political	spheres	to	bring	the	subject	of	mental	retardation	into	the	light	of	mediatization	or	public	gaze	but	in	the	process	revealing	merely	reiterations	of	darkness,	the	repressed	and	repression	of	the	Other.		Kramer’s	spotlight	of	enlightenment	came	up	against	the	chiaroscuro	of	Cassavetes’	‘fly	on	the	wall’	urge	to	documentary-like	verité.		In	the	television	production	of	A	Child	is	Waiting	all	of	the	children	in	the	institution	had	been	played	by	professional	child	actors	and	this	had	been	Kramer’s	intention	for	the	film,	but	when	John	Cassavetes	was	hired	as	director	he	insisted	on	using	twenty	‘children’	(ten	males	and	ten	females)	from	the	Pacific	State	Hospital	in	Pomona,	later	explaining	this	decision:	It	was	about	retarded	children.		What	did	I	want	to	use	actors	for	to	play	retarded	kids?		They	didn’t	know	anything	about	it,	and	neither	did	I.	I	spent	three	and	a	half	months	doing	research	on	the	subject	with	the	
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writer,	Abby	Mann,	visiting	retarded	children	and	their	parents,	talking	to	their	teachers	and	learning	about	their	lives.		Getting	to	know	those	children	was	a	moving	and	really	beautiful	experience.	(120)	The	only	exception	to	this	casting	policy	was,	significantly,	the	role	of	Reuben,	who	was	played	by	a	professional	child	actor.		Cassavetes’	approach	to	working	with	‘the	children’	from	Pacific	State	Hospital	was	to	proceed	from	an	acknowledgement	of	his	own	ignorance	of	‘mental	retardation.’		In	Ray	Carney’s	Cassavetes	on	Cassavetes	there	is	the	following	account	of	his	encounter	and	engagement	with	‘the	children’:	Cassavetes	himself	spent	hours	with	the	children,	talking	to	them	and	horsing	around.		Many	scenes	demonstrate	his	fondness	for	the	children,	who	are	not	treated	generically,	but	individualized	and	given	almost	as	much	on-camera	time	as	the	stars.		Cassavetes	told	me	that	he	found	the	experience	of	working	with	the	children	so	interesting	that	for	several	years	afterwards	he	flirted	with	the	idea	of	becoming	a	documentary	filmmaker.	(119)	Producer	Stanley	Kramer	is	on	record	as,	at	first,	supporting	Cassavetes’	decision	to	cast	‘the	children’	from	the	Pacific	State	Hospital:	‘.	.	.	it	was	exciting.		They	surprised	us	everyday	in	reaction	and	in	what	they	did	.	.	.’(Fishgall	215)	but	as	the	filming	progressed	Kramer	became	increasingly	concerned	by	Cassavetes’	methodology	of	improvisation	and	by	his	emphasis	on	‘the	children’	at	the	expense	of	the	narratives	of	the	central	characters,	Reuben,	his	father,	Jean	Hansen	and	Dr	Clark.		This	conflict	eventually	came	to	a	head	with	Kramer	firing	Cassavetes	and	finishing	the	final	edit	of	the	film	himself.		According	to	Carney:	Cassavetes’	edit	had	included	much	more	footage	of	the	children,	to	the	point	that	they	had	become	more	important	than	the	nominal	‘stars’	of	the	picture	and	Kramer’s	main	objections	to	Cassavetes’	edit	were	that	the	children	were	too	prominent	in	the	narrative	and	that	they	came	off	
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as	being	‘silly’	or	‘comical.’		When	Cassavetes	objected,	Kramer	told	him	that	he	had	become	too	close	to	them	emotionally	and	had	lost	perspective.	(121)	Kramer’s	reported	objections	are	interesting,	particularly	in	the	light	of	some	of	his	other	comments	on	the	film:		My	dream	was	to	jump	the	barrier	of	ordinary	objection	to	the	subject	matter	into	an	area	in	which	the	treatment	of	it	and	the	performance	of	it	would	be	so	exquisite	that	it	would	transcend	all	that.		Somewhere	we	failed.	(228)	Kramer’s	rhetoric	reveals	a	concern	with	a	certain	aesthetic	and	ethical	‘taste’	that	he	feels	Cassavetes	does	not	achieve.	He	appears	to	want	an	aesthetic	gloss	over	a	subject	matter	that	is,	in	the	broadest	sense,	political:	the	treatment	of	the	‘mentally	retarded’	in	the	context	of	the	USA	in	1963.		At	the	same	time	Kramer	wishes	to	expose	what	Dark	Ages	thinking	has	hidden	under	the	rocks.	A	contemporary	review	of	the	film	by	Bosley	Crowther	in	the	New	York	Times,	articulated	this	question	of	taste:	We	must	be	thankful	that	what	might	have	been	harrowing	and	even	distasteful	beyond	words	to	behold	comes	out	as	a	forthright,	moving	documentation	of	most	unfortunate	but	hopeful	youngsters	in	a	school.	.	.	.one	should	learn	a	great	deal	from	this	picture	–	all	of	which	should	be	helpful	and	give	hope.	(Crowther	1963)			The	implication	here	is	that	the	presentation	of	‘mental	retardation’	is	the	ultimate	in	bad	taste.		He	immediately	seeks	to	leaven	even	the	threat	of	this	ultimate	bad	taste	with	references	to	the	positive,	to	hope.	It	is	as	if	the	very	idea	of	‘mental	retardation’	is	too	much	of	a	challenge	to	the	imaginary	of	the	time,	with	its	adherence	to	the	performance	principle	and	desire	to	repress	anxiety,	difference	and	what	in	mental	retardation	is	uncanny	-	in	Freud’s	sense	of	both	
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heimlich,	these	‘children’	are	ours,	our	relatives,	and	unheimlich,9	they	provoke	anxiety	and	need	to	be	‘othered’	and	segregated	in	institutions.			Crowther	apprehends	from	the	film	the	need	for	‘unemotional	discipline’	for	these	children.		This	echoes	another	charge	that	Kramer	leveled	at	Cassavetes:	‘he	had	become	too	close	to	them	emotionally	and	had	lost	all	perspective.’	(Carney	121)	In	Kramer’s	and	Crowther’s	discourse	a	particular	kind	of	Othering	is	taking	place:	‘mental	retardation’	needs	to	be	treated	with	good	taste	and	with	a	kind	of	Enlightenment	‘reason’	so	that	one	does	not	commit	the	error	of	becoming	emotionally	involved,	an	error	that	would	result	in	bad	‘taste’:	bad	aesthetic	and	ethical	conduct.		Kramer	specifically	accuses	Cassavetes	of	having	lost	a	sense	of	aesthetic	distance	or	objective	correlative,	a	lapse	in	taste	that	threatens	the	ethical	probity	or	efficacy	of	his	work.					In	this	context	it	is	interesting	to	look	at	the	great,	and	costly,	lengths	to	which	Kramer	went	to	re-edit	Cassavetes’	footage	and	what	they	reveal	of	Kramer’s	own	‘taste’:	He	used	an	optical	printer	to	reprint	some	of	Cassavetes’	medium	shots	as	close-ups	and	he	freeze-framed	and	slowed	down	some	of	the	reaction	shots	to	lengthen	their	duration.		Illustrations	include	the	shots	of	Reuben’s	and	Ted	Widdicombe’s	faces	in	the	scene	in	which	Reuben	is	on	stage.		Kramer’s	final	step	was	to	lay	in	a	lot	of	mood	music.	(Carney	123)	Cassavetes	later	explained	another	technique	Kramer	used	in	his	final	edit	and	how	he	interpreted	the	effect	on	the	viewer	Kramer	intended	to	achieve	by	doing	so:	 If	you	double-cut	on	close-ups	you	can	make	the	thing	seem	a	great	deal	more	sentimental.		In	other	words	if	I	look	at	you	and	you	look	at	me	and	
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then	I	look	back	at	you	and	you	look	back	at	me	there’s	a	feeling	there	of	sentimentality.	(123)	Cassavetes’	subsequent	disowning	of	the	film	reiterated	the	concerns	he	articulated	over	Kramer’s	editing:	‘I	didn’t	think	his	film	–	and	that’s	what	I	consider	it	to	be,	his	film	–	was	so	bad,	just	a	lot	more	sentimental	than	mine.’	(123)	 Kramer’s	attempts	to	sentimentalize	the	film’s	narrative	were	centred	around	the	father-son	relationship	and	the	star	performers	Burt	Lancaster	and	Judy	Garland.	He	found	it	more	difficult	to	‘sentimentalize’	Cassavetes’	footage	of	‘the	children.’		Kramer	accused	Cassavetes	of	making	‘the	children’	seem	‘silly’	or	‘comical’,	an	accusation	that	was	later	answered	by	Cassavetes:	I	wanted	to	make	the	kids	funny,	to	show	that	they	were	human	and	warm	–	not	‘cases’	but	kids.	(123)	Cassavetes	summed	up	the	difference	between	‘his’	film	and	Kramer’s	film	in	the	following	terms:	The	difference	in	the	two	versions	is	that	Stanley’s	picture	said	that	retarded	children	belong	in	institutions	and	the	picture	I	shot	said	retarded	children	are	better	in	their	own	way	than	supposedly	healthy	adults.		The	philosophy	of	his	film	was	that	retarded	children	are	separate	and	alone	and	therefore	should	be	in	institutions	with	others	of	their	kind.		My	film	said	that	retarded	children	could	be	anywhere,	any	time,	and	the	problem	is	that	we’re	a	bunch	of	dopes,	that	it’s	our	problem	more	than	the	kids	.	.	.	(123)	It	is	clear	from	Cassavetes’	statement	that	his	approach	was	characterized	by	an	ethical	and	perhaps	political	intent	that	was	different	to	Kramer’s	sentimental	othering	of	the	children	invoking	the	viewer	to	sympathize	with	their	misfortune.		For	Cassavetes	the	children	are	‘better	in	their	own	way	than	supposedly	healthy	adults’	and	here	‘better’	conflates	‘healthier’,	morally	better	
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and	‘better	off’			By	assuming	a	position	of	‘stupidity	before	the	other’	his	encounter	with	the	children	results	in	an	exposure	of	the	lack,	the	disability	and	the	‘retardation’	in	assumptions	of	normativity.			He	has	done	so	through	what	might	be	considered	‘aesthetic’	means:	‘horsing	around’	as	Kramer	terms	it,	improvisation	or	play	without	‘useful’	outcome,	an	encounter	allowing	the	children	to	be	‘silly’	to	be	‘comical’:	to	play.			From	another	but	related	perspective	it	could	be	argued	that	the	encounter	between	Cassavetes	and	‘the	children’	is	what	Dwight	Conquergood,	drawing	from	the	work	of	Mikhail	Bakhtin,	called	‘dialogic’	-	as	opposed	to	the	more	‘monologic’	approach	to	the	process	and	the	narrative	of	Kramer.	For	Conquergood	in	Performing	as	a	Moral	Act:	Ethical	Dimensions	of	the	
Ethnography	of	Performance	when	performance	is	dialogic	it	‘aims	to	bring	together	different	voices,	world	views,	value	systems,	and	beliefs	so	that	they	can	have	a	conversation	with	one	another.’	(9)	The	awkwardness	of	the	African	American	girl,	the	resistance	to	scripted	performance	of	the	boy	who	needs	to	be	continually	prompted	to	say	his	lines,	the	stepping	out	of	the	naïve	theatrical	narrative	frame	of	the	boys	who	fight	with	their	Puritan	hats,	the	laughter	released	by	the	premature	arrival	of	the	Indians,	the	potential	ambivalence	of	response	created	by	the	group’s	singing	and	the	uneasiness	of	the	curtain	call,	all	of	these	moments	of	tension	or	ambivalence	are	all	evidence	of	an	‘unconcluding	dialogue’,	dialogic	performance,	a	‘genuine	conversation’	in	Conquergood’s	terms.		I	believe	there	was	another	and	deeper	difference	between	the	film	that	Cassavetes	wanted	to	make	and	the	film	that	Kramer	wanted	to	make.	A	Child	is	
Waiting	is	a	film	that	Kramer	wanted	to	re-make,	a	film	he	felt	compelled	to	
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repeat.	Kramer’s	spotlight	was	an	attempt	to	hide	something	darker:	a	return	of	the	repressed.			Kramer	and	Abby	Mann	had	previously	worked	together,	as	director	and	screenwriter	respectively,	on	both	the	television	production	and	the	subsequent	1961	film,	Judgment	at	Nuremberg.		In	many	ways	Kramer	with	A	
Child	is	Waiting	was	trying	to	repeat	the	critical	and	commercial	impact	of	this	film,	which	had	featured	both	Burt	Lancaster	and	Judy	Garland,	the	latter	in	what	was	seen	as	a	come-back	dramatic	role	in	the	wake	of	her	well-publicized	problems	with	prescription	drugs	and	alcohol.		That	film	which	was	nominated	for	eleven	Oscars	and	won	two	was	also,	significantly,	the	first	mainstream	American	film	to	feature	footage	from	the	liberation	of	the	concentration	camps	at	Buchenwald,	Dachau	and	Belsen,	five	minutes	of	graphic	footage	and	images	which	had	been	used	at	the	Nuremberg	war	trials.	My	contention	is	that	there	may	have	been	deeper	reasons	that	compelled	the	desire	to	repeat	A	Judgment	at	
Nuremberg	in	A	Child	is	Waiting.		Both	A	Child	is	Waiting	and	Judgment	at	Nuremberg	contain	pivotal	scenes	that	represent	an	encounter	with	a	supposed	‘real’:	the	scene	in	the	asylum	in	A	
Child	is	Waiting	and	the	scene	of	the	use	of	concentration	camp	footage	in	the	trial	of	Judgment	at	Nuremberg.	It	is	my	contention	that	there	is	a	complex	connection	between	these	two	scenes	that	reveals	much	about	the	presentation	and	representation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	the	cultural	imaginary	of	the	United	States	of	this	period.		These	are	scenes	that	are	not	acted,	but	rather	scenes	of	documentary	footage	that	are	meant	to	stand	for	a	confrontation	with	the	‘real’	-	and	yet	both	are	mediatized.	They	are	doubly	mediatized,	firstly	by	being	contextualized	within	the	fictional,	dramatic	narratives	of	the	films	in	which	they	appear,	and	
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then	they	are	of	course	mediatized	as	film,	particular	camera	settings	with	particular	perspectives,	shots	edited	and	manipulated	in	the	attempt	to	give	a	witness-eye	view,	whatever	that	might	be.		In	‘Holocaust’	in	Simulacra	and	
Simulation	Baudrillard	characterizes	the	mediatization	of	the	Holocaust	in	the	following	terms:		One	no	longer	makes	the	Jews	pass	through	the	crematorium	or	the	gas	chamber	but	through	the	sound	track	and	the	image	track,	through	the	universal	screen	and	the	microprocessor.		(49)		What	he	is	arguing	is	that	the	mediatization	of	the	atrocity	is	itself	an	atrocity.		He	is	referring	specifically	to	the	1978	television	mini-series,	Holocaust	an	attempt	‘to	rekindle	this	cold	event	through	a	cold	medium,	television’	(50)	but	what	he	says	could	also	apply	to	the	initial	mediatization	of	the	atrocity	in	the	newsreel	footage	of	the	liberation	of	the	camps.		That	footage	was	taken	by	the	US	Army	Signal	Corps,	a	unit	that	during	the	course	of	the	war	employed	Hollywood	directors	such	as	John	Huston,	Frank	Capra	and	Billy	Wilder	to	document	the	involvement	and	victories	of	American	troops	for	the	newsreels.	When	the	concentration	camps	were	liberated,	photographers	and	cameramen	were	sent	inside	the	camps	before	the	army	medical	units.	Thus	the	most	famous	footage	of	‘the	camps’	is	not	footage	of	the	camps	in	operation	nor	indeed	in	liberation	but	in	an	interim	state,	at	the	time	of	the	first	arrival	of	the	cameras.	The	filming	of	the	liberation	was	not	the	liberation,	it	was	an	event	stage	managed	or	mediatized	from	the	outset.		As	cameramen	the	Signal	Corps	were	operating	under	strict	pre-established	guidelines:		A	letter	from	the	judge	advocate	of	the	European	Theater	of	Operations	dated	April	27,	1945,	specifies	a	set	of	standard	practices	for	the	US	Signal	
	 72	
Corps	to	shoot	and	process	“still	and	motion	pictures	.	.	.	taken	of	liberated	prisoners	and	Concentration	Camps”	.	.	.	the	document	calls	for	a	range	of	coverage,	including	wide	shots	(“general	conditions”)	and	medium	shots	and	close-ups	(“individual	cases	of	atrocities”).	(Lee	66)	The	direction	of	the	overall	shooting	of	evidence	was	the	responsibility	of	a	war	crimes	officer	who	also	reviewed	it	before	and	after	editing	and	then	signed	an	affidavit	as	to	“the	accuracy	of	the	scene	depicted”,	the	circularity	and	unfalsifiability	of	this	procedure	thus	elided	the	subjectivity	of	that	war	crimes	officer	at	every	stage	of	the	process.		The	mediatization	of	the	event	is	also	the	truth	of	the	event,	an	impossible	contradiction.		The	promise	is	of	both	an	accurate	depiction,	or	representation,	and	the	sworn	truth,	in	short,	an	aporia.	My	contention	is	that	this	aporia	of	truth	and	representation	is	related	to,	and	in	some	ways	productive	of,	a	similar	aporia	in	the	representation	of	the	liberation	of	the	institutions	of	‘mental	retardation.’	This	aporia	of	truth	and	representation	was	reiterated	in	the	subsequent	usage	of	the	Signal	Corps	footage:	During	World	War	II,	the	Roosevelt	Administrations	War	Production	Board	limited	each	newsreel	to	a	length	of	750	feet,	or	approximately	eight	minutes	.	.	.	On	the	eve	of	a	public	screening	of	official	U.S.	Signal	Corps	footage	of	concentration	camps,	New	York	Times	film	critic	Bosley	Crowther	railed	against	these	restrictions,	claiming	they	inhibited	the	“social	obligation”	for	theaters	to	present	“such	evidence	graphically”	of	“horrors	coming	hot	out	of	Germany.”	(Lee	58)	The	description	of	the	footage	by	Crowther	as	coming	‘hot	out	of	Germany’	is	a	particularly	distasteful	figuration,	contrasting	with	Baudrillard’s	later	trope	of	coldness,	but	suggestive	of	a	perceived	need	to	consume	the	representation	of	the	horror,	and	to	consume	it	fast	before	it	goes	cold,	or	perhaps	before	America’s	anger	went	cold.		When	the	footage	did	reach	cinemas,	which	was	as	
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early	as	May	1945,	it	was	played	to	what	Film	Daily	described	as	‘record-breaking	audiences’	in	cinemas	across	the	United	States.	Signs	outside	cinemas	and	captions	introducing	the	footage	trumpeted	the	message	of	America’s	just	war	in	melodramatic	or	even	pornographic	terms:	‘Here	America	Is	The	Shocking	Truth	.	.	.’,	‘‘An	Aroused	America	Has	Awaited	These	Films’	‘See	S.S.	Guards	Executed!’	10	The	subject	did	go	cold	relatively	quickly	in	terms	of	visibility	within	mainstream	cinema,	as,	after	the	initial	showing	of	the	newsreel	footage,	the	films	disappeared	from	view	for	a	number	of	years,	perhaps,	as	Baudrillard	intimates,	because	of	the	Cold	War,	as	part	of	the	desire	to	encourage	West	Germany	to	look	economically	and	culturally	to	the	future	with	the	United	States,	rather	than	to	the	East.		This	cooling	of	the	desire	for	the	shocking	truth	so	aroused	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	war	may	also	have	been	influenced	by	the	knowledge	coming	out	that	in	August	1942	the	US	State	Department	had	been	informed	in	a	telegram	from	the	British	Foreign	Office	of	the	Final	Solution,	the	Nazi	intention	to	eliminate	European	Jewry,	and	had	chosen	to	take	no	action.		What	can	also	be	inferred	from	Baudrillard’s	‘Holocaust’	is	that	the	footage,	once	it	became	a	televised	subject,	then	circulates	as	just	another	spectacle	in	the	Society	of	the	Spectacle	or	hyperreality.		It	becomes	just	another	item	on	network	television	as	instanced	by	the	absurdity	of	the	last	minute	editing	of	the	1959	television	production	of	Judgment	at	Nuremberg	in	which	all	
																																																								10	From	Imaginary	Witness:	Hollywood	and	the	Holocaust.		
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references	to	‘gas	chambers’	were	overdubbed	with	silence	at	the	behest	of	the	program’s	main	sponsors,	the	American	Gas	Association.11	Within	weeks	of	the	war	ending	General	Eisenhower	invited	sixteen	Hollywood	producers	and	studio	heads	to	view	the	sites	of	the	atrocities,	and,	after	a	day	at	Dachau,	Jack	Warner	of	Warner	Brothers	wrote:	No	one	connected	with	motion	pictures	who	has	seen	these	things	can	allow	themselves	to	assume	responsibility	for	a	screen	which	portrays	only	a	make-believe	world.	(Imaginary	Witness.)	Here	Warner	cites	the	reality	or	truth	of	‘these	things’	in	opposition	to	the	‘make-believe’	of	Hollywood,	but	both	Crowther	and	Warner	come	up	against	the	aporia	of	the	camps:	an	unrealizable	real	in	terms	of	representation	and	an	unrepresentability	threatening	any	form	of	poesis.		Both	Warner	and	Crowther	attempt	to	adapt	to	their	own	commercial	agenda	Adorno’s	oft-cited:	‘To	write	poetry	after	Auschwitz	is	barbaric.’(34).		In	Remnants	of	Auschwitz:	the	Witness	
and	the	Archive	Agamben	characterizes	this	aporia	in	the	following	terms:	Facts	so	real	that	by	comparison,	nothing	is	truer;	a	reality	that	necessarily	exceeds	its	factual	elements	–	such	is	the	aporia	of	Auschwitz.	(12)	It	is	interesting	to	compare	Crowther’s	demand	that	the	‘shocking	truth’	be	shown	of	the	‘horrors	coming	hot	out	of	Germany’	with	his	comments	on	A	Child	
Is	Waiting,	his	unrealized	but	palpable	fear	that	the	subject	matter	of	the	film,	mental	retardation,	threatened	the	revelation	of	the	‘harrowing’	and	‘the	distasteful	beyond	words	to	behold.’		My	contention	is	that	his	apparent	confusion	over	what	can	be	shown	and	what	should	not	be	shown	is	related	to	the	compulsion	to	repeat	certain	
																																																								11	Priemel	and	Stiller	235		
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elements	of	A	Judgment	at	Nuremberg	in	A	Child	Is	Waiting.	This	compulsion	to	revisit	the	‘real’	of	the	camps	with	the	‘real’	of	the	‘subject	of	retardation’	is	symptomatic	of	the	ethical	and	political	framework	within	which	people	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	were	both	viewed	and	treated	at	that	time	and	which	has	left	traces	on	how	they	have	been	subsequently	perceived	and	treated.		In	Rancièrean	terms	the	distribution	of	the	sensible	of	that	particular	historical	and	geographical	context:	what	can	be	seen	and	what	cannot,	said	and	not	said,	thought	and	not	thought	about	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	is	apparent	in	the	way	in	which	the	two	mainstream	Hollywood	‘social	issue’	films	reiterate	the	relationship	to	the	Other.	The	Other	is	embodied	in	the	victims	of	the	concentration	camps	and	that	particular	Othering	is	then	transposed	onto	people	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities.		The	compulsion	to	repeat,	however,	like	all	repetitions,	results	in	repetition	and	difference.		
	In	Judgment	at	Nuremberg	the	moment	of	truth	and	the	confrontation	with	the	‘real’	is	the	showing	of	a	five	minute	extract	from	the	Signal	Corps	footage	in	the	trial	of	the	judges;	in	A	Child	is	Waiting	it	is	the	scene	where	Dr	Clark	takes	Jean	Hansen	into	the	actual	locked	adult	ward	of	the	Pacific	State	Hospital.		The	former	scene	is	a	confrontation	with	the	past	but	a	past	that	was,	and	still	is,	in	so	many	ways,	present;	the	latter	scene	is	a	confrontation	with	the	present,	but	a	present	for	some	that	is	also	the	potential	future	for	others,	and	that	continues	to	be	so.	In	the	jetztzeit	of	their	presentation	both	hinge	around	the	possibility	of	being	saved	or	being	condemned.			 In	Judgment	at	Nuremberg	the	Signal	Corps	footage	and	still	images	are	shown	in	a	five-minute	sequence	during	the	trial	of	German	judges	and	
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prosecutors	charged	with	crimes	against	humanity.		The	projector	is	set	up	in	the	courtroom	its	curtains	drawn	to	focus	all	attention	on	the	grainy	images	that	seem	to	become	the	only	source	of	light.		The	footage	and	images	are	accompanied	by	a	sonorous,	accusatory	and	almost	exasperated	running	commentary	by	Richard	Widmark	as	a	US	military	prosecuting	attorney.	The	footage	and	images	show	prisoners	shuffling	in	striped	prison	gear,	ovens,	charred	skeletons,	piles	of	brushes,	shoes,	spectacles,	gold	from	teeth,	objects	made	from	human	skin,	tattooed	children,	piles	of	corpses	in	box	cars,	the	showers,	Zyklon	B	canisters,	more	and	more	piles	of	emaciated	corpses,	the	bulldozers	at	Belsen	pushing	piles	of	emaciated	corpses	into	mass	graves.			As	if	the	footage	and	images	are	not	enough,	they	are	intercut	with	reaction	shots:	the	presiding	American	judge,	played	by	Spencer	Tracy,	looking	down	or	looking	away,	or	at	times	palpably	forcing	himself	to	look,	the	German	judges	on	trial,	including	Burt	Lancaster	as	senior	judge	Ernst	Jannings,	looking	uncomfortable	or	looking	on	in	disbelief	or	struggling	to	maintain	composure,	the	young	German	defence	attorney,	played	by	Maximilian	Schell,	flinching	and	grimacing,	and,	after	the	footage	of	the	bulldozers	at	Belsen,	the	hardened	US	Military	Policemen	looking	on	in	tears.			 	The	function	of	the	footage	is	to	cast	a	spotlight	not	merely	on	the	atrocities	but	on	the	viewing	of	the	atrocities	in	which	everyone	seems	to	be	at	once	guilty	and	victim.	It	is	the	USA	that	must	judge	these	crimes	against	humanity,	but	who	judges	the	judges?	In	response	to	the	showing	of	the	film	in	the	darkened	courtroom	the	defence	attorney,	Maximilian	Schell,	in	his	summing	up	seeks	to	spread	the	guilt	to	include	not	just	Nazi	Germany	and	its	judiciary,	but	the	guilt	of	the	Soviet	Union	who	facilitated	Hitler’s	programme	of	
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extermination	by	the	non-aggression	pact	of	1939,	the	guilt	of	the	Vatican	for	the	Reichskonkordat	of	1933	that	gave	Hitler	a	kind	of	moral	legitimacy,	and	the	guilt	of	the	‘American	industrialists	who	helped	Hitler	to	rebuild	his	armaments	and	profited	by	that	rebuilding.’	(Judgment	at	Nuremberg.)	In	A	Child	is	Waiting	the	sequence	in	which	Dr	Clark	leads	Jean	Hansen	into	an	actual	adult	male	ward	for	mentally	retarded	patients	lasts	three	minutes	and	a	deep	description	reveals	much	about	how	this	scene	might	represent	a	desire	to	reiterate	or	revisit	the	‘real’	of	the	Signal	Corps	footage	in	Judgment	at	
Nuremberg.			This	real	might	appear	to	be	what	is	defined	by	Lacan12	in	the	following,	cited	by	Georges	Didi-Huberman	in	Images	in	Spite	of	All:	Four	
Photographs	From	Auschwitz:		the	revelation	of	the	real	in	what	is	least	penetrable,	of	the	real	without	any	possible	mediation,	of	the	last	real,	of	the	essential	object	that	is	no	longer	an	object	but	rather	something	before	which	all	words	stop	and	all	categories	fail,	the	object	of	anxiety	par	excellence.	(80)	What	this	analysis	reveals	is	how	each	film	aspires	to	present	these	moments	of	truth,	where	documentary	footage	interrupts	fictional	narrative,	but	is	caught	up	in	how	such	a	Real	is	presented	or	represented	through	cinematic	techniques.	What	is	revealed	is	that	cinema,	and	spectatorship	more	generally,	both	desires	the	Real	and	cannot	bear,	or	bear	witness	to,	the	Real.	The	sequence	opens	with	a	close	up	of	the	head	of	a	patient	on	a	ward	for	intellectually	disabled	adult	male	patients.		The	camera	shoots	him	from	below,	his	head	dominates	the	screen,	his	look	into	the	camera	might	be	said	to	embody	Garland-Thomson’s	description	of	the	‘blank	stare.’	The	soundtrack	accompanying	these	images	is	of	high	pitched	laughter	and	a	hubbub	of																																																									12	Lacan	209.	
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indistinguishable	speech.			He	suddenly	looks	to	his	left	and	there	is	a	match	cut	to	another	patient,	also	shot	from	below,	also	looking	to	his	left.	Both	patients	are	disheveled	and	give	the	impression	of	being	alienated	from	their	surroundings.		The	direction	of	their	looks	draws	the	eyes	of	the	viewer	to	the	next	shot,	a	one-perspective	mid-range	shot	which	shows	the	arrival	of	Dr	Clark	and	Jean	Hansen	through	the	door	and	into	the	ward.		The	next	shot	shows	from	above	two	older	adult	male	patients	sitting	on	the	floor,	one	with	his	arm	around	the	other.		The	soundtrack	is	a	repeated	loop	of	the	high-pitched	laugh	and	the	indistinguishable	hubbub.		The	next	shot	is	from	the	side	and	shows	a	patient	sitting	in	front	of	a	window	swaying	from	side	to	side	with	increasing	force.		The	camera	moves	in	a	similar	way,	eventually	moving	away	as	if	it	is	in	fear	of	being	hit,	to	reveal	another	patient	who	is	holding	a	teddy	bear.		This	shot	is	followed	by	a	close	up	of	another	patient,	filmed	from	below.		He	is	smiling	and	performing	some	gestures	with	the	fingers	of	both	hands	that	might	be	described	as	stereotypy.		The	camera	then	pans	down	from	his	hands	to	reveal,	on	the	seat	next	to	him,	a	toy	fire	truck.		There	is	an	intercut	of	Jean	Hansen	looking	incredulously	around	the	ward.	The	camera	follows	the	direction	of	her	gaze	to	another	shot	of	the	patient	sitting	by	the	toy	fire	truck	who	is	now	holding	a	ball,	a	miniature	basketball	which	looks	small	in	his	large	hands.	He	throws	the	ball	casually	in	front	of	him	with	his	right	hand.		The	next	shot	we	see	is	of	the	same	ball	hitting	another	patient	in	the	face.		This	patient	barely	reacts	and	he	is	then	handed	the	ball	which	at	first	he	takes	in	his	hands	but	then	proceeds	to	put	in	his	mouth	and	tries	to	eat	it.			Dr	Clark	and	Jean	Hansen	walk	through	this	ward	down	a	corridor	between	locked	doors	and	windows	covered	in	metal	grilles.		Some	of	the	
	 79	
patients	they	pass	have	Down	Syndrome,	some	sit	in	poses	suggestive	of	being	locked	in	on	themselves.	They	play	desultorily	with	children’s	toys,	seemingly	laughing	at	nothing,	making	noise	rather	than	conversation.			The	two	named	characters	talk	but	around	them	all	is	repetitive	movement,	repetitive	noise,	whoops	and	howls,	a	cacophony.		There	is	the	suggestion	of	the	underlying	myths	of	Orpheus	in	the	underworld	and	Lot’s	wife	as	they	walk	through	the	madhouse.	This	is	a	vision	of	a	potentially	hellish	future	for	boys	like	Reuben,	the	madhouse	as	human	zoo	with	the	chimpanzee-like	laughter	and	the	infantilized	adult	males	with	their	children’s	toys.		A	man	staggers	unsteadily	towards	the	camera,	he	stares,	he	laughs.		Dr	Clark	tells	Jean	Hansen	how:		“Some	were	sterilized	by	the	State,	they	used	to	sterilize	them	the	way	they	sterilize	cattle”and	the	man	makes	an	animal-like	noise	seemingly	on	cue.		These	are	the	retarded	children	grown	old,	no	longer	redeemed	by	cuteness,	living	‘bare	lives’13,	like	animals.				 A	closer	look	at	the	sequence	reveals	the	carefulness	of	the	editing	to	present	the	vision	of	the	asylum	as	hell	and	reveals	other	aspects	of	the	mediatization	of	this	glimpse	of	the	Real.		The	timing	of	the	patient’s	animal-like	wail	after	Dr	Clark’s	reference	to	the	patients’	being	sterilized	like	cattle	does	seem	to	be	on	cue	and	a	more	careful	investigation	of	the	soundtrack	strongly	suggests	that	this	has	been	looped	in	post-production.		This	mediatizing	or	‘staging’	of	the	supposed	real	of	the	asylum	is	also	revealed	or	exposed	in	the	brief	moments	when	the	patient	has	a	ball	thrown	at	his	face.	At	first	we	see	a	small	basketball,		he	takes	the	ball	in	his	hands,	the	same	small	basketball,	but																																																									13	Agamben’s	concept	of	‘bare	life’	zoe	as	opposed	to	bios	is	outlined	in	Homo	Sacer.		The	‘homo	sacer’	the	exceptional	life	that	is	both	sacred	and	sacral	connects	to	cultural	tropes	of		the	intellectually	disabled	figure	at	once	‘touched	by	God’	as	a	Holy	Fool	and	banned	from	the	temple	(Leviticus	21:	16-23)	
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the	ball	he	puts	in	his	mouth	in	the	next	shot,	a	sharp	edit	from	a	closer	angle,	is	a	completely	different	ball	with	a	horizontal	striped	pattern	on	it.			A	presentation	of	the	hopelessness	and	animal-like	existence	of	the	adult	patients	in	the	ward	serves	the	central	narrative	better.		This	is	not	to	say	that	the	conditions	in	the	Pacific	State	Hospital	were	not	appalling,	but	the	film	seems	to	wish	both	to	present	a	ne	plus	ultra	of	the	real	while	at	the	same	time	editing	and	shaping	perceptions	to	suit	a	certain	narrative	in	a	way	that	is	similar	to	the	capture,	mediatization	and	usage	of	the	Signal	Corps	footage.		There	is	of	course	no	ideal,	objective	way	to	present	deeply	traumatic	experience	and	events.	Blanchot’s	comment	in	L’Ecriture	du	désastre	seems	apposite	here:	There	is	a	limit	at	which	the	exercise	of	an	art,	whatever	it	be,	becomes	an	insult	to	misfortune.	(qtd	Didi-Huberman	27)		What	else	might	audiences	then	and	now	be	seeing	when	called	to	witness	these	‘real’	scenes	or	moments	of	truth	couched	within	the	dramatic	narrative	of	A	Hollywood	social	issues	film?		In	Remnants	Of	Auschwitz:	The	Witness	And	The	
Archive,	in	his	analysis	of	ethical	and	political	meanings	of	the	extermination,	Giorgio	Agamben	calls	into	question	at	a	deep	level	notions	of	‘witnessing’	and	‘testimony’	and	in	fact	connects	this	questioning	with	what	he	terms	the	desubjectifying	of	the	‘subject.’	Crucial	in	this	analysis	is	what	Agamben	terms	Primo	Levi’s	paradox	from	If	This	is	a	Man:	‘the	Muselmann	is	the	complete	witness.’	(Agamben	Remnants	158)	The	Muselmann	was	a	name	given	in	Auschwitz	to	those	figures	dying	of	starvation	who	had	given	up	all	hope,	motivation	and	humanity,	walking	corpses,	in	a	limit	state	somewhere	between	human	and	non-human.		Agamben	locates	testimony	as	a	process	which	involves	at	least	two	subjects:	the	survivor,	who	can	speak	but	has	nothing	interesting	to	
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say	and	the	Muselmann,	who	has	much	to	say	and	cannot	speak:	both	figures,	in	different	ways,	of	extreme	incapacity.		In	Judgment	at	Nuremberg,	a	film	that	in	some	ways	offers	to	bear	witness	to	the	exterminations,	as	General	Eisenhower	demanded	of	the	Hollywood	producers	in	the	war’s	immediate	aftermath,	there	are	many	elisions	to	facilitate	the	construction	of	a	narrative	for	the	consumption	of	a	cinema	audience	in	the	USA	in	1963.	The	most	striking	elision	is	that	there	are	no	Jewish	characters	in	the	entire	dramatis	personae	of	the	film,	just	those	nameless	bodies	we	see	in	the	Signal	Corps	footage.	There	is	also	another	elision	around	the	issue	of	‘mental	enfeeblement’	or	intellectual	disability.		This	centres	in	the	character	of	Rudolph	Peterson,	played	by	Montgomery	Clift,	who	won	an	Oscar	for	Best	Supporting	Actor	for	his	performance.		This	is	not	just	another	example	of	a	professional	actor	achieving	the	ultimate	Hollywood	plaudit	for	the	portrayal	of	a	person	with	intellectual	disabilities:	something	much	more	complex	is	being	elided.	Clift	plays	Rudolf	Petersen,	a	baker’s	assistant	from	a	large	German	family,	the	son	of	a	Communist,	who	was	subjected	to	enforced	sterilization	as	a	‘mentally	unfit	and	therefore	“asocial”	member	of	the	Volksgemeinschaft.’	(Fraser	9)	He	is	cross-examined	by	the	Defence	Attorney,	Hans	Rolfe	(Maximilian	Schell)	acting	for	the	judge	Ernst	Jannings	(Burt	Lancaster).		Rolfe	seeks	to	justify	the	sterilization	on	the	grounds	that	it	was	‘the	task	of	the	Hereditary	Health	Court	(in	Stuttgart)	to	sterilize	the	mentally	incompetent.’	After	casting	aspersions	on	his	large	family	and	limited	education,	in	a	class	of	‘backward	children’,	he	refers	to	Petersen’s	mother	having	‘mental	abnormalities’	and	‘hereditary	feeble-mindedness’	and	then	asks	Petersen	to	complete	the	standard	‘simple’	test	of	mental	competence	used	by	the	Hereditary	Health	Court	–	to	form	a	sentence	out	
	 82	
of	the	three	words	‘hare’,	‘hunter’	and	‘field.’		Rolfe	repeats	the	terms	of	the	simple	test.		Petersen	starts	by	saying	‘hare’	and	‘hunter’	but	then	over	the	next	two	minutes	completely	avoids	any	attempt	to	complete	the	test,	explaining	heatedly	that	the	Health	Court	was	intent	on	giving	him	the	operation	from	the	start,	graphically	describing	his	helplessness	in	the	procedure,	then	talking	about	his	mother,	vehemently	denying	the	accusation	of	her	feeble-mindedness,	and	eventually,	when	his	words	run	out,	producing	a	faded	photograph	of	his	mother	and	appealing	to	the	court	and	the	judge:	I	would	like	you	to	judge.		I	want	that	you	tell	me.		Was	she	feeble	minded?			My	mother?		Was	she?		Was	she?			The	affective	force	of	his	appeals	is	far	more	eloquent	than	the	words	he	fails	and	manages	to	find,	and	it	is	with	a	look	verging	on	the	piteous	that	Rolfe,	the	prosecutor,	having	given	him	time	to	pass	the	test,	passes	judgment:		‘I	feel	it	is	my	duty	to	point	out	to	the	Tribunal	that	the	witness	is	not	in	control	of	his	mental	processes.’		To	which	Petersen	replies:		 I	know	I’m	not.		Since	that	day.			I’ve	been	half	I’ve	ever	been.	The	Oscar	winning	performance	is	presumably	in	the	gap	between	what	the	character	says,	which	is	not	much	and	inadequate,	and	what	the	actor	makes	the	spectator	feel,	but	Clift’s	Petersen	is	a	kind	of	Hollywood	attempt	at	a	realization	of	Agamben’s	witness	who	cannot	speak,	or	the	‘subject	in	desubjectification.’	This	witnessing	or	desubjectification,	however,	can	never	be	spoken	through	language	alone,	through	‘constative	judgments,	illocutive	acts	or	enunciations.’		The	three	sentences	that	Petersen	speaks	seek	to	give	testimony	to	his	knowledge	of	himself	as	a	sterilized	not-man	not-person	(‘I	know	I’m	not’	
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which	is	also,	of	course,	his	acknowledgement	of	his	own	mental	incompetence),	his	knowledge	and	shame:	In	shame	the	subject	thus	has	no	other	content	than	its	own	desubjectification:	it	becomes	witness	to	its	own	disorder,	its	own	oblivion	as	a	subject.		This	double	movement,	which	is	both	subjectification	and	desubjectification,	is	shame.		(Agamben	Remnants	105-6)	His	blaming	of	his	mental	incompetence	on	his	sterilization	(‘that	day’)	and	the	powerful	if	logically	impossible	articulation	‘I’ve	been	half	I’ve	ever	been.’	is	at	once	an	expression	of	shame	in	the	sense	which	Agamben,	citing	Levinas,	describes	as	being	‘grounded	in	our	being’s	incapacity	to	move	away	and	break	from	itself’	and	of	subjectification/desubjectification.		The	archive	around	the	making	of	the	film	suggests	that	Kramer	exploited	Clift’s	actual	mental	and	physical	fragility	to	obtain	this	scene	and	these	lines.	The	actor	was	still	physically	scarred	after	a	near	fatal	car	crash	in	1956	and	visibly	in	the	throes	of	alcoholism	on	set,	incapable	of	remembering	lines:		Finally	I	said	to	him,	“Just	forget	the	damn	lines,	Monty.		Let’s	say	you’re	on	the	witness	stand.		The	prosecutor	says	something	to	you,	then	the	defense	attorney	bitterly	attacks	you,	and	you	have	to	reach	for	a	word	in	the	script.		That’s	all	right.		Go	ahead	and	reach	for	it.			Whatever	the	word	may	be,	it	doesn’t	really	matter.		Just	turn	to	Spencer	Tracy	on	the	bench	whenever	you	feel	the	need,	and	ad	lib	something.	It	will	be	all	right	because	it	will	convey	the	confusion	in	your	character’s	mind.”		He	seemed	to	calm	down	after	this.		He	wasn’t	always	close	to	the	script,	but	whatever	he	said	fitted	in	perfectly,	and	he	came	through	with	as	good	a	performance	as	I	had	hoped.	(Kramer	193)	Clift’s	own	incapacity	is,	however,	of	a	different	order	to	his	character’s	supposed	mental	incompetence.	How	could	Petersen	possibly	testify	or	bear	witness	to	his	own	mental	incompetence?	The	narrative	seeks	to	both	present	Petersen	as	
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‘mentally	incompetent’	and	to	provoke	sympathy	for	this	and	his	enforced	sterilization	through	an	impossible	ability	to	articulate	his	own	knowledge	of	his	own	mental	incompetence	and	his	ability	to	articulate	the	aporia	of	his	own	subjectification/desubjectification.		This	impossibility	underlies	many	of	the	attempts	to	give	voice	to	the	voiceless,	or	to	speak	for	the	unspeakable	population.	It	underlies	attempts	to	mediatize	or	to	theatricalize	incapacity	that	remain	unresolved	and	crucial	contradictions	in	the	development	of	theatrical	performance	involving	people	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	in	the	last	five	decades.		There	is	an	impossible	desire	and	demand	for	such	performance	to	give	testimony	and	bear	witness	to	the	lived	experience	of	intellectual	disability.		In	“Judging	Judgment	at	Nuremberg:	Law,	Justice	and	Memory	in	Hollywood”	David	Fraser	points	to	another	elision	in	the	Petersen	scene	that	centres	around	the	conflict	between	law	as	justice	and	law	as	law,	and	the	ability	of	law	to	judge	itself,	when	he	refers	to	Abby	Mann’s	stated	intentions	for	the	scene:		Mann	himself	stated	that	the	point	of	the	Peterson	episode	was	to	establish	not	just	the	general	nature	and	unacceptability	of	Nazi	eugenics,	but	to	make	the	broader,	liberal	and	humanist	point	that	even	if	we	accept	Petersen’s	“feeblemindedness”,	that	cannot	ever	serve	as	a	justification	for	the	use	of	compulsory	sterilization.	(10)	This	intention	is	undermined	by	a	scene	that	occurs	in	an	earlier	part	of	the	trial,	but	which,	as	Fraser	points	out,	is	then	never	referred	to	again.		In	this	scene	prosecutor	Rolfe	cross	examining	Dr	Vick,	a	former	teacher	of	Ernst	Jannings	refutes	Vick’s	comments	about	Nazi	Germany’s	‘novel	legislation’	on	the	
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sterilization	of	the	mentally	incompetent,	by	citing	the	following	earlier	judgment	cited	in	the	film	as	from	a	country	‘other	than	Germany’:	We	have	seen	more	than	once	that	the	public	welfare	may	call	upon	the	best	citizens	for	their	lives.		It	would	be	strange,	indeed,	if	it	could	not	call	upon	those	who	already	sap	the	strength	of	the	State,	for	these	lesser	sacrifices,	in	order	to	prevent	our	being	swamped	with	incompetence.		It	is	better	for	all	the	world,	if,	instead	of	waiting	to	execute	degenerate	offspring	for	crime	or	to	let	them	starve	for	their	imbecility,	society	can	prevent	their	propagation	by	medical	means	in	the	first	place.		Three	generations	of	imbeciles	are	enough.	14	These	are	of	course	the	words	of	the	American	jurist	Oliver	Wendell	Holmes,	who	in	the	landmark	case,	Buck	vs	Bell,	1927,	upheld	the	enforced	sterilization	of	Carrie	Buck,	who	it	was	claimed	was	a	mental	defective,	as	constitutional.		This	was	an	endorsement	at	the	level	of	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	of	the	eugenic	sterilization	programmes	of	California	and	some	twenty	seven	other	states.	In	fact	at	the	actual	Nuremberg	trials	Nazi	doctors	explicitly	cited	Holmes’	opinion	in	defence	of	their	actions.			In	the	context	of	the	trial	in	the	film	this	reference	is	used	by	Rolfe,	the	Defense	Attorney	to	render	problematic	pretensions	to	the	occupation	of	the	moral	high	ground	by	the	American	court	and	makes	the	word	‘Judgment’	in	the	title	resonate	much	closer	to	home	for	an	American	audience.		Indeed	in	the	period	immediately	prior	to	the	Second	World	War	there	was	a	sharing	of	information	on	eugenic	theories	and	practices	between	Germany	and	the	United	States.		The	1936	propaganda	film,	Erbkrank	(the	
																																																								14	U.S.	Supreme	Court	Buck	v.	Bell.								
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‘Hereditary	Defective’),	produced	by	the	Rassenpolitisches	Amt	or	Office	of	Racial	Policy	of	the	Nazi	regime,	was	distributed	in	1937	in	the	United	States	by	the	Pioneer	Fund.		It	showed	specimens	of	‘useless	eaters,’	accompanied	by	captions	detailing	how	much	it	cost	the	State	per	year	to	keep	them	alive.	People	with	a	range	of	intellectual	and	physical	disabilities	were	paraded	in	the	camera’s	gaze,	displayed,	scrutinized	and	selected	as	candidates	for	enforced	sterilization	or	‘euthanasia’.		Films	such	as	Erbkrank	and	the	1937	Opfer	der	Vergangenheit	(Victims	of	the	Past),	filmed	in	German	lunatic	asylums,	afford	the	viewer	the	sense	of	power	of	at	once	the	voyeuristic,	the	diagnostic	and	the	teratological	gaze.	They	provoke	a	response	in	the	viewer	that	is	characterized	by	a	dialectic	of	fascination	and	repulsion.				Bosley	Crowther	writes	of	the	fear	of	the	‘harrowing	and	distasteful	beyond	words’	that	could	be	unleashed	in	the	presentation	of	mental	retardation	in	A	Child	is	Waiting.	Is	this	fear	at	its	deepest	level	a	fear	of	confrontation	with	human	bodies	perceived	to	be	in	a	limit	state	between	human	and	animal?		This	fear	elides	both	an	acknowledgement	that	these	bodies	are	subjected	to	such	treatment	so	that	other	bodies,	that	is	‘our’	bodies,	might	be	deemed	normal	and	that	when	we	treat	or	view	other	bodies	as	‘mere	animals’	we	expose	our	own	being	as	‘animal’.		In	Remnants	of	Auschwitz	Agamben	cites	Walter	Benjamin	on	what	may	be	at	the	root	of	the	dialectic	in	this	fear:		For	Benjamin	the	predominant	feeling	in	disgust	is	the	fear	of	being	recognized	by	what	repulses	us	“The	horror	that	stirs	deep	in	man	is	an	obscure	awareness	that	in	him	something	lives	so	akin	to	the	animal	that	it	might	be	recognized.”	(106-7)	The	‘useless	eater’	is	deemed	as	less	than	animal,	a	human	who	is	deemed	not	to	meet	the	requirements,	or	fulfill	the	obligation,	of	being	human	and	therefore	
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whose	life	is	not	worth	living,	Lebensunwertes	leben.	In	Die	Freigabe	der	
Vernichtung	Lebensunwerten	Lebens	(Allowing	the	Destruction	of	Life	Unworthy	of	Life)	(1920)	Binding	and	Hoche,	part	of	the	Eugenics	movement,	first	proposed	that	such	people,	the	mentally	enfeebled	and	retarded	or	mentally	ill	be	eliminated	as	burdens	to	the	State.	This	proposal	was	first	implemented	in	
Aktion	T4	on	people	deemed	to	be	brain	damaged,	mentally	retarded,	mentally	ill	or	too	physically	disabled	to	survive,	until	the	category	of	Lebensunwertes	leben	was	extended	to	the	‘racially	impure’	or	‘racially	inferior’	and	the	Final	Solution	of	the	Jewish	Question.		The	brief	vision	of	the	adult	locked	ward	in	A	Child	is	Waiting	with	its	Goyaesque	figures	lost	in	themselves,	locked	away,	‘under	the	rocks,’	outside	the	social	order,	is	a	vision	of	the	potential	dark	future	of	the	mentally	retarded	children,	but	it	is	also	a	vision	of	the	recent	past	and	symptomatic	of	the	repression	of	that	past.		This	is	a	past	that	was	becoming	more	visible	but	only	in	the	sense	of	being	reduced	to	mere	mediatized	images,	a	past	that	as	it	becomes	more	important	to	remember	becomes	more	distant,	more	in	danger	of	being	forgotten	and	exterminated	in	the	memory.		Perhaps	the	compulsion	to	repeat	certain	elements	of	A	Judgment	at	Nuremberg	in	A	Child	is	Waiting	is	symptomatic	of	what	was	repressed	in	the	liberation	of	the	concentration	camps.	This	would	include	the	guilt	of	the	US	State	Department	having	done	nothing	when	informed	in	August	1942	of	the	nature	and	scale	of	the	Final	Solution,	the	guilt	that	the	pursuit	of	the	American	Dream	could	harbour	and	promote	eugenic	sterilization,	and	the	much	wider	guilt	of	being	complicit	that	Agamben	refers	to	as		‘the	common	tendency	to	assume	a	generic	collective	guilt	whenever	an	
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ethical	problem	cannot	be	mastered’	when	faced	with	the	moral	and	ethical	aporia	of	the	extermination.			
A	Child	Is	Waiting	is	an	early	part	of	a	movement	in	the	United	States	in	the	1960s	to	make	visible	those	people	categorized	as	mentally	retarded	or	mentally	ill,	people	who	were	housed	or	accommodated	or	warehoused	in	overcrowded,	decrepit	and	often	abusive	institutions.		The	scenes	of	liberation	of	the	concentration	camps	could	be	revisited,	repeated	or	re-enacted	in	the	liberation	of	these	institutions,	but	so	too	could	the	inherent	ethical	aporia	in	terms	of	the	politics	of	visibility	of	these	scenes,	an	aporia	that	often	continues	to	be	reiterated	in	the	presentation	and	representation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	theatrical	performance	since	that	period.		Goffman’s	study	of	Asylums	(1961),	his	analysis	of	‘total	institutions’	that	was	so	influential	in	the	anti-psychiatry	movement,	makes	frequent	references	and	comparisons	to	behaviour	witnessed	in	the	concentration	camps	and	cites	accounts	such	as	David	P.	Boder’s	I	Did	Not	Interview	The	Dead	(1949)	,	Eugene	Kogon’s	Theory	and	Practice	of	Hell	(1950)	and	Elie	A.	Cohen’s	Human	Behavior	
in	the	Concentration	Camp	(1953).			In	Remnants	of	Auschwitz	Agamben	refers	to	the	explicit	connections	Bruno	Bettelheim	(who	was	in	Dachau	and	Belsen	in	1938	and	1939)	makes	between	the	behaviour	of	prisoners	in	concentration	camps	and	that	of	the	autistic	children	he	studied:	For	him	the	Musselman	became	the	paradigm	through	which	he	conceived	his	study	of	childhood	schizophrenia	.	.	.The	Orthogenic	School,	which	he	founded	in	Chicago	to	treat	autistic	children,	thus	had	the	form	of	a	kind	of	counter-camp	in	which	he	undertook	to	teach	Muselmänner	to	become	men	again.	.	.There	is	not	one	character	trait	in	Bettelheim’s	detailed	phenomenology	of	childhood	autism	described	in	The	Empty	Fortress	that	
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does	not	have	its	dark	precursor	and	interpretative	paradigm	in	the	behavior	of	the	Muselmann	.	.	.	(46)		As	Agamben	points	out,	Bettelheim’s	motivation	is	both	interpretative	and	curative	and,	in	a	way,	compensatory,	in	the	sense	that	he	was	hoping	to	make	of	the	alienated	behavior	of	autistic	children	a	sense	that	he	had	not	been	able	to	make	of	the	behaviour	of	the	Muselmänner,	those	shuffling,	tottering	figures,	appearing	to	bow	in	a	grotesque,	etiolated	version	of	Moslem	prayer,	lost	to	the	world,	lost	to	themselves,	lost	to	self,	in	a	limit	state	blurring	life	and	death,	human	and	non-human:	humanity	at	a	limit-state	of	incapacity.	Agamben	intimates	that	Bettelheim’s	motivation	extended	to	the	messianic:	both	curing	the	autistic	child	in	the	present	and	somehow	reclaiming	the	Muselmänner	from	the	past	for	redemption	and	inclusion	as	human:		In	the	semi-cross-eyed	gaze,	hesitant	walk,	and	stubborn	repetitiveness	and	silence	of	Joey,	Marcie,	Laurie,	and	the	other	children	of	the	school,	Bettelheim	sought	a	possible	solution	to	the	enigma	that	the	Muselmann	had	confronted	him	with	at	Dachau.	(46-7)	Bettelheim	himself	in	the	introduction	to	The	Empty	Fortress:	Infantile	Autism	
and	the	Birth	of	the	Self	describes	how	the	connection	he	made	between	the	concentration	camps	and	autistic	children	was	inspired	by	an	encounter	with	Anna,	an	‘autistic’	young	girl	who	although	she	was	not	‘a	child	of	the	German	concentration	camps,	her	life	history	was	such	as	to	bring	them	sharply	to	mind’:			Through	her	the	phenomenon	of	the	camps,	which	had	long	occupied	much	of	my	personal	and	theoretical	interest,	became	somehow	linked	with	my	daily	work,	the	treatment	of	severely	disturbed	children.	(7)	But	the	actual	point	of	connection	or	overlap	between	the	observed	behavior	of	those	in	the	concentration	camps	and	the	observed	behavior	of	the	‘autistic’	
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children	is	the	observer:	Bruno	Bettelheim,	he	who	had	been	in	the	concentration	camps	both	observer	and	observed,	as	he	makes	clear	in	the	following,	in	which	the	emphases	are	mine:	Could	there	be	any	connection,	I	wondered,	between	the	impact	of	the	two	kinds	of	inhumanity	I	had	known	–	one	inflicted	for	political	reasons	on	victims	of	a	social	system,	the	other	perhaps	a	self-chosen	state	of	dehumanization	(if	one	may	speak	of	choice	in	an	infant’s	responses?)		For	myself	it	was	the	German	concentration	camps	that	led	me	to	introspect	in	the	most	personal,	immediate	ways	on	what	kinds	of	experience	can	dehumanize.		I	had	experienced	being	at	the	mercy	of	forces	that	seemed	beyond	one’s	ability	to	influence,	and	with	no	knowledge	of	whether	or	when	the	experience	would	end.		It	was	an	experience	of	living	isolated	from	family	and	friends,	of	being	severely	restricted	in	the	sending	and	receiving	of	information.		At	the	same	time	I	
felt	subject	to	near	total	manipulation	by	an	environment	that	seemed	focused	on	destroying	my	independent	existence,	if	not	my	life.	(7)	Bettelheim	equates	his	personal	experiences	of	the	camps	with	his	perceptions	of	the	behaviors	of	‘autistic’	children,	or	rather	he	equates	his	experience	of	what	he	calls	the	concept	of	‘extreme	situation’,	of	the	concentration	camp,	to	his	perception	and	understanding	of	the	behaviors	of	autistic	children.				From	this	position	of	subjectivity	and	unfalsifiability	he	can	then	read	
across	time	and	history	the	behaviors	of	both	concentration	camp	prisoners	and	‘autistic’	children:			Others	have	remarked	on	the	averted	gaze	of	autistic	children,	their	looking	vaguely	in	the	distance	without	seeming	to	see,	and	their	concentration	on	things	close	at	hand	where	there	is	nothing	to	see	but	their	own	twiddling	fingers.	.	.This	is	essentially	the	same	phenomenon	as	the	prisoner’s	averted	gaze.	Prisoners	were	inattentive	to	true	causality	in	their	lives	and	replaced	it	by	delusional	fantasy.		Their	nearly	continuous	daydreaming	was	a	close	parallel	to	the	self-stimulation	of	autistic	
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children,	as	in	their	repetitive	twiddling.		The	purpose	in	each	case	was	to	blot	out	recognition	of	an	immediate,	threatening	reality.	(67)	This	means	that	his	relationship	with	regard	to	the	Other	of	the	‘autistic’	children	is	one	characterized	by	appropriation.		He	reads	his	own	experiences	onto	the	children	and	by	doing	so	seeks	a	‘cure’	that	would	cure	him.		At	the	same	time	he	claims	that	whatever	suffering	or	trauma	he	perceives	in	the	children	is	in	some	way	his	own.			This	reading	of	his	own	trauma	onto	the	otherwise	unreadable	autistic	children	leads	to	the	double	negation	of	the	Other	in	self	and	other	and	is	a	pattern	of	ethical	behavior	which	besets	the	relationship	between	those	who	are	the	so-called	able,	usually	in	positions	of	power:	teachers,	therapists,	theatre	directors,	and	emerges	out	of	an	ethical	impasse:	the	impossibility	of	reacting	to	or	processing	the	moral	and	political	dimension	of	the	concentration	camps.		Bettelheim	views	autistic	children,	as	Goffman	views	the	inmates	of	asylums,	through	the	paradigm	of	the	concentration	camps.	The	autistic	children	and	the	asylum	inmates	were	abject	bodies,	about	which	it	was	felt	something	could	still	be	done,	unlike	the	ghostly	images	of	the	bodies	in	the	concentration	camps.	These	bodies,	at	least,	still	had	the	potential	to	be	saved,	or,	at	least,	to	be	seen	to	be	saved.			They	were	also	closer	to	home,	in	a	number	of	ways.		In	an	interview	filmed	in	1982	screenwriter	Abby	Mann	recalled	how	A	Child	is	Waiting	was	shown	in	a	special	screening	in	the	Whitehouse	to	President	John	F.	Kennedy	who	became	tearful	at	the	accompanying	speeches	that	described	the	plight	of	mentally	retarded	children	as	‘he	had	a	sister	who	was	retarded	who	meant	a	lot	to	him.’	15	The	reference	is	to	Rose	Marie	Kennedy,	a	member	of	the	high	
																																																								15	Mann	“Archive	Interview.”		
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achieving	Irish-American	family	who	failed	to	measure	up	educationally,	as	she	was	deemed	to	have	an	IQ	between	60	and	70	on	the	Stanford-Binet	test	obligatory	in	schools	in	Massachusetts	at	that	time.	She	was	subsequently	lobotomized	at	the	age	of	23	in	1941	and	institutionalized	from	1949	until	her	death	in	2005.		In	1965	the	President’s	brother,	Senator	Robert	Kennedy	made	an	unannounced	visit	to	New	York	State’s	Willowbrook	School	on	Staten	Island,	the	largest	State-run	institution	for	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	the	USA,	where	6,000	people	were	lodged	in	a	space	designed	for	4,000.	At	a	press	conference	Kennedy	stated:	I	think	particularly	at	Willowbrook	we	have	a	situation	that	borders	on	a	snake	pit.		The	children	live	in	filth	and	many	of	our	fellow	citizens	are	suffering	tremendously.	The	reference	to	‘snake	pit’	nicely	conflates	the	actual	with	the	mediatized	as	it	recalls	the	1948	Olivia	de	Havilland	film	The	Snake	Pit	a	melodrama	set	in	a	nightmarish,	bureaucratic,	brutal	mental	hospital.		This	kind	of	revisiting	of	the	scene	of	the	liberation	of	the	camps,	of	exposing	conditions	in	the	camps,	was	one	that	would	be	reiterated	many	times	at	this	period	by	campaigning	politicians	or	journalists	seeking	to	expose	dehumanizing	conditions.		Seven	years	after	Robert	Kennedy’s	visit,	television	journalist	Geraldo	Rivera	was	back	at	Willowbrook	presenting	an	exposé	of	‘The	Last	Great	Disgrace’	secretly	filming	inside	the	institution,	having	gained	access	with	a	stolen	key.		In	the	aftermath	of	Robert	Kennedy’s	visit	to	Willowbrook	and	Rome	State,	Blatt	and	Kaplan	published	their	photojournalistic	exposé	Christmas	in	Purgatory:	A	
Photographic	Essay	on	Mental	Retardation.		Its	opening	statement	announced:	There	is	hell	on	earth	and	in	America	there	is	a	special	inferno.		We	were	visitors	there	during	Christmas	1965.	(1)	
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The	book	is	filled	with	graphic,	grainy	black	and	white	images	of	incarceration,	neglect	and	abuse.		Naked	and	ill-nourished	inmates	wander	aimlessly	in	dilapidated	wards	and	dayrooms,	some	regard	the	cameras,	others	appear	to	be	squatting	or	rocking	back	and	forth,	lost	in	their	own	worlds,	beyond	hope,	for	all	the	world	like	so	many	Muselmänner.	This	work,	Kennedy’s	well–publicized	visits,	and	exposés	like	Geraldo	Rivera’s	are	often	cited	as	being	instrumental	in	the	changing	of	laws	and	the	treatment	of	those	marginalized	in	institutions	for	the	‘mentally	retarded’	and	the	mentally	ill	(groups	often	housed	together	in	institutions	at	this	period)	because	of	the	visibility,	meaning	mediatized	visibility,	they	afforded	people	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities.	They	may	be	seen	as	symptomatic	of	much	wider	movements	of	emancipation:	the	de-institutionalization	and	anti-psychiatry	movement	of	texts	as	diverse	as	R.D.	Laing’s	The	Divided	Self:	An	Existential	Study	in	Sanity	and	
Madness	(1960)	Michel	Foucault’s	Madness	and	Civilization,	which	appeared	in	various	forms	1961-1964	and	Ken	Kesey’s	One	Flew	Over	the	Cuckoo’s	Nest	(1962).			Few	would	argue	against	the	exposure	of	abuse	and	subsequent	closure	of	institutions	like	Willowbrook	in	the	United	States	and	institutions	elsewhere	in	the	Global	North,	but	it	could	be	argued	that	although	institutions	of	a	certain	type	were	exposed	and	shut	down,	the	abuse	of	this	vulnerable	sector	of	the	population	was	not.	It	was	merely	reiterated,	often	with	a	similar	level	of	cruelty,	within	the	more	liberal	‘de-institutionalized	institutions’,	halfway	houses	and	residential	units	that	came	to	replace	them.		It	was	reiterated	in	the	neglect,	abuse	and	bullying	that	is	often	the	lot	of	those	left	in	community	care	homes	or	left	in	the	‘care	of	the	community’,	a	laissez	faire	strategy	of	neoliberalism	that	
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presupposes	that	there	is	a	’community’	and	that	that	community	‘cares’.	Foucault	showed	in	Madness	and	Civilization	how	removing	the	chains	from	the	insane	in	asylums	was	not	the	hoped-for	moment	of	emancipation	but	merely	led	to	alternative	forms	of	observation,	self-observation	and	control.	Those	societies	of	discipline	Foucault	analysed	have	now	been	replaced	by	societies	of	control.	Just	as	systems	of	power	reiterate	themselves,	any	resistances	to	them	need	to	be	likewise	reiterative.			My	contention	is	that	because	the	movement	to	deinstitutionalization	was	in	some	ways	symbolically	seen	as	a	re-enactment	of	the	liberation	of	the	concentration	camps	this	has	had	a	profound	and	long-lasting	effect	on	how	people	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	are	both	viewed	and	treated.	The	ethics	of	the	relationship	between	people	with	and	without	intellectual	disabilities	are	formed	on	the	basis	of	both	victimization	and	a	generic	and	impersonal	othering.		Even	if	this	ethical	relationship	is	pursued	in	the	name	of	equality	and	emancipation,	the	victimization	and	othering	will	merely	be	reinstated	unless	there	is	a	re-distribution	of	the	sensible.		In	the	discourse	of	Disability	Studies	‘inclusion’,	itself	a	highly	problematic	term,	is	a	journey	and	perhaps	the	reason	it	needs	to	be	a	journey	is	that,	as	Hardt	and	Negri	have	shown	in	Empire	the	power	systems	of	‘Empire’	adapt	fluidly	to	encompass	and	incorporate	movements	which	seek	to	resist	and	disrupt	them,	hence	the	need	to	keep	changing	the	terms	on	which	these	resistances	are	made.					The	filmed	performance	contained	within	A	Child	is	Waiting	marks	an	early	moment	in	the	genealogy	of	the	involvement	of	people	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	in	theatrical	performance.	It	is	early	in	the	sense	that	the	groups,	theatre	and	dance	companies	associated	with	this	form	have	only	
	 95	
emerged	in	the	last	five	decades,	some	years	after	this	film	was	made.16	An	analysis	of	this	film,	therefore,	allows	a	consideration	of	some	of	the	determining	factors	that	have	influenced	the	subsequent	development	of	these	socially	minded,	emancipatory	theatre	practices.	What	I	also	hope	to	show	is	that	the	issues	and	paradoxes	raised	in	this	early	paradigm	are	reiterated	in	subsequent	attempts	to	initiate	and	establish	different	models	of	theatrical	performance	involving	people	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities.		The	subsequent	history	of	this	performance	form	is	not	a	telos	of	development,	progression	and	achievement:	there	is	a	recurrent	process	of	reinvention	of	what	this	theatre	might	be	and	this	is	what	reaffirms	its	‘political’	potential.		What	I	believe	is	at	stake	in	this	potential	is,	to	adapt	Foucault	in	the	introduction	to	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	Anti-Oedipus,	who	was	himself	adapting	St	Francis	de	Sales,	the	possibility	for	‘an	Introduction	to	the	Non-Fascist	life’	(xv)	by	means	of	the	involvement	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	a	dialectical	reconfigurement	of	incapacity	and	theatricality.	The	theatrical	performance	in	A	Child	is	Waiting	is	caught	between	the	spotlight	of	the	Hollywood	social	issues	drama	and	Cassavetes’	quasi-documentary	urge.		The	next	theatrical	performance	I	will	consider	is	framed	within	the	format	of	a	documentary,	but	the	presence	of	the	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	is	still	both	mediated	and	occluded	in	a	search	for	an	impossible	Real	through	the	particular	phantasms	of	creativity	of	a	non-disabled	director.																																																									16	The	National	Theatre	Workshop	for	the	Handicapped	in	New	York	was	started	in	1977,	Compagnie	de	l’Oiseau	Mouche	(France)	in	1978	Graeae	Theatre	Company	in	the	UK	in	1980,	Theatre	Terrific	in	Canada	in	1985,	Back	to	Back	Theatre	Company	in	Australia	in	1987,	Mind	The	Gap	(UK)	in	1988,	Theater	Maatwerk	(Netherlands)	1989	Theater	Rambazamba	(Germany)	1990,	Theater	Hora	(Switzerland)	1993	and	Touch	Compass	(New	Zealand)	1997.	
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Chapter	Two	
Mirror	Stages:	Aldo	Gennaro	and	Robert	Wilson	
Stepping	Out:	‘the	birth	of	a	theatre	of	the	mentally	handicapped.’	The	next	theatrical	performance	that	I	would	like	to	consider	in	this	highly	selective	genealogy	of	theatre	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	is	the	subject	of	a	documentary	film	made	in	Australia	in	1980,	the	first	International	Year	of	Disabled	Persons	as	designated	by	the	United	Nations.		
Stepping	Out,	directed	by	Chris	Noonan,	documents	the	rehearsal	process	of	a	group	of	residents	of	the	Lorna	Hodgkinson	Sunshine	Home	in	Sydney.		They	are	rehearsing	for	a	performance	at	the	Sydney	Opera	House	under	the	direction	of	the	Chilean	arts	therapist	and	theatre	director	Aldo	Gennaro,	a	former	Augustinian	priest,	who	had	been	employed	as	a	dramatherapist	at	the	Home	since	1977.		
Stepping	Out	is	an	important	documentary	record	that	has	been	highly	influential	in	the	development	of	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	Australasia.	The	film	is	also	an	early	document	of	an	attempt	to	give	voice	to	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		A	close	analysis	reveals	some	of	the	contradictions	and	tensions	in	the	underlying	ideas	and	assumptions	of	‘creativity’	as	a	methodology	towards	the	empowerment	or	emancipation	of	those	people	excluded	as	Other.	Just	as	A	Child	is	Waiting	is	interested	as	much	in	the	process	leading	to	performance	as	it	is	in	the	performance	event	itself,	Stepping	Out	spends	the	majority	of	its	fifty-four	minutes	on	the	processes	leading	to	the	performance	event	in	the	Sydney	Opera	House.		This	type	of	performance	seems	to	generate	expectations	of	a	particular	relationship	between	the	‘real’	and	the	theatricalized	
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in	performance.		It	is	a	document	at	an	early	stage	in	the	continuing	fascination	with	whether	this	type	of	performance	is	presentation	or	representation:	is	it	‘real’	or	performance,	are	these	people	truly	present	as	actors	or	merely	present,	just	‘being	themselves’	or	‘being	disabled?’	Underlying	this	is	the	fundamental	question	of	how	incapacity,	perceived	as	cognitive	or	communicative	disability,	can	be	negotiated	in	the	making	of	theatre.		Whereas	A	Child	is	Waiting	presented	a	performance	within	an	institution,	
Stepping	Out	presents	a	theatrical	performance	by	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	emerging	from	the	confines	of	a	segregated,	residential	institution	into	the	space	of	public	performance	in	the	Sydney	Opera	House.		The	documentary’s	subtitle	‘the	birth	of	a	theatre	of	the	mentally	handicapped’	connects	to	another	prominent	motif	of	both	the	theatrical	production	and	the	film:	the	transformation	of	the	chrysalis	into	the	butterfly,	another	kind	of	birth	in	which	something	bound	up,	hidden,	aesthetically	dysmorphic	and	unappealing	is	transmuted	into	something	beautiful,	liberated	and	emancipated	in	flight.		Various	different	meanings	of	‘stepping	out’	emerge	throughout	the	documentary.		This	includes	stepping	out	of	the	shadows	into	light,	a	stepping	out	into	visibility,	reflecting	Stanley	Kramer’s	intention	to	‘throw	a	spotlight’	on	the	subject	of	mental	retardation.	The	residents	of	the	home	are	stepping	out	into	the	theatre,	into	the	limelight,	into	the	public	gaze	or	scrutiny	or	into	normalcy	or	normalization.				They	are	also	stepping	out	of	the	Home,	stepping	out	of	the	shadows	of	the	institution.		Can	they	ever,	however,	step	out	of	institutionalization?		The	documentary	leaves	this	question	open.	If	Stepping	Out	documents	‘the	birth	of	a	theatre	of	the	mentally	handicapped’	what	kind	of	birth	was	it?	The	performance	in	the	Opera	House	
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was	a	reiteration	of	the	performance	in	A	Child	is	Waiting	in	that	it	was,	as	far	as	the	performers	were	concerned,	another	one-off	performance.		It	was	also,	however,	a	birth	later	to	be	reenacted	in	repeated	rebirths.		One	characteristic	of	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	over	the	last	fifty	years	is	that	in	various	places,	at	various	times,	groups	still	seem	to	feel	the	need	to	reinvent	the	wheel	of	this	type	of	theatre.		This	is	a	theatre	that	seems	to	exist	outside	of	tradition	and	of	historiography.		I	would	argue,	though,	that	this	need	to	reinvent	itself	is	one	of	the	strengths	of	this	theatre.		It	is	constantly	re-emerging	as	potential	rather	than	as	an	established	practice	and	tradition.		It	is,	therefore,	constantly	questioning	what	theatre	is	and	what	it	might	be,	and	in	this	alone	it	is	political	theatre.			‘Stepping	out’	also	means	taking	the	stage.		The	residents	of	the	Sunshine	Home	step	out	onto	the	stage	of	the	Sydney	Opera	House	but	it	is	important	to	consider	how	they	are	stepping	out	and	into	what	kind	of	‘theatre.’			This	involves	examining	on	what	terms	and,	crucially,	on	whose	terms	they	are	taking	the	stage:	with	what	kind	of	support	and	what	kind	of	expectations.			These	performers	‘step	out’	but,	as	the	documentary	sensitively	suggests,	they	are	still	perceived	as	out	of	step	with	the	world	around	them.		What	are	the	implications	for	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	both	stepping	out	and	being	out	of	step	in	an	aesthetic	and	social	context?		Petra	Kuppers	in	the	introduction	to	her	influential	work	Bodies	on	Edge	relates	this	‘out	of	step	stepping	out’	of	disability	artists	and	disability	culture	to	the	stepping	out	of	the	turtle	walker,	one	of	the	flâneurs	Walter	Benjamin	refers	to	in	his	work	on	Baudelaire:	
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Around	1840	it	was	briefly	fashionable	to	take	turtles	for	a	walk	in	the	arcades.		The	flâneurs	liked	to	have	the	turtles	set	the	pace	for	them.	(1)	The	turtle	walker	makes	an	appearance	in	the	arcade	that	causes	a	commotion	and	is	remarkable:	‘Difference	leaves	its	allocated	spaces	and	mixes	in	the	street.’	(1)	At	the	outset	of	the	documentary	the	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	arrive	at	the	Sydney	Opera	House,	already	in	costume	and	stepping	out	of	vans	marked	Lorna	Hodgkinson	Sunshine	Home.		They	are	doubly	‘marked’:	both	as	performers	–	although	perhaps	‘amateur’	performers	of	the	kind	who	are	to	be	seen	displaying	their	costumes	offstage	–	and	as	residents	of	a	special,	segregated	institution.			There	is	a	deliberate	uncertainty	of	context	and	ambiguity	of	perspective	in	the	opening	moments	of	the	documentary.			Chris	Dobbin,	one	of	the	residents,	a	young	man	with	Down’s	Syndrome	and	principal	actor	in	the	final	performance,	steps	out	onto	the	wooden	floor	of	the	Hall.			This	is	a	part	of	the	institution	used	for	large	gatherings	that	has	now	become	the	rehearsal	space	for	the	Drama	Group:	a	space	temporarily	set	apart	from	the	rest	of	the	institution.			What	is	this	space	that	he	is	stepping	out	into?		He	gracefully	undulates	his	arms	as	he	moves	across	the	floor	through	the	late	afternoon	sunlight	of	the	Hall,	his	barefoot	steps	are	carefully	chosen,	he	drops	on	one	knee	as	his	arms	continue	to	undulate.		These	images	are	accompanied	by	silence	and	then	ambient	diegetic	sounds:	his	bare	feet	on	the	wooden	floor,	the	voices	of	others	in	the	background	and	finally	the	first	limpid	chords	of	the	piano	soundtrack	by	Keith	Jarrett,	that	accompanies	his	movements.		The	documentary	shows	that	he	now	inhabits	a	space	set	apart	for	performance,	but	what	remains	uncertain	is	whether	this	is	the	performance	of	an	arts	practice	or	of	the	arts	as	therapy:	an	aesthetic	or	
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spiritual	exercise.	There	is	an	ambivalence	as	to	whether	this	is	the	first	steps	of	the	realization	of	an	as	yet	undiscovered	potential,	or	a	‘special	needs’	version	of	performance,	a	failed	seriousness	associated	with	amateur	dramatics	and	camp.		This	is	not	to	gainsay	the	intensity	of	his	engagement	in	what	he	is	doing,	but	ultimately	the	questions	arise	of	how	his	performance	is	framed.	After	the	shots	of	the	arrival	of	the	Home’s	buses	in	front	of	the	steps	of	the	Opera	House	and	the	smiles	and	hugs	and	the	flashes	of	cameras	as	residents	are	helped	off	the	buses,	the	next	shots	are	of	the	residents	being	made	up	as	performers.	Support	staff	of	the	theatre	project	apply	exaggerated	stage	makeup:	white	faces	and	heavy	lines	and	bright,	exaggerated	colours	around	the	eyes	on	the	lips	and	cheeks	as	the	performers	sit	in	rows	in	front	of	mirrors.		The	last	person	we	see	having	white	makeup	applied	to	his	face	is	Chris	Dobbins	just	as	the	first	voiceover	is	heard,	the	voice	of	Romayne	Grace,	one	of	the	residents:	Everyone	is	very	tense.		We	are	feeling	quite	erm	.	.	.	a	lot	nervous	(Stepping	Out)	We	then	see	a	shot	from	below	of	the	side	entrance	of	the	Opera	House	and	we	see	another	group	of	people	arriving,	dressed	up	for	a	night	out	in	their	evening	clothes:	the	audience	are	stepping	out	to	come	to	the	theatre.		The	camera	shows	a	poster	showing	Chris	Dobbins	in	makeup	and	costume	and	the	title	of	the	performance:	‘Life	Images	and	Reflections’.	The	camera	focuses	in	on	Chris’s	face	looking	out	from	the	poster	and	then	switches	back	to	a	match	cut	to	Chris’s	face	being	made	up	in	the	dressing	room.		We	see	other	faces	being	made	up	and	hear	Romayne’s	voice:		 It’s	quite	unusual	for	people	.	.	.of	us	to	do	something	like	this	and	I	think			 the	audience	are	going	to	get	a	kick	out	of	it	(she	laughs).	
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We	then	see	a	wall	marked	‘The	Lorna	Hodgkinson	Sunshine	Home’	and	the	documentary’s	narrative	takes	us	back	in	time	into	the	Home	and	the	rehearsal	process	that	will	lead	to	the	performance	at	the	Opera	House.		From	this	opening	sequence	we	can	see	a	vision	of	Chris	stepping	out	into	a	liminal	space	within	the	institution,	we	see	him	and	others	from	the	institution	transformed,	made	up	and	dressed	up	to	appear	before	others	who	are	dressed	up,	reflected	and	lit	by	mirrors	and	lights.		The	residents	of	the	Home,	with	the	collusion	of	the	dressed	up	audience,	are	stepping	out	into	the	glamour	and	spectacle	of	a	version	of	‘theatre’	as	Alain	Badiou	categorizes	it	in	Rhapsody	for	
the	Theatre:	The	ritual	insipidness	of	a	celebration	of	self,	some	laughs,	culture,	recognizable	figures,	feeling	always	one	foot	ahead,	answers	that	‘hit	the	nail	on	the	head’,	sublime	décor,	communion	during	intermission.		(23)		‘Theatre’	is	the	‘good	night	out’	of	entertainment,	in	good	taste.		Is	this	‘good	night	out’	in	any	way	affected	by	the	fact	that	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	are	involved?	This	remains	a	question	under	investigation.	The	flowing	multi-coloured	floral	fabrics	of	the	costumes	that	the	residents	of	the	Home	are	wearing	on	arrival,	the	heightened	‘operatic’	makeup	that	is	applied	to	their	faces	and	Chris’s	‘butterfly’	movement	sequence	in	rehearsal	all	indicate	that	the	‘aesthetic’	of	this	theatrical	performance	is	perhaps	suggestive	of	the	‘camp’	glamour	of	amateur	dramatics.		This	impression	is	supported	by	what	is	implied	in	the	careful	observation	and	editing	(from	fifteen	hours	of	footage)	of	the	rest	of	the	documentary.		In	Pure	Products	Go	Crazy,	Matt	Hargrave	suggests	the	use	of	‘camp’	in	considering	theatre	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	as	a	way	of	escaping	certain	binaries	of	judgment:	
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Camp	asks	that	we	celebrate	the	intensity	of	what	is	there.	Camp	offers	us	a	way	out	of	acting	as	a	hierarchy,	or	at	least	offers	a	joyful	fresh	perspective	on	it.	(49)	He	cites	Sontag’s	“Notes	on	‘Camp’”:	Camp	taste	turns	its	back	on	the	good/bad	axis	of	ordinary	aesthetic	judgement.			Camp	doesn’t	reverse	things.			It	doesn’t	argue	that	the	good	is	bad,	or	the	bad	is	good.		What	it	does	is	to	offer	for	art	(and	life)	a	different	-		a	supplementary	-		set	of	standards.	(61)		He	goes	on	to	argue	that	camp	‘offers	a	parallel	performance	universe’	that	seems	to	suit	the	performer	with	intellectual	disability	who	is	otherwise	doomed	to	be	‘always	playing	catch	up’	to	achieve	the	skill	and	virtuoso	of	the	techniques	the	trained	non-disabled	actor.				Susan	Sontag	specifies	the	particular	incapacity	underlying	camp:	In	naïve,	or	pure,	Camp,	the	essential	element	is	seriousness,	a	seriousness	that	fails.	(63)	It	is	a	kind	of	incapacitated	art,	just	as	‘amateur	dramatics’	implies	‘theatricality’	as	a	theatre	of	which	the	fakery	and	pretence	is	displayed	and	celebrated	and	which	establishes	its	own	community,	the	world	of	amateur	dramatics.	If	the	performers	in	Stepping	Out	are	presented	as	stepping	out	into	a	world	of	camp	and	amateur	dramatics	then	the	begged	question	is:	whose	camp	is	the	camp	of	the	performance?		Who	has	chosen	this	strategy	and	for	whose	benefit:	who	is	‘in	on’	the	camp?		It	could	be	argued	that	the	sensibility	of	the	performance	comes	largely	from	the	director/dramatherapist,	Aldo	Gennaro,	but	it	is	unlikely	that	he	is	actively	trying	to	achieve	‘camp.’		His	methodology	and	aesthetic	is	inspired	by	a	spiritual	philosophy	of	encouraging	or	bringing	out	‘creativity’,	building	confidence	to	facilitate	self-expression	–	but	whose	‘self’	is	being	expressed?		The	answer	to	this	question	is	in	the	mirror.	
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The	documentary	is	sufficiently	subtle	and	sensitive	to	present	various	kinds	of	mirroring	either	as	confirmations	and	reassurance	of	normality	or	as	the	distorted	reflections	that	question	the	very	structure	and	construction	of	normality.	The	documentary	in	its	editing	suggests	a	mirroring	of	the	segregated	and	set	apart	spaces	of	the	two	institutions-	the	Lorna	Hodgkinson	Sunshine	Home	and	the	Sydney	Opera	House:	a	mirroring	of	the	corridors	and	shut	doors	of	both,	as	well	as	the	attendants	or	supporters	who	make	the	performers	up	in	the	special	time	of	performance	in	the	dressing	room	but	also	provide	a	different	kind	of	care	and	attention	in	the	time	of	the	daily	routine	of	the	institution.			After	the	sequence	of	the	arrival	of	the	two	groups	-	the	‘mentally	handicapped’	performers	and	the	audience	-	the	documentary	takes	the	viewer	back	to	the	institution	out	of	which	the	theatrical	performance	emerges.		We	see	in	long	shot	residents	standing	outside	various	buildings	in	the	Home	and	then	in	interior	shots	the	camera	brings	the	viewer	close	up	to	two	naked	young	boys	in	a	communal	bathroom	being	scrubbed	down	with	flannels	by	female	staff	members.			The	documentary	suggests	that	this	institutional	care	of	‘feeding,	washing	and	toileting’	mirrors	the	care	taken	to	apply	makeup	and	costume	the	performers.		Romayne	Grace,	one	of	the	residents	and	participants	in	the	theatrical	performance	supplies	the	main	narrative	voice	of	the	documentary.	The	documentary	thus	eschews	an	omniscient	or	neutral	narrative	voice.		The	documentary	also	reveals	through	Romayne’s	voiceover	the	mechanisms	of	control	that	are	so	much	in	operation	in	the	lived	experience	of	the	residents	of	the	Home	that	they	have	been	internalized	at	the	level	of	their	discourse.		What	Romayne	and	the	other	residents	desire	is	rarely	fully	or	clearly	articulated	and	
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needs	to	be	intimated	or	interpreted	from	what	they	say.			Interpretation	involves	deconstructing	the	clash	of	their	desires	and	the	other	voices	in	their	heads	that	censor	or	police	what	can	be	said	or	thought.		When	we	hear	Romaine	Grace’s	voice	say:	“	Most	of	the	people	will	be	here	for	the	rest	of	their	lives,”	accompanied	by	shots	of	residents	smiling	and	playing	a	ball	game	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	she	says		‘most	of	the	people’	and	not	‘all	of	the	people.’	We	learn	later	in	the	film	that	she	and	her	boyfriend	Chris	Dobbins	have	dreams	of	stepping	out	of	the	institution	and	living	together.		Perhaps	the	use	of	‘most	of	the	people’	is	evidence	of	a	desire	on	her	part	to	exclude	Chris	and	her	from	this	group,	in	the	hope	that	they	will	be	among	the	few	who	might	escape	this	fate.		With	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	however,	this	desire	proved	to	be	no	more	than	wishful	thinking:	it	took	another	twenty	five	years	before	the	one	hundred	and	thirty	remaining	residents	finally	left	the	Lorna	Hodgkinson	Sunshine	Home.		When	they	did,	in	2005,	they	were	all	transferred	into	smaller	group	homes.		After	she	says	“Most	of	the	people	will	be	here	for	the	rest	of	their	lives,”	the	camera	switches	to	a	longshot	down	a	long,	asylum-like	corridor,	at	the	end	of	which	we	view	a	young	girl	spinning	around	and	around	on	the	spot	repetitively;	the	next	shot	cuts	to	rows	and	rows	of	residents	seated	at	long	tables	in	a	workspace	folding	letters	and	stuffing	them	into	envelopes:	the	implication	is	that	although	‘free	time’	and	work	time	have	a	different	topography	-	circularity	and	linearity	-	they	share	the	same	repetitiveness.		Romayne	Grace	then	lists	the	ages	and	lengths	of	time	spent	in	the	Home	of	six	of	the	residents,	whom	we	will	come	to	know	as	some	of	the	forty	residents	who	are	taking	part	in	the	theatrical	production.	The	lengths	of	time	range	from	
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twelve	to	twenty	eight	years.	She	gives	us	this	information	in	the	following	form,	repeated	for	each	person:		“This	is	Una.		She	‘s	thirty	eight.		She	came	to	Sunshine	when	she	was	ten.”		The	active	voice	of	the	verb	in	the	third	and	final	sentence	implies	an	agency	at	the	grammatical	level	that	elides	Una’s	lack	of	agency	in	what	presumably	happened	to	her	at	age	ten.			Romayne	identifies	herself	last:	she	is	twenty-one	and	came	to	Sunshine	when	she	was	nine.			She	adds	her	own	joky	rider,	which	she	accompanies	with	a	laugh:	‘I’d	just	like	to	say	that	anyone	that’s	been	in	Sunshine	since	they	were	nine	is	crazy!’	On	one	level	she	may	be	indulging	in	an	antipodean	penchant	for	self-deprecation:	anyone	who’s	been	in	Sunshine	since	they	were	nine	is	crazy,	perhaps	‘crazy’	to	have	stayed	there	that	long	–	as	if	they	had	a	choice,	or	even	possibly	‘crazy’	in	a	good	way	–	in	the	sense	of	the	grimly	cheery	workplace	cliché	‘you	don’t	have	to	be	crazy	to	work	here	–	but	it	helps!’		On	another	level	the	sentence	could	have	the	connotation	of	‘if	anyone	has	been	in	Sunshine	for	nine	years	they	will	be	crazy,	the	institution	will	institutionalize	you	and	drive	you	crazy’.		If	it	is	an	ironic	statement,	though,	then	whose	is	the	irony?	Who	is	party	to	the	irony,	who	is	in	control	of	the	irony?		Some	sixteen	and	a	half	minutes	into	the	documentary	we	see	a	male	announcer	on	a	black	and	white	television	screen	who	appears	to	be	a	voice	of	authority,	and	certainly	what	he	says,	in	an	accent	heavily	inflected	with	the	vowel	sounds	and	articulation	of	English	Received	Pronunciation,	sounds	authoritative:	1981	is	the	Year	of	the	Handicapped	but	residents	of	the	Lorna	Hodgkinson	Sunshine	Home	can’t	wait	for	that	.	.	.		(Stepping	Out)	
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There	is	an	implied	cheery	impatience	and	agency	in	the	phrase	‘but	residents	.	.	.	can’t	wait	for	that’	that	belies	the	fact	that	these	particular	children	have	been	waiting	all	of	their	lives	in	this	institution	and	even	when	the	Year	of	the	Handicapped	arrives	it	will	not	lead	to	their	emancipation	or	change	their	material	circumstances.		The	announcer’s	face	on	the	television	screen	has	filled	the	cinema	screen	as	he	has	been	speaking	but	as	he	says	‘can’t	wait	for	that’	we	hear	a	noisy	reaction	from	a	group	of	people	and	the	next	shot	pulls	back	away	from	a	television	monitor	and	reveals	a	group	of	residents	of	the	Home	in	a	communal	television	room	watching	the	broadcast.			One	of	them	shushes	and	encourages	the	others	to	be	quieter	as	the	announcer	continues:	.	.	.they’ll	be	staging	a	unique	theatrical	performance	at	the	Opera	House	next	week.	It	will	be	the	first	public	appearance	by	a	group	of	intellectually	handicapped	.	.	.	actors.	He	leaves	a	slight	but	noticeable	pause	and	moves	his	head	forward	as	he	stresses	the	word	‘actors.’	He	cites	them	as	‘actors’,	as	if	not	quite	believing	it,	they	are	presented	as	actors	in	inverted	commas.			The	television	screen	then	shows	outside	broadcast	footage	of	the	entrance	to	the	Home:		residents	of	different	ages,	some	holding	hands,	accompanied	by	staff,	troop	into	the	institution.		At	first	as	the	images	of	the	institution	appear	on	the	television	screen	one	resident	is	heard	saying	“Ooh”	but	the	kind	of	‘ooh’	indicative	of	embarrassment	rather	than	wonder.		There	then	follows	a	sequence	of	non-verbal	expressions	of	emotion	and	individual	and	group	reactions.		Initially	there	are	sounds	associated	with	embarrassment	and	then	as	the	reaction	spreads	among	the	whole	group,	some	cheers	or	sounds	emerge	indicative	of	recognition,	approval,	or	even	excitement.		The	next	shot	
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shows	some	thirty	or	forty	of	them	sitting	in	the	television	room.		A	female	voice-over	from	the	television	news	footage	is	heard	saying:		There	was	a	time	when	brain	damaged	children	were	hidden	away	and	too	often	the	hiding	place	was	a	bleak	institution.		Out	of	sight	out	of	mind.		No	thought	was	given	to	enriching	their	lives.		No	thought	to	their	right	to	develop.		During	this	the	camera	pans	slowly	around	the	group	of	residents	in	the	television	room.			The	juxtaposition	of	the	Australian	television	news	programme’s	narrative	of	the	historical	conditions	of	‘brain	damaged	children	being	hidden	away	in	.	.	.	a	bleak	institution’	with	the	images	of	the	residents	of	the	Lorna	Hodgkinson	Sunshine	is	also	ironic.		There	was	a	time	when	brain	damaged	children	were	hidden	away	in	institutions	but	look	now	at	this	progressive	institution	and	its	residents	becoming	actors.	The	initial	response	in	the	television	room	to	the	appearance	of	the	Sunshine	Home	on	the	screen	is	a	kind	of	ironic	response	in	the	control	of	and	communicated	by	the	residents.		The	television	broadcast	voiceover	that	speaks	of	brain	damaged	children	and	bleak	institutions	juxtaposed	with	the	panning	shot	of	the	residents	seems	to	me	to	be	an	irony	which	is	more	in	the	control	of	the	film-makers.			It	is	more	difficult	to	locate	where	the	knowledge	and,	therefore,	the	agency	is	in	the	irony	of	Romayne’s	joke	about	‘anyone	that’s	been	in	Sunshine	since	they	were	nine	is	crazy.’			There	is	an	element	of	her	laughing	off	what	in	many	ways	is	an	intolerable	situation,	but	there	is	also	the	possibility	that	the	film-makers	are	making	her	the	subject	of	an	irony	of	which	she	may	be	unaware.		Obviously	the	entire	text	of	her	voiceover	is	selected	and	edited	by	the	film-makers	but	in	the	context	of	the	whole	documentary	we	see	enough	of	Romayne	Grace	in	a	variety	of	interactions	with	others	to	make	a	judgment	that	
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she	is	capable	of	a	complexity	of	response	to	situations	over	which	she	has	no	apparent	control.		That	particular	irony	might	then	be	said	to	have	been	negotiated	between	Romayne	and	the	film-makers.	Noonan’s	documentary	technique	is	a	version	of	the	cinéma	verité	employed	by	Cassavetes,	but,	of	course,	such	a	‘fly	on	the	wall’	technique	is	never	neutral	or	objective.		In	the	sequence	in	the	television	room	I	believe	the	documentary	opens	up	the	possibility	of	a	multiplicity	of	perspectives,	the	‘view’	of	the	mentally	handicapped	implied	in	the	television	broadcast,	the	patronization	of	the	word	‘actors’,	the	viewpoint	of	the	residents	looking	at	this	mediatization	of	their	life	in	the	institution.		This	multiplicity	of	perspectives	encourages	the	possibility	for	an	ambivalence	of	response	in	the	spectator.		The	viewer	is	encouraged	to	question	how	the	residents	are	supposed	to	interpret	or	respond	to	what	is	being	said	about	them.		The	talk	of	‘brain	damaged	children’	cannot	be	assumed	to	be	going	over	the	residents’	heads.	This	is	possibly	an	indication	of	the	dialogic	process	in	which	Noonan	engaged	with	the	subjects	of	his	documentary:	the	residents	of	the	Sunshine	Home	and	Aldo	Gennaro.		Authority	and	power	may	not	have	a	voice	that	is	overt	in	the	documentary	but	the	residents	are	powerfully	controlled	by	the	gaze	and	the	stare,	the	various	ways	in	which	they	are	interpellated	or	included	but	only	on	‘special’	terms.		The	institutional	constraints	in	the	Sunshine	Home	in	1980	are	more	liberal	and	relaxed	than	those	of	the	US	institutions	of	the	1960s	period	but	what	the	documentary	reveals	both	explicitly	and	implicitly	is	the	systems	of	control	that	govern	the	behavior	of	the	residents	at	the	level	of	thinking,	feeling	and	desiring	both	within	the	Home	and	when	they	leave	the	Home	on	sanctioned	excursions.				
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Romayne	is	not	so	much	an	untrustworthy	as	an	incapacitated	narrator.		She	is	a	narrator	not	apprised	of	all	the	facts	of	her	situation.		This	is	not	because	of	her	‘mental	handicap’	but	because	what	she	can	say	is	constrained	within	discursive	formations	that	diminish	her	ability	to	express	desire	and	to	take	action.		She	is,	for	example,	operating	under	the	pressure	to	be	a	cheery,	self-deprecating	Aussie,	as	an	attempt	to	appear	or	to	‘pass’	as	normal.		She	is	also	a	resident	in	a	segregated	institution,	where	staff	look	after	and	support	her,	but	also	control	her	liberties	and	rights,	where	freedoms	and	privileges	need	to	be	negotiated	constantly,	a	situation	within	which	cheerful	compliance	and	being	what	Foucault	in	Discipline	and	Punish	termed	a	‘docile	body’:	‘A	body	that	may	be	subjected,	used,	transformed	and	improved’	(36)	might	achieve	far	more	than	stubborn	rebellion	or	resistance.		It	is	extremely	difficult	for	her	to	express	her	desires	and	frustrations	overtly.		This	is	illustrated	in	a	scene	in	the	hall	of	the	institution.		Aldo	Gennaro	leads	the	group	through	contact	improvisation	pair-work	exercises,	and	Romayne	says:	Being	in	the	hall,	it’s	cut	off	from	the	Home	when	we’re	using	it.		It’s	like	a	home	away	from	home,	you	might	say.		I	think	it	was	a	good	place	to	work.		As	we	hear	her	speaking	of	a	‘home	away	from	home’	we	see	the	residents	in	the	exercises	touching	each	other	and	lying	on	top	of	each	other	and	Romayne	herself	doing	an	exercise	in	which	she	and	her	boyfriend	Chris	mirror	each	other,	which	then	collapses	joyfully	into	cuddling	and	hugging.		The	camera	goes	back	to	show	others	in	the	midst	of	exercises	and	switches	back	to	Romayne	and	Chris	in	intimate	conversation,	at	exactly	the	same	time	as	her	voice-over	continues:		
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and	I	think	we	should	have	our	room	to	ourselves	no	matter	what	anyone	
says.	(my	emphasis)	She	thus	indirectly	cites	and	challenges	the	voices	of	the	staff	of	the	Home	or	of	the	family	members	implied	in	the	phrase	‘no	matter	what	anyone	says.’		In	a	later	scene	in	which	we	see	Romayne	and	Chris	‘stepping	out’	from	the	Home,	unsupervised,	to	walk	to	the	local	dairy	to	buy	ice	creams	and	this	is	accompanied	by	an	extended	voice-over	during	which	Romayne	says	of	Chris:	I	don’t	think	I’d	give	him	up	for	anything.		Not	even	if	I	was	given	five	dollars	I	wouldn’t	give	him	up.		He’s	too	beautiful	–	in	spite	of	what	Mum	
says	.	.	.	(my	emphasis)	Again	the	assumption	is	that	a	voice	of	authority	seeks	to	gainsay	Romayne’s	desire.		Whether	‘what	Mum	says’	is	intended	to	be	an	indication	of	Romayne’s	mother’s	serious	disapproval	or	of	her	affectionate	deprecation	of	Chris	as	a	boyfriend	is	difficult	to	determine.		What	does	become	apparent	in	this	extended	sequence	is	the	difficulty	for	Romayne	and	Chris	to	express	intimate	feelings.		The	documentary	presents	this	incapacity	in	carefully	observed	scenes.		Romayne	and	Chris	step	out	of	the	Sunshine	Home	in	order	to	spend	some	time	together,	suggesting	another	meaning	of	‘stepping	out	together’	or	dating.		There	are,	however,	a	number	of	limitations	on	just	how	far	they	can	step	out.		They	go	to	a	dairy	just	across	the	road	and	practically	on	the	Sunshine	Home	campus,	but	even	so	the	documentary	shows	the	difficulties	they	experience	trying	to	cross	the	road	as	traffic	flies	past.		At	one	point	Romayne	makes	a	start	to	go	across	but	she	has	to	check	and	stop	herself,	thus	unbalancing	herself.			She	grabs	onto	Chris’s	hand	who	then	also	loses	his	balance	and	it	takes	them	quite	a	while	to	cross	the	
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street.		The	documentary	captures	both	the	vulnerability	of	their	desire	and	the	fragility	of	the	possibility	of	their	emancipation	from	the	institution.	The	shopowner	asks	them	what	ice	creams	they	would	like.	Chris	points	at	a	display	showing	images	of	the	various	products.		The	shop-owner	is	uncertain	as	to	what	he	is	pointing	at	and	asks,	“A	Splice?	Or	a	Gaytime?”	to	which	Chris,	wishing	to	assimilate	and	participate	in	the	dialogue	even	at	the	expense	of	his	own	preference,	replies,	simply:	“Yes.”		The	shop-owner	then	says	something	about	not	being	sure	he	has	any	left,	searches	around	in	the	refrigerator,	then	turns	to	Romayne	and	suggests:	“What	about	two	Triple	Treats?”	Romayne	and	Chris	both	eagerly	and	happily	agree	to	this	suggestion.		The	documentary	shows	their	docility	in	settling	for	what	is	easiest	or	for	what	others	tell	them	should	be	desired.		Crossing	the	road	or	buying	an	ice-cream	become	activities	fraught	with	difficulty	not	because	of	any	innate	‘mental	handicap’	but,	the	documentary	implies,	as	a	result	of	their	lack	of	independence	from	the	institution.			When	Romayne	later	talks	about	her	feelings	for	Chris,	her	desire	for	intimacy	is	in	tension	with	the	path	of	least	resistance	of	settling	for	what	is:	I’d	like	to	be	a	lot	closer	to	him	but	at	the	moment	we	can’t.		I’m	trying.	Chris	is	enjoying	it.		I	am.	.	.	Maybe	in	the	future	we	might	get	married	or	have	kids	but	for	the	time	being	I’m	right	(she	laughs)	the	way	I	am.		I	think	Chris	is	too.		Cos	there’s	a	lot	of	work	to	going	into	being	married	and	having	kids.	There	may	well	be	the	encouragement,	advice	or	even	the	demand	of	others	at	stake	in	the	option	of	‘choosing’	a	homeostasis	that	becomes	her	identity:	‘I’m	right	the	way	I	am.’		When	she	says	‘Cos	there’s	a	lot	of	work	to	going	into	being	married	and	having	kids’	it	sounds	like	a	citation	of	someone	else’s	voice	or	
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viewpoint,	a	recitation	of	what	she	has	been	told	is	best	for	her,	a	policing	of	her	desire	that	she	has	internalized.			It	is	interesting	to	look	at	how	Romayne	herself	seems	to	regard	the	performance	in	which	they	are	both	involved,	and	its	effects	on	their	relationship:		I	think	once	the	play	is	over	and	everything	settles	all	down	again	I	think	we’ll	be	quite	happy	again	because	at	the	moment	we’re	having	a	bit	of	a	task	trying	to	keep	together	and	–	I	don’t	know	.	.	.		As	she	and	Chris	sit	on	a	bench	outside	the	dairy	eating	their	ice-creams	she	addresses	Chris	directly,	voicing	her	underlying	fear	of	his	engaging	in	public	performance:		I	reckon	you’ll	be	going	into	showbusiness	the	rate	you’re	going.		Yeah.	Honest.	You’ll	be	going	into	it	if	I’m	not	careful!	I’ll	be	losing	you	to	all	the	women	out	in	the	air	–	out	in	the	world!	Her	fear	of	losing	Chris	to	showbusiness	or	to	all	the	women	out	in	the	world	may	be	a	displacement	of	what	for	her	is	an	unarticulable	fear:		losing	Chris	to	another	relationship,	that	with	the	director	Aldo	Gennaro.		Earlier	in	the	film,	in	a	section	that	introduces	the	viewer	to	the	spaces	and	rhythms	of	the	institution,	we	see	a	shot	of	Aldo	Gennaro	sitting	cross-legged	on	the	floor	of	the	Hall	surrounded	by	the	forty	residents	in	the	Drama	Group	seated	in	imitation	of	him.		He	is	taking	them	through	breathing	exercises,	a	technique	common	to	both	meditative	practices	and	actor	training,	that	takes	on	an	interesting	resonance	in	the	context	of	a	Home	for	the	‘mentally	handicapped.’		Much	conventional	actor	training	is	a	kind	of	unlearning	or	via	negativa:	unlearning	and	relearning	how	to	walk,	to	handle	objects	or,	indeed,	how	to	breathe.	This	training	assumes	a	kind	of	incapacity	or	dis-ability	on	the	part	of	
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the	actor	in	training	who	needs	to	unlearn	their	particular	habits	to	achieve	a	neutral.17	The	residents	commit	to	the	exercises	with	remarkable	intensity	and	focus,	perhaps	because	they	are	used	to	being	approached	as	if	they	are	incapacitated.	We	then	see	Aldo	Gennaro	take	a	smaller	group,	that	includes	Chris	Dobbins	and	Romayne	Grace,	through	the	‘mirror	exercise.’		At	this	point	we	hear	for	the	first	time	his	voice-over,	with	his	own	distinctive	grasp	of	English:	These	people,	for	the	first	time,	they	start	unlocking	themselves.		Institutions,	whatever	institution	happen	to	be,	suppress	individual	creativity.	Creativity	is	our	tool	to	keep	growing.	It’s	no	other	one.	The	mirror	exercise	has	become	a	commonplace	of	actor	training	in	many	countries	but	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	Aldo	Gennaro	from	Chile	would	have	come	across	it	through	the	work	of	Augusto	Boal.	The	point	of	the	exercise	is	that	at	some	point	it	should	become	unclear	who	is	leading	or	who	is	following:	‘we	seek	ourselves	in	others	who	seek	themselves	in	us’	(126).		His	methodology	becomes	apparent	in	a	scene	in	which	we	first	see	Chris	standing	holding	two	oriental	circular	fans	with	his	arms	crossed	in	front	of	his	chest.		Behind	him	in	the	Hall	are	two	upright	mirrors.		We	then	see	Aldo	Gennaro	standing	facing	him,	his	hands	crossed	over	his	chest	in	an	identical	way.		It	is	clear	Chris	is	mirroring	Aldo,	as	mimesis,	rote	repetition.	We	see	Aldo	lock	eyes	with	Chris	and	Chris	with	Aldo	and	hear	Aldo’s	words	in	voice-over:	I	see	Chris	the	thing	he’s	good	in,	the	thing	he	feels	completely	free	and	joyful	with,	is	movement,	dancing,	he’s	present	that	with	all	his	body,	but	at	the	same	time	he’s	a	very	insecure	-	have	a	lot	of	lack	of	confidence	because	suddenly	he’s	exploring	something	new	to	him	.	.	.																																																									17	Carrie	Sandahl	‘The	Tyranny	of	the	Neutral’	discusses	how	this	approach	excludes	many	actors	with	disabilities.		Sandahl	and	Auslander	255-267.	
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The	only	thing	I	can	give	is	just	the	little	touch	of	confidence.	The	next	shot	cuts	to	Aldo’s	car	driving	through	Sydney.		He	and	Chris	emerge	and	go	into	a	shop	where	Aldo	puts	various	kimonos	on	Chris.	There	are	shots	of	Chris	looking	at	himself	open-mouthed	in	a	mirror.	He	practises	a	fluttering,	undulating	movement	with	the	fingers	of	both	hands.		He	seems	to	be	practicing	the	movements	of	transformation	into	the	butterfly.	These	fluttering	fingers	crossfade	into	a	scene	in	which	Chris	is	in	the	Hall,	he	sits	back	on	his	heels	dressed	in	the	kimono	from	the	shop,	Aldo	Gennaro	sits	in	a	similar	way	facing	him,	they	bow	to	each	other	and	bring	their	heads	back	up,	they	are	mirroring	each	other	again.				The	Keith	Jarrett	piano	soundtrack	then	becomes	more	intense	and	developed	and	mixes	with	a	recording	of	“Un	bel	di	vedremo”	by	Maria	Callas,	as	Aldo	leads	Chris	in	movement	through	the	space	and	shows	him	the	pose	he	wishes	him	to	make.		Chris	duly	imitates	Aldo’s	pose,	and	imitates	Aldo’s	liquid,	expressive	‘feminine’	gestures	as	he	extends	his	arm	and	gracefully	upturns	his	hand.		Chris	is	imitating	Aldo	imitating	Madame	Butterfly.	The	camera	follows	Chris	through	the	space,	past	a	supremely	uninterested	female	resident	sitting	on	the	stage,	as	Aldo	leads	Chris	in	a	sweeping	circular	movement	around	the	space	with	one	arm	across	the	body,	hand	and	fingers	extended	and	the	other	reached	out	behind	as	if	a	force	is	impelling	the	body	to	move	against	its	will,	and	in	that	struggle	La	Callas	hits	a	swooping,	beautiful,	but	pained,	climactic	note.			The	camera	often	catches	Aldo	and	Chris	gazing	one	at	the	other,	caught	in	each	other’s	reciprocal	gazes.		During	another	rehearsal	sequence	in	the	Hall,	Aldo	looks	on	as	Chris	improvises	a	butterfly	dance	at	the	end	of	which	Chris	looks	to	Aldo	for	approval,	which	is	given,	to	the	obvious	delight	of	Chris.			We	
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then	see	a	montage	sequence	of	residents	putting	on	various	costumes	for	the	production,	and	Chris	bare	chested	putting	on	a	white	kimono,	walking	with	his	arms	undulating,	and	finally	wearing	the	kimono,	walking	delicately	on	the	balls	of	his	feet,	his	arms	undulating	gracefully	like	the	wings	of	a	butterfly	and	wearing	a	black	wig	with	the	hair	caught	up	in	a	bun	in	the	style	of	a	Japanese	female.		We	are	shown	the	stages	in	his	transformation	into	a	version	of	Madame	Butterfly,	hinting	at	another	motif	of	the	production:	the	emergence	of	a	butterfly	from	a	chrysalis	as	a	paradigm	of	spiritual	development,	the	unlocking	of	creativity	in	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.			As	this	transformation	proceeds	we	notice	around	the	edges	of	the	Hall,	others	looking	at	him,	staff	members,	some	not	really	knowing	what	to	make	of	what	they	are	seeing.		We	even	catch	sight	of	Romayne.		As	Chris	passes	her,	he	fails	to	see	her,	lost	in	his	transformation.			The	documentary	makes	the	viewer	aware	of	these	other	viewpoints	around	Aldo	and	the	Drama	Group,	the	viewpoints	of	those	who	are	not	as	invested	in	the	importance	of	the	production,	or	who	are	suspicious	of	the	camp	theatricality’s	threat	to	established	orders	of	able	and	disabled,	male	and	female.				The	documentary’s	carefully	edited	revelation	of	gazes	and	stares	is	even	more	apparent	in	a	sequence	in	which	Aldo	Gennaro	takes	a	group	of	residents	out	of	the	Home	to	buy	leotards.	They	go	to	a	specialist	dance	outfitters	in	one	of	Sydney’s	shopping	arcades,	the	distinctive	late	nineteenth	century	edifices	themselves	modeled	on	Parisian	models.		It	is	a	scene	of	stepping	out	reminiscent	of	Petra	Kupper’s	citing	of	Benjamin’s	turtle	walker	and	the	Parisian	arcades.		The	camera,	positioned	one	floor	above,	shows	Aldo	Gennaro	leading	or	shepherding	a	group	across	a	footbridge	in	the	arcade.		The	camera	angle	seems	
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to	heighten	the	sense	of	the	exposure	of	the	group,	of	their	difference	from	the	other	shoppers	in	the	arcade;	some	of	the	shoppers	stop	and	stare	at	the	unusual	or	remarkable	group.		Accompanying	these	images	is	Romayne’s	voice-over:	At	the	moment	people	on	the	outside	don’t	realize	that	we	even	do	exist.		I	think	that’s	very	bad	because	we	do	exist	and	yet	it’s	also	very	hard	for	us	because	getting	to	know	people	on	the	outside	is	even	harder.	The	camera	shows	Chris	emerging	from	the	changing	rooms	in	a	sleeveless	powder	blue	leotard	that	is	extremely	figure-hugging,	especially	around	his	genitals.		The	next	shot	shows	a	mirror	in	which	a	female	shop	assistant	is	visible	taking	a	long	look.		Chris	goes	in	front	of	another	mirror,	looks	at	himself	and	makes	a	gesture	with	his	arms	that	starts	as	a	flexing	of	his	biceps	but	develops	into	an	odd	kind	of	movement	with	his	shoulders	forward,	suggestive	of	his	undulating	butterfly	wing	movements.			The	next	shot	is	a	very	noticeable	intercut	to	another	young	female	shop	assistant	standing	to	one	side	and	exhaling	cigarette	smoke	and	looking	up,	her	eyes	flicking	from	side	to	side	in	some	astonishment	–	the	inference	of	the	film	grammar	of	the	documentary	is	that	her	astonished	look	is	at	Chris.		There	is	then	a	full-length	shot	of	David,	a	lithe	twenty-year	old	with	long	dark	hair	who	is	shown	in	a	white	leotard	with	sheer	white	tights.		The	camera	pans	down	his	body	and	then	there	is	an	abrupt	intercut	to	the	same	female	shop	assistant	whose	mouth	is	now	open.		She	looks	to	the	side	to	see	if	anybody	else	can	see	what	she	is	seeing,	and	her	eyes	open	wider	as	she	repeats	this	action.	The	camera	then	cuts	to	a	pan	up	from	David’s	legs	encased	in	white	tights	to	reveal	him	now	in	a	different	figure-hugging	leotard	of	bright	pink.		Intercut	with	Chris	and	David	gazing	at	their	transformations	in	the	full-length	mirrors	are	the	stares	and	double-takes	of	the	young	female	shop	assistant	who	clearly	cannot	
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quite	believe	what	she	is	seeing.		Whether	her	unguarded	reactions	are	to	the	unusual	and	remarkable	display	of	the	‘mentally	handicapped’	in	public	or	to	the	barely	suppressed	homoeroticism	of	this	scene,	or	both,	is	not	clear.		What	is	it	that	is	on	display	here?		Stepping	out	here	is	not	only	‘cripping	the	arcade’	-	the	unusual	appearance	of	a	group	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	a	dance	outfitters	in	Sydney	in	1980	–	but	perhaps	also	‘queering	the	arcade’.		Given	that	homosexual	acts	were	still	criminal	offences	in	the	state	of	New	South	Wales	at	this	time,	and	given	the	repression	of	sexuality	in	institutions	like	the	Sunshine	Home,	anything	that	the	documentary	can	show	must	be	implicit	or	suggestive	of	love	that	dared	not	yet	speak	its	name.	In	the	climactic	scenes	of	the	theatrical	production	we	see	Chris	out	in	front	of	the	stage	curtain,	caught	in	two	spotlights,	dressed	in	a	‘male’	kimono,	holding	up	two	fans,	moving	them	until	they	are	across	his	chest.		The	fans	are	decorated	to	resemble	butterfly	wings.		These	actions	are	accompanied	by	chords	on	a	Japanese	shamisen	and	a	male	voice	recites	the	following	extract	of	a	prose	poem	“The	Chrysalis”	by	the	Rosicrucian,	Frances	Ono,	on	the	spiritual	trope	of	the	emergence	of	the	butterfly	from	the	chrysalis:		In	a	luminous	early	morning	meadow	I	happened	upon	a	new-born	butterfly	climbing	out	of	its	green,	gold-spotted	case.			Here	is	a	being	changed,	transformed,	my	mind	thought.		And	within	his	mind	a	person	may	incubate	new	attitudes	about	himself.		He	will	grow	and	change	within	and	suddenly	emerge	anew,	a	changed,	more	fulfilled	person.18	The	camera	then	shifts	perspective	to	a	backstage	view	of	Aldo	Gennaro	looking	out	at	Chris	through	gauze	screens	and	then	back	to	Chris	as	he	ceremoniously	changes	into	the	‘female’	kimono	and	dons	the	black	wig,	the	hair	of	which	is																																																									18	Qtd	in	Rosicrucian	Beacon		
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caught	up	into	a	bun	with	a	coronet	of	cherry	blossom.		We	are	now	shown	Chris	as	a	version	of	Cio	Cio-San	from	Puccini’s	Madame	Butterfly,	in	a	scene	that	conflates	the	opera’s	most	famous	aria,	“Un	bel	di	vedremo”,	from	Act	II	with	the	ending	of	the	opera:	Cio	Cio	San’s	performing	seppuku	or	ritual	suicide.		Chris	moves	upstage	to	pull	back	screens	that	reveal	three	large	mirrors	in	a	triptych	arrangement	facing	the	audience.			As	Maria	Callas’	voice	swells,	he	picks	up	a	sheathed	Samurai	sword,	comes	downstage,	turns	his	back	to	the	audience	and	faces	the	upstage	mirrors,	and	Aldo	Gennaro	behind	them.		He	then	kneels,	lifts	the	sheathed	sword	horizontally	high	above	his	head,	unsheathes	it,	holds	it	with	both	hands	high	above	him	until	a	phrase	in	the	music	finishes	with	a	great	crash	of	a	gong	at	which	point	he	brings	the	sword	into	his	body	and	falls	to	the	floor.		He	then	drags	his	body	upstage	toward	the	mirrors,	holding	his	right	arm	up	high,	fingers	fluttering	as	he	drags	himself	upstage.		The	arm	with	the	fluttering	fingers	drops	lower	and	lower	until	his	hand	hits	the	stage	and	his	movement	ceases.		The	music	continues	as	the	audience	is	left	to	gaze	at	the	prone	body	split	into	multiple	reflections	in	the	three	upstage	mirrors.		The	lights	dim,	the	screen	goes	to	black	and	there	follows	a	two-minute	sequence	of	applause.			The	relationship	of	Aldo	and	Chris	is	presented	in	the	documentary	as	a	narrative.	It	is	one	among	other	narrative	strands	in	the	documentary:	the	progression	of	the	theatrical	production	from	rehearsal	to	performance,	the	journey	of	the	residents	from	the	segregation	of	the	Institution	to	appearance	in	public	at	the	Sydney	Opera	House,	the	transformation	of	the	residents	into	actors	and	their	growth	in	confidence	and	(self-)	performance	skills,	the	waving	of	the	flag	of	inclusion	in	Australia	in	the	International	Year	of	the	Disabled	Person.		All	
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of	these	narrative	strands	have	an	underlying	telos	of	development	but	the	Aldo-Chris	narrative	is	different,	its	underlying	features	are	lack	and	loss.		The	documentary	attempts	again	and	again	to	capture	the	‘presence’	or	the	elusive	Real	of	the	‘mentally	handicapped’	residents	or	performers,	but	these	moments	reveal	themselves	to	be	instead	what	Phelan	in	Unmarked:	the	Politics	
of	Performance,	adapting	Lacan,	terms	‘the	hole	in	the	Signifier	or	the	Real-impossible’	and	what	is	exposed	are	the	processes	of	signification	and	representation:		Representation	follows	two	laws:	it	always	conveys	more	than	it	intends;	and	it	is	never	totalizing.	The	“excess”	meaning	conveyed	by	representation	creates	a	supplement	that	makes	multiple	and	resistant	readings	possible.	Despite	this	excess,	representation	produces	ruptures	and	gaps;	it	fails	to	reproduce	the	real	exactly.	(2)	These		‘ruptures	and	gaps’	are	particularly	apparent	in	the	play	of	significations,	intimations	and	possible	interpretations	around	the	presentation	of	the	relationship	between	Chris	Dobbins	and	Aldo	Gennaro.		Chris’s	climactic	butterfly/Madame	Butterfly	sequence	represents	the	climax	of	the	presentation	of	the	spiritual	or	psychoanalytic	tropes	of	mirroring	and	transformation	and	of	the	relationship	that	has	been	developing	between	Chris	and	Aldo.		What	it	is	that	is	being	enacted	in	Chris’s	climactic	solo	scenes	on	the	stage	of	the	Opera	House?		He	is	first	presented	in	a	frame	of	exotic	difference,	an	Orientalist	‘inscrutability.’		Perhaps	this	attempt	to	‘other’	Chris	racially	is	an	attempt	both	to	exoticise	him	and	make	reference	to	his	otherness	as	a	young	man	with	Down’s	Syndrome.		His	movements	are	slow,	precise	and	ritualistic	as	he	transforms	onstage,	putting	the	more	ornately	decorated	full-length	‘female’	kimono	over	the	shorter	plain	blue	‘male’	one	and	placing	the	‘female’	wig	on	his	
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head.		The	voiceover	that	accompanies	his	actions	speaks	of	an	observer	viewing	the	emergence	of	a	butterfly	out	of	its	‘case’	and	how	that	inspires	in	the	observer	thoughts	of	how	‘the	mind’	can	change	the	self	so	that	a	new	‘more	fulfilled’	person	will	emerge.		At	the	linguistic	level	this	text	appears	to	flirt	with	difference,	the	observer	is	differentiated	from	the	butterfly,	the	mind	from	the	observer	‘s	thoughts	and	the	abstracted	person	–	the	abstracted	person’s	attitudes	and	this	‘person’	before	and	the	changed	person	after	the	thought	transformation	but	in	effect	any	idea	of	difference	or	otherness	is	elided	in	the	identification	of	the	I	of	the	observer	with	the	butterfly	and	with	the	mind	and	the	abstracted	person	of	the	indefinite	article.		The	text	assimilates	any	difference	or	otherness	into	what	Levinas	in	Totality	and	Infinity	terms	the	Same	of	identification:	The	I	of	representation	is	the	natural	passage	from	the	particular	to	the	universal.		Universal	thought	is	a	thought	in	the	first	person.		(126)	This	appropriation	of	Difference	into	the	Same	operates	at	the	level	of	this	spoken	text	but	also	determines	and	informs	other	aspects	of	Aldo/Chris’s	performance	text.	Differences	are	elided	into	identification,	the	‘difference’	of	Japanese	culture	is	elided	with	Chris’s	difference	of	appearance	as	a	person	with	Down’s	Syndrome	and	elided	with	Aldo	Gennaro’s	difference	as	a	South	American	migrant,	a	former	priest	and,	according	to	the	laws	of	the	time,	a	sexual	deviant.		All	of	these	differences	of	course	are	posited	as	difference	from	a	norm,	a	majoritarian	or	universalizing	‘mainstream’	but	their	elision	merely	creates	a	kind	of	universal	and	transcendent	idea	of	‘Difference’	which	is	behind	all	diversities	subsumed	in	the	notion	of	‘diversity’	prevalent	at	that	time,	encapsulated	by	the	following	list	in	Aspects	of	Creativity	by	Dulcie	M.Stone	a	
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colleague	and	contemporary	of	Gennaro:		‘people	who	are	disabled,	disadvantaged,	unemployed,	nursing	home	residents,	prisoners,	children,	the	aged,	and	other	non-mainstream	people.’	(108)	As	the	scene	proceeds,	Chris/Aldo	transforms	into	a	version	of	Cio	Cio	San,	an	elision	or	slippage	of	identity	in	terms	of	sexual	difference.		In	characterizing	the	theatre	of	drag	as	the	best	performative	example	of	the	phallic	function	Peggy	Phelan	states:			Performing	the	image	of	what	he	is	not	allows	him	to	dramatize	himself	as	“all.”	But	the	performance	of	drag	does	not	and	cannot	reproduce	“the	woman.’’	(17)	The	scene	on	the	Opera	House	stage	when	Chris	steps	out	as	Cio	Cio	San	is	a	complex	nexus	of	enactment	part	drag,	part	camp,	part	projection	and	introjection	vis	a	vis	Aldo	Gennaro	and	Chris	Dobbins.	Aldo	Gennaro	is	projecting	or	acting	out	through	the	performance	of	Chris	his	own	desire	to	‘dramatize	himself	as	all’	to	see	himself	in	Cio	Cio	San	and	to	see	himself	in	the	feminized	‘mentally	handicapped’	young	man,	but:	The	failure	to	secure	self-seeing	leads	again	to	the	imagination	of	annihilation	and	castration.	(20)	In	his	reworking	of	Puccini’s	opera	Aldo	Gennaro	is	impelled	to	conflate	Cio	Cio	San’s	aria	with	her	suicide:	‘the	scopic	drive	returns	us	to	the	failure	of	representation.’	(20)	The	split	within	the	subject	and	between	the	subjects	is	laid	bare	in	the	diffusion	and	dissolution	of	images,	personae	and	representations	of	butterfly/Madame	Butterfly/Maria	Callas/Aldo/Chris	and	this	is	realized	theatrically	in	the	closing	image	of	Chris’s	prone	body	and	the	three	reflections	in	the	three	mirrors.			Chris	has	stepped	out	into	Aldo	Gennaro’s	phantasm,	a	phantasm	incorporating	elements	of	drag	and	camp.		
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What	Aldo	Gennaro	took	away	from	the	experience	of	the	performance	in	the	Opera	House	is	articulated	in	this	extract	from	a	radio	interview	with	Caroline	Jones	on	‘The	Search	for	Meaning’:		That	was	the	first	time	I	experienced	real	love	in	my	life,	unconditional	love.	And	these	people	have	the	ability.	They	don't	love	you	because	you	are	special,	they	love	you	because	the	only	thing	they	do	is	love.	And	every	time	an	intellectually	disabled	person	touched	me,	I	feel	something	very	special,	I	felt	something,	a	sense	of	release	and	I	realise	some	sort	of	healing	having	happening	inside	of	me.	For	they	are	very	wounded	people,	and	they	have	the	ability,	they	are	the	healers,	the	only	real	healers	having	come	involved	in	my	life.		Aldo	Gennaro	as	dramatherapist	gives	an	emotional	account	of	how	he	is	the	recipient	of	a	kind	of	therapy	as	well	as	a	practitioner,	an	account	that	also	reveals	a	fetishization	of	the	Other	in	his	view	of	the	residents,	a	thematization	of		‘the	mentally	handicapped’	Others	as	quasi-shamanistic	wounded	healers.	There	is	also	a	record	of	what	happened	to	Gennaro	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	release	of	the	documentary	in	article	in	The	Age	of	29th	December,1981:		The	board	of	the	institution	criticized	an	“excessive	display	of	affection”	between	two	of	the	people	in	the	film.		Later	Aldo	Gennaro	and	several	staff	members	were	sacked.	(“Drama	Review”)	The	Sydney	Morning	Herald	of	27th	December	1980	also	referred	to	how	Gennaro’s:		reformist	approach	to	the	care	of	the	handicapped	brought	him	into	conflict	with	the	tried	and	established	practices	at	the	home	and	he	lost	his	job.		and	continues	more	explicitly:		
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Mr	Gennaro	believes	in	the	rights	of	the	handicapped;	rights	to	freedom	of	expression,	both	artistic	and	sensual	.	.	.raising	the	question	of	the	sexuality	of	the	handicapped.	(“A	Voice	to	be	Heard”)	Gennaro’s	interview	on	“The	Search	for	Meaning”	was	conducted	just	before	his	death	in	1987	from	an	AIDS-related	illness	and	in	the	archive	around	that	interview	there	is	a	reference	to	his	being	one	of	the	first	people	in	Australia	to	speak	publicly	about	dying	of	AIDS.	There	is	no	similar	archive	for	Chris	Dobbins	or	the	forty	or	so	members	of	the	Drama	Group	at	the	Lorna	Hodgkinson	Sunshine	Home.			It	is,	therefore,	more	problematic	to	speculate	about	what	Chris	received	in	the	process,	what	the	nature	of	the	ethical	relationship	was,	whether,	in	Spinozan	terms,	his	capacity	to	act,	in	an	aesthetic	and	political	meaning	of	the	word,	was	augmented	or	diminished.	It	could	be	argued	that	Aldo	Gennaro’s	methodology	was	bad	directorial	practice,	that	Chris	could	not	have	been	empowered	in	a	process	of	mere	imitation	and	that	at	a	deeper	psychoanalytic	level	Aldo	is	projecting	his	own	wishes,	desires,	phantasms	trauma	and	attempts	to	deal	with	his	own	sense	of	difference	onto	Chris.		An	argument	may	be	made	that	Aldo	Gennaro	was		‘acting	out’	his	desires	and	wish	fulfillments	through	the	performance	of	Chris	Dobbins,	that	he	was	imposing	or	projecting	his	tastes,	his	desires,	his	phantasms	and	his	trauma	onto	Chris	to	heal	his	own	‘self’:	The	pleasure	of	resemblance	and	repetition	produces	both	psychic	assurance	and	political	fetishization.		Representation	reproduces	the	Other	as	the	Same.	(Phelan	Unmarked	3)	Chris	Dobbins	‘imitates’	Aldo	Gennaro’s	gestures	and	mannerisms	and	his	imitation	may	be	very	good.		As	an	institutionalized	‘mentally	handicapped’	
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person	he	may	have	developed	a	capacity	for	imitation	as	a	coping	strategy	to	assimilate	or	pass	as	normal.		If	we	look	at	the	specific	gestures	and	movements	of	what	Chris	is	attempting	to	imitate	in	those	moments	of	Aldo’s	rehearsal	process	recorded	in	the	documentary	then	we	become	aware	that	Chris’s	imitation	of	Aldo	is	already	an	imitation	of	an	imitation	Aldo	is	himself	imitating	Cio	Cio	San,	imitating	a	gendered	female	Other,	an	Orientalist	Other	and	Chris	is	imitating	this.			If	we	stop	to	consider	what	is	at	stake	in	Aldo’s	strategy	of	enacting	the	gestures	and	mannerisms	of	Cio	Cio	San,	they	may	well	be	modeled	on	an	actual	female	body	performing	similar	gestures,	but	as	Judith	Butler	has	pointed	out	in	“Imitation	and	Gender	Insubordination”,	a	female	body,	or	a	body	gendered	as	female	is	already	an	imitation:			Gender	is	a	kind	of	imitation	for	which	there	is	no	original;	in	fact,	it	is	a	kind	of	imitation	that	produces	the	very	notion	of	the	original	as	an	effect	and	consequence	of	the	imitation	itself.	(125)	Aldo	Gennaro	is,	however,	not	trying	to	get	Chris	to	imitate	a	‘female’	body	but	to	imitate	a	‘drag’	version	of	a	‘female’	body,	to	refer	again	to	Judith	Butler:	There	is	no	original	or	primary	gender	a	drag	imitates,	but	gender	is	a	kind	of	imitation	for	which	there	is	no	original.	(127).	This	hall	of	mirrors	of	imitations	of	imitations,	in	part	explains	Aldo	Gennaro’s	use	of	mirrors	in	the	production,	Life	Images	and	Reflections,	which	is	then	developed	by	Chris	Noonan	in	the	film	Stepping	Out.	Does	all	this	mirroring	reflect	back	a	narcissistic	self-realization	of	Aldo	Gennaro	enacted	on	Chris	Dobbin	or	an	imago,	a	distortion	of	Gennaro	that	disrupts	and	undermines	his	unitary	image	of	himself?			
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Gennaro’s	transfiguration	of	himself	and	Chris	is	haunted	by	melancholia	as	he	punishes	himself	for	his	desire.		The	phantasm	of	Chris	as	Cio	Cio	San	has	to	kill	her/himself.			So	again	in	attempting	to	investigate	Chris’s	agency,	the	figure	of	Aldo	steps	up,	because	at	a	deep	level	Aldo	projects	his	own	phantasm	of	transfiguration	and	melancholia	onto	Chris	and	this	is	in	effect	all	there	is	for	Chris	to	imitate.		When	John	Haydon	Langdon	Down	observed	the	‘Mongolian	idiots’		in	“Observations	on	an	Ethnic	Classification	of	Idiots”	he	saw	in	their	supposed	facility	for	imitation	and	mimicry	a	method	of	transforming	these	stigmatized	and	hopeless	cases	into	socially	useful	and	productive	subjects:			This	faculty	of	imitation	may	be	cultivated	to	a	very	great	extent,	and	a	practical	direction	given	to	the	results	obtained.	(262)	Down	assumed	that	this	imitative	faculty	could	be	employed	in	the	imitation	of	the	‘originals’	of	socially	acceptable	or	socially	and	economically	useful	behaviour.		Erving	Goffman’s	radical	insight	in	The	Presentation	of	the	Self	in	Everyday	
Life		was	that	just	as	gender	has	no	original,	the	self	itself,	as	in	the	performance	of	self	in	the	everday,	may	be	likewise	a	performative	construction:		A	correctly	staged	and	performed	scene	leads	the	audience	to	impute	a	self	to	a	performed	character,	but	this	imputation	–	this	self	–	is	a	product		of	a	scene	that	comes	off,	and	is	not	a	cause	of	it.	The	self,	then,	as	a	performed	character,	is	not	an	organic	thing	that	has	a	specific	location,	whose	fundamental	fate	is	to	be	born,	to	mature	and	to	die;	it	is	a	dramatic	effect	arising	diffusely	from	a	scene	that	is	presented,	and	the	characteristic	issue,	the	crucial	concern,	is	whether	it	will	be	credited	or	discredited.		(252-3)				
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This	would	locate	Down’s	faculty	of	‘Mongolian	idiots’	for	imitation	in	the	social	sphere	as	an	imitation	of	an	imitation	for	which	there	is	no	original.		So	if	people	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	may	achieve	‘credit’	by	imitating	socially	productive	or	acceptable	behaviour,	what	of	such	faculty	for	imitation	in	the	supposedly	aesthetic	sphere	of	theatre?		Following	Goffman’s	insight	that	the	self	may	be	performative	in	everyday	life	then	the		distinction	between	‘social’	and		‘aesthetic’	begins	to	breakdown.	In	the	moments	of	his	performance	Chris	Dobbins	steps	out	to	inhabit	the	place	of	‘actor’	or	‘dancer’		on	the	Opera	House	stage	which	presumably	changes	the	perceptions	of	his	capabilities	in	those	viewing	him.		From	the	perspective	of	the	audience	in	the	Opera	House	he	shows	his	capacity	for	‘drama’	in	the	sense	of	gestures	and	behaviours	appropriate	to	the	musical	soundtrack,	costumes	settings	and	props,	he	shows	his	ability	to	inhabit	a	character	or	persona	very	different	from	his	own.		It	is	interesting	to	examine	what	emerges	in	the	discourse	and	attitudes	of	those	staff	supporting	the	residents	as	performers.	In	the	dressing	room,	a	woman	slightly	off	camera,	who	has	been	putting	make-up	on	Chris,	pronounces	him	and	the	group	“true	actors	tonight”	as	she	taps	him	on	the	shoulder,	in	a	kind	of	echo	of	the	Australian	television	announcer’s	inverted	commas	of	emphasis	around	the	word	‘actors.’		The	residents	are	specially	marked	as	‘actors’,	but	only	on	this	particular	occasion.	The	implication	is	that	when	they	leave	the	Opera	House	they	cease	to	be	‘actors’	in	both	an	aesthetic	and	social	sense.	On	the	other	hand	the	residents	themselves,	in	the	face	of	fairly	persistent	enquiry	into	how	they	are	feeling	or	whether	they	are	nervous,	respond	to	concerns	over	their	well-being	with	statements	such	as:		“I	know	how	to	calm	myself	down	and	pull	myself	together”	and	“I	can	take	it	as	it	comes	to	me.		I	really	can.		I	can	take	it	as	
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a	man.		I	can	take	it,”	in	which	it	is	apparent	that	‘acting’	for	them	is	a	form	of	validation	as	a	person,	a	marker	of	a	kind	of	capacity	not	normally	ascribed	to	them.	 The	documentary	uses	particular	visual	metaphors	and	metonyms	to	represent	the	‘presence’	of	the	residents/performers.		One	prevalent	image	is	of	faces	in	chiaroscuro,	the	white	face	of	the	performer	in	makeup	caught	in	the	hand-held	lighting	in	the	darkness	backstage.	Backstage	is	a	liminal	space	and	time	in	which	the	camera	seeks	the	very	moments	when	a	Sunshine	Home	resident	is	transforming	into	an	Opera	House	performer.	Given	that	these	performers	are	people	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	their	passage	from	the	darkened	spaces	of	the	wings	backstage	to	the	brightly	lit	space	onstage	resonates	as	a	metaphor	for	the	journey	out	of	the	institution	into	visibility	or	inclusion.		They	are	faces	in	transition	between	darkness	and	light,	in	a	state	of	becoming	or	potential.		There	is	a	tendency	throughout	the	documentary	to	fetishize	the	heads	or	the	faces	of	the	performers,	particularly	those	with	the	distinctive	features	of	Down’s	Syndrome	as	if	by	dwelling	on	them	the	camera	might	penetrate	the	mystery	of	their	identity.		When	these	faces	are	covered	in	white	face	makeup	a	new	veil	is	added	which	heightens	the	mystery:	does	the	Real	behind	the	appearance	of	the	residents	become	more	or	less	visible	in	theatrical	performance?			The	documentary	asks	the	question	but	leaves	the	answer	open.		What	was	achieved	by	the	performers	stepping	out?		How	might	the	social	or	political	efficacy	of	this	performance	be	assessed?		The	performance	was	an	important	moment	in	the	genealogy	of	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disability	in	Australia	and	beyond.		In	Australia	this	
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performance	was	a	precursor	to	a	burgeoning	disability	culture	of	theatre	and	dance	which	has	seen	the	development	of	companies	such	as	Back	to	Back,	Restless,	Rawcus,	No	Strings	Attached,	and	support	organisations	such	as	Arts	Access	Australia	with	an	explicit	commitment	to	‘intellectual	disability	arts.’		I	would	contend	something	else	was	achieved.		A	particular	artistic	and	social	vision	of	Aldo	Gennaro,	a	vision	of	‘creativity’	applied	to	the	‘disadvantaged’	led	to	Chris	and	the	others	stepping	out	on	the	stage	of	the	Opera	House.		What	emerged,	however,	was	greater	than	the	sum	of	the	parts	of	the	production	with	its	community	arts	aesthetic,	and	its	vague	social	justice	and	spiritual	agenda.		The	documentary	bears	traces	of	an	emergent	‘something	else’	that	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	bring	to	theatrical	performance.	The	efficacy	of	the	performance	and	documentary	was	perhaps	greatest	with	regard	to	the	scenes	of	‘excessive	display	of	affection’	that	created	a	dissensus	that	led	to	the	dismissal	of	Aldo	Gennaro	and	other	staff.		These	scenes	indicate	the	possibility	of	a	shift	in	perception	of	what	can	be	seen	or	heard	or	said	of	people	with	intellectual	disability,	a	shift	in	perception	from	infantilized	to	sexual	beings.			This	potential	sexuality	also,	of	course,	underscores	the	various	fetishizations,	mirrors	and	veils	of	representation	of	the	Chris-Aldo-Madame	Butterfly	scenes.	After	the	first	screening	of	the	documentary	this	potential	for	emancipation	was,	however,	immediately	foreclosed	by	the	sacking	of	Gennaro	and	the	return	to	the	Institution	of	the	residents,	now	no	longer	the	Drama	Group.			 These	scenes	that	caused	such	offence	or	such	dissensus	retain	their	force	in	the	documentary	in	the	Hall	in	the	Sunshine	Home,	in	the	‘home	away	from	home’	that	Romayne	describes.	She	connects	this	‘home	away	from	home’	to	
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another	imaginary	space:	‘I	think	we	should	have	a	room	of	our	own,	no	matter	what	anyone	says’	she	blurs	her	desire	for	a	space	of	intimacy	with	Chris	with	the	intimacy	the	space	in	the	Hall	became	during	the	scenes	of	physical	contact	and	improvisation.		In	these	scenes	we	see	her	seated	next	to	Chris	on	the	floor,	they	lean	their	heads	against	each	other,	they	kiss,	not	demure	kisses	on	the	cheek,	but	fully	engaged	open	mouthed	kisses.		We	see	them	lie	on	the	floor	and	touch	each	other,	head	pressed	against	head,	arms	around	each	other.		These	scenes	make	us	aware	of	a	different	kind	of	voyeurism.	Perhaps	a	re-distribution	of	the	sensible	takes	place	in	our	viewing.		In	these	scenes	of	intimacy	in	the	‘home	away	from	home’	that	which	is	both	heimlich	and	unheimlich	comes	into	view:	bodies	touching	with	tenderness,	bodies	touching	with	desire.		Between	and	amongst	the	bodies	in	the	Hall	and	the	bodies	watching	the	documentary,	bodies	in	very	different	times	and	places,	pass	affects:	of	desire,	of	anxiety,	of	embarrassment,	of	empathy:	fellow	feelings	that	open	up	a	commonality	in	desire	and	vulnerability.		The	documentary	sensitively	shows	the	shortcomings	of	this	attempt	to	theatricalize	the	incapacities	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	as	a	method	of	emancipating	their	creativity.	The	production	revealed	instead	the	incapacity	of	a	certain	transcendent	and	narcissistic	concept	of	creativity	that	required	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	merely	to	mirror	the	tastes	and	sensibilities	of	a	person	without	intellectual	disabilities.			
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Mirroring	inverted:	Robert	Wilson	and	Christopher	Knowles	Robert	Wilson	attempted	to	reverse	this	binary	of	the	mirror.	Whereas	Aldo	Gennaro	a	non-disabled	director	required	Chris	Dobbins	a	disabled	performer	to	mirror	him	to	make	theatre,	Robert	Wilson	a	non-disabled	director	seeks	to	mirror	Christopher	Knowles	a	disabled	man	in	order	to	understand	him	and	to	make	theatre.			Robert	Wilson’s	artistic	collaboration	with	the	‘autistic	poet’	Christopher	Knowles	was	initiated	in	A	Letter	for	Queen	Victoria	(1974)	and	continued	into	other	works	such	as	The	$	Value	of	Man	(1975),	Dia	Logs	(1975)	and	Einstein	on	the	Beach	(1976).	The	collaboration	of	Wilson	and	Knowles	raises	similar	questions	to	those	raised	by	the	performances	in	A	Child	is	Waiting	and	Stepping	Out	about	the	negotiation	of	power	relationships,	agency,	volition	and	collaboration	in	the	access	to	voice	and	presence	of	a	person	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities.			Wilson	explored	these	questions	of	incapacity	and	theatricality	to	evolve	an	avant-garde	theatre/performance	art	form	influenced	by	the	modernist	or	historical	avant-garde’s	fascination	with	tropes	of	what	Berger	has	characterized	as	‘the	disarticulate.’	There	are	a	number	of	different	versions	of	the	genesis	of	Robert	Wilson’s	collaboration	with	Christopher	Knowles.	Wilson	himself	sought	to	mythologise	the	origins	of	this	collaboration,	his	discovery	of	the	young	autistic	poet,	just	as	he	did	his	previous	discovery	of	Raymond	Andrews,	a	young,	deaf	African	American	man.		This	myth	of	discovery	connects	with	those	stories	of	finding	an	
enfant	sauvage	or	‘wild	child’	in	the	forest.		Wilson’s	mythologizing	also	allows	him	to	identify	with	the	wild	child	in	himself,	with	his	sense	of	his	own	intellectual	disability,	an	acknowledgement	of	incapacity	that	was	important	to	him	as	out	of	it	he	was	able	to	reimagine	and	recompose	basic	principles	of	
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space,	time	and	meaning-making	in	a	highly	distinctive	and	influential	aesthetic	at	the	intersection	of	theatre	and	performance	art.				One	version	of	the	myth	of	the	origins	of	the	collaboration	is	that	in	1973	a	friend	of	Knowles’s	parents	gave	Wilson	an	audiotape	that	the	thirteen-year	old	boy	had	made	of	a	poem	he	had	written	about	his	sister:	‘Emily	likes	the	TV,	because	she	watches	TV,	because	she	likes	it.’		Wilson’s	reaction	was:		I	was	fascinated	from	the	very	beginning	with	what	Chris	was	doing	with	language.		He’d	take	words	we	all	know	and	fracture	them	and	then	put	them	back	together	in	a	new	way.		He’d	invent	a	new	language	and	then	destroy	it	a	moment	later.		Words	are	like	molecules	that	are	always	changing	their	configurations,	breaking	apart	and	recombining.	It’s	very	free	and	alive.		(qtd	Ebrahimian	71)	Wilson	saw	in	Christopher	Knowles	a	combination	of	enfant	sauvage	and	idiot	
savant:	Knowles’	incapacity	with	the	phonemic	and	syntactic	properties	of	language	opened	up	new	possibilities	of	emancipation	at	an	aesthetic	level.		In	a	later	interview	with	the	New	Yorker	Wilson	describes	his	first	meeting	with	Chris	in	epiphanic	terms:					When	I	first	met	Chris	he	was	in	an	institution	for	brain-damaged	children	and	that	was	one	of	the	first	things	I	thought	about	is	that	everyone	in	the	institution	was	trying	to	correct	the	child	his	speaking	his	making	writings	on	a	typewriter	his	doing	things	inventing	languages	I	found	it	very	beautiful	as	an	artist	and	was	shocked	to	see	in	this	school	this	institution	that	it	was	being	corrected	so	I	said	why	are	we	saying	no	to	this	what’s	wrong	with	it?	I	think	we	should	support	it.	(Absolute	Wilson.)	Wilson	opposed	the	corrective	and	stultifying	strategies	of	the	institution	in	which	he	found	Knowles	with	his	own	acceptance	of	Knowles’	capabilities	as	an	artist:		As	I	took	Chris	back	to	school	one	day,	I	decided	to	spend	the	day	there	to	
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see	what	it	was	like.	I	was	shocked.	I	couldn’t	believe	what	was	going	on.	Everything	the	boy	was	doing	was	either	being	stopped	or	corrected.	I	went	to	the	Head	of	the	school	and	asked,	“What’s	wrong	with	this	behaviour?	I	know	it’s	a	bit	strange,	but	I’m	an	artist	and	I	find	his	behaviour	fascinating.”	(Wilson	Have	You	Been	Here	Before)	The	epiphany	that	was	hinted	at	in	Cassavetes’	vision	of	Mike’s	painting	without	paint	is	here	rendered	explicit	in	Wilson’s	validation	of	Knowles.		Wilson	could	realize	the	potential	of	Knowles’	‘incapacity’	in	art.		The	O.D.	Heck	institution	in	which	Wilson	found	Knowles	attempted	to	correct	Knowles’s	access	to	language	and	the	symbolic,	presumably	in	an	attempt	to	give	him	access	to	the	social	sphere;	Wilson	wished	to	reconfigure	Knowles’	perceived	incapacity	in	an	access	to	the	aesthetic	sphere.		How	Knowles	was	to	occupy	this	aesthetic	sphere	in	practical	terms	was	in	a	radical	emancipation	from	the	institution:	in	a	cohabitation	as	well	as	a	collaboration	with	Wilson:	After	some	months	and	many	conversations	with	his	parents	Chris	left	school	to	live	with	me.		.		.	A	couple	of	weeks	later	he	said,	“Dear	Madam,	most	gracious	of	ladies,	I	will	be	in	no	way	possessed	of	an	honour	of	an	introduction”	I	asked	him,	“What?	What	is	that?”	He	said	it	was	a	letter	for	Queen	Victoria.	.	.Because	of	this,	the	next	work	I	made	for	the	theatre	was	called,	“A	letter	for	Queen	Victoria”.	And,	of	course,	it	had	text	by	Christopher	Knowles.		(Wilson	Have	You	Been	Here	Before)	Wilson’s	project	then	became	at	once	a	con-viviality	or	living	together:	part	artistic	collaboration	–	in	which	Knowles	was	at	times	mentor,	at	times	muse	-	and	part	duty	of	care	-	given	Wilson’s	status	of	guardianship.		Wilson	was	re-enacting	an	earlier	relationship	with	Raymond	Andrews,	the	genesis	of	which	as	recounted	by	Wilson	involved	a	similar	epiphany	with	regard	to	the	boy’s	capacity	and	incapacity:	
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In	1967,	I	was	walking	down	the	street	when	I	saw	a	policeman	about	to	hit	a	13-year-old	black	boy.	I	stopped	the	policeman	and	asked,	“What’s	going	on?”	The	policeman	said,	”It’s	none	of	your	business.”	In	utter	shock	I	replied,	“But	it	is!	I	am	a	responsible	citizen.	Why	are	you	about	to	hit	this	child?”	After	a	brief	discussion,	I	decided	to	accompany	the	police	officer	and	the	boy	to	the	police	station.	Along	the	way,	I	listened	to	the	sounds	coming	from	the	boy	and	recognized	them	to	be	that	of	a	deaf	person.	(Wilson	Have	You	Been	Here	Before)	This	encounter	eventually	led	to	Wilson	adopting	Raymond	Andrews,	becoming	his	legal	guardian	just	weeks	before	the	boy	was	due	to	be	institutionalized.		It	also	led	to	Wilson’s	making	a	work	of	theatre	based	on	Raymond	Andrews’s	‘observations,	drawings	and	dreams,’	which	became	the	seven-hour	Deafman	
Glance.		These	epiphanic	encounters	with	Knowles	and	Andrews	did	not	arise	quite	as	haphazardly	and	fortuitously	as	Wilson’s	accounts	of	them	suggests.			Wilson’s	accounts	mythologize	an	artist’s	spontaneous	discovery	as	a	response	to	the	aleatory,	but	a	context	for	these	encounters	may	be	located	in	Wilson’s	previous	work.			For	some	time	he	had	been	exploring	the	blurred	line	between	therapy	and	arts	and	the	particular	aesthetic	challenges	of	working	with	people	with	severe	incapacities	and	limitations	of	access	to	spoken	language,	gesture	and	movement.		In	1967	Wilson	had	been	involved	in	a	project	at	Goldwater	Hospital	for	the	Terminally	Ill,	in	which	he	again	describes	an	initial	encounter:		I	walked	in,	wow	fifty	people	in	iron	lungs	just	tanks	sitting	on	tables	with	plugs	in	the	wall	just	their	heads	sticking	out	of	tanks.		So	most	of	the	people	were	catatonic	and	I	was	hired	to	encourage	them	to	speak.		In	the	beginning	I	wasn’t	quite	sure	whether	that	was	something	I	wanted	to	do	or	if	I	would	feel	comfortable	doing	it	er	but	you	know	once	I	got	in	there	
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and	started	working	with	the	people	I	realized	I	had	to	forget	about	all	my	problems	and	their	problems	was	what	was	important	(Absolute	Wilson)	His	first	reaction	to	this	encounter	is	reticence	but	this	is	overcome	by	an	ethical	imperative.		Robyn	Brentano,	a	member	of	Wilson’s	Byrd	Hoffman	group	gives	an	account	of	some	of	Wilson’s	initial	efforts	to	evolve	a	kind	of	theatrical	or	therapeutic	practice	for	people	at	the	limits	of	communicative	capacity:	Bob	began	doing	some	very	interesting	theatre	exercises	with	some	of	the	patients	who	were	completely	paralysed	and	the	only	movement	they	had	were	very	small	movements,	either	their	hands	or	they	used	mouth	sticks	to	communicate.		He	connected	them	all	up	with	photosensitive	string	put	on	a	dark	light	and	all	of	them	were	together	in	the	room	connected	with	each	other	and	their	piece	was	about	the	sort	of	communication	between	them	but	it	wasn’t	verbal	it	was	more	about	energy	it	was	more	about	the	sort	of	psychic	connections	between	people.	(Absolute	Wilson)	Wilson	recomposes	the	medical	space	as	an	aesthetic	or	quasi-ritual	space,	a	literal	and	localized	redistribution	of	the	sensible,	of	the	sensory	terms	of	expression.		What	is	somewhat	obscured	in	the	account’s	references	to	‘energy’	and	‘psychic	connections’	is	what	kind	of	efficacy	these	exercises	had.		If	this	is	theatre,	who	is	the	audience	-	or	is	there,	in	fact,	a	need	for	an	audience?	If	this	is	therapy,	how	do	the	patients	respond	to	it	or	benefit	from	it?	Is	this	‘incapacity	aestheticized’?		If	such	practice	emerges	from	the	isolation	of	the	therapeutic	context	to	the	public	space	of	theatre	does	it	become	an	aestheticization	of	the	incapacity	and	suffering	of	others	and,	therefore,	exploitative?	These	are	questions	which	will	recur	in	analyses	of	the	ethics	of	the	theatricalization	of	incapacity	in	subsequent	twenty	first	century	theatre	practices	–	and	not	just		involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.	In	Giulio	Cesare	Romeo	Castellucci	theatricalizes	the	incapacity	of	performers	who	were	morbidly	obese	and	
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emaciated	or	an	actor	who	has	had	a	laryngectomy	who	speaks	in	a	voice	which	Castellucci	seeks	to	characterize	as	another	aesthetic	and	social	rebirth	in	incapacity:		a	laryngectomised	man,	as	a	mystagogue,	as	a	prophet	of	a	new	voice	…	a	voice	which,	consequently,	is	reborn,	just	started.	(Castellucci	qtd	in	Taylor)	In	1962	Wilson	had	‘worked	privately	with	a	small	group	in	Texas,	researching	body	movement	with	brain-damaged	children.’		Accounts	suggest	the	work	proceeded	by	means	of	a	kind	of	via	negativa	similar	to	certain	types	of	actor	training:	‘It	involved	going	back	and	“re-learning”	very	simple	movements	that	had	become	distorted	in	the	course	of	day-to-day	living	by	various	anxieties	and	inhibitions.’	In	Bill	Simmer’s	account	of	the	processes	in	“Robert	Wilson	and	Therapy”:			The	emphasis	was	on	the	personal	growth	of	the	people	involved.		Wilson	wanted	them	to	be	able	to	present	themselves	naturally	onstage,	without	self-consciousness.	(103)	Wilson’s	reported	objective,	the	facilitation	of	the	peoples’	‘ability	to	present	themselves,’	is	located	interestingly	somewhere	between	a	therapeutic	imperative	towards	greater	socialization	and	a	kind	of	theatricality	or	presentation	of	self	in	the	aesthetic	context	of	the	stage.	It	is	possible	to	relate	all	these	theatrical	and	therapeutic	practices,	the	early	private	experiments	with	‘brain-damaged	children’,	the	work	at	the	Hospital	for	the	Terminally	Ill,	the	work	with	Raymond	Andrews	and	Christopher	Knowles,	to	Wilson’s	sense	of	his	own	intellectual	disabilities.	Christopher	Innes	in	Avant-Garde	Theatre	1892-1992		refers	to	‘the	self-
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promulgated	myth	that	up	to	the	age	of	17	severe	stuttering	had	kept	him	virtually	speechless’	(201)	and	in	the	words	of	Wilson	himself:		I	had	big	problems	to	learn	how	to	read	and	write.	I	couldn’t	catch	a	ball.	It’s	a	processing	disorder.		I	didn’t	understand	it	and	my	parents	neither.		It	made	for	a	very	difficult	childhood.	(Absolute	Wilson)	This	disability	narrative	certainly	plays	an	important	part	in	Wilson’s	image	of	himself,	his	desire	to	trace	the	genesis	of	his	creativity	to	his	own	incapacity,	disability	or	sense	of	difference	and	his	desire	to	identify	on	a	deep	empathetic	level	with	Raymond	Andrews,	Christopher	Knowles	and	others	forced	to	negotiate	a	sensual	and	cognitive	relationship	to	the	world	very	different	to	the	constructed	normalcy	of	the	conventional	and	the	consensual.		Early	on	in	his	career	he	was	given	advice	to	deal	with	this	processing	disorder	by	his	first	teacher,	the	dance	instructor,	Byrd	Hoffman	(after	whom	he	named	his	company),	to	‘slow	everything	down’	advice	that	remained	with	him	in	the	aesthetic	of	slowness	of	movement	and	durationality	for	which	he	is	renowned.		Wilson’s	collaboration	with	Christopher	Knowles	therefore,	comes	out	of	his	previous	experience	of	encounters	with	people	with	disability,	which	were	in	turn	perhaps	the	re-enactment	of	an	encounter	with	his	sense	of	disability	in	himself.		In	talking	of	Knowles,	Wilson	feels	the	need	to	stress	a	sense	of	identification	or	fellow-feeling:		Chris	and	I	think	alike,	a	lot	alike.		His	mother	saw	my	notebook	and	she	said	it	looks	a	lot	like	Christopher’s.		It	was	amazing	how	that	we	were	often	like	on	the	same	wavelength	(	.	.	.)	Chris	is	I	think	the	closest	one	to	me.		I	think	of	all	the	people	I	know	it’s	the	one	who	moves	me	the	most.			You	know	Chris	can’t	tell	a	lie.	That	breaks	my	heart.	(Absolute	Wilson)	
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Wilson	describes	their	first	appearance	on	stage	together	which	occurred	after	his	receipt	of	an	audiocassette	of	Chris	reciting	one	of	his	poems	and	after	Wilson	had	contacted	the	family	by	telephone	and	invited	them	to	a	performance	of	his	seven-hour	performance,	The	Life	of	Joseph	Stalin.	As	Wilson	relates	the	encounter,	as	he	was	sitting	in	his	dressing	room,	a	half	hour	before	the	performance	there	was	a	knock	on	his	door	and	Mrs	Knowles	and	Chris	appeared	and	Wilson	persuaded	Chris	and	his	family	to	allow	Chris	to	come	on	stage	with	him:	Just	before	the	performance	was	to	begin	I	took	Chris	by	the	hand	and	we	stood	together	on	the	stage.	I	addressed	the	audience,	“Ladies	and	Gentlemen	because	‘A’”	And	Chris	said,	“Because	she	likes	Mickey	Mouse.”	And	I	said,	“Because	‘B’”	And	Chris	responded,	“Because	she	likes	Bugs	Bunny”	Then	I	said,	“Because	‘A’”	Chris	replied,	“Because	she	likes	the	Flintstones”	And	again	I	said,	“Because	‘B’”	And	Chris	followed,	“Emily	likes	the	TV	because	she	watches	it.”		After	we	left	the	stage	there	was	an	applause.	(Wilson	Have	You	Been	Here	
Before).	Wilson	then	sought	to	revisit	this	scene	in	the	dramaturgy	of		A	Letter	for	Queen	
Victoria	in	the	entr’actes	where,	as	Bonnie	Marranca	describes	it	in	The	Theatre	
of	Images,	the	pair	‘play	with	certain	clusters	of	letters	(“HAP”	“HATH”	“HAT”)	and	put	together	words,	letters	and	sentences	like	building	blocks’	(43).	Marranca	characterizes	the	structuration	of	these	sequences	as	incorporating	the	‘behavior	patterns	of	autistic	children:	echolalia,	wordplay,	imitation.’	(43).		Wilson	adapted	the	strategies	of	imitation	he	had	developed	in	his	personal	encounters	with	Knowles	into	a	key	devising	and	rehearsal	methodology	for	the	production,	as	Stefan	Brecht	recounts	in	The	Theatre	of	
Visions:	
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Wilson’s	idea	.	.	.	seemed	to	be	that	we,	the	performers,	were	to	learn	from	Chris,	by	talking	to	and	being	with	him,	and	by	imitation	of	him	(imitation	would	make	communication	possible.	(271)	This	is	a	complete	reversal	or	inversion	of	the	strategy	of	imitation	that	Aldo	Gennaro	employed	with	Chris	Dobbins.		Brecht’s	account	of	the	rehearsal	process	goes	on	to	say,	however,	that	this	attempt	by	professional	actors	to	imitate	the	speech	rhythms	of	an	‘autistic’	young	man	failed	due	to	the	actors’	inability	and	unwillingness:	The	rehearsals	were	initially	designed	to	accord	to	Chris	this	role	of	praeceptor.		But	the	project	aborted:	partly	by	its	difficulty,	partly	by	the	resistance	of	some	performers	.	.	.(272)	That	the	actors	may	have	been	uncertain	as	to	what	it	was	they	were	supposed	to	imitate	is	suggested	in	Brecht’s	attempts	at	describing	Knowles’s	‘voice’:		Chris’s	voice	then	had	a	perfectly	empty	and	marvelously	sustained	enthusiasm;	his	repetitions	lined	out,	in	arabesques	in	place,	the	heartfelt	arrests	of	mind.	(271)	There	are	interesting	conflations	of	incapacity	and	theatricality	in	Brecht’s	description	of	Knowles’	speech.		Knowles’	enthusiasm	is	both	‘perfectly	empty’	
and	‘marvellously	sustained’	which	I	would	interpret	as	a	kind	of	relentlessness	of	delivery	married	to	a	perceived	flatness	or	affectlessness	of	those	elements	of	speech	related	to	emotional	engagement:	variation	and	modulation	in	pitch	and	emphasis,	breathing	‘inspired’	by	new	thoughts,	and	so	on.		Similarly	Brecht	conflates	the	term	‘arabesque’	with	its	meanings	of	patterning	in	design,	movement	or	music	with	an	‘arrest’	or	lack	of	movement,	and	finally	conflates	the	‘heartfelt’	with	the	‘mind.’		All	of	which	suggests	a	kind	of	breakdown	in	being	able	to	interpret	Knowles’	distinctive	use	of	language	and	speech	patterns	that	
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would	account	for	the	difficulty	or	resistance	experienced	by	the	actors	in	attempts	at	imitating	them.	Brecht	characterizes	the	actors’	attempts	at	imitating	Chris’s	‘voice’	as	falling	somewhere	between	the	strategies	adopted	by	two	of	the	actresses	involved	in	the	project,	Sheryl	Sutton	and	Cindy	Lubar,	‘the	former	spoke	with	the	accents	of	the	trained	actress,	while	Cindy	maintained	a	powerful	ostentatious	inexpressiveness,	speaking	her	lines	mechanically.’		(274)	This	incapacity	of	the	trained	actors	to	imitate	Knowles	is	also	apparent	at	the	visual	level	in	the	video	recording	of	the	Chitter	Chatter	sequence	of	Act	III	in	which	‘five	couples	seated	against	a	large	backdrop	painted	in	a	symmetrical	arrangement	of	the	words	“chitter”	and	“chatter”	gossip		.	.	.	and	as	they	speak	gesticulate	wildly’	(Marranca	43),	as	Jensen-Moulton	points	out:		the	entire	cast’s	movements	on	stage	reflected	Knowles’	mannerisms	such	as	hand	flapping,	spinning,	rocking,	sudden	marching	across	the	stage,	and	other	movements	that,	today,	would	be	considered	signatures	of	autism	spectrum	behavior.	(19)	It	seems	that	Christopher	Knowles	is	fully	present	in	the	‘stereotypy’	of	these	gestures	whereas	the	trained	actors	struggle	to	imitate	them:			Knowles’	performance/presence	appeared	more	live,	more	full	than	any	other	performer’s	affect	leaving	the	others	to	appear	as	automata	(Davies)	The	gestures	of	stereotypy	that	were	manifestations	of	failed	acting	in	the	theatrical	representations	in	A	Child	is	Waiting	and	Stepping	Out,	become	in	Wilson’s	strategy	benchmarks	of	an	innovative	technique	that	the	so-called	‘able’	actors	fail	to	attain.		Bonnie	Marranca	assigns	far-reaching	social	implications	to	Wilson’s	aesthetic	strategy	of	the	imitation	of	Knowles:	
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Here	autism	is	assigned	an	aesthetic	value.		By	finding	a	creative	place	for	Knowles	in	his	theatre	Wilson	has	challenged	psychologists’	insistence	that	the	autistic	child	cannot	be	integrated	into	society.		He	has	proposed	him	as	a	model	member	of	a	new	society	through	his	use	of	the	phenomenology	of	autism	as	an	aesthetic	anchor	of	his	theatre;	so	it	seems,	since	the	performers	imitate	Knowles	rather	than	vice-versa.	(44)	Marranca’s	interpretation	connects	with	the	trope	of	the	‘disarticulate’	in	modernism	to	which	James	Berger	refers.		‘Autism	assigned	an	aesthetic	value’	attempts	to	re-locate	the	perceptual	world	of	the	marginalized	and	excluded	into	the	exclusive	and	set	apart	space	of	art	and	the	aesthetic.		At	a	deeper	level	this	connects	with	what	has	been	characterized	by	Stuart	Murray	in		Representing	
Autism	as	on	the	one	hand:		the	complex	desires	of	a	society	that	wishes	to	be	fascinated	with	a	topic	that	seems	precisely	to	elude	comprehension	.	.	.	and	on	the	other:		the	allure	of	potentially	unquantifiable	human	difference	and	the	nightmare	of	not	somehow	being	‘fully’	human	.	.	.	(4-5)	both	aspects	of	which		I	would	connect	to	the	underlying	affects	of		‘wonder’	and	‘guilt’	which	Malabou	and	Johnston	in	Self	and	Emotional	Life	interpret	as	the	basic	motivator	for	projects	of	knowledge,	‘wonder’	in	terms		of	theoretical	philosophy		‘epistemology,	ontology,	metaphysics,	logic	and	so	on’		and	‘guilt’	in	terms	of		practical	philosophy	‘ethics,	morality	and	politics.’	(xv-xvi).		Contemporary	responses	to	Wilson’s	‘use’	of	Knowles	or	of	‘autism’	in	A	
Letter	to	Queen	Victoria	and	subsequent	performances	included	accusations	of	exploitation	and	impropriety	on	Wilson’s	part:		I	was	of	course	interested	in	the	fact	that	Wilson	had	been	somewhat	autistic	in	his	early	years,	that	he	came	late	to	reading	and	speaking	and	that	he	was	involved	with	a	youth	of	an	even	more	autistic	nature	whom	
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he	was	pushing	forward	at	us.		I	don’t	feel	that	that’s	necessarily	an	immoral	act	but	it	does	seem	in	some	ways	exploitative	(Absolute	Wilson)	Simon’s	accusation	was	refuted	by	Wilson	in	emotional	terms:	People	have	said	with	Chris	that	I	was	taking	advantage	of	a	brain-damaged	child.		A	judgment	is	put	on,	a	superficial	judgment	without	talking	about	the	work.		Chris	is	I	think	probably	the	closest	one	to	me	I	think	of	all	the	people	I	know	it’s	the	one	who	moves	me	the	most.		You	know	Chris	can’t	tell	a	lie.		It	breaks	my	heart.	(Absolute	Wilson)	The	charge	of	exploitation	was	also,	significantly,	refuted	in	distinctive	style	by	Christopher	Knowles	himself	many	years	later	in	an	art	work	referred	to	in	a	New	Yorker	article	by	Eric	Kingsberg	on	Knowles’s	readings	and	exhibition	of	paintings	at	a	gallery	in	the	West	Village	in	2013:		Another	painting,	which	consisted	solely	of	the	words	“JOHN	SIMON	POLLUTE	YOUR	ANGER,”	had	been	inspired	by	the	theatre	critic	John	Simon’s	dismissive	treatment	of	Wilson’s	work.	(Simon	called	him	“a	charlatan”	and	accused	him	of	exploiting	Knowles.)	He	(Knowles)	pointed	at	the	edge	of	the	canvas,	where	he’d	drawn	Simon	with	a	cartoonish	face,	and	giggled.	“He’s	not	smiling	at	all,”	he	said.	(Kingsberg)	Others	responded	to	A	Letter	for	Queen	Victoria	as	if	it	were	an	exercise	in		therapy	for	Christopher	Knowles,	Harvey	Lichtenstein	refers	to	the	‘eternal	gratitude’	of	Chris’s	parents	to	Wilson	for	giving	him:	a	context,	a	meaning,	an	opportunity	to	be	.	.	.	a	person	in	himself	and	to	feel	that	he	was	accepted	and	can	express	himself	(Absolute	Wilson)	Stephanie	Jensen-Moulton	argues	a	case	that	Knowles	should	be	acknowledged	more	not	only	for	his	collaboration	on	the	three	earlier	works	but	also	for	his	contribution	to	Einstein	on	the	Beach	that	helped	to	establish	the	artistic	reputations	of	both	Robert	Wilson	and	Philip	Glass.		Jensen-Moulton	also	cites	a	contemporaneous	critique	of	A	Letter	for	
Queen	Victoria	by	John	Gruen	in	the	New	York	Times	in	which	Wilson	is	cited	
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defending	the	project	by	equating	tropes	of	autism	with	contemporary	non-autistic	and	artistic	experience:		Today,	there	is	an	increase	in	autistic	behavior.	The	pattern	of	artists,	of	many	people,	is	becoming	autistic.	You	might	call	autistic	what	Gertrude	Stein	did	with	language,	with	words,	with	sounds.	It’s	the	repetitiveness	and	the	obsessiveness	of	it	all.	Of	course,	autistic	people	are	usually	institutionalized.	But	autism	simply	means	that	one	is	daydreaming.	If	a	child	wants	to	go	to	the	window	and	watch	the	sky	change	for	six	hours,	that’s	considered	autistic	behavior.	Well,	I	believe	in	autistic	behavior.	I	believe	in	alternating	it,	but	also	in	reinforcing	it.	(Gruen	xi)		What	becomes	apparent	in	this	response	is	the	entangling	of	myths,	tropes	and	thematizations	of	‘autism’	in	relationship	to	avant-garde	artistic	processes	but	also	in	regard	to	contemporary	subjectivity	at	a	moment	where	modernism	is	in	the	process	of	becoming	postmodernism.		Wilson	himself	makes	explicit	the	connection	between	an	idea	of	‘autism’	and	urban	alienation,	‘autism	as	an	increasingly	common	psychological	response	to	the	pressures	of	contemporary	life’:		 More	and	more	people	are	turning	into	themselves	.	.	.	You	can	see	it	in	the	subways	where	everybody	is	bunched	together,	and	nobody	is	looking	at	anybody.	What	they	are	doing	is	signing	off.		They	have	to	because	there’s	so	much	overload	.	.	.	It’s	actually	a	means	of	survival	(qtd	Innes	202)		Wilson’s	relationship	and	work	with	Knowles	connects	to	a	continuing	fascination	with	the	idea	of	‘autism’	in	modernism,	postmodernism	and	beyond.	This	fascination	emerged	in	modernism	amidst	deep	anxieties	ultimately	over	subjectivation,	as	James	Berger	argues	in	The	Disarticulate:	The	mentally	impaired	figure	in	modernism	is	a	point	of	convergence	at	which	aesthetic,	philosophical,	ethical,	political,	medical,	and	scientific	
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discourses	come	together	and	which,	further,	is	immersed	in	deep	anxieties	associated	with	these	discourses	and	their	intersections.	(70)	This	fascination,	caught	somewhere	between	wonder	and	guilt,	continues	in	a	proliferation	of	studies	and	investigations	which	reflect	both	the	convergence	and	the	suspicion	of	discourses	of	projects	of	knowledge	with	regard	to	autism	as	a	trope	of	unknowability.		Autism	then	is	not	only	a	term	that	generates	metaphors	and	mythologies	but	these	are	metaphors	and	mythologies	that	are	particularly	important	to	both	aesthetic	and	political	movements	in	thought	in	the	development	from	modernism	to	postmodernism	and	beyond,	in	the	period	in	which	Robert	Wilson	was	collaborating	with	Raymond	Andrews	and	Christopher	Knowles	in	an	exploration	of	reconfiguring	the	aesthetics	of	theatrical	performance.			I	will	now	consider	the	specific	details	of	the	methodology	with	which	Wilson	sought	to	find	ways	of	communicating	with	both	young	men	and	how	these	influenced	performances	he	created	with	the	various	groups	of	people	with	whom	he	worked	in	the	1960s.		In	“Robert	Wilson	and	Therapy”	Bill	Simmer	outlines	the	methods	of	communication	that	Wilson	first	evolved	in	contact	with	the	young	men	and	which	was	then	incorporated	in	the	work	of	Wilson’s	company,	the	Byrd	Hoffman	Group	of	Byrds.		When	Raymond	Andrews	was	living	with	him,	Wilson	noticed	his	physical	response	to	notes	played	on	the	piano:	lower	notes	would	evoke	movement	in	Andrews’	lower	body	and	higher	in	his	upper	body,	so	that	he	was,	in	a	sense,	hearing.		While	unable	to	hear	conventional	speech,	Wilson	noticed	that	Andrews	responded	to	an	imitation	of	the	sounds	he	himself	made.		Wilson	extrapolated	from	this	that	Andrews	was	using	a	‘language’:	
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All	the	work	I’ve	seen	or	heard	about	with	the	deaf	had	never	considered	the	idea	of	learning	the	language.		All	the	work	was	imposing	a	hearing	world’s	language	on	a	non-hearing	person	(.	.	.	)		But	through	imitating	what	we	do	there	is	some	understanding,	and	in	turn,	society	could	assume	the	responsibility	in	reverse,	and	imitate	what	they	do.	(101)	Wilson	took	this	practice	of	learning	Andrews’	‘language’	into	the	work	with	the	Byrd	Hoffman	group	so	that	movement	and	improvisation	exercises	were	developed	to:	learn	Andrews’	language	by	imitating	him.	They	learned	his	gestures	and	the	way	he	moved	as	well	as	the	sounds	he	made.	(101)	A	particular	sequence	of	movements	and	sounds	that	Andrews	devised	and	the	group	imitated	was	then	incorporated	into	the	seven	hour	performance	of	The	
Life	and	Times	of	Joseph	Stalin	where	a	whole	row	of	soldiers	performed	the	same	sequence.	When	Wilson	brought	Christopher	Knowles	into	his	home	and	into	the	group	he	followed	a	similar	process:		Much	as	he	had	done	with	Andrews,	Wilson	tried	to	understand	Knowles’	unique	vision.		To	do	this,	he	began	trying	to	learn	Knowles’	language.(107)	Again	imitation	or	mimesis	was	crucial	to	Wilson’s	strategy,	but	a	reversal	of	the	mirror	image	strategy	that	Aldo	Gennaro	employed	with	Chris	Dobbins:		He	will	never	never	put	things	together	the	way	we	do,	because	the	brain	is	organized	differently		.	.	.	it	is	absurd	for	us	to	impose	upon	him	our	way.		We	can	try	to	have	him	imitate	us,	but	maybe	we	should	try	to	imitate	him	too.	(107)	This	form	of	imitation	was	developed	by	Wilson	in	his	personal	interactions	with	Knowles	and	then	adapted	into	the	working	methods	of	the	Byrd	Hoffman	Group:	
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After	Knowles,	the	brain	damaged	youth,	joined	the	Byrds,	imitation	became	a	regular	feature	of	the	workshops.		Knowles	was	often	asked	to	lead	the	group	activities.		Usually,	he	would	stand	at	the	front	of	a	long	line	and	the	others	would	follow,	doing	whatever	he	did	and	repeating	whatever	he	said.	(Simmer	104)	What	are	the	implications	of	these	particular	strategies	of	imitation	in	terms	of	the	relationship	between	people	with	and	without	disabilities	in	the	construction	of	performance?		The	process	of	imitation	that	Wilson	sought	to	apply	to	the	encounter	with	Raymond	Andrews	is	problematized	somewhat	if	we	consider	what	it	is	that	Wilson	and	his	group	were	seeking	to	imitate.	It	is	interesting	that	Wilson	refers	to	attempting	to	learn	the	‘language’	of	Raymond	Andrews	who	as	a	‘deaf	mute’	in	disadvantaged	circumstances	has	been	outside	of	the	commonality	of	communication.		What	is	this	language?	The	movements	and	sounds	that	Andrews	produced	and	that	Wilson	then	required	the	Byrd	Hoffman	group	to	imitate	were	viewed	as	a	kind	of	purer	form	of	expression	and	communication	than	the	conventional	subject	caught	up	in	the	imaginary	of	spoken	language.		What	was	it	though,	that	Wilson	and	the	Byrd	Hoffman	group	were	imitating	in	imitating	the	sounds	and	gestures	of	Andrews	and	is	it	useful	to	speak	of	the	ethical	implications	of	this	imitation?		What	Wilson	perceived	as	Andrews’	‘language’	was	presumably	Andrews’	attempts	at	communication	and	expression	given	his	restricted	or	impaired	access	to	the	spoken	and	written	word.		These	attempts	could	be	termed	his	own	‘affordances’	of	his	incapacity	in	language.		I	have	taken	this	term	from	the	work	of	Arseli	Dokumaci19	and	others	on	the	‘affordances’	of	the	everyday,	adapted	from	James	Gibson’s	ecological	
																																																								19	See	Arseli	Dokumaci	“Disability	and	the	Affordances	of	the	Everyday”	
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psychology20,	in	the	mobility	of	people	with	disabilities.		A	person	with	an	invisible	disability	such	as	severe	rheumatoid	arthritis	may	develop	a	particular	sequence	of	movements	to	afford	their	ability	to	pick	up	a	spoon	or	get	out	of	a	chair.		These	are	performances	emerging	out	of	incapacity.		Raymond	Andrews	does	this	at	a	much	more	complex	level	to	‘afford’	some	kind	of	entry	into	the	symbolic	order	of	language.		What	Wilson	and	Byrd	Hoffman	may	well	be	imitating	then	is	his	attempt	to	participate	in	communication	and	expression,	his	affordances	of	his	incapacity.			From	these	sounds	and	movements	and	gestures	a	kind	of	imitative	choreography	emerges.			What	occurs	in	this	imitation?		According	to	Byrd	Hoffman	group	member,	Cindy	Lubar:		Doing	Raymond’s	movement	and	sound	with	him	–	I	did	not	do	it	exactly	the	same	way	he	did	–	but	just	trying	to	do	that	myself	was	really	a	breakthrough	of	some	kind	for	me,	in	terms	of	getting	in	touch	with	my	own	vocabulary	of	movement.	(Simmer	104)	The	imitation	will	be	imperfect,	will	fail,	but	will	help	to	reconfigure	or	reinvigorate	the	movement	vocabulary	of	a	trained	performer.	Here	Andrews’	disability	is	an	enabling	of	artistic	practice.		Critical	responses	to	Deafman	Glance	at	the	time	emphasize	the	otherness	or	other	worldliness	of	its	aesthetic	as	is	exemplified	in	the	famous	letter	Louis	Aragon	sent	to	Andre	Breton	after	seeing	the	performance:	The	world	of	a	deaf	child	opened	up	to	us	like	a	wordless	mouth.		For	more	than	four	hours,	we	went	to	inhabit	this	universe	where,	in	the	absence	of	words,	of	sounds,	sixty	people	had	no	words	except	to	move...I	never	saw	anything	more	beautiful	in	the	world	since	I	was	born.		Never	never	has	any	play	come	anywhere	near	this	one,	because	it	is	at	once	life	awake	and	the	life	of	closed	eyes,	the	confusion	between	everyday	life	and																																																									20	See	James	Gibson	The	Ecological	Approach	to	Visual	Perception.	
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the	life	of	each	night,	reality	mingled	with	dream,	all	that’s	inexplicable	in	the	life	of	a	deaf	man.	(4)		The	letter	is	a	prime	example	of	a	Surrealist	or	modernist	view	of	‘disability’	as	a	kind	of	primal	difference	more	in	touch	with	deeper	mysteries	than	the	lives	of	those	without	disabilities	and	connects	with	Berger’s	observations	on	the	place	of	the	‘disarticulate’:	In	the	post-Babel	condition	that	has	been	so	widely	depicted	in	Europe	and	America	at	least	since	World	War	I,	the	abject,	the	traumatic,	and	the	transcendent	have	been	linguistically	indistinguishable.	(Location	2169)	Aragon’s	reading	connects	Wilson’s	engagement	and	collaboration	with	Andrews	to	the	preoccupation	of	modernism	and	the	historical	1920s	avant-garde	with	the	relationship	of	the	artist	and	the	tragic,	mentally	different	other	as	muse.	This	relationship	is	documented	in,	for	example,	Andre	Breton’s	second	novel,	
Nadja	based	on	his	interactions	over	ten	days	with	an	actual	young	woman,	Léona	Camile	Ghislaine	Delacourt,	a	patient	of	Pierre	Janet.		The	novel’s	famous	last	sentence	‘la	beauté	sera	CONVULSIVE	ou	ne	sera	pas’	(beauty	will	be	convulsive	or	will	not	be	at	all)	(158)	encapsulating	a	typical	Surrealist	and	Modernist	mixture	of	beauty,	the	sublime,	the	different	and	the	repressed	other	of	madness.		Wilson’s	encounters	with	Andrews	and	Knowles	are	informed	by	modernist	variations	of	the	Orpheus	myth:	the	irrecoverable	one	as	muse	inspiring	the	artist’s	mourning	of	the	loss	of	the	transcendent	incapacity	of	madness	in	himself	exemplified	in	the	Breton/Nadja	relationship.	This	myth	may	also	be	traced	and	the	connections	and	correspondences	made	between	Joyce’s	assault	on	the	conventions	of	language	and	meaning-making	in	Finnegans	Wake	and	the	discourse	of	his	daughter,	Lucia,	diagnosed	as	a	hebephrenic	
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schizophrenic	and	subjected	to	confinement	in	mental	institutions	for	fifty	years	of	her	life.21	A	particular	intertwining	of	wonder	and	guilt	inflects	the	myth	and	its	variants.		In	the	development	of	Wilson’s	aesthetic	Raymond	Andrews	was	the	preceptor	of	his	theatre	of	images,	Christopher	Knowles	the	preceptor	of	a	highly	particular	relationship	with	the	spoken	and	written	word.		Just	as	he	had	done	with	Andrews,	Wilson	attempted	to	get	inside	the	‘language’	of	Knowles.		But	what	was	it	that	Wilson	and	the	Byrd	Hoffman	group	were	imitating	in	Christopher	Knowles?		In	Simmer’s	account	there	is	a	confusion	of	the	imitation	with	the	stated	intention	of	imitation:	‘By	imitating	him	Wilson	was	eventually	able	to	approach	some	understanding	of	his	thought	processes’	(107)	This	is	apparent	in	Wilson’s	own	words:	I	saw	that	he	had	very	similar	concerns	as	I	had	.	.	.	in	terms	of	language-	in	terms	of	his	patterning	words	and	thoughts.		Once	I	learned	.	.	.	his	patterns,	then	we	had	this	exchange	through	his	way	of	structuring	his	thoughts.	(107)	The	identification	that	Wilson	obviously	felt	with	Knowles	perhaps	clouds	the	openness	to	the	other	with	which	Wilson	might	have	approached	his	process	of	imitation:	‘I	saw	that	he	had	very	similar	concerns	as	I	had’		Wilson	found	what	he	was	looking	for	in	Knowles	but	it	is	a	moot	point	whether	this	was	done	by	appropriating	the	latter’s	Otherness	into	the	Same	of	identification.	Simmer	also	cites	an	account	of	the	relationship	of	Wilson	and	Knowles	by	Dr	Hugh	Lafave,	a	key	figure	in	the	connection	between	the	two.	He	had	been	Knowles’s	supervisor	at	O.D.	Heck	and	instrumental	in	persuading	Knowles’	parents	to	let	Knowles	work	with	Wilson.	He	characterized	the	relationship																																																									21	See	Ellman	320.	
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between	the	two	as	proceeding	in	stages,	stages	which	he	compared	to	those	of	the	development	of	language	–	an	initial	non-verbal	stage	of	looks	and	‘the	way	they	sized	each	other	up’	followed	by	communication	through	movement	and	dance	‘it	seemed	to	me	there	was	a	lot	of	body	language	going	on	between	them’	(108),	followed	by	an	exchange	of	drawings	and	pictures	and	then	spoken	and	written	language,	including	Knowles’	creation	of	graphic	patterns	of	word	and	letters	on	a	typewriter.		I	think	it	is	significant	that	Dr	Lafave	compares	the	development	of	their	relationship	to	the	development	of	a	language.		It	exemplifies	a	view	of	the	autistic	Knowles	as	a	kind	of	enfant	sauvage.	Wilson	can	then	be	positioned	as	an	artist-therapist-shaman	who	through	the	power	of	intuition	and	empathy	can	unlock	or	awaken	what	has	lain	dormant	in	the	intellectually	disabled	young	man.		A	very	clear	example	of	this	assumption	of	quasi-miraculous	power	is	given	in	an	account	by	Christopher	Knowles’	father	of	Wilson	at	the	O.D.	Heck	Centre	cited	by	Simmer	that	I	would	like	to	cite	at	length	as	it	encapsulates	a	kind	of	theological	underpinning	to	the	negotiation	of	the	participation	of	people	with	intellectual	or	communicative	disabilities	in	theatrical	performance	which	emerges	in	this	account	but	also	influences	subsequent	views	of	how	this	kind	of	performance	is	produced:	either	in	the	wonder	of	the	healing	touch	of	the	arts	or	in	the	guilt	of	the	puppet-like	manipulation	or	exploitation	of	the	disabled	by	the	non-disabled:		There	were	perhaps	eight	or	ten	very	badly	damaged	kids,	neurologically	damaged,	both	physically	and	mentally	.	.	.	And	there	was	one	little	guy	who	was	about	three	feet	long,	about	six	years	old,	who	had	arms	about	as	big	as	your	thumb.		And	he	was	just	lying	there	whimpering	and	a	woman	was	sitting	there	stroking	his	back	and	trying	to	console	him	.	.	.Right	
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adjacent	to	her	was	one	of	those	electric	organs-	there	were	two	actually	–	so	Bob	went	over	and	looked	down	at	the	kid	and	he	touched	the	kid		.	.	.		with	the	back	of	his	hand,	the	back	of	his	fingers.		And	the	kid	stopped	whimpering	and	with	great	effort,	lifted	his	head	up.		And	then	Bob	with	the	kid	still	watching	him,	went	over	to	one	of	these	organs	and	just	put	his	hand	down	on	the	keys	and	made	a	noise.		And	he	just	held	it	there,	and	the	child	looked	at	his	hand,	and	then	crawled	over	to	the	adjacent	organ	and	put	his	hand	down	and	made	a	noise.		It	was	the	first	time	this	child	had	ever	done	anything	voluntarily	in	the	whole	time	he’d	been	at	the	school.		And	then	he	looked	up	at	Bob,	sort	of	making	a	communication,	saying,	“Look,	I	can	do	that	too.”		And	then	Bob	very	carefully	raised	his	hand	and	moved	it	over	so	it	made	a	different	sound:	and	the	kid	realized	that,	and	he	made	a	different	sound,	too.			No	whimpering.		Suddenly	he	was	doing	something	that	was	meaningful.		He’d	learned	something.		The	entire	process	took	at	least	five	minutes.		It	is	a	question	of	Bob	understanding	what	that	kid’s	rhythms	were	and	being	able	to	work	with	that	kid	in	the	same	rhythms.		And	of	course	everyone	was	stunned,	that	in	five	minutes	time	he	suddenly	had	this	kid	operating,	when	no	one	else	had	ever	been	able	to	reach	him.		As	we	left	–	there’s	a	real	Chaplinesque	ending	to	the	story	–	the	young	lady	who	was	sitting	there	with	the	kid	started	plunking	out	“Jesus	Loves	Me”	on	the	organ.		She	was	going	to	teach	him	to	play	“Jesus	Loves	Me.”	(104-5)	The	description	of	the	boy	in	the	bed	is	of	another	limit-human,	for	all	the	world	another	Mussulman.		The	touch	that	Robert	Wilson	gives	the	young	boy	is	presumably	different	to	what	the	boy	has	previously	experienced.		It	is	with	the	back	of	the	hand	and	the	back	of	the	fingers,	which	is	unusual,	and	contrasted	with	the	woman’s	touch	stroking	his	back	presumably	with	the	palm	side	of	her	hands	and	fingers,	actions	performed	in	Ed	Knowles’	view	to	try	to	‘console’	him.		The	implication	of	Ed	Knowles’	narrative	is	that	the	woman’s	touch	does	the	child	no	good	because	it	offers	a	generic	timeless	sympathy,	a	sympathy	that	is	
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going	nowhere,	whereas	Wilson’s	unusual	and	unexpected	touch	acts	as	a	kind	of	provocation	to	the	child,	it	stops	him	in	the	tracks	of	his	whimpering	and	causes	him	to	sit	up	and	take	notice.		The	process	of	imitation	between	Wilson	and	the	child	which	then	ensues	leads	Ed	Knowles’	to	an	interpretation	which	assumes	explicit	agency	on	the	part	of	the	child:	‘It	was	the	first	time	this	child	had	ever	done	anything	voluntarily	in	the	whole	time	he	had	been	at	the	school.	’			While	it	is	possible	to	appreciate	the	rhetorical	force	of	this	statement	it	has	to	be	logically	inadequate	or	absurd.	Even	assuming	the	child	had	been	constantly	observed,	how	would	anyone	know	if	and	when	the	child’s	will	or	volition	were	involved	in	any	given	action	or	response?		The	phrase	‘Suddenly	he	was	doing	something	that	was	meaningful’	is	interesting	because	it	affirms	a	particular	meaning	to	‘meaningful’	–	the	application	of	the	child’s	hands	to	the	keys	of	the	organ	in	a	similar	place	to	where	Wilson’s	hand	had	been	on	the	other	organ	is	meaningful	in	the	sense	of	entry	into	the	symbolic	order,	unlike	the	(unmanly)	whimpering	and	the	consoling	touch	of	the	woman	which	are	discounted	from	having	any	‘meaningful’	meaning.			It	is	difficult	to	avoid	seeing	a	kind	of	Oedipal	drama	within	Knowles’	parable	of	the	touch	of	the	maestro	causing	the	disarticulate	young	boy	to	awaken	into	meaningfulness.		Christopher	Knowles,	of	course,	did	not	arrive	in	Robert	Wilson’s	life	as	an	enfant	sauvage	raised	in	isolation.		Prior	to	his	time	at	O.D.	Heck	his	parents	had	enrolled	him	in	the	Institutes	for	the	Achievement	of	Human	Potential	in	Philadelphia,	the	therapeutic	practice	of	which	Ed	Knowles,	cited	in	Simmer,	describes	thus:	These	are	the	people	who	have	kids	creeping	and	crawling	and	kids	are	manipulated,	made	to	move	in	infantile	patterns,	which,	according	to	the	
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theory,	would	re-establish	whatever	neurological	pathways	had	been	damaged.			And	this	went	on	for	about	eight	years.		Very	intensive	work	–	eight	hours	a	day,	seven	days	a	week,	no	time	off.	(106).	The	founder	of	the	Institutes,	Glenn	Doman,	outlined	the	ethos	and	methodology	of	the	organization	in	What	To	Do	About	Your	Brain-Injured	Child.	Although	subsequently	widely	criticized	and	discredited,	the	IAHP	is	still	in	existence.		The	fundamental	ethos	of	the	organization	is	that	children	with	a	range	of	diagnoses	of	intellectual	disability	are	“hurt”	and	may	be	cured	through	their	intensive	programme	which	includes:	Gravity/Antigravity	activities	–	rolling,	somersaulting	and	hanging	upside	down	and	Gagging	in	which	the	child	breathes	into	a	plastic	bag	until	gasping	for	breath.	This	is	based	on	the	belief	that	it	will	cause	maximum	use	of	the	lungs	and	thus	maximize	oxygen	circulation	to	the	brain.22		The	IAHP	and	its	methodology	is	fairly	representative	of	organizations	capitalizing	on	the	anxieties	of	the	parents	of	children	with	a	range	of	behavioural	issues	and	intellectual	disabilities	by	offering	intensive	-	and	expensive	-	miracle	cures	the	efficacy	of	which	are,	at	the	very	least,	dubious.			Was	Knowles’s	‘autistic’	behavior	alleviated	or	exacerbated	by	this	intensive	treatment	at	IAHP?		Was	Robert	Wilson	in	his	desire	to	imitate	Knowles,	as	with	Raymond	Andrews,	imitating	the	young	man’s	coping	strategies,	strategies	evolved	in	coping	with	having	been	fairly	traumatized	by	eight	years	of	this	‘treatment’?			These	are	of	course	now	imponderable	questions	in	terms	of	discovering	‘truth’	but	what	they	do	indicate	is	a	problematization	of	
any	binary	of	‘original’	and	‘copy’	in	negotiating	relationships	and	processes	between	people	with	and	without	intellectual	disabilities	that	will	lead	to	theatrical	performance.																																																											22	Qtd	Zigler	and	Hodapp	“Searching	for	Miracle	Cures”	in	Understanding	Mental	Retardation	
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The	working	relationship	and	process	of	collaboration	between	Robert	Wilson	and	Christopher	Knowles	was	complex	and	not	solely	motivated	by	Wilson’s	desire	to	empower	a	disabled	Knowles.		What	becomes	apparent	in	the	archive	around	A	Letter	for	Queen	Victoria	and	the	later	productions	on	which	the	two	collaborated	is	that	there	was,	precisely	a	collaboration:	a	working	together,	a	two-way	process.			What	emerges	in	the	recordings	of	the	production	-	and	a	television	interview	given	by	Knowles	and	Wilson	at	the	time	that	is	included	in	the	documentary	Absolute	Wilson	-	in	which	they	both	launch	into	the	‘Sundance	Kid’	text		-	is	that	the	two	voices	interweave	in	a	kind	of	spoken	text	version	of	Boal’s	mirror	exercise	in	which	it	becomes	unclear	who	is	leading	and	who	is	following.		If	we	look	again	at	Ed	Knowles’	emotive	description	of	Wilson’s	reaching	out	to	a	young	boy	in	the	O.D.	Heck	School	then	it	is	about	a	connection	made	where	‘self’	and	‘other’	are	in	a	more	dialectical	relationship.		Perhaps	Wilson’s	touching	the	boy	with	the	back	of	the	hand	implies	less	agency,	less	control	in	the	intention	of	the	toucher,	it	carries	no	threat,	no	desire	for	one	‘self’	to	impose	itself	on	the	‘other.’		Perhaps	in	this	haptic	exchange	there	are	more	positive	affects	in	play,	as	is	suggested	in	the	following	passage	in	Alphonso	Lingis’s	The	Community	of	
Those	Who	Have	Nothing	in	Common:	What	recognizes	the	suffering	of	the	other	is	a	sensitivity	in	my	hands	.	.	.	which	finds	itself	no	longer	moved	by	my	own	imperative	but	by	the	movements	of	abandon	and	vulnerability	of	the	other	.	.	.	What	recognizes	the	suffering	of	the	other	is	a	movement	in	one’s	hand	that	turns	one’s	dexterity	into	tact	and	tenderness	.	.	.	(31)	
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The	spontaneous	dialogue	that	then	takes	place	between	Wilson	and	the	boy	is	conducted	through	the	third	thing	of	a	musical	instrument	and	is	one	in	which	both	can	participate.		There	is	a	re-definition	of	‘presence’	here	as	co-presence	in	the	sense	of	
being	there	for	the	other	person,	sensitive	enough	not	to	impose,	open	to	possibilities,	not	rushing	to	make	judgments	of	how	to	interact	too	soon,	sensitive	also	to	the	co-presence	of	the	non-human	presence	of	objects	and	the	surrounding	environment	which	had	been	present	in	Wilson’s	earliest	work	with	people	with	severe	impairments.		Robyn	Brentano,	cited	in	Ebrahimian’s	The	
Cinematic	Theater,	provides	another	account	of	Wilson’s	work	with	patients	in	iron	lungs	that	suggests	the	emergence	of	different	ecologies	of	theatre	and	therapeutic	practice:		I	remember	Bob	did	a	theatre	piece	with	the	patients	on	C-12,	which	was	a	ward	of	polio	victims	who	were	either	in	iron	lungs	or	in	respirators.	.	.	Many	of	the	patients	were	completely	paralyzed	so	the	work	he	was	doing	was	extremely	minimal,	often	more	mental	than	physical.		He	basically	just	got	them	to	work	with	what	they	were	hearing	and	what	they	were	thinking	and	the	very,	very	small	movements	they	were	able	to	make.	.	.He	could	get	patients	to	respond	by	bringing	them	to	the	window	to	look	at	the	boats	on	the	river	or	listen	to	steam	in	the	pipes	or	watch	the	plants	grow	in	the	solarium.		The	whole	point	of	his	work	was	that	he	tried	to	get	people	to	open	up	and	be	much	more	aware	of	the	small	things	in	their	environment.	(Ebrahimian	16)	The	potential	inherent	in	this	kind	of	work	is	still	being	realized.	Wilson	was	asking	the	people	to	recompose	their	sense	of	their	environment	from	that	of	the	hospital	or	the	institution	to	an	increased	awareness	and	sensitivity	to	elements	in	another	conceptual	and	sensual	space.		This	gentle	work	based	in	an	‘aesthetic’	of	the	sensorium:	sound,	sight,	smell,	touch	carries	a	political	and	aesthetic	
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potential	of	recomposing	the	relationship	of	the	participants	in	that	performance	to	and	with	their	environment,	a	conception	of	performance	so	very	different	to	the	‘institutional	theatrical’	the	performance	in	A	Child	is	Waiting	or	the	inhabiting	of	the	conventional	theatre	space	in	Stepping	Out.				I	have	thus	far	discussed	in	detail	certain	modalities	and	paradigms	of	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	emerging	in	the	United	States	and	Australia	in	the	period	from	the	early	1960s	to	1980.	I	will	now	turn	my	attention	to	performance	in	the	first	two	decades	of	the	twenty	first	century.	In	this	period	such	theatre,	for	a	variety	of	reasons	that	I	will	discuss,	emerges	from	the	margins	of	therapeutic	and	community	practice	to	the	profile	and	visibility	afforded	by	the	international	theatre	and	arts	festival	circuit	and	to	the	forefront	of	critical	thinking	about	performance.	I	will	consider	the	development	of	theatre	with	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	the	work	of	Christoph	Schlingensief,	Back	to	Back	Theatre	and	Jérôme	Bel	with	Theater	Hora.		This	later	work	connects	to	the	Reality	Trend23	in	contemporary	performance	and	the	continuing	investigation	of	the	ethics	of	participation	and	spectatorship.	This	work	also	intersects	with	the	burgeoning	field	of	Performance	Philosophy	and	its	debates	on	the	interrelationship	between	theatre,	theatricality,	performance	and	performativity	in	postdramatic,	or	even	posthuman,	theatre	and	the	continuing	contestation	of	what	constitutes	the	political	in	theatrical	performance.																																																														23	Qtd	Rimini	Protokoll	website.	
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Chapter	Three	
FreakStars	3000,	Back	to	Back,	and	Disabled	Theater		In	the	next	section	of	the	thesis	I	will	be	examining	how	ideas	of	incapacity	and	theatricality	play	out	in	the	involvement	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	Christoph	Schlingensief’s	FreakStars	3000	(2004),	Back	to	Back	Theatre’s	small	metal	objects	(2005),	Food	Court	(2007)	and	Ganesh	
versus	the	Third	Reich	(2009)	and	Jérôme	Bel	and	Theater	HORA’s	Disabled	
Theater	(2012).			 In	the	period	between	the	production	at	the	Sydney	Opera	House	in	1980	and	FreakStars	3000	in	2004	a	number	of	theatre	groups	emerged	pursuing	different	political	and	aesthetic	models	of	participation	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		These	companies	include	Mind	the	Gap	in	Bradford	in	the	United	Kingdom.	The	content	of	this	work	ranges	from	theatrical	adaptations	of	literature	reappropriating	intellectually	disabled	figures,	such	as	Boo	Radley	in	a	staged	adaptation	of	To	Kill	a	Mockingbird	(2009)	and	Lennie	in	Of	Mice	and	
Men	(2011).	The	Shysters	in	Coventry	have	established	a	body	of	performance	work	and	a	relationship	with	the	commercial	Belgrade	Theatre.	They	have	also	collaborated	with	Royal	Central	School	of	Speech	and	Drama	on	the	development	of	a	course	in	Applied	Theatre	and	on	a	limited	training	course	that	includes	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.	Blue	Teapot	Theatre	Company	in	Ireland	have	been	in	operation	since	1996	and	their	repertoire	has	evolved	through	versions	of	classic	texts	such	as	A	Midsummer	Night’s	Dream,	Alice	in	Wonderland	to	their	recent	production	of	ID,	a	work	devised	by	the	company	and	presented	at	the	2014	Galway	Arts	Festival.	In	Europe	Compagnie	de	
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l’Oiseau	Mouche	in	Roubaix	in	France	was	founded	in	1978,	established	as	a	professional	company	in	1985	and	evolved	a	path	of	development	through	‘theatre	des	gestes’	from	1987	onwards	to	development	in	the	early	2000s	that	saw	them	incorporating	the	texts	of	Racine	and	Shakespeare.		The	Dutch	group	Theater	Maatwerk	was	established	in	Rotterdam	in	1987.		In	Germany	Theater	RambaZamba	have	been	in	existence	in	Berlin	since	1995	producing	a	combination	of	spectacle	theatre	and	devised	projects	and	Theater	Thikwa	have	been	in	operation	there	since	1990.	In	Zurich,	Theater	HORA	have	been	in	operation	since	1993.		They	have	staged	over	fifty	productions	since,	and	their	work	includes	art	exhibitions,	music	projects,	theatre	festivals	and	since	2009	a	theatrical	training	programme	for	‘people	with	learning	difficulties.’	Disabled	
Theatre	their	collaboration	with	Jérôme	Bel	will	be	discussed	at	length	later	in	this	thesis.	This	is	by	no	means	a	definitive	list	but	it	is	important	to	give	a	brief	context	in	which	to	locate	the	productions	I	wish	to	discuss.		I	have	chosen	to	analyze	the	work	of	particular	artists	and	companies	that	address	ideas	of	incapacity	and	theatricality	in	ways	to	challenge	what	theatre	is,	or	can	be.		The	first	production	I	will	consider,	Christoph	Schlingensief’s	Freakstars	
3000	not	only	explores	the	meaning	of	‘freakery’	with	regard	to	the	involvement	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	contemporary	performance	but	also	opens	up	questions	about	what	constitutes	the	public	sphere	and	spectatorship,	part	of	an	ongoing	intermedial	exploration	in	Schlingensief’s	previous	projects	of	what	constitutes	an	audience	or	public.		As	Christopher	Balme	notes	of	an	earlier	Schlingensief	project,	Bitte	Liebt	Osterreich:	This	kind	of	installation	makes	it	difficult	to	even	define	spectatorship,	as	we	can	distinguish	live	bystanders,	interested	and	disinterested,	media	
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viewers	who	watch	the	performance	on	the	internet	and	possibility	vote;	the	wider	media	audience	who	followed	the	five	days	from	the	relative	comfort	of	their	living	rooms	by	newspaper,	radio	and	television.	(Balme)	The	audience	that	Freak	Stars	3000	constituted	included	the	television	audience	of	the	Viva	TV	series,	the	online	voters	on	www.freakstars.de,	the	audience	in	the	Volksbühne	for	the	live	performance	and	those	who	have	subsequently	viewed	the	dvd	that	deliberately	unreliably	documents	the	project.		Balme	points	out	that	‘we	need	to	examine	how	these	staging	devices	functioned	to	create	a	public	sphere.’	FreakStars	3000	is	also	situated	within	the	context	of	the	rest	of	Schlingensief’s	work	as	a	constant	interrogation	of,	and	provocation	of	the	norms,	expectations	and	conventions	that	underpin	both	avant-garde	and	popular	culture.			Back	to	Back	have	developed	from	origins	within	community	performance	to	operate	on	the	international	Festival	circuit	but	have	also	developed	what	they	refer	to	as	an	ongoing	dialogue	developing	from	production	to	production	and	involving	their	audience	–	with	particular	reference	to	talkbacks	and	post-show	discussions	–	where	one	production	incorporates	elements	offered	as	a	response	to	the	reception	of	a	previous	production.		The	staging	devices	of	the	company	whether	within	a	large	inflatable	(Soft)	or	in	a	configuration	of	public	space	(small	metal	objects)	or	within	a	conventional	proscenium	(Food	Court,	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich	and	Super	Discount)	explore	‘theatricality’	–	in	the	sense	of	‘literarity’	in	literature	–	a	reflexive	exploring	of	the	company’s	‘issues	with	theatre’	from	within	the	spaces	of	theatre	itself,	which	offers	particular	challenges	to	spectatorship.				Jérôme	Bel	brings	to	theatrical	performance	with	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	an	avant-garde	practice	that	centres	on	a	rejection	of	theatricality,	
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virtuosic	choreography	and	what	he	calls	the	‘narcissistic’	strengths	of	the	performer.	This	anti-theatrical	stance	becomes	complicated	in	his	use	of	the	term	‘disabled’	in	his	collaboration	with	Theater	HORA,	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities.	All	three	theatres	interrogate	not	only	the	place	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	but	also	assumptions	of	aesthetic	and	ethical	community	in	contemporary	theatrical	performance.		It	is	important	to	give	the	context	of	Christoph	Schlingensief’s	previous	work	to	show	how	FreakStars	3000	emerges	from	his	ongoing	concerns	and	how	the	involvement	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	was	as	but	one	group	of	people	with	which	he	worked,	among	many	other	groups	perceived	as	socially	disadvantaged,	outsiders	or	‘other.’		Schlingensief’s	work	crosses	and	blurs	boundaries.		He	worked	in	film,	theatre,	television,	activist	social	interventions,	installations,	art	and	opera.		He	became	widely	known	in	Germany	for	a	series	of	intermedial	projects	that	comprised	live	theatrical	performance,	broadcast	television,	public	interventions	and	installations	and	online	interaction.		He	was	considerably	influenced	by	the	ideas	and	practices	of	Joseph	Beuys	and	the	Fluxus	movement.	He	adapted	Beuys’	well-known	maxim	‘Everyone	is	an	artist’	and	his	extended	definition	of	art	and	the	idea	of	the	‘social	sculpture’	as	a	
Gesamtkunstwerk	or	complete	work	of	art.		In	fact	Schlingensief’s	influences	can	be	traced	back	to	the	historical	avant-garde,	specifically	the	Surrealists	and	the	Dadaists.		Out	of	these	varied	influences	Schlingensief	evolved	a	highly	fluid	and	shifting	praxis	blurring	and	crossing	boundaries	beween	media,	between	theatre	and	art	practices	and	social	engagement,	often	creating	anti-theatricality	in	theatres	and	anti-art	in	galleries.		He	has	been	variously	described	as	‘the	pain	in	
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the	arse	of	German	political	theatre’	24and	a	‘troublemaking	holy	fool	turned	into	a	pragmatic	humanitarian’25	This	last	reference	is	to	his	last	project,	before	his	death	from	lung	cancer	in	2010:	the	non-profit	project	Opera	Village	Africa,	a	large-scale,	counter-imperialist	European	intervention	in	Ougadougou.		The	exploration	of	a	deconstructive	and	iconoclastic	approach	to	the	aesthetics	of	performance	aligned	with	an	imperative	to	explore	social	engagement	recurs	throughout	his	work.		In	Passion	Impossible	staged	in	Hamburg	in	1997	he	set	up	a	mission	for	homeless	people	and	drug	addicts	and	encouraged	them	to	participate	in	a	series	of	social	and	political	interventions	in	the	city.		He	also	engaged,	somewhat	anachronistically,	in	high	art	practice:	directing	Parsifal	at	Bayreuth,	but	Schlingensief’s	work	is	not	easily	categorizable	and	the	fluidity	associated	with	projects	under	the	aegis	of	Fluxus	remained.	A	comment	that	he	made	in	an	interview	with	Florian	Malzacher,	cited	in	Forrest	and	Scheer’s	Christoph	Schlingensief:	Art	Without	Borders	captures	something	of	his	approach	to	politics	and	aesthetics:			Perhaps	I	was	always	already	political,	but	from	an	aesthetic	point	of	view.	And	what	I	am	doing	now	is	even	more	political	because	it	assumes	that	the	individual	can’t	deal	with	himself.	(210).	The	comment	also	captures	his	particular	take	on	the	Beuysian	project	that	everyone	is	an	artist	is	implicated	with	the	belief	that	everyone	is	at	the	same	time	incapable	of	dealing	with	themselves.		His	work	provokes	spectators,		participants	and	the	public	spheres	generated	around	them	to	adopt	multiple	and	contradictory	positions.				
																																																								24	Roos	“Palpating.”			25	Johnson.”Former	Auteur.”		
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In	Chance	2000:	The	Last	Chance	Party	a	‘public	action’	was	undertaken	in	1998	in	which	he	founded	a	political	party	with	the	aim	of	supporting	disabled,	unemployed	and	other	marginalized	people	to	become	independent	electoral	candidates,	a	project	reminiscent	of	Joseph	Beuys’	founding	and	co-founding	of	political	parties	in	the	1960s	and	1970s.		The	slogan	of	this	public	action	‘Vote	for	Yourself’	was	influenced	by	Beuys,	but	is	also	caught	up	in	a	tension	typical	of	Schlingensief	in	that	his	challenge	is	that	anybody	should	vote	for	themselves	not	as	a	promotion	or	affirmation	of	self	but	as	a	provocation	of	what	‘self’	means	in	the	distribution	of	the	sensible:		The	focus	is	on	the	individual.	This	refers	not	to	the	abstract	notion,	but	to	the	concrete,	mortal	individuals	who	deal	with	their	daily	routine	and	do	what	they	can	to	cash	in	society's	promise	of	bourgeois	happiness.	(“Chance	2000-	The	Last	Chance	Party,”	Schlingensief.com)	Voting	for	yourself	was	not	about	a	neoliberal	notion	of	self-promotion	to	which	all	subjects	are	required	to	subscribe,	but	more	in	the	sense	of	self	as	a	multitude	of	singularities.		Within	this	multitude	are	people	with	disabilities	amongst	others,	or	amongst	other	others	who	need	to	lay	a	claim	to	their	own	haecceities	of	‘self.’	The	project	included	Schlingensief’s:	weekly	shopping	trips	to	Berlin's	KaDeWe	department	store	with	a	continually	growing	number	of	unemployed	people,	welfare	recipients,	disabled	individuals	and	other	qualified	disqualified	people.	(Schlingensief.com)		an	indication	of	Schlingensief’s	ongoing	engagement	with	the	people	involved	that	extended	beyond	the	workplaces	of	studio	or	theatre.	Mario	Garzaner	and	his	parents,	Kerstin	Graßman,	Horst	Gelonnek,	Achim	von	Paczensky,	Helga	Stöwhase	Werner	Brecht	who	participated	in	Chance	2000	also	appear	in	FreakStars	3000.	An	ensemble	was	developed,	the	‘Schlingensief	
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family’	–	which	also	included	film	actors	who	had	worked	in	a	similar	ongoing	way	with	another	enfant	terrible	–	of	the	New	German	Cinema	-	Rainer	Werner	Fassbinder.	Members	of	this	ensemble	were	also	involved	in	another	Schlingensief	project	that	provides	important	contextualization	for	FreakStars	3000:	Bitte	Liebt	
Osterreich:	Please	Love	Austria:	First	Austrian	Coalition	Week.		Schlingensief	staged	this	retake	of	Big	Brother	as	in	intervention	in	2000,	the	year	Jorg	Haider’s	far-right	FPÖ	(Austrian	Freedom	Party)	entered	into	government	in	Austria	in	coalition	with	the	Christian	Democrats	(ÖVP).		It	involved	a	dozen	asylum	seekers	living	in	conditions	of	some	privation	in	a	shipping	container	placed	outside	the	Vienna	State	Opera	in	the	centre	of	the	city,	underneath	a	banner	inscribed	‘Ausländer	Raus’	(Foreigners	Out)	and	the	blue	flags	of	the	FPÖ.		The	container	was	equipped	with	closed	circuit	television	cameras	that	broadcast	what	was	happening	inside	the	container	24	hours	a	day	to	Webfreetv.		Members	of	the	public	were	asked	to	phone	in	or	vote	online	to	evict	two	candidates	each	day	who	they	were	informed	would	then	be	deported	back	to	their	native	countries	until	one	winner	remained	who	would	receive	a	cash	prize	and	the	possibility	of	Austrian	citizenship	through	marriage,	if	that	could	be	arranged	with	a	sympathetic	bystander.			Mario	Garzaner,	Horst	Gelonnek	and	others	intermingled	with	other	members	of	the	public	outside	the	container	expressing	their	vehement	opposition	or	support	for	the	‘project’	–understood	as	an	actual	‘reality	television	contest’.		The	vehemence	and	stridency	of	the	opinions	expressed	by	Mario	Garzaner	and	other	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	is	in	no	way	
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remarkable,	different	or	out	of	place	amongst	the	equally	extreme	and	vehement	opinions	of	the	dissensus	expressed	outside	the	Vienna	State	Opera.		Spectatorial	unease	and	dissensus	is	provoked	and	encouraged	throughout.		In	the	documentary	that	gives	an	account	of	the	project26	there	is	a	moment	when	the	prominent	banner	is	first	unveiled	from	on	high	as	Schlingensief	announces	into	a	microphone	with	enthusiasm:		‘Das	ist	Öestereich’	and	an	assistant	pulls	off	the	covering	paper	to	reveal	‘AUSLÄNDER	RAUS.’		People	applaud	and	cheer	-		but	what	is	it	that	they	are	applauding	and	cheering?	–		are	they	cheering	the	racist	sentiment	behind	FOREIGNERS	OUT	or	the	exposure	of	this	clear	agenda	of	the	FPÖ	and	by	extension	the	Austrian	coalition	government,	or	are	they	applauding	what	they	assume	will	be	another	Schlingensief	provocation?		The	revealing	of	the	banner	leaves	the	answer	to	these	questions	deliberately	unclear.		It	is	a	‘social	sculpture’,	a	performance	in	the	social	sphere	in	which	everybody	present	is	involved	except	nobody	knows	in	what	kind	of	performance	they	are	involved.		Schlingensief	and	his	team	likewise	operate	on	a	principle	of	taking	risks:	they	cannot	be	sure	what	will	be	provoked	by	their	provocations.			Beuys	configures	a		‘social	sculpture’	as	a	
gesamtkunstwerk,	Schlingensief	reconfigures	it	as	a	gesamtkunstwerk	of	dissensus.	Schlingensief	is	often	labeled	a	provocateur	but	if	he	is,	it	is	with	a	difference:	he	has	no	real	idea	of	the	outcome	of	the	provocation,	his	provocations	generate	work	that	is	‘fluid	and	open	in	its	structure’	and	requires	a	responsibility	and	performativity	in	the	audience.		As	Forrest	and	Scheer	articulate,	the	subject	matter	of	his	performances:	
																																																								26	Foreigners	Out!:Schlingensief’s	Container.		
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the	recent	success	of	far	right	parties	across	Europe;	the	indignities	of	unemployment	and	homelessness;	the	lack	of	visibility	of	disabled	people	in	the	media;	the	politics	of	fear	in	the	post	9/11	period	;	and	the	legacy	of	the	Nazi	past	in	contemporary	Germany.	(5)	are	all	highly	political	issues	but	he	does	not	push	any	one	political	agenda	or	viewpoint.		His	intention	is:		To	provoke	the	audience	to	think	for	themselves	and	to	approach	the	topic	from	multiple	angles:		‘self-provocation.’	(5)	
FreakStars	3000	then	needs	to	be	viewed	in	this	context.		Schlingensief	was	not	suddenly	turning	to	the	‘subject’	of	the	visibility	of	people	with	intellectual	disability	as	he	had	already	included	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	among	
others	in	his	previous	works.		I	would	contend	that	Schlingensief’s	Freakstars	
3000	completely	steps	outside	of	-	or	disrupts	from	within	-	the	discourses	that	inform	the	aesthetics	and	politics	of	theatrical	practices	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	that	had	been	established	from	the	1960s	onwards.		Schlingensief’s	methodology	and	intentionality	-	and	it	is	only	possible	to	speak	of	such	notions	with	regard	to	his	work	in	any	but	the	loosest	terms	-	are	
anarchic.		He	comes	to	work	with	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	
FreakStars	3000	from	a	background	of	anarchic,	iconoclastic,	pranksterish	performance	provocations.		His	work	not	only	defies	classification	into	genre	but	in	his	collaborations	with	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	he	is	completely	irreverent	toward	any	pieties	of	political	correctness	or	the	façade	of	ethical	concern.	Because	he	approaches	a	project	like	FreakStars	3000	with	a	non-discriminating	irreverence	he	opens	up	a	possibility	of	egalitarianism	between	people	with	and	without	intellectual	disabilities.			He	assumes	equality	between	people	with	and	without	disabilities	as	a	starting	point	just	as	he	assumes	an	
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equality	or	equi	-valence	between	high	and	low	art,	professional	and	amateur	performers,	popular	culture	and	the	avant-garde.		They	are	all	equally	contentious	and	contestable	terms	in	the	profound	self-provocation	Schlingensief	puts	them	and	himself	through	–	and	that	is	the	crucial	point:	he	includes	himself	in	the	provocation	-Schlingensief,	the	auteur,	the	director,	the	artist.		He	creates	a	framework	in	which	contradictory	and	diametrically	opposed	ethical,	aesthetic	and	political	positions	can	be	adopted	to	provoke	a	complete	re-examination	of	all	those	positions	or	discourses.		His	is	not	a	project	that	creates	a	safe	or	politically	correct	viewpoint	or	position	of	judgment	for	anyone	–including	those	who	profess	avant-garde	sensibilities	or	a	particular	liberal	or	radical	leftist	political	viewpoint.		Schlingensief	seeks	in	his	aesthetic	and	political	practices	a	democratic	nonchalance:	a	lack	of	concern	for,	or	judgment	of,	tastes	and	sensibilities	or	the	rightness	or	wrongness	of	values	and	arguments,	all	of	which	arguments	and	counter-arguments,	tastes	and	judgments	he	seeks	to	provoke	in	a	creative	exposing	of	dissensus.	His	strategy	is	ethically,	aesthetically	and	politically	risky.		It	risks	incapacitation,	the	incapacitation	of	ethical	and	aesthetic	judgment.		In	the	provocation	and	experimentations	of	his	hybrid	performance	projects	as	soon	as	a	particular	aesthetic	or	political	formation	emerges,	Schlingensief	seeks	to	incapacitate	that	formation.		His	work	is	anti-theatrical	in	the	same	sense	that	Jérôme	Bel’s	Disabled	Theater	is	anti-theatrical	but	with	Schlingensief	it	is	a	joyful	anti-theatricality,	a	jouissance	of	anti-theatricality.		
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FreakStars	3000	
FreakStars	3000	was	first	broadcast	in	2000	as	a	six-part	television	series	on	VIVA	influenced	by	talent	shows	such	as	Popstars	and	Deutschland	Sucht	den	
Superstar.		FreakStars	3000	is	a	casting	show	with	a	difference	in	that	only	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	and	psychiatric	diagnoses	comprise	the	two	dozen	contestants	from	amongst	whom	a	select	few	will	be	chosen	to	perform	at	the	Volksbühne	as	the	‘free	jazz’	band	Mutter	Sucht	Schrauben.			From	this	television	series	and	the	performance	at	the	Volksbühne	a	2003	dvd	also	called	FreakStars	3000	was	compiled	and	it	is	to	this	that	I	will	be	referring	in	my	analysis.		In	FreakStars	3000	Christoph	Schlingensief	goes	into	an	institution,	just	as	in	A	Child	is	Waiting,	and	takes	the	residents	through	a	process	that	is	supposed	to	culminate	in	a	performance	at	a	prestigious	cultural	venue,	just	as	it	did	in	the	Sydney	Opera	House	in	Stepping	Out.		Along	the	way,	however,	he	re-frames	the	format	as	a	mockumentary	of	the	selection	process	for	a	talent	show,	the	search	for	Freak	Stars.		Along	the	way	he	also	parodies	other	commercial	media	formats:	a	Home	Shopping	channel	and	cultural	and	political	talk	shows.		His	satire	is	swooping	and	comprehensive	and	the	targets	of	that	satire	include	the	current	avant-garde	practices	of	the	Reality	Trend	of	Rimini	Protokoll	and	other	groups,	the	use	of	untrained	actors	as	‘experts’	in	performance	and	relational	art	practices	and	the	use	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	the	work	of	avant-garde	theatrical	practitioners	Peter	Sellars,	Pippo	Delbono	and	Rodrigo	Garcia.		In	titling	the	project	FreakStars	3000	Schlingensief	is	at	the	same	time	invoking	nineteenth	century	freak	show	display	and	spectacle.		Schlingensief’s	intention	is	not	merely	to	expose	the	shallowness	of	contemporary	popular	broadcast	culture	nor	merely	to	expose	the	freak	show	latent	in	both	attitudes	to	
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people	with	intellectual	disabilities	and	underlying	the	Schadenfreude	of	so	much	‘reality’	television.	The	intent	is	rather	to	encourage	the	spectator	to	think	
through	these	expected	oppositional	responses	and,	therefore,	to	approach	the	questions	of	‘taste’	and	‘appropriateness’	that	the	FreakStars	project	raises	from	a	multiplicity	of	different	positions.						This	can	be	illustrated	in	an	analysis	of	how	the	project	is	positioned	from	the	outset	to	the	viewer	of	the	dvd.		The	first	thing	that	appears	in	the	main	body	of	the	dvd	is	an	introductory	commentary.		White	text	on	a	black	background	scrolls	up	the	screen,	accompanied	by	an	energetic	male	voiceover:	Dear	film	fans!	Watch	cool	young	people	fulfill	their	dreams	of	a	career	in	music,	with	talent	and	100%	dedication.		Hear	German	originals	use	song	to	highlight	the	problems	of	the	non-handicapped.		During	filming	actors	were	consistently	abused,	and	forced	to	act	handicapped.		Every	fit,	every	breakdown	is	therefore	authentic	and	unique!	(FreakStars	3000)	This	format	of	text	and	voiceover	is	normally	reserved	in	broadcast	and	film	media	for	the	guaranteeing	of	a	discourse	of	truth	or	authenticity,	or	conversely	for	the	guaranteeing	of	fictional	content,	but	in	this	particular	announcement	many	of	the	terms	are	revealed	to	be	problematic	at	quite	a	deep	level.			This	announcement	is	a	parody	of	the	kind	of	conventional	‘disclaimer’	which	might	state	that	no	animals	or	other	vulnerable	subjects	were	harmed	in	the	course	of	the	filming:	but	it	is	a	kind	of	dis-disclaimer	or	it	‘disses’	(disrespects)	the	usual	or	expected	disclaimer	around	‘sensitive	material’,	disclaimers	that	themselves	generally	paradoxically	encourage	viewers	to	bring	to	mind	the	very	behavior	that	is	being	disclaimed.		The	introductory	statement	or	preamble	introduces	
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disability	as	a	term	but	in	its	antithesis	in	the	negated	negative	term	‘the	non-disabled.’		This	reference	to	the	problem	of	non-disability	is	capable	of	a	number	of	different	readings.		In	“Productive	Discord:	Schlingensief,	Adorno	and	FreakStars	3000”	in	Christoph	Schlingensief:	Art	Without	Borders	Tara	Forrest	offers	one	reading:		it	is	clearly	the	perceived	prejudices	and	shortcomings	of	the	audience	–rather	than	any	‘shortcomings’	of	the	contestants	themselves	–	at	which	Schlingensief’s	criticism	is	leveled.	(130)		From	this	perspective	the	text	could	be	read	as	quite	sincere	in	its	intention:	the	great	problem	of	‘the	disabled’	is	the	non-disabled	in	terms	of	attitudes,	behaviours,	legislation,	medicalization	and	so	forth,	as	the	social	model	of	disability	articulates.		Forrest	immediately	goes	on	to	point	out:		In	Schlingensief’s	productions,	however,	criticism	is	never	straightforward.	(130)	The	‘social	model	of	disability’27	reading	is,	though,	only	one	of	the	possible	readings	and	it	is	not	set	forth	as	an	underlying	truth	or	an	underlying	reality	that	gives	point	to	the	irony.		On	one	level	the	text	could	simply	be	contrary,	ironic,	mocking	of	expectations	in	an	absurd	reversal	of	expectations.		My	contention	is	that	the	text	affords	both	a	‘social	model’	reading	and	a	mockery	of	the	‘piety’	of	this	reading	and	in	this	respect	is	an	example	at	the	molecular	level	of	the	whole	project’s	‘treatment’	of	the	subject	of	intellectual	disability.		Schlingensief’s	strategy	of	‘self-provocation’	continually	eludes	any	one	moral	or	ethical	standpoint,	seeking	rather	to	provoke	an	ongoing	critical	self-questioning,	uncertainty	and,	therefore,	a	degree	of	creativity	and	responsibility																																																									27	Found,	for	example,	in	Oliver.		The	social	model	of	disability	attempts	to	distinguish	between	impairment	in	the	person	and	disability	in	social	environments	and	situations.			
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from	the	spectator	in	response.		His	strategy	could	be	said	to	be	one	of	incapacitating	the	faculties	of	judgment	of	the	spectator	to	emancipate	other,	diverse	ways	of	thinking	and	seeing	and	of	questioning	what	can	be	thought	and	said,	or	the	distribution	of	the	sensible,	around	particular	ethically	sensitive	issues.		Schlingensief	’s	2004	project	is	a	kind	of	postmodern	parody28	of	a	documentary	format	that	has	become	hybridized	with	the	inexorable,	teleological	structure	and	confounding	of	backstage	and	onstage	of	a	talent	show	quest.		In	the	popular	television	talent	show,	reality	show	format	backstage	and	onstage	are	confounded	as	both	are	required	to	serve	its	particular	narratives,	which	are	narratives	of	selection:	either	the	would-be	performer/chef/designer	struggles,	faces	their	demons,	overcomes	adversity	and	triumphs	or	they	err,	implode,	embarrass	themselves	and	thus	create	a	compelling	drama	of	incapacity	and	reinforce	the	place	of	the	performance	of	winning	and	losing	in	late	capitalism.					The	documentary	format	that	might	have	still	been	trusted	in	the	period	Noonan	made	Stepping	Out	has	now	become	imbricated	with	the	highly	manipulative	dispositions	of	the	meaning	of	‘reality’	in	‘reality	television’	and	the	Schadenfreude	and	freak	show	dynamic	of	the	talent	quest.			Schlingensief’s	‘subject’	in	FreakStars	3000,	the	subject	of	his	parody	and	provocation	is	a	multiplicity,	a	constellation	that	includes	a)	how	the	talent	quest/reality	show	emerges	as	a	freak	show,	b)	how	the	involvement	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	reflects	on	the	freakery	of	the	talent	show	with	its	group	of	telegenic	‘cool	young	people’	with	talents	for	conventional	performance	set	in	competition																																																									28	See	Hutcheon	58.	
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with	each	other	to	gain	greater	capital	and	c)	how	the	talent	show	format	reflects	on	the	terms	of	visibility	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	within	public	spheres,	within	popular	culture	and	within	mainstream	and	avant-garde	theatrical	performance.					 Immediately	after	the	introductory	announcement/disclaimer	there	is	then	an	abrupt	cut	to	the	flashing	of	an	image	suggestive	of	the	white	noise	on	a	television	monitor	accompanied	by	the	sound	of	breaking	glass	and	of	an	electronic	glitch,	the	combination	of	which	suggests	a	television	malfunctioning	or	breaking	down.		The	screen	then	switches	to	a	man	walking	down	a	tree-lined	street	dressed	in	a	white	jacket	which	appears	to	be	too	big	for	him,	wearing	an	ill-fitting	black	wig.		He	is	singing	offkey	and	his	voice	is	on	a	permanent	vocal	fry.		From	the	outset	the	television	screen	shows	the	presentation	of	a	television	programme	in	a	state	of	breaking	down	and,	the	implication	is,	the	talent	quest	breaking	down	in	the	face	of	the	untalented.			At	the	same	time	these	breakdowns	themselves	are	clichés	of	short	attention	span	television	or	‘zany’,	‘wacky’	television	comedy	–	and,	the	implication	is,	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	are	susceptible	to	being	viewed	in	the	same	way:	zany,	wacky	others	who	are	the	latest	contribution	of	weirdness	to	voyeuristic	reality	television,	or,	given	Schlingensief’s	credentials,	the	latest	guarantors	of	both	otherness	and	authenticity	to	post-dramatic	and	anti-theatrical	performance.		The	spectator	is	left	in	a	state	of	uncertainty	both	as	to	the	target	of	this	parody	and	in	a	state	of	uncertainty	as	to	whether	they	themselves	might	be	the	target,	or	that	there	may	be	no	discourse	or	attitude	that	is	not	being	parodied.			This	is	followed	by	a	Terry	Gilliam-esque	animation	sequence,	accompanied	by	a	soundtrack	of	carnivalesque,	sideshow	music	and	the	sound	of	
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uninhibited,	slightly	demented	laughter.		Prominent	in	this	sequence	is	a	graphic	of	an	instrument	suggestive	of	both	cranial	calipers	and	a	vice,	but	certainly	some	sort	of	anthropometric	measuring	device.	This	same	graphic	is	superimposed	on	each	auditionee	throughout	the	audition	process.		As	Tara	Forrest	points	out	this	connects	the	‘measurement’	of	talent	in	contemporary	talent	quest	television	and	processes	of	normalizing	or	setting	up	norms	that	have	a	history	that	includes	the	destructive	eugenic	agenda	of	the	Nazis	and	others:		By	introducing	anatomical	measuring	devices	at	the	start	of	the	program,	and	by	superimposing	images	of	those	devices	on	the	footage	of	contestants	as	they	participate	in	the	audition	process,	Schlingensief	confronts	viewers	to	question	the	degree	to	which	certain	National	Socialist	ideals	of	what	constitutes	a	‘normal’	and/or	‘desirable’	retain	a	certain	currency	in	the	contemporary	media	and	popular	cultural	spheres.	(“Productive	Discord”	132)	This	is	certainly	a	part	of	Schlingensief’s	agenda	in	FreakStars	3000	but	as	Forrest	herself	recognizes	‘in	Schlingensief’s	productions	criticism	is	never	straightforward.’			In	the	superimposition	of	the	anatomical	measuring	device	and	in	other	sequences	in	FreakStars	3000	the	dvd,	for	example	when	Achim	von	Paczensky	appears	in	a	political	discussion	show	as	Jorg	Haider	with	a	felt	pen	moustache	and	hair	parting	applied	to	his	face	as	a	caricature	of	Hitler,	Schlingensief	is	also	breaking	the	taboo	in	German	broadcast	media	of	not	speaking	about	the	Holocaust.			This	is	an	agenda	to	which	Schlingensief	returns	in	the	corpus	of	his	works.	In	Quiz	3000:	You	are	the	Catastrophe,	a	Schlingensief	provocation	of	the	television	quiz	show	format	of	Who	Wants	to	Be	a	Millionaire?,	which	was	staged	at	the	Volksbühne	in	2002,		the	following	questions	appeared,	cited	in	Forrest:		
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Order	the	following	concentration	camps	from	north	to	south:	A:	Auschwitz	B:	Bergen	Belsen	C:	Dachau	D:	Ravensbrück	and:	 The	rape	of	members	of	which	minority	group	are,	according	to	the	German	civil	code,	less	heavily	penalized?	A:	Men	B:	Animals	C:	Children	D:	People	with	Disabilities	According	to	Forrest:	What	is	disturbing	about	the	questions	pertaining	to	concentration	camps	and	the	legal	consequences	of	the	rape	of	disabled	people	is	the	degree	to	which	they	short-circuit	the	experience	of	pleasure	associated	with	the	contestant/audience’s	capacity	to	answer	the	question.		(128)	She	goes	on	to	infer	that	if	the	contestant/audience	member	gets	the	question	about	the	concentration	camps	correct,	the	arousal	of	the	memory	of	the	camps	and	the	atrocities	would	both	‘outweigh	the	pleasure	gained	from	providing	the	correct	answer’	and	‘make(s)	it	difficult	to	proceed	in	an	enthusiastic	manner	to	the	next	question.’		While	this	is	certainly	one	aspect	of	how	these	particular	questions	subvert	the	Who	Wants	to	Be	a	Millionaire?	format	and	provoke	the	spectator,	there	are	other	issues	at	stake.	Testing	knowledge	of	the	concentration	camps	based	solely	on	their	geographical	location	and	relative	positions	on	a	north-south	axis	is	ludicrous.		This	occludes	other	knowledge	of	what	these	camps	mean	by	only	referring	to	their	relative	locations.		The	concentration	camps	have	become	of	the	same	status	as	the	trivialized	knowledge	of	any	random	‘general	knowledge’	question	in	a	game	of	Trivial	Pursuit.		Schlingensief’s	work	repeatedly	provoked	an	interrogation	of	processes	of	remembering,	and	of	forgetting,	the	Holocaust.	Schlingensief’s	strategy	seems	to	be	to	isolate	and	to	highlight	issues	that	are	‘sensitive’	in	that	they	are	in	a	state	of	uncertainty	in	the	doxa	of	
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contemporary	morality	or	ethics.		It	is	a	strategy	of	offering	spectators	a	number	of	different	positions	from	which	to	respond,	many	of	them	compromised	or	morally	and	ethically	dubious,	so	that	they	are	forced	to	confront	their	own	prejudices.		They	are	provoked	to	examine	both	knee-jerk	reactions	and	those	reactions	motivated	by	a	show	of	ethical	concern	to	be	‘politically	correct’.		I	think	Schlingensief’s	pranksterism	and	provocation	aligns	with	Rancière’s	idea	of	the	‘political.’	Politically	correct	ideas	are	based	on	consensus,	whereas	for	‘the	political’	for	Rancière	and	‘self-provocation’	for	Schlingensief	are	very	much	about	creating	dissensus,	a	clash	of	discourses	or	a	disruption	of	discourse.		In	FreakStars	3000	Schlingensief	sets	up	the	particular	discourse	and	narrative	structure	of	the	talent	show	quest	in	a	segregated,	residential	home	for	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	and	psychiatric	disorders.		At	first	sight	this	might	seem	like	a	deliberate	disconnect,	an	inappropriate	or	ironic	juxtaposition.			The	initial	auditions	take	place	within	the	institution	of	Thieler	Winckler	House	and	the	spectator	is	immediately	aware	of	the	‘embodied	difference’	of	the	residents	with	disabilities	from	amongst	whom	will	be	chosen	the	candidates	to	go	on	the	talent	quest.		Schlingensief	forces	the	conventions	of	the	format	to	fit	this	environment.		The	jurymembers,	who	will	judge	the	talent	are	all	non-disabled	and	include	Schlingensief	himself.			As	he	outlines	the	rules	of	the	audition	process	to	a	crowded	room	in	the	institution	he	struggles	to	make	himself	heard	above	the	hubbub.	He	raises	his	voice	and	asks	for	quiet	but	an	off-camera	voice	interrupts	him	in	mid-flow,	the	camera	cuts	to	one	of	the	residents	later	identified	as	Bernhard	who	shouts	out	‘NO!	NO!’	and	we	hear	a	loud	screaming	in	response.	This	comes	from	a	female	resident	who	will	later	be	identified	as	Gabriele.		We	see	her	shaking	agitatedly	on	her	chair.		Bernhard,	
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visibly	upset,	spits	out	‘Shut	your	trap	.	.	.	your	mouth’	as	the	loud	screaming	continues.		Bernhard	storms	out	of	the	room.	Somebody	we	assume	to	be	a	staff	member	of	the	institution	follows	him	out	as	Christoph	repeats	his	name	attempting	to	call	him	back	in.		A	male	voiceover	is	heard:					Everyone	is	on	edge.		Tensions	are	running	high.		Jurymember	Christoph	tries	to	calm	them	down.	Schlingensief	invites	Bernhard	to	come	back	and	sit	at	the	front.		The	staff	member	leads	him	by	the	hand,	saying	‘Come	here,	dear.’		Bernhard	resumes	his	seat	but	still	fires	off	another	comment	at	Gabriele:	‘I’ll	smash	your	face	in!’		Schlingensief	says:		‘We’ll	do	it	together,	now.	Everything’s	okay	right?	We’ll	keep	going.’			In	this	brief	disturbance	one	institutional	dispositif	is	set	off	against	another:	the	talent	quest	against	the	segregated	institution.			The	voiceover,	added	in	post-production,	‘Everyone	is	on	edge.		Tensions	are	running	high’	is	from	the	discourse	of	the	talent	quest	narrative,	an	attempt	to	gloss	over	the	disturbance	of	the	behaviour	of	two	of	the	segregated	residents	as	if	it	is	part	of	this	narrative	of	hyped-up	enthusiasm	of	the	talent	quest	.		The	interaction	of	this	discourse	with	that	of	the	institution	–	the	staff	member’s	‘Come	here,	dear’	-	draws	attention	to	both	the	tensions	between	these	two	discourses	and	their	similarities	in	terms	of	the	control	and	disciplining	of	the	affect	of	those	subjected	to	them.		The	interaction	also	reveals	the	‘third	thing’	in	this	dialectical	encounter:		Schlingensief’s	project	of	‘social	sculpture’	or	socially	engaged	arts	practice.		This	project	is	not	overtly	activist	in	that	it	says	either	a)	see	how	‘reality’	talent	quest	television	is	as	controlling	as	an	institution	for	the	intellectually	disabled	or	b)	see	how	the	intellectually	disabled	are	reduced	to	
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the	level	of	freaks	in	a	freak	show	in	a	society	based	on	norms	of	appearance	and	behaviour	that	they	are	set	up	to	fail	to	achieve.			This	is	a	dialogic	process	in	which	multiple	discourses	may	emerge	and	thus	the	place	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	this	project	can	not	be	said	to	be	either	one	of	exploitation	or	of	empowerment	as	the	project	encourages	the	spectator	to	be	aware	of	both	of	these	perceptions.	It	also	encourages	a	thinking	through	of	the	blind	spots	created	by	thinking	in	terms	of	either	exploitation,	‘a	send-up	of	disabled	people’,	or	empowerment,‘	highlighting	the	problems	of	the	non-handicapped’.	We	see	this	troubling	of	easy	binaries	upon	which	judgment	and	taste	is	predicated	in	the	audition	process	in	FreakStars	3000.	This	takes	place	in	groups	of	three	over	the	course	of	the	programme	and	in	one	group	we	first	see	Anne	Marie,	who	is	microcephalic.	Her	appearance	invokes	a	history	of	images	of	the	freakshow:	Schlitzie	the	pin-headed	sideshow	performer	who	appeared	in	Tod	Browning’s	1932	film	Freaks,	or,	indeed,	those	unnamed	bodies	paraded	as	
Lebensunwertes	leben	in	the	Nazi	eugenics	propaganda	films,	Erbkrank	or	Opfer	
der	Vergangenheit.		When	required	to	audition,	with	the	attention	of	the	whole	room	on	her,	Anne	Marie	brings	one	finger	up	to	her	lips	and	makes	a	shushing	sound.	She	smiles	broadly	and	turns	to	look	at	the	other	residents	in	the	audience.		Axel,	who	is	sitting	near	her,	says	encouragingly	and	gently:		‘Sing	us	a	song.’		There	are	other	noises	of	encouragement	and	laughter.	We	hear	Christoph’s	voice:	‘Quiet	now!		Let’s	be	quiet.			So,	Anne	Marie	.	.	.’	Anne	Marie	continues	to	smile	beamingly,	turns	to	Axel	and	says	something	inaudible.		This	is	the	extent	of	her	participation.	The	talent	show	music	and	graphics	press	on	inexorably.			
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The	next	contestant	is	introduced:	Axel.	He	has	phocomelia,	the	foreshortened	‘flipper’	arms	associated	with	thalidomide	births.		Axel	sings	from	a	book	a	few	lines	of	an	anti-war	song.			As	he	sings	this,	we	can	hear	Gabriele’s	animated	laughter	and	the	sound	of	shushing.		Axel	continues,	singing	the	refrain:		‘So	why	do	we	have	wars?	So	why	do	we	have	wars.’		His	singing	is	sincere	but	tuneless	and	he	seems	to	be	smiling	in	acknowledgement	that	singing	is	not	his	forte.		He	is	taking	an	in-breath	for	the	next	line	when	Schlingensief	interrupts	him	with	a	‘Bravo’	and	the	soundtrack	of	the	mockumentary	plays	the	fanfare	that	greets	the	end	of	auditions.		The	voiceover	adds	a	comment:	‘Why	do	we	have	wars?’	An	important	question	nowadays.	How	will	the	jury	react?’	Schlingensief	also	responds:	‘Why	do	we	have	wars?	No	idea.	Perhaps	we	should	discuss	that,	yes?’		At	that	point	Gabriele	responds:	‘Yes!	Yes!’	She	shakes	both	arms	in	movements	characteristic	of	stereotypy	and	shouts	and	screams	‘Yes!	Yes!	Yes!	Yes!	Yes!	Yes!’	She	makes	several	repeated	joyful	screaming	sounds	as	she	stands	in	front	of	the	other	residents.		Schlingensief	is	seen	laughing	and	pronounces	the	single	word:	‘Enthusiasm’	and	her	audition	ends.		On	one	level	this	audition	sequence	demonstrates	how	the	project	tries	to	negotiate	‘the	fine	line	between	presenting	and	exposing	its	performers.’		In	Schlingensief’s	project	the	formations	of	the	talent	quest	format,	in	this	case	the	audition,	are	used	heuristically.	The	participation	of	Annemarie,	Axel	and	Gabriele	all	in	their	own	ways	disrupt	the	theatrical	and	narrative	expectations	of	this	process.		Whether	they	and	others	pass	or	fail	the	audition	is	shown	throughout	the	mockumentary	to	be	the	result	of	arbitrary	decisions	by	the	jurymembers.		These	are	performances	of	another	order	entirely	to	the	showing	off	of	technique	or	the	ability	to	imitate	current	models	of	virtuosic	performance	
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of	conventional	talent	shows.		At	the	same	time	the	possibility	is	raised	that	a	spectator’s	suspension	of	critical	judgment	in	the	face	of	the	‘failure’	of	these	auditions	is	itself	patronizing,	a	patronization	encapsulated	in	Schlingensief’s	pronouncement	of	the	word	‘Enthusiam’	after	Gabriele’s	outburst.		It	is	unclear,	however,	and	I	believe	it	is	deliberately	unclear,	how	much	this	patronization	of	the	efforts	at	‘talent’	of	these	three	residents	is	a	citation	of	patronization,	a	parody	of	the	relentless	upbeat	positivity	of	talent	shows,	or	whether	it	is	a	parody	of	the	pity	and	sentimentality	that	infects	the	appreciation	or	judgment	of	the	efforts	of	people	with	disabilities	cast	into	the	spotlight	of	the	media	or	theatrical	performance.		On	another	level	Schlingensief’s	comment	‘Enthusiasm’	can	be	taken	at	face	value.		All	those	present	in	Thieler	Winckler	House	invest	with	great	energy	and	enthusiasm	in	Schlingensief’s	version	of	the	talent	show.		The	format	of	the	television	talent	show	requires	the	inflation	of	an	enthusiasm	on	the	part	of	the	participants	and	the	audience	that	borders	on	the	hysterical.	The	residents	appear	to	be	enjoying	themselves	tremendously	in	what	they	are	doing	and	participating	in	Schlingensief’s	provocations	with	humour	and	‘enthusiasm.’				 It	could	also	be	argued	that	Schlingensief	appropriates	the	talent	show	form	in	what	Christopher	Balme	has	described,	with	reference	to	Bitte	Liebt	
Österreich,	as	a	strategy	of	‘ironic	over-identification’,	a	term	that	Zizek	adapted	from	Lacan	to	refer	to:	forms	of	political	intervention	and	resistance	where	an	idea	or	issue	is	not	opposed	but	embraced	and	given	form	in	a	hypertrophic	version	.	.	.	by	taking	the	system	more	seriously	than	it	takes	itself.		(Balme)	If	FreakStars	3000	is	an	over-identification	-	of	the	aesthetically	and	politically	reactionary	television	talent	show	format	-	does	that	strategy	depend	upon	the	
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intellectually	disabled	residents	of	Thieler	Winckler	House	taking	Schlingensief’s	version	of	the	talent	show	seriously?		Does	Schlingensief	achieve	his	ironic	over-identification	at	the	expense	of	the	gullibility	of	the	residents?		This	interpretation	is,	however,	posited	on	the	assumed	lack	of	agency	of	the	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	Thieler	Winckler	House.		One	response	to	this	argument	is	that	Schlingensief	is	at	least	being	democratic:	just	as	the	over-identification	of	Bitte	Liebt	Österreich	is	based	on	certain	publics	believing	in	the	‘reality’	of	the	rejected	asylum	seekers	being	repatriated	when	they	have	been	voted	out	of	the	Container	so	FreakStars	3000	is	based	on	the	belief	by	the	contestants	in	the	‘reality’	of	the	contest	and	the	choosing	of	the	final	group	of	performers	to	present	the	‘free	jazz’	concert	at	the	Volksbühne	at	the	end	of	the	project	–	an	event	that	does	actually	take	place.			What	is	also	interesting	in	this	respect	is	the	composition	and	responses	of	the	audience	at	the	Volksbühne.			Did	they	come	to	see	intellectually	disabled	people	perform	or	a	work	of	avant-garde	provocation	by	Schlingensief	and	how	might	their	horizon	of	expectations	have	affected	their	response	to	the	unmusical,	chaotic	‘talentless’	concluding	performance?		Another	response	to	this	argument	is	that	FreakStars	3000	is	not	just	a	version	of	a	talent	show,	it	encompasses	Hit	Parade	a	parodic	version	of	videos	of	middle	of	the	road	musical	stars	–	such	as	Nana	Mouskouri	and	Peter	Black	–	promoting	bulk	lots	of	their	cds	on	a	Home	Shopping	Channel,	
Freakmann	–	a	version	of	a	political/arts	discussion	show	and	Presse	Club	in	which	the	residents	enact	particular	versions	of	the	heated	and	ranting	discussions	of	German	politicians	and	journalists.	In	all	of	these	forms	the	residents	participate	with	commitment	and	energy.		They	and	Schlingensief	are	palpably	enjoying	themselves.				
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The	intricate	problem	of	(re)presenting	disability	–	particularly	intellectual	disability	or	psychiatric	disorders	-	is	imbricated	in	the	talent	show	as	freak	show	format:	The	freak	is	in	the	situation	itself,	which	forces	us	to	make	a	distinction	between	what	is	and	isn’t	normal.	(qtd	“Productive	Discord”	132)		At	times	this	results	in	a	level	of	parody	in	which	it	is	not	clear	whether	the	target	of	the	provocation	is	the	talent	show	of	the	society	of	the	spectacle	or	the	‘show’	of	concern	for	‘the	disabled.’		This	blurring	or	overlapping	of	the	target	of	the	parody	is	evident	in	the	unfailingly	positive	reactions	to	auditions,	however	disastrous	they	may	be	perceived	in	conventional	terms	of	success	and	failure.		‘Super’	is	the	most	common	response.	At	times	the	three	judges	chant	in	unison	‘Re-spect,	Re-spect,	Re-spect.’		At	such	moments	the	layers	of	irony	are	complex.			At	one	level	the	chants	of	Re-spect	could	be	without	irony:	the	performers,	people	with	disabilities,	whatever	level	of	conventional	talent	they	may	or	may	not	have,	are	approaching	the	audition	with	engagement,	commitment	and	energy;	they	deserve	encouragement	and	respect	for	this.		At	another	level	this	chanting	might	expose	the	sham,	show	or	veneer	of	respect	that	the	talent	show	format	appears	to	offer	to	all,	while	at	the	same	time	the	format	is	based	on	a	hope	that	there	will	be	performances	that	are	so	bad	that	they	will	generate	a	powerful	affective	response	in	audience	and	viewers.		At	another	level	the	chanting	of	Re-spect	may	be	ironic	at	the	expense	of	those	who	make	a	show	of	uncritically	accepting	whatever	people	with	disabilities	offer	in	terms	of	performance	and	the	arts,	those	who	unthinkingly	respect	‘diversity’	as	an	abstract	concept	without	acknowledging	specific	differences.		On	another	level	the	irony	could	be	directed	at	those	viewers	of	FreakStars	3000	who	would	view	
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the	whole	project	as	lacking	in	respect	for	the	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities,	as	exploiting	those	performers	and	hence	subscribe	to	the	view	that	such	a	thing	should	not	be	broadcast	or	staged.		Kroß	cites	Doris	Kolesch’s	response	to	this	last	argument:		sweeping	statements	such	as	“theater	must	not	do	this”...	only	bear	witness	to	the	general	reluctance	of	engaging	with	an	aesthetic	perception	and	to	the	recourse	to	a	supposedly	tolerant	and	liberal	moral	code	which,	by	invoking	the	existence	of	seemingly	intangible	abstract	values	(such	as	equality,	equal	rights,	etc.	)	only	serves	the	purpose	of	avoiding	experience.	In	fact,	such	a	statement,	no	matter	where	or	when	it	is	pronounced,	reduces	disabled	persons	to	their	disability.		(Kroß	191)	Schlingensief’s	project	in	FreakStars	3000	is	to	expose	sensibilities	or	pieties	of	‘taste’	that	when	applied	to	the	participation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	manifest	in	a	desire	to	‘speak	for,	or	on	behalf	of’	such	people.	This	is	what	Deleuze	referred	to	as	‘The	indignity	of	speaking	for	others.’29	It	is	a	form	of	excluding	those	who	are	spoken	for	or	on	behalf	of	from	ethical	debate	concerning	them.			The	particular	problems	around	the	‘taste’	or	appropriateness	of	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	–	which	can	be	exposed	as	a	kind	of	show	of,	or	pretence	at,	ethical	concern	–	need	to	be	situated	within	Schlingensief’s	much	broader,	political	–and	Nietzschean	-	questioning	of	values	implicit	in	taste	and	judgment.		By	staging	at	the	Volksbühne	what	might	appear	to	be	a	talent	show	of	the	obviously	untalented	and	by	recording	this	process	as	a	mockumentary	within	an	institution	for	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	he																																																									29		See“Intellectuals	and	power:	A	conversation	between	Michel	Foucault	and	Gilles	Deleuze”	in	Michel	Foucault,	Language,	Counter-Memory,	Practice:	Selected	Essays	and	Interviews.Ithaca,	N.Y.:	Cornell	University	Press,	1980),	205-217.	
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raises	much	broader	questions	of	the	aesthetic	and	political	assumptions	of	‘taste’	that	distinguish	between	high	culture	or	the	avant	garde	and	popular	culture	or	kitsch.		In	the	course	of	this	examination,	people	with	intellectual	disability	are	crucially	engaged	but	the	subject	or	target	of	his	investigation	is	not	exclusively	the	treatment	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		I	do	not	believe	that	Schlingensief	attempts	to	broach	the	‘issue’	of	disability	as	he	is	conscious	of	the	dangers	of	positing	a	disabled	ontology,	of	reifying	disability	as	opposed	to	engaging	in	a	critique	of	the	situations	that	create	disability.		He	also	wishes	to	facilitate	the	occupying	of	ambivalent	and	contradictory	positions	by	the	performers	with	disabilities.			One	example	of	this	is	a	sequence	that	is	discussed	by	Kati	Kroß	in	‘Consistently	Abused	and	Forced	to	Portray	Disability’	in	which	Achim	von	Paczensky	in	his	underpants	is	given	a	bath	in	a	bath	hoist	(a	piece	of	assistive		equipment	designed	for	people	with	physical	disabilities,	which	Achim	von	Paczensky	is	clearly	not)	with	the	assistance	of	a	nurse	or	support	person.			The	format	of	this	sequence	is	that	it	is	introduced	as	one	in	an	occasional	series	entitled	‘Wie	funktionert	eigentlich	.	.	.?’		How	does	-----	work	actually?’	a	format	which	Kroß	compares	to	a	German	children’s	television	programme:		 The	structuring	principles	and	commentating	of	the	scene	bring	to	mind			 Die	Sendung	mit	der	Maus.	(185)	Which	leads	her	to	read	the	scene	as	a	critique	of	the	‘infantilization	of	persons	with	disabilities.’			In	support	of	this	reading	she	cites	the	accompanying	voiceover:		This	is	Achim,	and	that	is	Yvonne.	Achim	heaves	himself	onto	the	bath	lift	and	Yvonne	pushes	him	to	the	bathtub.	Now	Yvonne	can	use	the	bath	lift	to	lower	Achim	into	the	bath,	gently	and	slowly,	so	as	to	avoid	splashing.	
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And	now	the	bathing	fun	begins.	And	if	you’re	lucky,	you’ll	also	get	a	hair	wash.	(186).	and	goes	on	to	observe	that:		The	exaggerated	and	satirizing	staging	of	the	rough	hair	wash	the	protesting	von	Paczensky	gets	in	Schlingensief’s	film	highlights	the	innumerable	practices	of	incapacitating	disabled	people	in	all	sorts	of	welfare	institutions.	(186)	While	this	is	certainly	one	aspect	of	the	scene,	what	this	analysis	does	not	take	into	account	is	that	it	is	Schlingensief	himself	who	interrupts	this	scene	to	playfully	and	roughly	wash	Achim’s	hair,	an	action	to	which	Achim	responds	by	saying	that	his	hair	does	not	need	washing.		Elsewhere,	in	the	‘extras’	section	of	the	dvd,	Schlingensief	interrupts	an	interview	to	camera	with	Achim	von	Paczensky	by	himself	coming	in	to	shot,	poking	him	in	the	chest	while	questioning	him	about	his	being	exploited	in	certain	work	practices	and	goes	on	to	playfully	wrestle	with	him	until	both	of	them	end	up	rolling	around	on	the	floor.			For	me	this	behaviour	is	a	paradigm	of	Schlingensief’s	overall	strategy	in	this	project.		Issues	of	disability	are	raised	-	such	as	infantilization	or	workplace	exploitation	-	not	with	the	intention	of	offering	a	solution	in	activism	or	a		corrective	discourse	but	rather	as	part	of	a	process	of	mutual,	disrespectful	and	joyful	investigation.		Through	a	process	of	negotiation	and	dialogue	Schlingensief’s	iconoclastic	provocations	align	with	the	concerns	and	issues	that	affect	the	performers	with	disabilities.		I	would	contend	that	this	negotiation	takes	place	dialogically,	democratically	in	an	acknowledgement	of	the	debunking,	incapacitating	power	of	humour.	This	humour	has	been	developed	and	shared	over	a	long	period	of	working	together:	Achim	von	Paczensky	was	by	this	point	a	longstanding	member	of	the	Schlingensief	ensemble.			
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This	approach	does	run	the	risk	of	overstepping	ethical	boundaries	and	of	causing	offence.		One	might	pose	the	‘ethical’	question	of	how	would	this	parodic	sequence	where	a	bath	lift	is	used	by	somebody	who	clearly	does	not	need	to	use	it,	be	received	by	a	spectator	who	is	sufficiently	physically	disabled	to	need	to	use	a	bath	lift?		Perhaps	one	answer	to	this	is	that	such	a	person	is	more	likely	than	most	to	understand	when	‘care’	and	‘support’	descends	into	infantilization	and	patronization	and	it	cannot	be	assumed	that	because	somebody	is	physically	disabled	that	their	sense	of	humour	is	likewise	impaired.		The	risk	is,	as	Kati	Kroß	has	articulated	it,	that	the	performers	are	‘exploited	for	making	a	political	statement	or	legitimizing	the	FreakStars	project’	and	she	goes	on	to	say	that	a	‘whole	number	of	scenes	in	Schlingensief’s	film	could	be	interpreted	in	this	way.’		Certainly	a	number	of	contemporary	critical	responses	chose	this	interpretation	of	FreakStars	3000	but	I	would	contend	that	this	response	fails	to	acknowledge	the	complexity	and	ambiguity	of	Schlingensief’s	strategies.			One	example	of	this	is	a	sequence	involving	Kerstin	Graßmann.			In	her	audition	she	sings	an	extract	from	‘Where	have	all	the	flowers	gone?’	The	response	of	the	judges	and	audience	is	of	course	positive	and	the	voiceover	comments	that	this	is	‘A	wonderful	song	from	a	wonderful	woman	who	we	won’t	be	forgetting	any	time	soon’	-	the	last	phrase	a	grammatically	negative	formulation	of	a	positive	sentiment	typical	of	the	hyperbolic	rhetoric	of	the	talent	show	format.	The	next	shot	is	of	Kirsten	having	her	makeup	removed	by	a	female	crew	member	while	Schlingensief	stands	over	her,	stroking	her	head.		He	remarks	almost	casually	to	camera	‘	Kirsten	was	schizophrenic	.	.	.’	then	turns	to	her	and	strokes	her	head	again	‘but	you’re	not	any	more.’	Perhaps	the	humorous	or	whimsical	suggestion	is	that	performance	has	‘cured’	Kerstin	or	possibly	that	
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as	you	get	to	know	her	and	get	closer	to	her	she	does	not	seem	schizophrenic	any	more.		Kerstin’s	response	is	good	natured	but	firm:		‘I	still	am	.	.	.	yes.’		Schlingensief	replies	‘What?’	as	if	surprised	or	feigning	surprise.		Kerstin	nods	and	slightly	more	resignedly	says	‘Yes.’	We	then	cut	to	Kerstin	dressed	and	bewigged	as	Nana	Mouskouri	for	a	Hit	Parade	sequence	in	which	she	is	followed	around	the	garden	of	Thiele	Winckler	Haus	by	swaying	fans/residents	and	interviewed	by	megaphone	by	Mario	Garzaner	and	then	sings	through	the	megaphone:	‘White	roses	from	Athens	.	.	.’		One	implication	of	this	juxtaposition	is	both	humorous	and	poignant:	that	behaviour	which	in	one	context	is	symptomatic	of	a	diagnosis	of	schizophrenia	is,	in	another	context,	performance.			This	oblique,	minoritarian	approach	to	the	politics	of	the	representation	of	people	with	disabilities	is	indicated	in	certain	aspects	of	the	audition	sequences.		In	these	sequences	the	dispositif	of	the	talent	show	quest	with	its	strict	narrative	formation	and	expected	affective	arc	is	disrupted,	or	comes	up	against	disjunctures,	due	to	the	distinctive	participation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.	Sabrina	Braemer,	a	young	woman	with	Down’s	Syndrome	takes	part	in	one	of	the	audition	sequences.		She	is	seen	aiding	another	auditionee,	Werner	Brecht,	by	singing	along	with	him.		Incorporating	the	discourse	of	the	conventional	talent	show	format	which	can	tolerate	the	occasional	relaxing	of	the	prevailing	competitive,	individualistic	ethos,	all	three	judges	take	great	pains	to	emphasize	to	Sabrina	that	her	helpfulness	to	others	gains	her	maximum	points	and	‘re-spect’	and	gets	her	into	the	next	round.		Her	immediate	reaction	is	to	weep.	The	voiceover	appropriates	this	reaction	within	the	expected	talent	show	narrative:	‘The	strain	of	the	last	hours	is	too	much	for	some’	She	is,	however,	genuinely	crying.		Schlingensief	goes	over	to	her	puts	an	
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arm	around	her	and	holds	her	hand,	saying	‘Are	you	that	happy?		Are	you	happy?	Yes?’	Sabrina	responds	by	nodding	her	head	and	saying,	‘Yes’	through	her	tears.		Schlingensief	then	hugs	her	close	and	says	‘You	were	great.		You	were	really	great.’	and	he	leads	her	from	the	room	with	his	arm	around	her.			The	tone	of	voice	he	uses	with	her	is	very	different	to	the	‘Super’	of	his	citation	of	a	talent	show	judge.		Later	in	the	film	when	Bernhard	is	asked	about	the	incident	that	blew	up	on	the	first	day,	the	clash	with	Gabriele,	the	following	exchange	takes	place:	Schlingensief:	Bernhard,	you	got	very	upset	on	your	first	day?	Bernhard:	Naw	Schlingensief:	What	upset	you?	Bernhard:	I	dunno.	I	thought	I’d	done	something	wrong.		I	thought	I	made																										a	mistake	(FreakStars	3000)	I	believe	Bernhard’s	admission	here	connects	interestingly	with	Sabrina’s	weeping	and	with	the	reactions	of	those	residents	when	informed	of	their	not	being	selected	for	the	subsequent	rounds	of	the	talent	quest.		There	are	a	number	of	occasions	in	the	course	of	the	mockumentary	when	individual	candidates	are	told	that	they	are	not	in	the	subsequent	round.			Norbert	is	told:	‘You	really	impressed	us,	but	you’re	out	of	the	running’	the	camera	stays	on	him	for	the	expected	reaction.		There	is	not	much	reaction.	He	shifts	slightly	in	his	seat.		Schlingensief	continues:	‘Are	you	very	sad	now?’	Norbert:	No.		Schlingensief:	No?		Norbert	smiles	broadly	and	shrugs.		When	Andreas,	a	wheelchair	user	with	cerebral	palsy,	and	an	ACDC	fan	who	‘plays’	an	untuned	electric	guitar,	is	rejected	at	the	audition	stage	he	takes	the	news	with	a	similar	equanimity,	and	when,	later	in	the	process,	sympathetic	Sabrina	Braemer	is	rejected	for	the	final	round,	Schlingensief	asks	her:	‘Are	you	sad?’	her	face	
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betrays	no	disappointment	and	she	firmly	and	clearly	says	‘No’	Schlingensief	pushes:	‘No?’	Sabrina	replies:	‘Not	today.	It’s	better.’			The	voiceover	renders	explicit	how	Sabrina’s	lack	of	disappointment	and	sadness	disrupts	the	narrative	expectations	of	the	talent	show:	‘The	sadness	is	limited.		The	jury	had	expected	more.’		While	Sabrina	weeps	when	she	is	accepted	and	praised,	her	reaction	to	rejection,	like	that	of	Norbert	or	Andreas,	is	much	more	matter	of	fact.	What	
FreakStars	3000	is	implying	is	that,	unlike	the	talent	show	contestants	of	the	mainstream	media,	for	Sabrina,	Bernhard	(ever	watchful	for	when	he	has	made	a	mistake)	Norbert,	Andreas	and	the	others,	rejection	and	exclusion	is	the	norm	and	unremarkable,	what	is	exceptional	and,	therefore	emotionally	harder	to	take,	is	validation.				In	analyzing	the	question	of	the	presence	of	the	residents	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	Freak	Stars	3000	Kati	Kroß	tries	to	make	a	case	that,	to	adapt	Garland-Thomson’s	work	on	staring,	‘the	freak	stars	stare	back!’		One	example	she	uses	are	the	sequences	in	the	mockumentary	in	which	Werner	Brecht	and	Achim	von	Paczensky	are	shown	in	the	control	or	editing	suite:		the	post-production	emphasizes	the	staged	character	of	the	representations	by	repeatedly	inserting	shots	of	the	freak	stars	at	the	control	desk	(191)	.	.	.	and	even	though	the	images	shown	do	not	document	the	actual	editing	of	the	film	and	the	freak	stars	have	no	apparent	influence	on	the	post	production.	.	.the	film	nevertheless	reveals	the	camera’s	allegedly	authentic	representation	of	them	as	illusory.	(191-2)	I	find	the	logic	here	confusing	as	Werner	Brecht	and	Achim	von	Paczensky	have	themselves	been	‘staged’	in	the	control	room.		As	Kroß	acknowledges,	they	are	merely	‘acting’	being	in	control	of	the	production	and	the	whole	dizzying	deconstruction	of	spectacle	of	the	entire	project	of	FreakStars	3000	reveals	the	
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illusory	nature	of	the	camera’s	representation	of	them.		At	the	conclusion	of	her	argument	she	refers	to	this	scene	again,	referring	to	the	work	of	both	Schlingensief	and	Jérôme	Bel	arguing	that	whatever	emancipatory	or	subversive	potential	this	work	may	have,	and	however	much	Schlingensief	and	Bel	allow	disabled	actors	more	influence	on	the	ways	in	which	they	are	represented,	they	both	‘still	revitalize	the	hierarchical	dichotomy	of	non-disabled/disabled	in	favor	of	the	first	term.’		She	continues:	Schlingensief	emphasizes	this	problem	in	the	scenes	that	show	the	freak	stars	at	the	control	desk.		Obvious	though	it	is	that	they	have	no	direct	influence	on	the	editing	of	the	film,	Schlingensief	develops	a	vision	in	which	actors	labeled	disabled	powerfully	occupy	this	position.	(196)	Again	I	find	the	logic	confusing	but	I	take	this	to	mean	that	Schlingensief	puts	Werner	Brecht	and	Achim	von	Paczensky	in	a	scene	of	or	vision	of	creative	power	or	authority,	even	though	at	the	control	desk	in	Freakstars	3000	they	have	no	creative	control.	While	I	accept	the	point	Kroß	goes	on	to	make	that	it	will	be	interesting	when	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities	themselves	are	much	more	involved	in	creative	decision	making	and	choices	I	feel	that	the	source	of	the	confusion	in	the	reference	to	the	control	room	scenes	is	that	Kroß	hierarchically	values	a	particular	ontology	of	creative	‘control’	which	would	simply	replace	Schlingensief	with	performers	with	disabilities,	one	authority	with	another.				Schlingensief’s	critique,	his	‘self-provocation’	is	fundamentally	a	critique	of	the	secure	self,	the	self	as	point	of	origin	or	control	in	the	aesthetic	and	the	political	sphere,	which	is	ultimately	also	a	critique	of	authority	–	hence	the	difficulty	of	placing	the	‘intention’	of	the	work,	the	self-provocation	goes	on	and	on	without	occupying	a	place	of	reification.		I	do	not	believe	that	Schlingensief	
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wishes	the	viewer	to	be	under	any	illusions	about	Brecht	and	Paczensky	having	any	control	in	the	control	room.		It	is,	however,	merely	one	parody	or	masquerade	among	others,	such	as	Achim	von	Paczensky	as	Horst	Mahler	of	the	NPD	with	a	Hitler	moustache	and	hair	parting	drawn	on	his	face	and	forehead	with	felt	pen	or	Werner	Brecht	as	Elvis,	parodies	and	masquerades	which	have	been	negotiated	between	Schlingensief	and	the	performers.				Schlingensief	operated	in	collaboration	with	the	performers/residents,	sensitive	to	their	predilections	and	tastes	and	obsessions:	schlager	music,	Nana	Mouskouri,	and	Home	Shopping	channels	and,	indeed,	talent	shows.		Achim	Paczensky,	Mario	Garzaner,	Horst	Gelennek,	Kerstin	Graßmann	and	other	performers	from	FreakStars	3000	had	previously	collaborated	with	Schlingensief.		The	fact	that	the	‘Schlingensief	family’	(Kroß	180)	evolved	meant	that	in	effect	the	performers	were	in	a	process	of	collaboration	in	employment,	in	practical	training	and	artistic	development	over	a	period	of	time	and	attests	to	Schlingensief’s	presence	with	them.		Schlingensief	worked	with	people	with	disabilities,	not	exclusively	with	people	with	disabilities	-	and	not	with	any	consensus	agenda	of	inclusivity	-	just	as	he	worked	with	other	non-trained	performers	or	outsider	artists	by	developing	a	working	and	creative	space	that	is	occupied	in	common	that	was	not	about	the	commonality	of	a	transcendent	community.	In	many	ways	his	work	is	an	attempt	to	provoke	dissensus	within	notions	of	community,	a	project	in	which	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	could	be	said	to	participate	on	a	much	more	equal	footing	than	in	previous		-	or,	indeed,	subsequent	-	performance	practices.				Any	consideration	of	the	social	political	or	aesthetic	efficacy	of	FreakStars	
3000,	however,	needs	to	be	circumspect	and	subject	to	qualification,	given	the	
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anarchic	pranksterism	and	provocation	that	hedges	about	the	oeuvre	of	Schlingensief.		With	regard	to	the	efficacy	of	the	Freakstars	3000	project	there	is	a	really	apposite	quotation	that	is,	characteristically	for	Schlingensief,	put	in	the	mouth	of	a	‘character’	we	only	see	in	one	brief	sequence	near	the	end	of	the	mockumentary,	who	appears	captioned	as	‘Rudi	Zander,	Produzent	(Producer)’	and	who	gives	what	sounds	like	a	summary	of	the	whole	Freakstars	3000	project:		Through	the	medium	of	televised	broadcast	I	would	say	that	a	broad	audience	will	consider	the	problems	of	the	non-handicapped	and	thereby	receive	stimulus	to	do	similar	or	different	things.		This	is	wonderfully	pompous-sounding	language	with	which	to	attempt	to	articulate	the	efficacy	of	the	performance	as	if	it	were	mechanistically	cause	and	effect.	The	effectivity	or	efficacy	which	is	said	to	be	achieved	here	is,	however,	a	‘stimulus	to	do	similar	or	different	things’	which	in	including	similarity	and	difference	basically	covers	every	possible	response,	thus	implying	that	the	performance	is,	in	effect,	both	totally	efficacious	and	entirely	without	efficacy.		It	is	in	this	paradoxical	pranksterish	context	that	any	sense	of	the	political	efficacy	of	the	project	should	be	considered.			The	project	concerns	itself	crucially	with	the	incapacitation	or	deconstruction	of	doxa	and	discourses	of	interpretation,	validation	and	valuation	as	these	reveal	themselves	in	operation	around	the	‘subject’	of	intellectual	disability,	and,	I	would	contend,	ultimately	around	the	mediatized	constructions	of	the	‘subject’	per	se.	In	another	paradox	Schlingensief	exposes	a	continuing	ethical	aporia	in	the	inclusion	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	by	appearing	to	flout	supposed	boundaries	of	ethical	behaviour	in	his	strategies	of	involving	them	in	theatrical	performance.		His	practice	still	stands	out	as	a	more	radical	challenge	to	the	recomposing	of	the	politics	and	aesthetics	of	this	type	of	
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theatrical	performance	than	much	of	the	recent	practice	that	has	succeeded	it	and	that	I	will	now	discuss.	At	the	end	of	Theatre	and	Ethics	Nicholas	Ridout	suggests	that:	Theatre’s	greatest	ethical	potential	may	be	found	precisely	at	the	moment	when	theatre	abandons	ethics.	(70)		Schlingensief	did	not	abandon	ethics	in	FreakStars	3000	but	he	certainly	played	fast	and	loose	with	ethical	expectations	around	interactions	with	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	and	in	the	process,	I	would	contend,	emerged	a	much	more	egalitarian	and	emancipating	way	of	working.		The	next	performances	I	will	discuss	also	deploy	a	strategy	of	exposing	what	may	underlie	ethical	niceties	around	the	participation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	theatrical	performance	and	assumptions	of	the	efficacy	of	that	performance			
Back	to	Back	Theatre	Back	to	Back	Theatre	was	founded	in	1987	with	a	commitment	to	engaging	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	theatre	arts	and	performance	in	the	local	community	of	Geelong,	a	city	located	one	hour’s	train	journey	from	Melbourne,	Australia’s	cultural	capital.			The	company	maintains	a	commitment	to	that	local	community	with	community	theatre	projects	but	has	also	developed,	since	the	arrival	of	Bruce	Gladwin	as	artistic	director	and	Alice	Nash	as	producer,	a	smaller	ensemble	of	performers	who	have	achieved	great	critical	and	commercial	success	internationally.		This	aspect	of	the	company’s	work	has	led	to	their	being	designated	Australia’s	most	consistently	successful	professional	theatre	company,	winners	of	numerous	awards	and	the	company	regularly	tours	to	international	arts	and	theatre	festivals	around	the	world.		
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It	is	important	to	contextualize	the	company’s	origins	in,	and	continuing	commitment	to	community-based	theatre	as	this	is	still	influential	upon	the	aesthetic	and	political	development	of	the	company’s	critically	and	commercially	successful	productions	such	as	small	metal	objects,	Food	Court	and	Ganesh	versus	
the	Third	Reich,	productions	that	I	will	be	analyzing	in	this	section	of	the	thesis.	The	ongoing	artistic	experimentation	and	development	of	the	group	aligns	with	a	facilitation	of	the	participation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	theatrical	performance	that	seeks	to	accommodate	both	their	capacities	and	incapacities	and	that	plays	with	various	incapacitations	of	the	audience	as	an	ethical	and	aesthetic	community.			
small	metal	objects	
	 small	metal	objects	seeks	both	to	theatricalize	a	public	space	and	to	reconfigure	at	a	fundamental	level	what	is	meant	by	spectatorship	and	audience.		It	reconfigures	what	an	audience	can	hear.		Each	member	of	the	audience	is	supplied	with	individual	headphones.	Individual	members	of	the	audience	thus	experience	a	decreased	ability	to	hear	the	reactions	of	others	in	the	audience	and	the	sounds	of	the	surrounding	environment.	It	reconfigures	what	an	audience	can	see.		The	four	performers	are	at	times	subsumed	into	the	surrounding	environment	of	the	public	space.		The	headphone-wearing	individuals	in	the	audience	become	solitary	and	immunized	from	interaction	with	others,	just	like	so	many	others	around	them,	lost	in	the	preoccupation	with	their	own	headphones	and	screens	of	phones	and	tablets.		In	the	Sydney	Festival	in	2007	I	handed	over	my	ticket	and	took	a	seat	in	a	marquee	opposite	the	transport	hub	of	Circular	Quays.		We	then	became	objects	
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of	the	gazes	or	stares	of	people	going	about	their	business,	some,	seeing	us	sitting	there	in	tiered	seats	under	cover	of	a	marquee,	lingered	in	front	of	us,	stared	or	laughed	at	us,	or	did	a	little	performance	‘turn’,	giving	us	something	to	look	at,	taking	the	opportunity	to	perform	in	front	of	an	audience	without	its	performance.		Some	looked	at	the	area	of	Circular	Quays	that	we	were	looking	towards,	to	see	if	they	could	see	what	it	was	that	we	had	gathered	to	look	at,	then	looked	back	at	us,	thinking	that	perhaps	we	were	the	performance.		Some	were	too	intent	on	their	journey	or	commute	to	give	us	any	more	than	a	cursory	glance,	irritated	at	our	being	an	awkward	presence	in	the	public	space,	while	they	clearly	had	places	to	go,	people	to	see.	In	Disability,	Public	Space	Performance	and	Spectatorship,	Bree	Hadley	writes	of	some	of	the	complexities	of	response	she	experienced	in	attending	
small	metal	objects.		She	refers	to	a	number	of	critical	responses,	typified	by	that	of	Owen	Richardson	in	‘The	Age’,	who	felt	that	the	staging	of	the	audience	and	the	placing	of	audience	and	performers	alike	out	in	the	public	space	‘creates	a	special	sense	of	solidarity	with	your	fellow	audience	members	and	cast.’	(86)		Hadley	goes	on	to	note	how	many	spectators	felt	that	the	particular	configuration	of	performers	and	narrative	to	audience	‘creates	a	sense	of	greater	closeness	with	fellow	performers	and	spectators’	(86)	that	Hadley	equates	to	Levinas’	‘religion’	or	Jill	Dolan’s	‘utopian’	moment	in	performance.’	(86)		She	then,	however,	goes	on	to	describe	how	her	own	personal	experience	did	not	align	entirely	with	this	sense	of	solidarity	in	the	face	of	the	response	of	passersby:		
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On	the	day	I	attended	this	included	a	small	child	doing	a	dance,	a	pair	of	‘emo’	girls	disappointed	their	kissing	display	only	drew	a	laugh,	and	old	people	asking	the	actors	for	directions,	amongst	other	things.’	(84)	She	relates	how	her	reaction	to	this	activity	caused	her	to	rethink	the	notion	of	the	audience	as	a	solidarity	or	community:	Watching	small	metal	objects	I	am	not	certain	I	myself	felt	precisely		-	or	only	–	this	sort	of	utopian	community	or	communion	with	fellow	spectators-as-performances	that	some	critics	celebrate.	(86)	This	is	due	in	part	to	the	complex	web	of	interaction	of	looks	and	gazes	between	spectators	and	passers-by:	There	were,	though,	also	moments	where	some	of	our	readings	of	the	‘yuppie’	characters,	or	the	passers-by-as-characters,	such	as	the	‘emo’	teens,	could	not	really	be	classed	as	non-violent,	community	or	ethically	oriented	readings.		Our	laughter	was,	at	times,	linked	primarily	to	a	sense	of	superiority	available	to	us	as	a	result	of	the	solidarity	and	special	perspective	of	the	spectator	group	–	which,	in	a	sense,	made	us	feel	comfortable	to	sneer	at	some	of	the	others,	such	as	the	‘emo’	girls,	in	front	of	us	in	a	way	we	might	not	normally	have	done.	(87).	Hadley’s	reference	to	the	sneer	exposes	the	tendency,	experienced	by	those	seated	as	audience	in	the	public	space,	to	be	judgmental	of	those	passing	through	it.			I	felt	embarrassed	at	the	need	of	some	passersby	to	give	us	a	performance	we	had	not	come	there	to	see,	that	mocked	or	drew	attention	to	our	presence	as	spectators.		I	was	judging	these	public	‘performers’	in	relation	to	a	performance	in	which	ideas	of	judgment	themselves	would	be	questioned,	specifically	with	regard	to	the	perception	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		The	spectatorship	of	small	metal	objects	from	the	outset	heightened	an	awareness	of	a	tendency	to	judgment,	a	sense	of	separation	rather	than	solidarity,	and	a	discomfiting	of	audience	as	community.			
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In	its	reconfiguration	of	audience	and	performance	in	a	public	space	small	
metal	objects	explores	meanings	of	theatricality	that	Josette	Féral	outlines	in	“Theatricality:	The	Specificity	of	Theatrical	Language”	in	which	she	posits	three	scenarios	that	exemplify	the	‘theatricality	of	the	quotidian.’		The	first	is	within	a	theatre:		You	enter	a	theater.The	play	has	not	yet	begun.	In	front	of		you	is	a	stage;	the	curtain	is	open;	the	actors	are	absent.		(95)		In	this	example	the	space	itself	is	theatricalized.		The	second	example	refers	to	a	subway	where	one	person	argues	with	another	about	smoking	on	the	train	indicating	a	NO	SMOKING	sign	but	when	they	both	alight	at	a	station	the	one	who	has	been	smoking	indicates	a	huge	billboard	for	a	tobacco	company	and	the	theatricality	of	this	performance	then	emerges	as	an	example	of	Boal’s	‘invisible’	theatre.		The	third	example	is	described	as	follows:		You	are	seated	at	a	sidewalk	café	watching	passers-by	who		have	no	desire	to	be	seen,	nor	any	intention	of	acting.	As	they	pass,	they	project	neither	pretense	nor	fiction,	nor	do	they	behave	as	if	showing-off.	Only	by	chance	might	they	be	aware	of	the	watchful	eyes	following	them.		However,	your	eyes	perceive	a	certain	theatricality	in	their	figures	and	gestures,	in	the	way	they	occupy	the	space	around	them.	As	a	spectator,	you	inscribe	this	theatricality	in	the	real	space	surrounding	them.	It	is	the	simple	exercise	of	watching	that	reassigns	gestures	to	theatrical	space.	(97).	For	Féral	in	the	first	scenario	space	is	the	vehicle	of	theatricality,	in	the	second		theatricality	appears	as	a	result	of	the	performers’	affirmed	theatrical	intention	and	in	the	third,	which	she	concedes	is	the	most	marginal,	‘theatricality	seems	to	be	a	process	that	has	to	do	with	a	"gaze"	that	postulates	and	creates	a		distinct,	virtual	space	belonging	to	the	other.’			
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The	subtlety	and	the	complexity	of	the	staging	of	small	metal	objects	is	that	it	creates	an	interplay	between	all	three	of	Féral’s	scenarios	of	the	theatricality	of	the	quotidian.		The	setting	up	of	the	marquee	within	busy	urban	environments	creates	a	theatricality	of	space	which	is	reflexive:	Circular	Quays	becomes	a	stage	set	for	the	audience	in	the	marquee	but	so	does	the	marquee	for	the	audience	of	passersby.		The	affirmed	theatrical	intention	of	the	second	scenario	is	embodied	by	the	Back	to	Back	performers	but	their	presence	generates	both	the	unconscious	theatricality	of	‘actual’	engagement	(people	asking	them	for	directions)	and	a	conscious	theatricality	(the	‘emo’	girls).	The	third	scenario	is	played	out	as	the	perception	of	intended	or	unintended	performances	in	the	background	of	the	public	space:	performances	that	intricately	interweave	with	or	threaten	to	interrupt	the	scripted	theatrical	narrative	of	the	microphoned	performers.					At	one	point	in	the	theatrical	narrative	of	small	metal	objects	Carolyn,	the	corporate	psychologist,	looking	for	illegal	recreational	drugs	for	a	corporate	event,	says	to	Gary,	one	of	the	drug-dealers	(in	some	of	the	performances	played	by	Sonia	Teuben):	CAROLYN:	Gary,	we	are	all	living	in	a	very	different	world		(Grehan	and	Eckersall	69)	In	the	immediate	context	of	the	theatrical	narrative	this	comment	refers	to	Carolyn’s	work.		Alan,	the	lawyer	also	looking	for	drugs,	has	described	Carolyn	as	a	psychologist.		Gary	has	misunderstood	this	as	being	akin	to	a	counsellor.		Carolyn,	after	making	the	above	comment,	goes	on	to	explain	that	her	practice	of	psychology	is	not	as	a	counselor	but	in	the	interface	with	corporations	to	effect	‘change	management.’		She	means	that	we	are	all	living	in	a	different	world	now	
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to	the	(understood)	previous	one	in	which	psychology	was	something	to	be	applied	to	damaged	psyches,	whereas	now	psychology	has	become	a	corporate	discipline	which	involves	in	her	words	‘helping	people	be	more	efficient,	more	productive.’		In	a	wider	context	of	the	narrative	Carolyn	and	Alan	and	Gary	and	Steve	(played	by	Simon	Laherty)	are	living	in	different	worlds	in	that	the	former	pair	are	successful	urban	professionals	and	the	latter	are	outsiders,	drug	dealers	and	to	a	lesser	or	greater	extent	intellectually	disabled.		This	is	never	really	specifically	referred	to,	but	certainly	implied.		Steve’s	desire	is	expressed	in	the	following	terms:		 STEVE:	I	want	people	to	see	me.		I	want	to	be	a	full	human	being	(66)	When	he	is	reluctant	to	participate	in	the	drug	deal	it	is	the	‘able’	characters	who	swiftly	move	to	a	judgment	of	him,	although	it	is	still	not	specific:		 ALAN:	This	guy	Steve	…	is	having	some	kind	of	freak	out.		 CAROLYN:	Is	this	guy	stable?		 ALAN:	Hang	on.		You	stable,	Steve?		 STEVE:	No.		(68-9)	And:		 ALAN:	The	guy	on	the	left	in	the	white	singlet	is	Steve:	he’s	having	some																														kind	of	metaphysical	meltdown.	(69)	Perhaps	the	audience	may	be	led	to	judge	him	as	being	intellectually	disabled	due	to	his	being	played	by	Simon	Laherty.		The	only	specific,	but	oblique,	reference	to	intellectual	disability	in	the	spoken	text	comes	from	Gary.		In	an	earlier	conversation	with	Alan,	in	an	attempt	to	personalize	the	bare	exchange	of	the	drug	deal,	he	states	that	he	thinks	he	knows	Alan	from	somewhere	and	asks	the	following	question:	
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GARY:	Alan,	did	you	used	to	play	footy	for	the	Broadmeadows	Special															School?		(64)	Alan,	of	course,	answers	‘No.’	Gary’s	familiarity	with	this	specific	‘special’	school	coupled	with	his	understanding	of	a	psychologist	as	a	counsellor	and	his	friendship	with	Steve,	all	suggest	that	he	has	some	familiarity	with	a	world	of	‘intellectual	disability’	which	Alan	does	not	have.	There	is	a	difference	in	habitus	between	Gary	and	Alan,	and	the	habitus	of	the	audience	is	more	likely	to	have	commonality	with	Alan	rather	than	Gary	and	Steve.	We	are	all	living	in	a	very	different	world,	disabled	and	non-disabled,	and	within	the	group	‘non-disabled’	different	as	to	the	degree	to	which	we	have	contact	with	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.	‘We	are	all	living	in	a	different	world’	also	resonates	with	a	group	of	people	sitting	listening	to	this	dialogue	on	their	individual	headphones	as	other	groups	of	people	swirl	and	criss-cross	around	the	performers	in	the	public	space.		Hadley	uses	Habermas’	term	‘public	sphere’	as	‘the	public	space	or	stage	where	people	negotiate	the	accepted	beliefs,	attitudes	and	systems	that	are	subsequently	adopted	as	representative	by	the	State	’	(2)	and	that	it	is	in	this	public	sphere	that	people	with	disabilities	‘cause	a	commotion’	in	the	phrase	of	Auslander	and	Sandahl.		The	various	groupings	of	individuals	wandering	around	and	through	the	performance	of	small	metal	objects	reveal	public	space	as	not	necessarily	a	communal	space.	There	is	likewise	a	troubling	of	commonality	in	the	disruption	of	the	assumed	solidarity	or	community	of	the	audience.		In	“Putting	the	Public	Sphere	to	the	Test:	On	Publics	and	Counter-Publics	in	Chance	2000	in	Christoph	Schlingensief:	Art	Without	Borders	Solveig	Gade	refers	to	how	in	Chance	2000	Schlingensief’s	strategy	was	‘to	put	public	spaces	to	the	test’	and	I	
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believe	small	metal	objects	operates	with	a	similar	strategy.		Gade	makes	a	connection	between	this	strategy	and:		Oskar	Negt	and	Alexander	Kluge’s	critique	of	the	notion	of	the	public	sphere	as	a	unitary	and	inclusive	entity	and,	more	specifically,	their	insistence	that	the	public	sphere	is	in	fact	constituted	by	a	multitude	of	publics	that	relate	to	each	other	in	more	or	less	conflictual	ways.	(91)	
Small	metal	objects	exposes	the	public	space	not	as	a	‘unitary	and	inclusive’	public	sphere	but	as	a	multiplicity	of	public	spheres,	a	heterotopic	space	as	Michael	Warner	outlines	in	Publics	and	Counterpublics.			It	is	in	this	context	that	small	metal	objects	approaches	the	questioning	of	the	current	’place’	of	people	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	and	what	‘they’	might	have	in	common	with	‘us’	or,	rather,	what	dialectical	arrangements	of	‘them’-ness	and	‘us’-ness	play	across	and	between	the	bodies	speaking	through	microphones,	the	bodies	sitting	in	a	marquee	wearing	headphones	and	the	other	bodies	traversing	the	public	spaces	in	the	immediate	environment.			 How	visible		‘intellectual	disability’	is	in	small	metal	objects	is	in	the	eye	of	the	beholder.			Bree	Hadley	refers	to	commentary	on	the	work:	‘many	spectators	talk	about	whether	or	not	they	were	aware	that	the	performers	had	an	intellectual	disability’	and	cites	Owen	Richardson’s	naïve	but	telling	questions	in	his	review	in	The	Age:	‘What	am	I	looking	for?		What	does	someone	with	an	intellectual	disability	look	like?’	(85).		Two	performers	emerge	out	of	the	crowd	and	because	they	are	microphoned	in	the	ears	of	the	spectators	before	the	spectator	is	able	to	pick	out	who	in	the	‘scene’	of	the	public	space	these	performers	are.		When	the	characters	of	Gary	and	Steve	emerge	it	is	unclear	if	they	are	intellectually	disabled.		Their	dialogue	is	characterized	by	ellipses	and	non-
	 199	
sequiturs,	but	then	so	is	much	dialogue	in	naturalistic	theatre	and,	therefore,	one	can	assume,	in	‘everyday’	conversation.	The	spoken	text	is	oblique,		it	blurs	percept	and	concept,	object	and	idea.		Gary’s	repeated	references	to	self-storage,	(‘I	want	to	get	into	the	self-storage	business	.	.	.	Self-storage	and	childcare	–that’s	where	you	want	to	invest	your	money’(62))	resonate	beyond	the	banality	of	his	views	on	money-making	schemes	to	intimate	obliquely	to	a	blurring	of	identity	of	thing	and	person:			Steve:	If	I	lost	one	of	my	things,	I	just	couldn’t	go	on	living	(62)	the	commodification	of	the	‘self’	characteristic	of	the	market-led	discourse	of	the	contemporary	imaginary.			Popular	psychology	might	say	that	Steve’s	character	struggles	with	issues	of	self-esteem,	‘esteem’	going	back	etymologically	to	an	estimated	value	or	valuation.		He	is	unsure	of	what	his	value	is	in	sexual	currency	and	of	what	his	self-worth	is	or	the	value	of	his	‘self.’			 The	small	metal	objects	of	the	title	are	objects	of	exchange.	Currency	is	questioned	both	in	its	meaning	of	a	system	of	exchange	and	the	paper	and	metal	objects	invested	with	value	in	this	exchange.	There	is	a	particular	section	of	dialogue,	which,	due	to	its	repetitive	force,	stands	out	in	the	surrounding	context	of	the	sparse,	limpid	and	oblique	text:	STEVE:	Everything	has	a	value	GARY:	Everything	has	a	value	STEVE:	Everything	has	a	fucking	value	GARY:	Everything	has	a	fucking	value	(62)	This	suggested	conflation	of	monetary	value,	use	value	and	sexual	value	is	at	the	crux	of	the	narrative.		The	moral	or	ethical	meaning	of	value	may	likewise	be	implied	in	the	meaning	of	currency	as	in	that	which	is	‘current’,	the	current	or	contemporary	fashion	or	way	of	thinking.	‘Current’	thinking	on	the	inclusion	of	
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people	with	intellectual	disabilities	suggests	some	sort	of	communal	or	consensual	thinking	which	will	be	influential	in	actions	at	the	individual	level.	Currency	in	what	might	be	termed	this	‘neoliberal’	sense	of	staying	current	or	keeping	current	is	akin	to	Agamben’s	‘contemporariness’	in	“What	Is	the	Contemporary?,”	in	Nudities,	that	he	defines	as:	.	.	.a	singular	relationship	with	one’s	own	time,	which	adheres	to	it	and	at	the	same	time,	keeps	a	distance	from	it	.	.	.it	is	that	relationship	with	time	
that	adheres	to	it	through	a	disjunction	and	an	anachronism.	(11)	Commonality,	currency	and	communication	are	constantly	called	into	question	in	small	metal	objects.			Back	to	Back	Theatre	in	a	statement	of	their	artistic	rationale	include	a	specific	disavowal	of	the	contemporary:			Back	to	Back	aims	to	propose	work	that	is	not	contemporary,	but	a	work	for	the	near	future.	It	is	simultaneously	a	contention,	an	allegation	and	an	affirmation	for	human	potential.	(Back	to	Back	website)	Discussions	of	‘intellectual	disability’	in	small	metal	objects	centre	around	Simon	Laherty’s	performance	as	Steve	is	the	performer	most	visibly	identifiable	as	intellectually	disabled,	a	representative	of	intellectual	disability.		The	following	exchange	has	been	cited	as	being	an	articulation	of	the	problems	of	the	person	with	intellectual	disability:	STEVE:	I’ve	started	being	aware	of	myself	GARY:	Is	that	good	STEVE:	I’m	missing	something,	a	feeling.	GARY:	A	good	feeling?	STEVE:	A	feeling	that	I’ve	felt,	sensed	and	known	that	I’ve	always	had.	GARY:	Hmm	STEVE:	It’s	my	task	to	be	a	total	man.	GARY:	OK	STEVE:	I	want	people	to	see	me.		I	want	to	be	a	full	human	being	(65-6).	
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The	last	two	sentences	of	this	exchange	can	be	read	as	a	reference	to	the	lack	of	visibility	or	full	personhood	of	people	with	intellectual	disability.		While	this	is	one	of	the	meanings	implicit	in	this	exchange	it	is	important	to	look	at	the	preceding	context	of	these	articulations	of	desire.		‘I’ve	started	being	aware	of	myself’	just	as	‘I	think	therefore	I	am’	(cogito	ergo	sum)	is	caught	up	in	the	limitations	of	language	at	the	level	of	syntax,	specifically	the	incapacity	of	pronominalization	to	account	for	the	process	of	the	construction	of	the	self.		Who	is	the	‘I’	in	Steve’s	sentence	and	how	is	it	the	same	as	or	different	to	‘myself’?		‘I’m	missing	something’	conflates	‘I	am	lacking	something’	with	‘I	am	desiring	something	I	previously	had’	and	‘A	feeling	that	I’ve	felt,	sensed	and	known	that	I’ve	always	had’	takes	a	remarkable	journey	where	‘	a	feeling’	is	felt,	sensed	and	known	–	running	a	gamut	of	different	but	related	systems	of	‘experience’	-	when	in	fact	it	has	always	already	been	there.		No	wonder	Gary	can	only	reply	‘Hmmm.’				Steve	may	be	referring,	however,	to	the	‘totality’	of	being	a	man	or	the	person	with	disabilities’	desire	to	be	perceived	as	a	total	man	-	a	whole	and	not	a	lack	or	deficiency,	the	gaps	and	ellipses	of	what	is	being	said	strongly	indicate	that	this	sense	of	‘self’	can	only	ever	be	a	‘feeling’	an	imaginary	desire	for	wholeness	and	completeness	of	a	subject	caught	up	in	processes	of	subjectivation.		Community	is	problematized	at	the	level	of	its	supposedly	atomic	structure	the	constituent	in-dividual	part.			
Small	metal	objects’	interrogation	of	self-worth	and	self-esteem,	the	value	of	a	person,	comes	up	against	the	split,	the	gap,	and	the	diversity	in	selfhood.		Bruce	Gladwin	commenting	on	small	metal	objects	refers	to:	
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A	person’s	value	is	determined	by	their	productivity	and	this	is	a	question	that’s	pertinent	to	people	with	disabilities.		But	it’s	increasingly	pertinent	to	everyone	in	society.	(qtd	Hadley	85)	The	questioning	of	the	‘value’	of	a	person	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	does	not	stop	at	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	it	forces	a	questioning	of	the	‘value’	or	quality	of	personhood.		It	is	not	possible	to	take	‘person	with	intellectual	disabilities’	in	isolation	and	to	atomize	it.		To	cite	Jean-Luc	Nancy:	one	cannot	make	a	world	with	simple	atoms.	There	has	to	be	a	clinamen.	There	has	to	be	an	inclination	or	an	inclining	from	one	toward	the	other,	of	one	by	the	other,	or	from	one	to	the	other.		Community	is	at	least	the	clinamen	of	the	‘individual.’	(The	Inoperative	Community	3)	
Small	metal	objects	concerns	a	number	of	communities	or	sub-communities	that	do	not	work,	that	do	not	function	both	within	themselves	and	in	relation	to	each	other.		Steve	and	Gary	live	in	a	shadowy	or	outsider	community	that	includes	drug	dealing	and	they	share	some	reference	to	a	culture	of	therapy	or	‘counselling.’			Alan	breaks	into	the	world	of	Steve	and	Gary	and	tries	to	speak	the	euphemistic	language	of	a	transaction	to	acquire	drugs:	‘Darren	was	‘helping	me	out’’	‘the	‘what	have	you’	has	fallen	through.’	(Grehan	and	Eckersall	63)	Everywhere	is	the	promise	of	a	community,	but	that	promise	never	seems	to	be	fulfilled.			Simon	Laherty’s	character	Steve	is,	however,	located	in	a	position	of	power	in	the	dramatic	narrative.		It	is	a	power,	though,	that	he	chooses	not	to	exercise,	or	rather	that	he	chooses	to	exercise	by	not	acting	or	doing.	He	chooses	incapacity.		His	unwillingness	to	move	or	be	moved	is	both	the	sticking	point	that	incapacitates	a	drug	deal,	a	financial	exchange	and	a	potential	sexual	exchange	
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and	a	kind	of	emancipation.			In	‘Pure	Products	Go	Crazy’	Hargrave	refers	to	other	possible	choices	or	judgments	being	made	in	Steve’s	lack	of	movement:				Laherty’s	character	hardly	moves.	For	most	of	the	60	minutes	he	is	still,	a	weightless	touchstone	in	a	moving	world.	There	is	something	about	his	stillness	that	transcends	the	‘stubborn’	and	becomes	eloquent,	as	if	the	character	is	making	an	aesthetic	judgment	as	much	as	a	psychological	or	moral	one.	(47)	Hadley	offers	a	supplementary	reading	of	this	choice	not	to	move:	Steve	and	Gary’s	stillness		.	.	.	differentiates	them	from	the	productive	‘busyness’	of	the	city	space	and	the	productive	‘busyness’	of	Alan	and	Carolyn.	(84)	Carolyn	the	psychologist	friend	of	Alan,	called	in	to	try	to	help	seal	the	drug	deal	that	has	stalled	because	of	Steve’s	refusal	to	move,	at	first	offers	her	services	as	a	psychologist	but	Steve	does	not	budge.		Her	final	gambit	to	get	Steve	and	the	deal	moving	is	resisted	and	in	this	resistance	Steve	can	feel	again:	CAROLYN:	You’re	standing	here	dying	and	you	could	be	living.	Come	to																																								the	locker	and	I’ll	suck	your	fucking	dick.	STEVE:	I’m	staying	here.	CAROLYN:	You’re	a	fucking	useless	piece	of	shit	(Carolyn	and	Alan	exit.		Gary	and	Steve	meet)	STEVE:	I	feel	much	better	now.		Thanks.	(Grehan	and	Eckersall	72)	Steve’s	refusal	to	move	or	be	moved	becomes	his	taking	a	stand,	his	standing	apart.		He	actively	chooses	incapacity.		Steve’s	stand	is	a	resistance	to	various	market	pressures	on	him	to	move.			When	at	other	times	during	the	performance	Simon	Laherty	as	Steve	did	move	through	the	space	it	was	on	his	own	terms.		His	movements	followed	a	particular	pattern	of	floortiling	or	some	other	geometric	feature	within	the	configuration	of	the	structure	of	the	public	space.	This	trajectory	of	movement	
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revealed	a	patterning	‘normally’	ignored	by	those	in	a	rush	to	proceed	through	the	space.		This	was	his	own	particular	response	to	the	strange	and	alienating	patterning	of	the	public	space	and	it	also	revealed	the	strangeness	of	the	movements	of	those	bodies	moving	normally	through	the	space.			The	piece	ends	with	the	relationship	of	Steve	and	Gary.		They	rarely	touch.	In	their	exchanges	their	words	seem	at	times	to	glance	off	each	other	and	their	conversational	strategies	proceed	at	times	obliquely,	at	times	potent	with	a	depth	of	connection	that	their	words	and	tone	of	voice	seem	ill-suited	to	expressing.		They	stand	still	and	apart	for	much	of	the	duration	of	the	piece.		In	the	assemblage	that	is	small	metal	objects	a	group	of	individuals	in	a	marquee	sit	together,	yet	apart.		The	spectators	in	the	marquee,	the	performers	with	microphones,	the	bodies	moving	around	them	are	also	bodies	in	the	same	space	together	but	apart.		In	the	patterns	of	movement	of	these	bodies	what	does	the	stillness	of	Steve/Simon	embody?	Is	his	lack	of	movement	equated	with	a	lack	of	engagement	that	is	the	trope	of	autism	par	excellence	in	the	popular	imaginary?		Has	this	trope	of	autistic	disengagement	now	become	the	nomos	of	the	subject-consumer	equally	at	odds	and	out	of	place	in	the	currents	of	the	public	space?		Is	this	stillness	possibly	a	political	act?	Is	the	stillness	or	non-movement	of	Steve	an	act	of	resistance	akin	to	the	durun	adam	or	standing	man	protests	in	Turkey	or	the	tank	man	of	Tiananmen?			All	of	these	questions	suggest	potential	meanings	in	the	subjunctive	modality	of	theatrical	performance.			Another	question	posed	by	this	stillness	is	whether	Simon	Laherty	stands	there	as	a	disabled	man	or	a	disabled	actor	–	‘actor’	in	both	an	aesthetic	and	social	sense	of	the	word?		In	Pure	Products	Go	Crazy	Hargrave	emphasizes	
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different	meanings	of	non-acting	with	regard	to	Laherty’s	performance,	quoting	an	interview	with	Bruce	Gladwin:	There	was	something	so	amazing	about	watching	Simon	standing.	No	matter	what	else	was	going	on	in	the	rehearsal	I	would	be	drawn	back	to	Simon.	When	he	did	stuff,	I’d	say,	no,	just	stand.	Don’t	move.	That’s	how	it	started.	Watching	Simon	standing	.	.	.	(46)		Hargrave	then	develops	this	idea:	Laherty,	the	most	minimal	performer,	hardly	‘does’	anything.	He	is	still	for	such	a	large	percentage	of	the	play	that	he	comes	close	to	an	even	more	pared	down	point	on	the	continuum:	that	of	‘received	acting’.	This	is	where	the	performer,	an	extra	for	example,	might	walk	on	and	stand	in	costume.	They	appear	to	be	acting	because	their	image	is	aesthetically	framed	but	they	are	not	actively	feigning	or	representing	something.	(47-8).	I	believe	there	is	a	danger	in	this	latter	reading	of	ignoring	the	high	degree	of	skill	Simon	Laherty	applies	to	the	choices	of	incapacity	he	makes	in	his	performance	in	both	Small	Metal	Objects	and	in	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich.	From	another	perspective	an	actor	who	can	inhabit	the	space	as	if	‘just	being’	is	actually	achieving	the	highest	form	of	Stanislavskian	or	naturalistic	acting.			By	the	time	Hargrave	comes	to	write	Theatres	of	Learning	Disability	he	seems	to	have	modified	his	opinion	of	Simon	Laherty’s	acting	equating	the	performance	and	Steve’s	choice	of	incapacity	as	equivalent	to	Melville’s	Bartleby	and	his	active	choice	of	incapacity	encapsulated	in	the	phrase	‘I	would	prefer	not	to’:	a	voice	of	small	objection,	a	voice	of	the	potential	of	the	im-potential.	In	“Making	Room	for	Elephants”	an	interview	with	Richard	Gough	in	
‘We’re	People	Who	Do	Shows’,	Bruce	Gladwin	refers	to	the	emergence	of	Food	
Court	from	responses	to	the	(re)presentation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	small	metal	objects:	
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	 there	are	a	number	of	agendas	in	Food	Court.		One	was	in	response	to		a	series	of	comments	in	relation	to	small	metal	objects,	which	generally	was	received	very	well.		Some	people	questioned	the	two-dimensional		quality	of	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	and	suggested	that	they	were	always	the	victim.	And	it	really	got	us	thinking	and	led	to	the	idea	‘Well	let’s	make	something	where	the	people	with	disabilities	are	the	perpetrators	of	an	action,	as	opposed	to	having	to	respond	to	it.’		So	that	was	a	starting	point,	in	terms	of	the	idea	of	having	the	capacity	to	be	evil.	(241)	It	is	now	important	to	proceed	to	trace	lines	of	development	of	the	aesthetics	and	politics	of	Back	to	Back	Theatre	from	small	metal	objects	to	Food	Court:	from	incapacity	to	the	‘capacity	to	be	evil’,	from	particular	attempts	to	incapacitate	and	theatricalize	the	audience	in	public	space	to	the	incapacitation	of	theatricality	in	a	performative	questioning	of	the	ethics	of	spectatorship	and	spectacle.				
Food	Court	In	Food	Court	Back	to	Back	seek	to	reinhabit	or	reoccupy	the	conventional	theatre	space.		From	the	outset	this	creates	a	tension:	the	production	is	both	bound	by	and	seeks	to	undermine	the	theatre	space	with	its	proscenium	arch	and	orchestra	pit	and	the	techne	of	dramatic	theatre.	There	is	an	attempt	to	reconfigure	the	relationship	between	actor	and	text:	discourses	and	doxa	seem	to	pass	through	and	across	the	various	bodies	of	actors	in	the	space,	all	of	whom	are	perceived	as	disabled.			Back	to	Back	made	the	decision	to	go	back	inside	a	conventional	theatrical	space	for	Food	Court	despite,	or	perhaps	because	of,	what	Bruce	Gladwin	has	articulated	as	the	group’s	‘issues	with	theatre’	(Gladwin	“Searchlight.”).		Food	Court	attempts	an	incapacitation	of	fundamental	features	of	
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representational	or	dramatic	theatre:	an	undoing	of	the	nuts	and	bolts	of	staging	and	characterization.	Spectacle,	a	feature	of	theatre	which	Aristotle	denigrated	in	favour	of	a	concentration	on	the	causal	logic	of	plot,	and	spectacle	as	subjected	to	Debord’s	critique	in	the	Society	of	the	Spectacle	are	both	put	through	a	process	of	deconstruction	in	Food	Court:	both	presented	and	erased.		The	piece	seems	to	shimmer	and	glimmer,	to	come	in	and	out	of	appearance,	to	shine	light	on	and	to	render	obscure	the	bodies	in	the	space:	to	make	us	aware	of	the	dark	spots	and	blind	spots	necessary	for	the	construction	of	the	visual	field.	Characterization	as	a	coherent	representation	of	a	specific	unitary	individual	undergoes	a	similar	process	of	incapacitation.	There	is	a	blurring	of	character,	persona	and	performer.		Some	characters	bear	invented	names,	some	share	a	name	with	the	performer.	Speech	is	technically	amplified	and	manipulated	through	a	variety	of	microphones	and	sound	software	and	the	corresponding	words	are	rendered	simultaneously	as	projected	captions.		The	result	of	this	over-identification	of	the	processes	of	communication	and	clarification	is	paradoxically	confusion	as	to	the	site	of	the	utterance.			There	is	an	uncertainty	over	where	the	text	is	coming	from,	a	difficulty	of	locating	these	speech	acts	that	come	at	the	audience	in	so	many	different	ways	simultaneously.			This	confusion	is	enhanced	by	the	deliberate	indeterminacy	of	characterization,	which	feeds	upon	spectators’	confusion	over	the	extent	of	the	agency	of	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	the	performance.		At	times	a	spectator	may	well	question	whether	a	character	is	speaking	what	they	‘feel’,	or	speaking	in	the	voices	of	others,	of	the	‘cops	in	the	head’	and	whether	the	performer	is	genuinely	presenting	their	character,	their	disability	or	merely	citing	a	stereotype	of	disability.						
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It	is	possible	to	read	these	features	of	the	production	in	Deleuzian	terms:	the	piece	is	becoming-spectacle:	the	actors	are	becoming-characters.		The	piece	also	invokes	the	‘becoming’	in	the	meaning	of	that	which	is	pleasing	to	behold	and	appropriate.		It	is	at	the	same	time,	‘unbecoming’	in	the	sense	of	that	which	is	unsuitable,	inappropriate	and	improper.		The	piece	interrogates	what	is	deemed	becoming	or	unbecoming	for	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	representations	of	sexuality,	abuse	and	violence.		In	Food	Court	the	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities	are	presented	as	the	perpetrators	of	sexual	abuse	and	violence	rather	than	the	victims,	but	what	is	being	interrogated	is	the	formation	that	produces	both	abuser	and	abused.		This	in	turn	raises	many	questions	of	the	place,	or	lack	of	place,	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	the	spheres	of	ethics	and	intersubjectivity.	I	will	be	referring	to	my	own	memories	of	attending	a	performance	in	the	Adelaide	Festival	in	2010	and	viewings	of	a	vimeo	recording	provided	by	Back	to	Back	of	a	performance	in	the	Melbourne	Festival	in	2008.	The	first	part	of	the	performance	of	Food	Court	takes	place	downstage	in	front	of	the	stage	curtains,	the	next	section	takes	place	within	an	onstage	inflatable	which	reconfigures	the	light	and	the	space	to	create	the	impression	of	voids,	vacuums	or	abstract	spaces.		The	use	of	a	scrim	renders	the	silhouettes	of	bodies	in	what	appears	to	be	a	white	box.	In	the	last	section,	the	inflatable	is	deflated	to	reveal	a	single	body	in	space,	in	the	blackness	of	a	theatre	space	that	extends	to	the	back	wall	of	the	theatre	building.		What	is	characteristic	of	these	strategies	is	that	they	are	attempts	both	to	create	and	deconstruct	spectacle,	both	to	encourage	and	to	reveal	different	ways	of	looking,	but	this	challenge	to	spectatorship	is	still	very	much	within	a	theatre.			
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The	orchestra	pit	is	also	made	use	of,	but	it	is	inhabited	by	The	Necks,	an	experimental	jazz	trio	who	improvise	on	keyboard,	bass	and	percussion	throughout	the	performance.	The	relationship	of	their	playing	with	the	onstage	performance	is	complex.		It	is	not	really	an	accompaniment	in	the	usual	sense,	nor	is	it	a	soundtrack,	which	would	suggest	a	kind	of	seamless	underscoring	of	narrative	or	the	emotions	of	the	characters.		What	is	improvised	throughout	the	fifty	minutes	of	the	performance	are	arpeggio-like	phrases	in	a	minor	key	that	promise	a	return	or	recurrence	but	never	deliver.		Piano,	bass	and	percussion	interact	one	with	the	other,	at	times	pulsing,	at	times	rumbling,	at	times	crashing	and	thrashing	about:	never	offering	a	resolution.		There	is,	moreover	an	interesting	and	unresolved	interplay	between	what	is	being	improvised	in	the	orchestra	pit	and	what	is	being	rendered	visible	and	audible	on	the	stage.		It	is	not	easy	to	determine	which	element	of	the	production	‘leads’	the	other,	in	fact	Helena	Grehan	in	“Responding	to	the	‘unspoken’	in	Food	Court”	in	‘We’re	People	Who	Do	Shows’	refers	to	promotional	material	for	the	show	that	describes	it	as	‘a	concert	as	much	as	it	is	a	theatre	show.’	(Grehan	and	Eckersall	105)		Indeterminacy	as	an	aesthetic	choice	is	present	in	the	other	technical	elements	of	the	production.		In	fact	the	techne	of	theatrical	effects	is	problematized	throughout	the	production:	specifically	the	use	of	audiovisual	technology	and	the	techniques	of	conventional	or	naturalistic	‘acting.’		In		‘We’re	
People	Who	Do	Shows’	Trezise	and	Wake	in	“Disabling	Spectacle:	Curiosity,	contempt	and	collapse	in	performance	theatre”	refer	to	the	use	of	captions:	‘to	render	the	oral	visual	and	to	foreground	the	background’	while	at	the	same	time		‘the	spoken	words	work	to	render	the	visual	oral,	creating	a	kind	of	speech	that	reveals	its	own	imperfections	through	its	‘failure’	to	arrive	unaided.’	(126)		It	is,	
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in	addition,	unclear	whether	the	captions	are	there	to	aid	the	audience	or	the	performers,	or	indeed	to	draw	attention	to	the	process	of	understanding	–	and	misunderstanding	-	between	performance	and	audience,	between	people	with	and	without	disabilities.			Given	this	indeterminacy	it	is	perhaps	not	surprising	that	it	has	provoked	a	variety	of	critical	responses.		Referring	to	the	first	section	of	the	show	that	happens	downstage	in	front	of	black	stage	curtains,	Glen	McGillivray	in	“Pleasure	Out	of	Suffering:	Negotiating	Material	Reality	Through	Fetishism	and	Disavowal	in	Food	Court”	makes	the	following	judgment:	Food	Court’s	first	act	made	it	difficult	for	the	audience	willing	to	disbelieve.		Set	before	a	black	curtain	on	the	forestage	of	the	Drama	Theatre	at	the	SOH,	and	lit	by	an	unchanging	open-light	wash,	this	act	was	unrelentingly	flat.	(98)	He	goes	on	to	give	a	fairly	detailed	description	of	the	movements	and	actions	of	the	performers	–	as	if	partly	to	check	he	is	not	missing	something	-and	concludes	his	description:	The	audience	is	restless:	nothing	is	happening,	will	the	show	reward	my	attention	or	am	I	about	to	be	tortured	by	bad/obscure	theatre/performance	art?		How	long	will	this	go	on?	(99)	McGillivray	uses	terminology	more	associated	with	an	older	form	of	theatre,	the	division	of	time	into	‘acts’,	and	he	uses	a	descriptor	like	‘flat’	that	assumes	‘theatre’	will	be	a	condensed	use	of	time	rather	than	durational.		His	descriptions	and	judgments	suggest	he	sides	with	‘theatre’	rather	than	‘performance’	in	the	theatre	versus	performance	debate	instigated	by	Michael	Fried.	30	McGillivray	seems	to	equate	performance	art	with	bad/obscure	theatre	just	as	a	Fried	equates	theatricality	with	bad	performance.			McGillivray,	when																																																									30	Referred	to	in	Féral’s	“Performance	and	Theatricality”cited	previously.	
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confronted	with	theatre	on	the	verge	of	collapse	into	performance	that	is	the	opening	of	Food	Court	struggles	to	comprehend	or	be	engaged	as	he	is	expecting	conventional,	representational	dramatic	theatre	which	follows	certain	rules	of	characterization	and	movements	and	intensities	in	time	and	space.		What	the	opening	section	of	Food	Court	is	offering,	though,	is	akin	to	Féral’s	undoing	of	competencies	in	the	specific	meaning	she	assigns	to	‘theatricality’.						Trezise	and	Wake	open	their	analysis,	as	McGillivray	does,	with	a	detailed	description	of	Mark	Deans’	actions	as	he	appears	to	set	up	the	theatrical	space,	but	their	reading	of	these	actions	is	quite	different.			They	describe	how	Mark	puts	a	chair	on	stage	in	a	certain	position	and	then	removes	a	piece	of	masking	tape	on	the	stage	so	that	it	is	closer	to	the	chair,	thus	giving	the	impression	that	he	has	made	a	mistake	in	the	placement	of	the	chair.		This	action	plays	on	audience	assumptions	that	Mark,	a	person	with	Down’s	Syndrome	has	missed	his	‘mark.’		This	assumption,	however,	is	confounded	soon	afterwards	when	a	very	precise	downlight	hits	the	chair	that	Mark	has	repositioned.		The	audience	experiences	what	Trezise	and	Wake	describe	as:	‘a	sly	and	subtle	joke	on	‘able’	expectations	of	‘disabled’	performers’,	a	strategy	which	they	locate	in	a	wider	context	of	the	production’s	blurring	of	the	‘boundaries	between	reality	and	representation,	perception	and	preconception,	ability	and	disability.’		(119)		In	the	opening	section	Mark	and	Scott	lay	out	the	basic	building	blocks	of	the	theatrical	space,	positioning	chairs	and	microphones.		Scott	Price	does	a	microphone	check.			Scott	speaks	the	words	‘Yes,	yes	c’mon.	Yes	c’mon.	C’mon.	Yes,	yes,	yes.	Oh	yes.		Mmm.	Yes.	That’s	good’	(96)	as	a	kind	of	sexed	up	version	of	a	check,	but	a	sexing	up	which	he	delivers	in	a	flat,	affectless	tones.	Tresize	and	Wake	read	this	as	Scott	‘cripping	up’	the	microphone	check.		They	characterize	
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his	style	of	delivery	as	‘aggressively,	tauntingly	flat.	’	He	is	either	a	very	bad	actor,	as	McGillivray	fears,	or	there	is	some	reason	for	the	‘flat’	delivery.	The	reason	Trezise	and	Wake	ascribe	to	his	delivery	is	that	he	is	‘cripping	up’:	‘he	plays	on	and	with	expectations	of	how	people	with	perceived	disabilities	ought	(not)	to	perform	(both	on	stage	and	in	bed).’	(124)	McGillivrays’s	initial	reading	of	this	section	of	the	performance	is	that	it	seems	to	be	bad	theatre,	Trezise	and	Wake’s	that	it	is	highly	subtle,	reflexive	theatrical	performance,	what	they	term,	after	Elinor	Fuchs,	‘performance	theatre’	a	hybrid	form	akin	to	performance	art	‘in	its	continuous	awareness	of	itself	as	performance.’	(123)	Trezise	and	Wake’s	analysis	connects	this	self-reflexivity	of	performance	theatre	with	disability	in	the	following	way:	To	place	a	performer	with	a	perceived	disability	in	front	of	a	mainstream	audience-	the	majority	of	whom	are	likely	to	see	themselves	as	able-bodied-	is	to	invite	that	audience	to	undertake	an	act	of	double	or	triple	perception:	to	perceive	perceived	disability	as	it	were,	rather	than	simply	disability.	(120)	They	summarize	Food	Court’s	aesthetic	and	political	efficacy	in	the	closing	words	of	their	analysis:	‘remarkably,	we	perceive	ourselves	perceiving.’	(129)		Glen	McGillivray’s	reading	is	a	more	straightforward	perception	of	‘disability’	in	acting,	acting	that	is	incapacitated	in	the	sense	that	it	is	inadequate	or	incompetent	in	terms	of	the	communication	of	the	spoken	text	or	of	the	presentation	of	character:		Dialogue	ensues	between	‘Gloria’	and	‘Jenny’	in	voices	(when	we	can	hear	them)	that	are	flat,	lisping,	nasal	alternating	between	monotone	recitations	and	harshly	shouted	outbursts.	(99)	
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McGillivray	goes	on	to	offer	an	analysis	of	a	scene	in	which	Gloria	and	Jenny	bully	Leslie:		this	portrayal	of	bullying	is	presented	in	such	an	unadorned	fashion	that	the	actors’	distinctive	physicalities	and	vocal	qualities	are	exposed	to	our	scrutiny.	Yet	‘Gloria’	and	‘Jenny’,	in	particular,	perform	with	an	insouciance	that	heightens	the	Verfreumdungseffekt	(sic)	of	the	long	list	of	epithets	‘Gloria’	hurls	at	‘Leslie’	while	‘Jenny’	laughs.	(99)	In	this	analysis	it	is	unclear	whether	the	actors	are	bad	actors,	disabled	people	achieving	an	unconscious	Verfremdungseffekt	or	whether	they	are	in	fact	capable	of	the	level	of	skill,	technique	and	layered	performance	to	achieve	this	
Verfremdungseffekt.		I	think	the	production	encourages	this	blurring	of	the	crucial	question	of	agency	as	a	strategy	of	deliberate	indeterminacy.		This	strategy	provokes	a	range	of	responses	in	the	spectator	who	is	left	unsure	of	whether	the	performers	are	being	disabled	or	whether	they	are	playing	up	to	or	playing	with	tropes	of	disabled	behaviour.		This	indeterminacy	over	the	agency	of	people	with	intellectual	disability	both	within	theatrical	performance	and	outside	it	is	deployed	as	a	strategy	by	Back	to	Back	to	cause	audience	and	critics	discomfort	and	to	question	their	own	responses.		In	Pure	Products	Go	Crazy	Matt	Hargrave	relates	his	own	particular	discomfort	at	his	reaction	to	the	interaction	of	Carolyn	and	Steve	at	the	end	of	
small	metal	objects:	a	middle	class,	middle-aged	woman	is	offering	to	fellate	a	younger	autistic	man	in	a	public	space.	Did	my	laughter	at	the	line	mask	a	discomfort	with	the	idea	of	Steve	having	a	sexual	life?	(46)	Trezise	and	Wake	similarly	catch	themselves	checking	their	own	response	to	Scott’s	sexed	up	microphone	check	in	Food	Court:	
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These	pornographic	words,	stripped	of	any	context	or	desire,	are	doubly	pornographic	for	how	they	sit	against	their	speaker	whom	we	perceive	to	be	intellectually	disabled.		Trezise	and	Wake	like	Hargrave,	question	the	assumptions	they	make	in	their	own	subjective	responses:				 Has	he	had	sexual	experience?		Does	he	understand	it?	Does	he	want	it?	Does	he	know	that	this	blankly	parodic	speech	exposes	not	only	the	words,	but	also	a	certain	vision	of	him?	Is	he	performing	citation	well,	or	failing	to	perform	with	emotion?	(124)			This	questioning	of	response	again	hinges	around	an	uncertainty	over	the	capacity	of	Scott	Price	to	act	or	to	know	what	he	is	doing	by	acting	and	his	capacity	as	a	sexual	being.			These	‘pornographic’	words	are	in	some	way	speech	acts	or	performative	utterances	in	that	the	speaking	of	them	is	intended	to	increase	libido	or	accompany	the	reaching	of	a	sexual	climax.		They	are	at	once	ejaculations	and	pre-ejaculatory	performative	utterances.	Scott	is	achieving	something	quite	remarkable	if	he	is	both	delivering	these	words	flatly	and	somehow	suggesting	their	sexual	performative	power.		He	is	citing	pre-ejaculatory	utterances	in	an	awareness	of	performativity	many	people	would	not	associate	with	a	person	with	intellectual	disabilities		What	is	the	space	that	Mark	and	Scott	are	laying	out	on	the	forestage	in	front	of	the	stage	curtains?		The	‘food	court’	of	a	shopping	mall	is	the	site	of	inspiration	for	Back	to	Back’s	production,	the	narrative	is	based	on	conversations	the	performers	overheard	there,	and	yet	the	production	contains	no	visual	reference	to	such	a	location,	instead	the	theatrical	space	is	configured	in	highly	abstract	ways.		In	this	abstraction	of	the	space	the	Food	Court	of	the	title	is	opened	to	other	and	shifting	meanings	-	a	food	‘court’	as	a	place	in	which	people	are	judged	before	their	peers.		
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When	Rita	Haleberec	and	Nicki	Hall	arrive	onto	this	scene	they	take	us	to	another	space	of	judgment.		They	are	dressed	in	gold	leotards	and	leggings,	a	costume	sparkling	with	the	glamour	of	trapeze	artists	or	dancers.		These	are	garments	designed	to	display	bodies	trained	to	high	levels	of	physical	virtuosity	but	they	draw	attention	to	every	folding	and	refolding	of	flesh	of	these	young	women’s	bodies.		Does	this	exposure	of	their	physiques	also	reveal	the	court	of	judgment	instantly	in	session	with	regard	to	their	body	shape	in	the	eyes	and	minds	of	the	spectators?		Is	that	visual	judgment	the	same	or	different	given	their	appearance	as	young	women	with	Down’s	Syndrome?		From	the	outset	their	appearance	thus	doubly	challenges	how	the	spectator	judges	them.		They	sit	on	two	chairs	positioned	stage	right	and,	despite	the	fact	they	both	wear	face	microphones,	Mark	brings	on	a	boom	microphone	and	swings	it	from	one	to	the	other	as	they	speak	to	each	other.		What	they	say	is	also	projected	above	them	in	white	text	on	the	black	stage	curtain.		This	excess	of	theatrical	techne	also	suggests	that	this	text	is	not	originating	in	the	bodies,	and	therefore	minds,	of	the	speaking	women	but	that	they	may	be	involved	in	a	process	of	citation.	Theron	Schmidt	in	“Acting	Disabled:	Back	to	Back	Theatre	and	The	Politics	of	Appearance”	in	Postdramatic	Theatre	and	the	Political		characterizes	these	utterances	as	‘un-locatable	speech-acts.’	(207)	The	challenge	to	the	audience’s	judgmental	scrutiny	of	the	two	young	women	is	then	transposed	as	the	two	young	women	judge	Sarah	Mainwaring’s	arrival	centre	stage	as	Leslie.		She	is	slightly	built	but	her	gait	and	stance	suggest	palsy.	She	immediately	becomes	the	object	of	scrutiny	of	Jenny	on	the	chair	centre	stage.	Leslie	makes	her	way	to	the	chair	that	is	positioned	stage	left,	audience	right,	a	conventionally	‘weaker’	stage	position.	Gloria	from	the	position	
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of	most	power	stage	right	makes	the	pronouncement:		‘She’s	fat.’		At	first	Jenny,	seated	centre	stage	misunderstands	this	interpellation	as	being	intended	for	her,	asking	‘Me	or	her?’	to	which	Gloria	responds	‘Her.’		Mark	brings	the	boom	microphone	to	Gloria	as	she	asks	Leslie:	‘Have	you	got	a	name	tag	or	something?’	Leslie	does	not	respond	and	Mark	pokes	the	boom	microphone	at	Leslie’s	breast,	or	where	a	name	tag	might	be.		As	the	interrogation	proceeds	Jenny	prompts	Leslie	to	respond:	‘Use	your	tongue’	and	follows	this	up	with:	‘Do	you	know	where	your	tongue	is?’	At	this	point	Mark	inserts	the	boom	microphone	into	Leslie’s	mouth,	pulls	it	out	and	lets	it	play	around	her	lips.		The	interrogation-cum-accusation	now	includes	tag-questions	that	assume	Leslie’s	intellectual	disability:	‘You	can’t	spell	the	word	KETTLE,	can	you?’	From	afar	Gloria	calls	Leslie	‘Fat	cripple.’	(Grehan	and	Eckersall	96)	This	exchange	both	disconcerts	an	able	audience	–	‘we’	are	not	used	to	seeing	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	as	perpetrators	of	verbal	abuse	–	and	confuses	them	–	to	‘our’	eyes	all	of	the	bodies	on	stage	are	perceived	as	disabled.			What	emerges	is	both	the	problematic	of	the	perception	of	disability	and	a	presentation	of	abuse	as	a	system	in	which	any	body	may	be	interpellated.		When	Leslie	continues	to	say	nothing,	Mark	bangs	the	boom	microphone	on	her	head	so	that	she	at	least	produces	sound	if	not	speech,	thus	equating	her	with	the	voiceless	or	the	animal.		The	abuse	of	Leslie	continues	and	at	one	point	Gloria	stands	in	front	of	Leslie	and	harangues	her:	‘Look	at	you!’		This	command	or	demand	echoes	throughout	Food	Court.	This	imperative	interpellates	the	addressee	in	a	much	wider	field	of	scrutiny	than	their	own	gaze.	The	audience	is	of	course	implicated	in	this	imperative	to	look	at	or	look	down	on	Leslie	but	
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perhaps	there	is	even	a	suggestion	that	they	too	come	under	its	interpellation	and	need	to	look	to	themselves.			Gloria	then	shouts	into	a	hand	held	microphone	a	list	of	abusive	epithets	while	Jenny	stands	stage	right	laughing	into	the	boom	mic	which	picks	up	her	laughter	and	manipulates	it	to	reverberate.		This	sequence	of	berating,	abusing	and	laughing	goes	on	for	three	minutes	before	the	long-suffering	and	silent	Leslie	exits	as	Gloria	and	Jenny	stand	in	cahoots	still	laughing.		The	hyper-mediatization	of	the	abusive	epithets	of	the	two	young	women	draws	attention	to	this	text	as	citation	of	doxa,	as	Theron	Schmidt	articulates:		We	do	not	know	if	the	speaker	is	talking	to	the	other	woman	or	to	a	character	who	is	represented	by	the	woman,	or	repeating	the	things	that	she	has	been	called.	(200)	Helena	Grehan	summarizes	this	citation	of	doxa	as	‘a	group	of	performers	performing	the	‘majority.’’	(Grehan	and	Eckersall	109)	When	the	three	women	have	exited	the	stage	Mark	Deans	appears	to	speak	a	form	of	narrative	link	between	the	food	court	and	a	forest.		He	speaks	the	text	but	also	turns	to	read	it	as	it	appears	projected	on	the	back	of	the	stage.	Schmidt	refers	to	a	post-show	discussion	in	London	in	which	Bruce	Gladwin	explained	Mark’s	role	as	a	kind	of	incapacitated	narrator:		Mark’s	text	–	the	karaoke-like	moment	that	marks	the	transition	between	scenes	–	emerged	because	Mark	has	never	spoken	in	previous	performances;	Gladwin	describes	his	strength	as	being	with	physical	performance	and	creating	strong	relationship	with	audiences.		The	use	of	surtitles	and	text	captioning	was	a	way	to	support	him	speaking	on	stage.	(203-4)	The	way	Bruce	Gladwin	and	Back	to	Back	frame	him	within	the	body	of	the	company’s	work	makes	use	of	his	persona	of	the	humorous,	hugging	person	with	
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Down	Syndrome	and	some	kind	of	parergon	of	intellectual	disability	–	both	hinting	at	the	incapacity	to	make	theatre:	to	speak,	to	remember	lines,	to	fully	inhabit	a	character	other	than	one’s	own	and	at	the	theatrical	power	of	what	he	brings	to	the	stage	as	an	affective	presence.			In	Food	Court	the	affable,	comic	persona	he	has	developed	over	his	years	with	Back	to	Back	sits	unbecomingly	–	deliberately	unbecomingly	–	with	the	violence	of	the	actions	he	performs	in	the	first	section	–	inserting	the	boom	microphone	into	Leslie’s	mouth	and	banging	it	over	her	head.			Mark’s	role	within	the	theatrical	assemblage	is	complex.		On	the	one	hand	what	he	is	doing	resembles	‘non-matrixed	acting’,	his	actions	are	like	those	of	a	stage	hand:	he	marks	out	the	space,	he	operates	the	boom	microphone.		On	the	other	hand	his	actions	play	with	the	spectator’s	perception	of	his	acting.		His	marking	of	the	space	proves	to	be	an	ironic	provocation	or	sending	up	of	audience	assumptions	about	his	ability.		His	operation	of	the	boom	microphone	is	conflated	with	his	perpetration	of	abuse	and	intrusion	on	the	body	of	Sarah	Mainwaring’s	Leslie.		In	a	particular	twist	of	the	question	of	agency	it	could	be	argued	that	the	point	of	the	boom	microphone	entering	Leslie’s	mouth,	touching	her	breast	or	making	sound	by	banging	her	head	is	to	expose	the	invasion	and	abuse	the	technology	of	mediatization	and	theatre	performs	on	her	in	seeking,	probing	and	forcing	her	character	to	give	‘voice’	to	who	she	is.			The	instrument	of	the	boom	microphone	cannot,	of	course,	operate	without	an	operator.		How	responsible,	then,	is	Mark’s	character	for	the	abuse	of	Leslie?		The	production	may	also	suggest	that	Mark’s	violence	is	a	case	of	his	‘only	following	orders’	from	Jenny	and	Gloria,	the	bullies,	but	Mark’s	character	is	still	required	on	some	level	to	take	responsibility	for	the	perpetration	of	the	abuse.		The	confusion	over	
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agency	operates	on	yet	another	level	as	the	audience	may	find	it	difficult	to	distinguish	between	‘Mark’s	character’	and	Mark	Deans.		I	think	all	of	these	confusions	over	the	extent	of	Mark’s	agency	in	his	performed	actions	are	deliberate:	they	force	an	audience	into	a	confrontation	over	what	they	think	Mark	as	a	person	with	intellectual	disability	is	responsible	for,	what	capacity	for	action	and	intention	he	has.				To	return	to	the	karaoke	scene	that	marks	the	transition	in	Food	Court,	it	is	similarly	not	clear	whether	Mark	is	the	subject	of,	or	subjected	to,	the	techne	and	the	language	of	this	sequence.		It	is	another	example	of	Theron	Schmidt’s	‘un-locatable	speech	acts.’	His	particular	playing	of	the	role	of	narrator	is	a	reminder	that	what	we	are	seeing	here	is	a	‘flickering	of	appearances	and	representations’	(Schmidt	207)	between	actor,	character	and	persona	which	is	a	(re)presentation	of	how	Mark	Deans,	person	with	Down	Syndrome	is	viewed	both	in	the	play	and	out	of	it	and	how	perceptions	of	him	in	those	two	different	contexts	interact	with	each	other.		Schmidt	cites	Bruce	Gladwin’s	reference	to	this	indeterminacy	of	spectatorship	or	witnessing:	There’s	a	guy	with	Down’s	Syndrome.		I	wonder	if	he’s	playing	a	guy	with	Down’s	Syndrome.		I	think	that’s	a	tension	that	the	audience	is	never	released	from.		(197)						Schmidt	also	refers	to	a	kind	of	split	in	spectatorship	and	an	uncertainty	of	identifying	with	performers	with	intellectual	disability:	I	have	one	kind	of	relationship	with	the	performers’	performance	and	another	kind	of	socially	mediated	relationship	with	the	performers	themselves	and	what	I	assume	they	might	be	going	through	as	they	perform	the	actions	they	are	performing	in	front	of	me.	Indeed	my	
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assumptions	are	more	than	likely	misconceived,	and	to	cast	myself	as	witness	is	to	propagate	these	misconceptions.	(197)	Both	refer	to	the	awkwardness,	the	uncomfortableness	of	the	spectator,	how	spectators	at	a	fundamental	level	can	manifest	a	failure	to	see	or	a	capacity	to	misconstrue	what	appears	in	front	of	them.		Is	this	the	anxiety	of	ethical	relations	that	are	themselves	historically	and	currently	confused	and	still	in	a	process	of	negotiation?	or	is	it,	as	Schmidt	suggests,	a	breakdown	in	seeing	and	seeing-as-understanding.		He	goes	on	to	refer	to:		the	disjunction	between	two	different	understandings	of	the	nature	of	the	event	to	which	I	am	a	spectator:	whether	it	is	‘real’	or	an	‘imitation’,	and	whether	I	am	supposed	to	ignore	or	pay	attention	to	the	performers’	eccentricities	of	speech	and	movement.	(198)	What	is	opened	up	by	the	participation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	contemporary	performance,	and	the	challenges	their	presence	seems	to	offer	to	the	processes	of	meaning	making,	is	how	the	act	of	‘seeing’,	in	terms	of	paying	attention,	is	based	upon	ignoring	what	is	not	being	paid	attention	to,	and	how	the	act	of	understanding	is	dependent	upon	ignoring	or	glossing	over	what	can	not	be	understood.		Such	performance	has	the	capacity	to	deconstruct	both	the	sensorium	and	the	sense-making	of	spectatorship.				The	theatre	space	is	then	reconfigured	using	an	inflatable	and	a	scrim	so	that	the	figures	who	appear	before	the	spectator	appear	both	hazy	and	indistinct.		Bruce	Gladwin	acknowledges	the	influence	of	the	visual	artist	James	Turrell’s	concept	of	the	Ganzfeld	(Grehan	and	Eckersall	242),	experimental	works	with	light	and	space	which	seemed	to	connect	with	Back	to	Back’s	concerns	with	the	qualities	of	obscurity	and	translucency	of	different	materials	when	lit	from	different	perspectives.		In	this	section	the	spectator	becomes	aware	of	the	
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shimmering	but	easily	recognizable	shapes	of	the	bodies	of	Gloria,	Jenny	and	Leslie.		Gloria	and	Jenny’s	abuse	of	Leslie	continues	and	intensifies.		They	command	her	to	go	to	the	toilet,	then	accuse	her	of	missing	the	toilet.		Gloria	then	issues	a	command:	‘Take	your	clothes	off’	Leslie	takes	her	clothes	off	down	to	her	underwear.			The	Necks’	soundtrack	is	curiously	gentle	at	this	point,	rippling	piano	and	soft	cymbals,	the	scrim	somewhat	mitigates	the	act	of	voyeurism	of	the	spectators	but	there	is	still	an	affective	charge	in	witnessing	two	young	women	with	intellectual	disabilities	compelling	another	disabled	young	woman	to	strip.		When	she	has	done	so,	the	interpellative	imperative	is	repeated:	‘Look	at	you.’	They	then	compel	her	to	turn	around	and	accuse	her	of	having	defecated	in	her	clothes.		They	then	command	her	to	remove	her	underwear.		Every	action	takes	place	slowly,	the	visual	shimmer	of	the	scrim	and	the	accompaniment	of	the	relentless	but	unresolving	musical	accompaniment	ratchets	up	the	tension.			Jenny	and	Gloria	repeat	the	same	question	to	each	other	‘What’s	next?’	as	if	there	is	some	narrative,	some	script	to	be	followed	in	their	abuse	and	humiliation	of	Leslie.			Rita	Halabarec,	Nicki	Holland	and	Sarah	Mainwaring	are	obviously	following	a	script,	one	which,	according	to	the	documentation	of	the	company	archive,	they	devised	in	improvisation	and	which	they	pushed	to	the	point	of	performer	nudity.		‘What’s	next?’	is	a	toying	with	the	victim,	an	assertion	of	power	by	the	perpetrators	that	also	presents	a	masquerade	of	lack	of	power,	a	reference	to	a	script	or	a	procedure	that	must	be	followed.		Gloria’s	answer	is	‘She’s	what’s	next?’	Jenny	commands	Leslie	to	‘Dance	over	there.	Slowly.’	(99)		and	she	dances,	naked,	moving	and	swaying	her	hips.		As	she	does	so,	more	and	more	bodies	arrive	to	observe	her	and	as	they	do	so	a	new	lighting	state	opens	up	the	full	expanse	of	the	white	stage	space.		One	by	one,	ten,	eleven	people	
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arrive	to	observe	her.		The	number	of	bodies,	their	stances	and	their	all	being	positioned	stage	right	looking	at	her,	suggest	an	abstraction	of	a	public	space,	the	locus	of	an	impromptu	public	spectacle.			Who	makes	a	spectacle	of	this	this	naked,	disabled	young	woman?		Do	her	abusers	make	a	spectacle	of	her,	or	is	it	the	group	of	bystanding	observers?	Does	this	group	stand	for	the	sense	of	majority	that	always	forms	among	the	non-disabled	when	a	person	with	disabilities	‘causes	a	commotion’	in	a	public	space?	How	does	this	group	relate	to	the	other	group	sitting	and	watching	all	this	in	the	auditorium?		As	Petra	Kuppers	observes	in	relation	to	another	Back	to	Back	production:	The	point	is	not	to	answer	these	questions	but	to	be	aware	of	these	projections,	of	these	reading	mechanisms	at	work	in	dramatic	reception.	(“Outsider	Histories”	39)		In	the	actions	of	the	group	the	victimization	and	bullying	of	the	playground	and	disability	hate	crimes	in	the	public	sphere	are	conflated	with	the	spectatorship	of	theatre.			After	Leslie	is	rendered	a	public	spectacle,	the	crowd	disperses	and	Jenny	and	Gloria	continue	their	abuse,	alternately	spitting	out	words	of	opprobrium	to	Leslie	and	expressing	their	affection	for	each	other	in	flat,	affectless	tones.		The	actions	and	speech	of	Gloria	and	Jenny	are	presented	as	citations	of	emotion.	Gloria	and	Jenny	are	incapable	of	finding	a	voice	to	express	to	each	other	the	intimacy,	tenderness	and	affection	their	words	profess	and	they	take	out	their	frustration,	shame	and	emotional	incapacity	on	Leslie.		Jenny	punches	Leslie	in	the	stomach.		The	theatricality	of	this	‘assault’	is	emphasized:	each	punch	is	accompanied	by	grunts	from	Jenny	as	Scott	is	shown	banging	boxing	gloves	
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together	into	Mark’s	boom	microphone.		Gloria	then	kicks	Leslie	while	she	is	on	the	ground	and	punches	her.	Jenny	bends	down	and	strangles	her.			The	guilt	of	abuser	and	abused	is	transposed.		I	believe	something	very	dark	concerning	the	othering	of	vulnerable	bodies	is	being	suggested.	Gloria	and	Jenny	are	punishing	themselves	and	each	other	by	punishing	Leslie.		There	is	likewise	a	confounding	of	self	and	other	when	the	perceived	‘other’	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	are	represented	as	the	perpetrators,	the	aggressors,	the	bullies,	confounding	audience	expectations	of	agency.		This	in	turn	seems	to	open	up	the	possibility	of	a	confounding	of	self	and	other	in	the	relationship	between	observers	and	observed	as	is	indicated	by	Avi	Lipski’s	comment	cited	in	Grehan:		I	watched	horrified	as	they	inflicted	pain	onto	one	another,	and	felt	a	stirring	deep	inside	me	that	harked	back	to	memories	of	pain	I	had	caused.	(109)	People	with	intellectual	disabilities	are	no	longer	just	the	equivalent	of	the	Musselmänner,	the	victims	at	a	limit	point	of	humanity,	they	can	now	be	imagined	as	perpetrators	of	violence.		In	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich	they	become	the	Nazis	as	well	as	the	victims	in	the	camps.	According	to	Bruce	Gladwin	in	an	interview	with	Clare	Morgan	cited	in	Tresize	and	Wake,	Back	to	Back	developed	the	performance	from	improvisation	devised	by	the	performers:	Three	actors	.	.	.were	improvising	a	scene	in	which	a	woman	is	abducted	by	two	others	and	taken	to	a	forest.		Gladwin	told	the	abductors	that	because	they	were	in	control,	they	could	do	what	they	liked	with	their	captive.		They	immediately	ordered	her	to	strip.			From	a	director’s	point	of	view	I	started	feeling	really	anxious,	and	so	did	other	people	in	the	room	.	.	.I	felt	an	obligation	that	maybe	I	should	stop	
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the	work.		But	at	the	same	time	I	could	see	the	actors	really	getting	into	it,	and	nobody	wanted	to	stop.	.	.	It	was	like	theatre	gold	at	the	time.		When	we	finished	the	improvisation	people	were	ecstatic.	(127)	This	anecdote	stresses	the	‘agency’	of	the	actors	concerned.	It	is	of	course	a	facilitated	agency	in	the	context	of	a	theatrical	process:	in	the	course	of	an	improvisation	Gladwin	gave	the	actors	permission	to	have	control,	to	do	what	they	liked.	When	Gladwin	elsewhere	comments	on	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	presenting	characters	who	are	‘perpetrators	as	well	as	victims	of	abuse’	in	Food	Court	the	force	of	his	rhetoric	elides	a	moral	dilemma:	If	you	can’t	act	evil,	then	you’re	subhuman,	in	a	way,	because	we’re	all	capable	of	being	evil.	(qtd	Schmidt	202)	
Food	Court	is	political	not	because	it	explicitly	advocates	a	particular	moral	or	ethical	standpoint	concerning	the	treatment	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		Its	politics	lies,	paradoxically,	in	its	location	in	the	apartness	of	the	aesthetic	sphere.		Here	difficult	questions	of	morality	and	ethics	can	be	posed,	here	the	positions	of	abuser	and	abused	can	be	reconfigured.		When	the	roles	of	perpetrator	and	victim	are	both	enacted	by	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities	this	both	challenges	perceptions	of	such	people	as	always	already	victims	and	also	raises	awkward	questions	of	the	implications	of	the	structuration	of	agency	and	empowerment.		At	the	root	of	this	problem	is	a	kind	of	Levinasian	ethical	question:	is	agency	or	empowerment	always	at	the	expense	of	others?	In	the	last	section	of	Food	Court	Leslie	finally	does	get	to	speak,	‘proving’	that	she	can	speak	after	all	and	that	she	has	in	effect	been	‘playing	dumb.’		When	she	does	speak	it	is	a	highly	theatrical	’speech’:	Caliban’s	speech	from	Act	III	
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Scene	ii	of	Shakespeare’s	The	Tempest	which	begins	‘Be	not	afear’d	the	isle	is	full	of	noises.’	The	speech	is	also	presented	in	a	highly	theatrical	and	mediatized	dispositif.		She	delivers	the	speech	into	a	microphone	which	not	only	amplifies	but	manipulates,	reverberates,	echoes,	and	alters	the	pitch	of	her	voice	while	her	words	are	projected	onto	both	the	screen	of	the	transparent	inflatable	in	which	she	stands	and	onto	the	still	visible	back	wall	of	the	theatre.		In	addition,	each	word	or	phrase	of	the	text	‘arrives’	in	a	distinctive	way:	the	captioning	or	surtitling	is	animated	and	voice	activated	using	software	specifically	developed	for	the	show.	Bruce	Gladwin,	the	director,	describes	what	he	feels	is	at	stake	in	the	use	of	the	techne:	She	has	an	ABI	–	an	acquired	brain	injury	–	and	there’s	a	quality	of	staccato	delivery.		She’s	always	starting	and	beginning	and	not	finishing	words	and	needing	a	visual	reference	to	get	the	word	formed.		So	she	would	have	two	or	three	attempts	at	it	and	the	word	would	float	up	or	the	letters	would	float	up,	jumbled,	and	as	they	get	closer	to	the	line	they	assemble	themselves,	but	if	she	doesn’t	deliver	it	with	enough	force	they	float	back	down	.	.	.It’s	like	a	visual	representation	of	her	speech	pattern.	(Grehan	and	Eckersall	243)	As	she	struggles	to	enunciate	the	words,	the	letters	and	words	of	the	captioned	text	‘bounce	around,	seeming	fragile	and	isolated	as	if	they	are	stuttering	or	left	hanging	in	space.’	(Grehan	110)	This	is	at	once	a	highly	theatrical	form	of	Derridean	différance–	and	a	representation	of	her	incapacity	to	breathe	or	speak	the	line	unsupported.		The	technology	does	not	support	her;	it	is	not	so	much	an	assistive	as	an	aesthetic	technology.	It	is	another	example	of	an	‘un-locatable	speech-act’	(Schmidt	207)	There	is	a	deliberate	indeterminacy	of	aesthetic	in	the	(re)presentation	of	Sarah’s	voice.	Of	what	is	Sarah’s	voice	constituted?	Where	is	the	speech	coming	from?		The	words	come	from	a	classic	of	the	Western	canon	of	
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dramatic	theatre,	couched	in	the	baroque	conceits	and	lexical	innovation	of	the	English	Renaissance.	Visually	it	looks	as	if	the	captions	are	emerging	from	the	prone	body	of	Sarah	Mainwaring	as	Leslie,	as	the	letters	and	words	rise	in	jumbles	and	clusters	and	sway	and	loop	and	dance	from	where	she	lies	on	the	stage	to	the	level	of	the	surtitles.		How	are	they	animated?		Are	they	voice	activated?		What	constitutes	her	‘speech	pattern’?	Is	it	her,	or	her	ABI?		Here	we	seem	to	have	a	different	configuration	of	un-locatable	speech	acts	caught	between	orality	and	textuality.		The	last	line,	which	she	says	twice,	sounds	particularly	faltering	and	wavering.		It	is	as	if	there	is	a	sob	within	it:	it	throbs	or	reverberates	both	at	the	‘source’	of	her	articulation	and	in	its	electronic	manipulation.		An	electronic	prolongation	of	this	reverberation	persists	as	the	projection	of	the	forest	seems	to	speed	away	into	white	space,	all	the	letters	of	all	the	words	disperse	into	black	and	we	see	her	silhouette	and	a	fade	to	black.		The	music	continues	and	then	we	see	the	translucent	inflatable	being	lifted	above	her,	hanging	there	like	a	canopy	of	clouds	and	we	finally	see	her	again,	this	time	unmediated	through	scrim	or	inflatable,	standing	alone	in	the	opened	stage	space	in	front	of	a	green	light	on	the	cyclorama.	She	appears	to	wave	with	her	left	hand,	and	her	right	hand	holding	the	microphone	is	still	moving	in	what	we	may	read	as	involuntary	movement.			In	an	earlier	part	of	the	production,	in	a	kind	of	visual	pun,	she	‘shakes	hands’	with	one	of	her	bullies,	a	gesture	which	is	part	of	a	social	code	of	competence,	but	after	the	other’s	hand	is	withdrawn,	her	hand	continues	to	shake.	At	the	end	of	the	Caliban	speech	her	hand	still	shakes,	but	is	the	shaking	indicative	of	emotion	or	dystonia?	On	one	level	the	production	beautifies	and	theatricalizes	her	voice	but	at	a	deeper	level	generates	an	‘un-locatable	speech-
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act’	flickering	and	wavering	between	theatrical	representation	and	performance,	incapacity	and	theatricality.	Leslie	is	finally	revealed	standing	centre	stage	after	much	of	the	mediatization	of	theatrical	techne	is	removed.		This	is	a	form	of	revelation,	but	veils	of	mediatization	remain,	she	is	still	lit,	there	is	a	green	light	behind	her,	the	music	of	the	Necks	still	accompanies	her.		The	protracted	closing	sequence	serves	to	leave	the	impression	on	the	retinas	of	the	spectator	of	her	figure	in	the	empty	space.		The	blackness	or	periods	of	limited	visibility	serve	to	enhance	the	presence	of	the	retinal	after-image.		When	the	performance	finally	ends	the	relentlessness	of	the	assault	on	the	senses	ensures	that	the	ears	of	the	spectators	are	still	resonating	with	unresolved	phrases,	the	eyes	are	still	accustoming	themselves	to	the	plays	of	light	and	dark,	visibility	and	lack	of	visibility	to	which	they	have	been	subjected.		In	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	performance	the	images	and	sounds	still	vibrate.		When	we	see	Leslie	in	a	less	mediatized	space	we	become	more	aware	of	how	our	own	organs	of	sense	perception	and	sense	making	contribute	their	own	interference,	flicker	and	shimmer,	their	own	points	of	focus	and,	hence,	blind	spots.		As	Trezise	and	Wake,	previously	cited,	conclude:	‘we	perceive	ourselves	perceiving’,	or	as	Schmidt	expresses	it:	‘this	theatre	is	a	place	where	appearance	is	seen:	it	is	this	that	makes	it	political.’	(207)	In	order	to	delineate	more	fully	what	constitutes	the	potential	meanings	of	the	‘political’	in	the	ongoing	work	of	Back	to	Back	Theatre	and	how	the	political	plays	out	at	the	level	of	the	aesthetic	and	is	revealed	or	obscured	in	concerns	with	the	ethical	it	is	necessary	to	go	on	to	consider	how	these	issues	are	explored	and	embodied	in	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich.	
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Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich	What	the	audience	first	sees	of	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich	is	an	arrangement	of	objects	in	what	appears	to	be	a	backstage	space.	Centrally	placed	is	a	chaise	longue	or	ottoman,	a	piece	of	furniture	that	is	a	kind	of	essential	building	block	for	naturalistic	theatre.		The	other	objects	denote	the	nuts	and	bolts	of	theatre:	brushes	and	mops,	an	A-frame	ladder,	sheets	of	plywood,	a	lighting	gantry,	crates,	a	worker	light	shines	from	this	upstage	location	to	cast	light	downstage	onto	the	floor	of	the	theatre	space	configured	as	a	black	box.		The	workings,	the	hidden	labour,	the	support	mechanisms	of	theatre	are	exposed,	but	artfully:	the	extreme	upstage	space,	which	is	lit	while	the	main	stage	is	in	darkness.	The	arrangement	of	the	theatrical	space	suggests	to	me	the	lit	doorway	at	the	back	of	Velasquez’s	Las	Meninas.		If	this	is	fanciful,	there	is	at	least	the	suggestion	of	an	interior	or	still	life	as	well	as	the	kind	of	theatricality	of	the	space	to	which	Josette	Féral	refers	in	“Theatricality:	The	Specificity	of	Theatrical	Language.”	Michel	Foucault	discusses	Las	Meninas	at	length	at	the	beginning	of	The	Order	of	Things	as	a	paradigm	of	both	the	construction	of,	and	the	problematizing	of,	the	viewing	subject.	This	particular	theatricalizing	of	the	space	from	the	outset	makes	the	spectator	aware	of	their	own	positioning	and	perspective	with	regard	to	what	they	are	seeing.		The	position	of	spectator	will	not	always	be	comfortable.		The	production	posits	various	models	of	spectatorship	that	are	subsequently	incapacitated	to	leave	spectators	uncomfortably	aware	of	the	prejudices	in	their	
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previously	held	assumptions	around	intellectual	disability	but	I	believe	the	intention	of	this	strategy	is	heuristic.			Across	this	framed	space	Simon	Laherty	and	Mark	Deans	casually	walk	on;	the	latter	sits	with	crossed	legs	on	the	chaise	longue.		The	opening	dialogue	between	Simon	Laherty	and	Brian	Tilley	is	heard,	but	what	is	seen	is	Mark	Deans	looking	from	side	to	side	in	time	with	the	turn	taking	of	the	exchange	between	the	two	others.			He	is	ignored,	and	not	part	of	the	conversation,	but	centrally	positioned	and	in	plain	sight.		He	is	in	a	kind	of	anteroom	of	the	theatre,	a	backstage	rendered	onstage,	or	an	onstage	representation	of	backstage.		His	presence	and	positioning	is	at	the	same	time	liminal:	on	the	threshold	of	the	stage,	on	the	edge	of	a	conversation,	and	in	the	centre	of	the	frame,	centre	stage.	This	is	indicative	of	his	function	in	the	whole	piece:		he	appears	to	be	left	‘free’	from	the	constraints	of	narrative	and	characterization.		His	presence	confounds	any	hierarchy	of	dominant	meanings	or	of	what	is	the	centre	and	what	is	the	periphery	of	the	piece,	a	confounding	of	ergon	and	parergon.			The	dialogue	that	goes	on	around	him	opens	with:	‘Are	you	playing	the	main	character?’		This	question	is	later	revealed	to	be	quite	problematic	as	the	piece	itself	shifts	and	interweaves	between	the	mythical,	epic	narrative	of	Ganesh’s	attempts	to	retrieve	the	symbol	of	the	swastika	from	Hitler	and	the	rehearsal	narrative	of	a	group	of	intellectually	disabled	performers	led	by	a	non-disabled	director	creating	this	epic	narrative.		Who	is	playing	the	main	character?	Is	it	Brian,	as	Ganesh,	or	the	writer	of	the	play?	David	Woods,	as	the	director	of	an	ensemble	of	performers	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	and	Vishnu?		Simon	Laherty	as	‘Simon’	or	Levi	the	Jew	or	Hitler?	Scott	Price	as	‘Scott’	the	conscience	of	the	piece,	and	an	SS	guard?	
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Is	it	Mark	Deans,	who	opens	and	closes	the	play,	a	free	floating,	un-castable	but	compellingly	watchable	presence	-	a	‘presence	guaranteeing	authenticity’	to	cite	one	of	the	later	parodic	exchanges	of	the	text.		‘Are	you	playing	the	main	character?’	is	a	question	that	is	never	answered.		In	a	play	that	Brian	states	from	the	outset	is	‘a	story	about	power’	it	is	not	easy	to	determine	who	wields	and	who	is	subjected	to	that	power.			The	three	performers	go	on	to	talk	about	casting	decisions	in	a	play	that	has,	of	course,	already	been	cast.			Simon’s	line	to	Brian	captures	something	of	the	odd	twists	and	turns	of	power	and	intersubjectivity	in	the	piece	when	he	asks:		 Do	you	think	I	might	be	interested	in	getting	a	part	in	the	play?	(160)	It’s	the	‘wrong’	question.		It	should	either	be	‘Do	you	think	you	might	be	interested	in	giving	me	a	part	in	the	play?’	or		‘Do	you	think	there	is	any	chance	of	me	getting	a	part	in	the	play?’	or	somesuch.		The	line	as	delivered,	however,	captures	the	odd	powerplay	of	agency	and	lack	of	agency	in	which	the	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	the	ensemble	seem	to	find	themselves.		Having	established	that	Simon	is	required,	the	next	section	of	dialogue	Simon	deals	with	Mark’s	inclusion.		Simon	to	Brian:	‘Would	you	include	Mark?’	Simon	to	Mark:	‘You	don’t	have	to,	but	you	can	be	in	it’	Simon	to	Mark:	‘Mark	are	you	available?’	Brian	explains	that	he	will	play	Ganesh,	God	of	Overcoming	Obstacles	and	suggests	to	Simon:		 BRIAN:	Maybe	you	could	be	one	of	the	obstacles?	(160)	This	playfully	refers	to	the	idea	of	the	‘dis’	in	disability	as	an	obstacle	to	the	assumed	abilities	or	competencies	of	an	actor.	Brian	and	Simon	settle	on	Simon	being	cast	as	a	Jew:	
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SIMON:	That	sounds	better	than	being	an	obstacle.	(160)																															Mark,	he’s	given	us	another	option.		Would	you	like	to	be	a	Jew?	MARK:	Yeah	SIMON:	Like	two	Jews	on	the	run	from	the	Nazis.		You’d	be	with	me,	Mark.	(160)	The	playful	and	humorous	suggestion	is	that	people	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	do	have	choices	as	to	what	roles	they	occupy:	they	can	either	be	an	obstacle,	‘something	that	stands	in	the	way	or	that	obstructs	progress’	or	a	Jew	on	the	run	from	Nazis,	a	role	reiteratively	on	offer	since	the	middle	of	the	previous	century.		The	line	that	suggests	that	at	least	there	will	be	some	sense	of	solidarity	in	Simon	and	Mark	participating	–	You’d	be	with	me,	Mark	–	a	conditional	tense	with	a	connotation	of	hope	–	proves	to	be	a	promise	only	fulfilled	on	certain	terms	in	Mark’s	case.		He	is	with	the	others	onstage	throughout	but	never	really	integrated	into	either	the	mythical	or	historical	narrative.		The	next	scene	is	also	a	scene	of	origins	and	is	presented	diegetically	by	David	Woods	as	Vishnu.		It	is	a	story	of	how	symbols	became	gods.			In	the	mythical	sweep	of	this	narrative	Parvati	wife	of	Shiva,	the	destroyer,	persuades	her	husband	to	let	their	son	Ganesh	go	to	reclaim	the	swastika	from	the	Nazis.		The	play	then	begins	again	in	a	quasi-historical	narrative,	in	1943	in	the	guard-house	of	a	concentration	camp	near	the	border	of	Germany	and	Poland.				In	this	scene	Woods	plays	Dr	Josef	Mengele	and	Simon	Laherty	plays	his	trusted,	intellectually	disabled,	Jewish	prisoner,	Levi.			Mengele	interrogates	Brian	Tilley’s	elephant-headed	Ganesh	as	another	aberration	to	be	added	to	his	collection	of	abnormal	curiosities.		The	histories	of	the	Shoah	and	the	extermination	of	the	
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disabled	in	Aktion	T4	are	conflated	with	a	re-telling	of	Hindu	myths	of	Ganesh.		Back	to	Back	pose	a	fundamental	and	highly	current	question	-	in	which	the	politics	of	representation	intersect	with	identity	politics	-	who	has	the	right	to	tell	whose	stories	and	what	are	the	politics	of	the	aesthetics	of	how	stories	are	told?			 Simon	Laherty	portrays	an	historically	impossible	figure:	an	intellectually	disabled,	Jewish	concentration	camp	prisoner.		In	terms	of	the	genealogy	of	the	representation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	this	represents	an	interesting	conflation	of	victim	identities.			Throughout	the	‘rehearsal	narrative’	of	the	play,	concerns	are	raised	about	appropriating	and	exploiting	the	experience	of	others:		SCOTT:	Hey,	I	am	concerned	about	Simon	and	Mark	BRIAN:	What?	SCOTT:	They	have	no	idea	about	the	content?	BRIAN:	What	content?	SCOTT:	Simon’s	playing	a	Jew	and	he	has	no	idea	about	Judaism.		Doesn’t																																that	strike	you	as	wrong?	(169)	Brian,	in	his	role	as	writer	of	the	piece,	flippantly	and	superficially	dismisses	Scott’s	moral	and	ethical	concern:	BRIAN:	He	looks	Jewish	to	me	SCOTT:	That’s	my	point;	he’s	been	cast	but	has	no	connection	to	the																																	material	he’s	presenting	BRIAN:	So?	He	looks	like	someone	from	Eastern	Europe.	(169)	This	exchange	I	believe	is	an	example	of	postmodern	parody	in	which	the	audience	is	not	encouraged	to	believe	that	either	protagonist	in	this	argument	is	
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ethically	or	aesthetically	‘right’	–	and,	therefore,	neither	is	‘wrong.’		The	exchange	generates	a	discomfiting	dissensus	rather	than	the	possibility	of	a	morally	secure,	consensus	of	ethical	response.	It	is	indicative	of	the	continuing	ethical	uncertainty	and	aporia	in	representation	caught	between	witnessing	and	testimony	that	Agamben	refers	to	in	Remnants	of	Auschwitz.			In	a	later	exchange	Scott	revisits	this	ethical	discussion:	SCOTT:	Simon,	do	you	comprehend	what	it	is	to	represent	a	Jew	in	the																															Holocaust?	SIMON:	Fuck	off,	Scott.	SCOTT:	If	you	mess	with	the	Holocaust	.	.	.	DAVID:	You	add	fuel	to	the	deniers.	SCOTT:	No,	you	will	offend	a	lot	of	people.	(170)		Scott	asks	what	Simon	comprehends	of	what	it	is	to	represent	a	Jew	in	the	Holocaust,	thus	placing	a	heavy	burden	of	ethics	and	aesthetics	on	the	shoulders	of	Simon	as	an	individual	performer,	regardless	of	his	perceived	intellectual	capacity,	hence	Simon’s	terse	rebuttal.		Scott’s	‘If	you	mess	with	the	Holocaust’	is	deeply	inadequate	and	problematic.		What	could	‘messing	with’	the	Holocaust	possibly	mean?		David’s	interruption	and	completion	of	Scott’s	conditional		-	you	add	fuel	to	the	deniers	–	assumes	a	grandiose	claim	of	efficacy	for	theatre	–	that	it	might	effect	an	erasing	of	the	memory	of	the	Shoah.		Scott’s	own	completion	of	the	conditional	sentence	–	‘No,	you	will	offend	a	lot	of	people’	gets	to	the	heart	of	the	contemporary	ethical	‘aporia’	between	witnessing	and	testimony	that	Agamben	diagnosed	in	terms	of	the	Musulmänner	but	which	continues	to	inflect	the	kind	of	‘ethical’	thinking,	or	what	passes	for	contemporary	‘ethical’	thought,	in	which	the	desire	not	to	cause	offence	is	a	primary	motivation.		This	suggests	
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that	‘the	Holocaust’	has	passed	into	such	common	currency	that	it	can	be	spoken	of	as	‘likely	to	offend	some	people.’		It	has	been	reduced	to	a	‘trigger	warning’	among	others.		Bruce	Gladwin	articulates	that	the	company	was	aware	of	such	issues:	There’s	a	large	Jewish	population	in	Melbourne,	where	the	work	was	originally	presented	and	there’s	an	ongoing	discourse	in	media	circles	about	representations	of	the	Holocaust.	Each	time	there’s	a	Hollywood	movie	such	as	The	Boy	in	the	Striped	Pajamas,	there’s	an	ongoing	dialogue	about	who	has	the	right	to	talk	about	which	stories	and	about	creating	a	fictional	world	within	a	point	in	history	for	which	there’s	particular	sensitivity.	(Schmelzer)	When	David	Woods	in	the	character	of	the	director	of	the	Ganesh	play,	a	non-disabled	director	of	a	Back	to	Back-like	ensemble,	speaks	to	Brian	of	Scott’s	continuing	ethical	objections	to	the	content	and	the	casting	he	rebuts	Scott’s	objections:	He	keeps	saying	stuff	about	what	we	are	doing	and	keeps	coming	up	with	these	kind	of,	um,	you	know	ethical	problems	and	moral	problems	that	we	can’t	do	this,	we	can’t	do	that,	and	I	just	want	you	to	be	free.	(Grehan	and		Eckersall	171)	‘I	just	want	you	to	be	free’	sounds	like	an	emancipation	from	any	concern	over	the	ethics	of	representation.		David	Woods’	character,	though,	is	not	Bruce	Gladwin	and	the	production	goes	on	to	show	that	he	is	highly	unreliable	and	not	to	be	trusted	for	any	kind	of	direction,	either	aesthetic	or	moral.				The	freedom	he	offers	is,	on	the	surface,	creative	freedom	but	on	another	level	it	is	a	freedom	from	ethical	responsibility	that	is	problematic	when	it	involves	people	with	
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intellectual	disabilities:	it	connects	with	his	later	line	‘I	think	anybody	can	play	anything.’	The	argument	he	is	making	is	akin	to	a	‘freedom	of	speech’	argument.			‘I	just	want	you	to	be	free’	and	‘I	think	anybody	can	play	anything’	are	part	of	a	liberal	discourse	that	could	only	possibly	have	validity	if	everybody	was	operating	from	a	completely	level	playing	field.		It	is	a	discourse	that	elides	difference	and	in	which	the	promise	of	emancipation	in	the	word	‘free’	is	confounded	in	the	connotations	of	‘free	speech’	and	the	‘free	market’	in	which	not	all	have	the	possibility	of	free	access.		Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich	is	a	lot	more	dialectically	complex	than	the	above	argument	implies	but	what	I	wish	to	indicate	is	that	David’s	arguments	should	not	be	taken	as	a	master	discourse,	neither	should	Scott’s	politically	correct	ethical	concerns	over	appropriation.			The	swastika,	so	crucial	in	the	piece,	is	a	clear	example	of	the	complexities	around	issues	of	signification	and	appropriation.	In	an	account	of	the	genesis	of	the	piece	Bruce	Gladwin	refers	to	members	of	the	ensemble	repeatedly	drawing	elephant	headed	Ganesh	and	the	swastika:		When	we	came	up	with	the	narrative	of	Ganesh	traveling	to	Nazi	Germany	to	reclaim	the	swastika,	we	thought	it’s	a	great	story	line	and	a	great	hero’s	journey,	but	it’s	not	actually	our	play	to	make.	We	don’t	actually	have	the	right	to	make	it.	But	then	there	was	a	turning	point,	where	we	actually	started	recognizing	that	the	issues	around	why	we	felt	we	couldn’t	make	it	would	actually	make	an	interesting	exploration	about	cultural	appropriation	and	who	has	the	right	to	tell	particular	stories.	(Schmelzer)	This	is	an	acknowledgement	from	the	outset	that	the	theatricality	of	the	story	is	to	be	found	in	the	company’s	ethical	incapacity	to	tell	it.	
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Back	to	Back	might	have	expected	objections	from	Jewish	communities	to	telling	the	story.	That	they	did	not	perhaps	testifies	to	the	ubiquity	of	making	representational	capital	out	of	the	Holocaust.		Objections	that	did	arise	came	from	an	unanticipated	quarter,	in	an	interesting	twist	of	intersectionality,	from	Hindu	commentators	and	communities.		The	night	I	arrived	to	attend	a	performance	at	the	Malthouse	Theatre	in	Melbourne	I	was	greeted	by	an	orderly	group	of	protestors	who	were	urging	people	not	to	attend,	carrying	placards	and	distributing	leaflets	which	articulated	specific	objections	to	the	piece:				The	play	has	an	obscene	innuendo	surrounding	Lord	Ganesh,	wherein						 one	character	asks	another,	whether	the	length	of	Lord	Ganesh’s	trunk	is					 long	enough,	and	the	audience	laughs	A	man	with	board	shorts,	no	shirt	and	a	garland	plays	Lord	Vishnu		Lord	Shiva	is	portrayed	in	poor	taste	and	there	is	a	scene	where	he		plucks	a	human	being	into	two.		(Uncredited,Forum	for	Hindu	Awakening,	2011)	Audience	members	who	were	undeterred	by	this	polite	protest	were	then	greeted	by	the	following	sign	that	the	company	or	venue	had	attached	to	the	door	of	the	theatre:			Please	be	informed	the	performance	GANESH	VERSUS	THE	THIRD	REICH	contains	coarse	language,	adult	themes	and	portrayal	of	Lord	Ganesh	which	some	may	find	troubling	and	offensive.		The	production	is	a	work	of	fiction	and	does	not	purport	to	be	an	accurate	representation	of	historical	fact	or	scripture.	
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These	texts	attest	to	the	seriousness	with	which	the	Hindu	protesters	took	the	theatrical	representation	of	deities	and	the	seriousness	with	which	the	company	and	venue	took	the	protests.			The	company	and	venue	went	to	great	lengths	to	appear	‘ethical’	in	the	sense	of	not	causing	offence.		One	elephant	in	the	room,	perhaps,	was	the	reaction	by	certain	Moslem	groups	to	dramatic	and	pictorial	representations	of	the	Prophet.			The	reaction	Scott’s	character	feared	in	his	reservations	about	causing	offence	by	‘messing	with’	the	Holocaust	was	in	fact	enacted	in	the	offence	caused	by	the	company’s	‘messing	with’	Shiva,	Vishnu	and	Lord	Ganesh,	Overcomer	of	Obstacles.	The	performance	text	of	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich	incorporated	reference	to	this	controversy:	SCOTT:	Brian,	what	do	you	think	the	Hindus	are	going	to	think	about	us																																using	their	gods	in	this	show?	Brian’s	response	is	characteristically	brash	and	located	in	the	imaginary	of	popular	culture.		He	refers	to	the	second	remake	of	the	film	King	Kong:		 BRIAN:	When	these	guys	took	King	Kong	from	the	Island	to	New	York	City		 	 		Jeff	Bridges’	character	says	we	actually	took	their	God.	(169)	What	Scott	or	anybody	is	to	make	of	Brian’s	response	is	open	to	interpretation.		Does	he	mean	that	by	representing	Ganesh	the	production	is	taking	the	God	–	which	in	King	Kong	is	then	destroyed,	so	they	are	guilty	of	cultural	appropriation?			Does	he	mean	that	by	‘taking’	Ganesh	the	company	will	produce	a	block-buster	success	like	King	Kong	and	therefore	the	cultural	appropriation	is	somehow	justifiable?			Scott	responsds	’Thanks	for	the	chat’,	the	audience	laughs,		they,	like	Scott,	are	none	the	wiser	after	Brian’s	response.			Scott	later	reiterates	this	concern	to	David:	
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SCOTT:	Not	all	the	actors	seem	to	understand	the	gravity	of	what	they	are				playing.		I’m	concerned.		Brian	is	playing	an	Indian	deity.		Do	you			think	that’s	OK?														DAVID:	Yeah.	I	think	anybody	can	play	anything.	(170)		In	the	interview	in	Walker	Art	Schmelzer	posed	a	question	to	Bruce	Gladwin	similar	to	Scott’s	objections:	How	does	it	work	to	have	actors	with	cognitive	or	intellectual	disabilities	addressing	the	Holocaust	on	stage?	Gladwin	responded:	It’s	also	a	question	of	how	can	you	ever	represent	it?		Any	representation	of	it	is	in	some	ways	disrespectful	to	the	actual	experience	of	what	it	was.	It	could	be	the	biggest,	most	expensive	Hollywood	film	production	and	it	would	still	be	inadequate	representation.	In	some	ways	the	performance	here	is	as	good	as	Bruno	Ganz’s	in	Downfall.		Both	performances	are	inadequate	and	both	great.		That’s	what	I	think.	(Schmelzer)	Gladwin	deflects	or	opens	up	the	question	‘How	is	it	possible	for	actors	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	to	represent	the	Holocaust?’	to	‘How	is	it	ever	possible	to	represent	the	Holocaust?’		What	is	begged	in	Gladwin’s	answer	but	implied	in	the	journalist’s	question	is:	How	is	it	possible	for	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities	to	be	aware	of	what	they	are	representing?		This	question	is	also	the	source	of	Scott’s	objections	to	his	fellow-performers.		It	is	a	question	that	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich	opens	up	and	enacts	on	stage.			In	order	to	discuss	this	fundamental	question	that	the	production	both	poses	and	answers	performatively	it	is	necessary	to	refer	to	another	story	of	the	genesis	of	the	piece	that	has	been	discussed	by	a	number	of	commentators.	This	
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account	comes	from	a	particular	response	to	a	post-show	audience	discussion	after	Food	Court	that	took	place	in	Brussels.	It	is	cited	in	Gabriella	Coslovich’s	review	of	Food	Court:	“I	don’t	believe	these	people	made	this	work,”	(an	audience	member	said)		“I	have	worked	with	people	like	this	and	I	don’t	think	they	are	capable	of	it.”	One	of	the	actors,	Scott	Price,	livid	at	the	presumption,	stood	up,	grabbed	the	microphone	and	said,	“Well	mate,	you	can	just	get	out	of	here	because	what	you	said	is	so	wrong	and	so	offensive.”	(20)	The	individual	audience	member	articulates	a	suspicion,	which	may	be	characteristic	of	someone	‘in	the	field	of’	intellectual	disability.		The	questioner’s	sense	of	knowledge	or	expertise	suggests	they	are	accustomed	to,	a	medicalized,	therapeutic,	perhaps	institutional	disposition	of	‘intellectual	disability.’	Their	question	articulates	that	in	some	way	the	representative	contract	between	performer	and	audience	is	being	disrespected	and	defiled	by	actors	who	are	being	‘exploited	and	manipulated.’		Bruce	Gladwin	refers	to	the	same	incident	but	in	the	context	of	other	objections	or	concerns	about	the	question	of	the	agency	of	the	actors:	We	had	a	conversation	with	one	festival	director	in	Australia	when	we	presented	Food	Court.		She	had	some	concerns	and	she	had	spoken	to	someone	else	who	had	some	concerns	about	the	process	of	us	making	
Food	Court	and	the	actors’	role	within	it	and	how	empowered	the	actors	were	and	questions	about	exploitation	and	manipulation.		She	said	she	felt	uncomfortable	about	it	and	she	had	spoken	to	several	other	people	who	had	felt	uncomfortable	about	it.		We	also	did	this	Q&A	in	Brussels	at	Kunsten	festival	and	someone	stood	up	and	said	‘You	know,	I	don’t	
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believe	these	actors	are	capable	of	doing	this	work	and	I	know	these	type	of	people	and	there’s	no	way	they	could	make	a	work	like	this	.	.	.’		(Grehan	and	Eckersall	246)	The	Australian	festival	director	has	her	discomfort	reconfirmed	by	the	discomfort	of	others	until	a	community	of	ethical	discomfort	has	been	established	to	compensate	for	the	absence	of	the	reassurance	of	a	community	of	aesthetic	taste.		In	“Irony,	Parody	and	Satire	in	Ganesh	Versus	the	Third	Reich”		Helena	Grehan	refers	to	the	ethics	of	spectatorship:	
Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich	unsettles	its	audience	on	ethical	grounds	–	so	that	the	ability	to	feel,	think	and	respond	to	the	issues	being	addressed	in	a	way	that	allows	spectators	to	make	sense	of	them	becomes	almost	impossible.	In	effect	the	work	positions	its	audience	in	such	a	space	of	undecidability	that	it	is	difficult	to	know	what	‘good’	spectatorship	(in	ethical	terms)	may	entail.		(197)		What	she	means	by	‘ethical’	seems	to	be	connected	to	a	notion	of	moral	spectatorship	-	‘good’	‘in	ethical	terms’	-	but	it	is	unclear	whether	she	is	really	suggesting	there	is	such	a	thing	as	appropriate	or	‘good’	spectatorship	or	that	Back	to	Back’s	strategy	is	to	deny	any	possibility	of	‘good’	spectatorship.	What	else	might	the	‘undecidability’	that	the	work	generates	provoke	in	an	audience?		Undecidability	is	a	provocation	to	performativity	on	the	part	of	the	audience:	they	must	make	their	own	ethical	or	moral	call	on	what	they	are	seeing.		Grehan	refers	elsewhere	to	the	unsettling	of	spectators	in	which	she	suggests	that	spectators	police	their	own	laughter:		
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Spectators	feel	as	if	they	are	constantly	in	danger	of	laughing	at	the	wrong	moment	and	hence	being	revealed	as	prejudiced	and	potentially	condescending.	(198)	This	suggests	the	self-consciousness	of	an	audience	keen	to	prove	they	are	part	of	an	ethical	and	aesthetic	community,	who	can	show	they	can	distinguish	between	the	right	and	wrong	moments	to	laugh.		The	wrong	moment	presumably	refers	to	laughing	at	the	incapacity	of	the	performers.		This	is	an	idea	of	an	audience	anxious	not	to	be	revealed	as	politically	incorrect.		Is	it	not,	however,	just	such	a	grouping	that	Back	to	Back	wishes	to	provoke	and	parody	in	their	strategy	of	unsettling	spectatorial	certainty?		Grehan	also	makes	reference	to	an	audience’s	stifling	of	a	desire	to	laugh:	Spectators	experience	a	desire	to	laugh	when	Simon	says	with	deep	sincerity,	‘It’s	really	hard	being	a	Jew’	but	of	course	any	response	is	overcoded	by	our	knowledge	of	the	treatment	of	Jewish	people	and	of	disabled	people	by	the	Nazis	and	such	a	desire	quickly	evaporates.	(201)	Whilst	this	reading	may	apply	to	the	response	of	some	audience	members,	phrases	like	‘our	knowledge’	make	an	assumption	of	commonality	that	I	think	is	problematic.		I	believe	the	continuum	of	response	is	more	nuanced	and	complex.			There	are	a	number	of	‘reasons’	and	affective	stimuli	that	provoke	laughter	at	this	point.		These	might	include	being	encouraged	by	the	laughter	of	others	in	the	audience.		Simon	Laherty’s	deadpan	delivery	of	the	line	‘It’s	difficult	being	a	Jew’	does	not	necessarily	quite	equate	to	‘sincerity.’			I	had	a	sense	that	Simon	Laherty	having	rehearsed	and	performed	the	line	a	number	of	times,	and	having	the	kind	of	memory	with	which	Bruce	Gladwin	credits	him,	knows	as	a	performer	that	if	he	finds	a	particular	groove	of	
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intonation	he	will	provoke	laughter.		Laughter	can	coexist	with	an	awareness	of	the	problems	of	representation.		I	am	also	not	sure	how	a	response	may	be	‘overcoded.’	Within	an	audience	it	is	possible	to	hear	laughter	roll	and	build	or	peter	out	or	be	stifled	in	embarrassment	or	to	‘die’	abruptly,	or	to	experience	a	dissensual	response	because	some	are	laughing	and	some	are	not,		but	personally	I	feel	that	there	is	a	greater	range	of	possible	responses	to	Simon’s	line	than	a	desire	to	laugh	which	then	evaporates.			A	similar	unsettled	audience	response	to	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich	is	discussed	in	“The	Impossible	Fairytale	or	Resistance	to	the	Real”	by	Anna	Scheer	in	‘We’re	People	Who	Do	Shows’.		She	refers	to	a	kind	of	sub-community	of	the	audience:	personal	friends	all	of	whom,	she	tells	us	‘share	an	academic	background’,	people	with	whom	she	might	have	assumed	community,	but	whose	responses	conflict	with	hers	and	instead	provoke	her	to	examine,	or	to	articulate	her	own	response:	A	selection	of	their	responses	were	bewildering	as	they	came	from	those	whom,	I	had	assumed,	shared	a	similar	interest	in	challenging	forms	of	contemporary	performance	and	theatre.		Their	comments	were,	for	the	most	part,	variations	of	an	expression	of	disapproval	toward	the	meta-theatrical	element	of	the	play,	in	particular	the	role	of	the	‘able-bodied’	director,	and	a	desire	for	the	production,	instead,	to	have	‘just	followed	the	fictional	storyline.’	(219)	Here	responses	that	might	be	termed	aesthetic	and	political	overlap	in	the	desire	to	confirm	membership	of	an	aesthetic	community	in	response	to	the	production.		She	goes	on	to	argue	that	the	‘questions	of	an	uneasy	spectatorship’	for	this	section	of	the	audience	were	alleviated	in	the	mythic	play	scenes	where	
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the	audience	is	given	an	easier	ride	as	‘uninterpellated	spectators’	as	they	favour	‘spectatorly	comfort’	rather	than	the	challenge	to	perceptions	of	the	discomfort	of	perceiving	the	‘egotism,	abnormality,	political	correctness	and	unkindness’	of	the	director	character	who	is	‘one	of	us.’	(226)	‘One	of	us’	is	a	neatly	dialectical	formulation,	capturing	at	once	a	community	of	the	so-called	normal	and	non-disabled	and	citing	the	chant	from	Tod	Browning’s	Freaks,	referring	to	a	scene	in	which	a	non-disabled	person	becomes	‘one	of	us’	by	being	‘reduced’	to	the	status	of	a	sideshow	freak.	In	another	twist	of	appropriation	and	identity	politics,	this	phrase	has	subsequently	been	reappropriated	as	a	badge	of	community	by	disability	activists.	The	challenge	to	audience	as	community	that	is	provoked	by	Ganesh	
versus	the	Third	Reich	becomes	particularly	apparent	in	that	phenomenon	of	the	contemporary	reception	of	theatre:	the	post-show	discussion	or	forum.		When	Petra	Kuppers	appraises	the	performance	within	“Outsider	Histories,	Insider	Artists,	Cross-Cultural	Ensembles”	she	delineates	a	kind	of	mutual	intersectional	misunderstanding	in	the	post-show	discussion	that	was	part	of	the	Bodies	of	Work	Festival	in	Chicago.	Due	to	the	controversy	around	issues	of	cultural	appropriation,	this	discussion	was	moderated	by	Ashish	Rajadhyaksa	of	the	Centre	for	the	Study	of	Culture	and	Society	in	Bangalore.		Her	description	of	the	event	is	telling	in	terms	of	a	dialogue	that	did	not	take	place:	This	was	one	mismatched	moderator/artists	set,	with	an	Indian	scholar	visibly	uncomfortable	with	the	appropriation	of	cultural	and	religious	heritage	but	trying	to	be	polite	in	his	pointed	queries,	and	a	theatre	troupe	that	saw	the	point	of	its	production	clearly	elsewhere.	(38)	
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The	format	of	the	post-show	discussion	seems	to	be	significantly	imbricated	in	the	work	of	Back	to	Back,	feeding	back	into	the	development	of	the	work	of	the	company.		The	post-show	discussion	is	an	interesting	phenomenon	in	terms	of	performance	studies.		On	one	level	it	fulfills	a	supposed	contemporary	desire	for	greater	interactivity	similar	to	the	comments	section	of	online	press	articles.	It	is	a	chance	for	the	audience	to	have	greater	interaction	after	their	relative	passivity	in	the	auditorium	and	it	aligns	with	the	marketing	strategies	of	venues	and	companies	that	now	employ	post-show	video	interviews	online	and	include	quotations	from	individual	audience	members	in	their	promotional	material.		Post-show	discussions	after	a	Back	to	Back	performance	may	provide	a	chance	to	check	responses	after	what	may	have	been	a	disconcerting	experience	of	spectatorship.	Do	these	discussions	then	seek	to	re-establish	a	community	of	response,	a	making	sense	or	consensus	or	are	they	potential	sites	of	dissensus?			They	take	place	in	the	space	of	the	theatre,	the	audience	still	in	the	auditorium,	the	cast	on	the	stage,	but	usually	accompanied	by	the	director	and	possibly	other	members	of	the	creative	team.		This	is	a	post-performance	space	and	occurs	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	performance.		What	can	be	said	is	governed	by	the	particular	space	and	time	of	the	format.	The	audience	has	been	looking	at	the	performers	very	differently	to	how	they	now	look	at	them	post-show.		The	performers	have	been	caught	up	in	the	energy	of	performance.		The	discussion	takes	place	within	the	professional	space	of	the	theatre,	but	the	audience	may	perhaps	wish	to	reconfigure	the	economy	of	exchange,	from	a	financial	transaction,	to	that	of	the	gift,	as	Ridout	suggests	occurs	in	the	curtain	call	(Stage	
Fright	162).		What	is	significant	in	the	post-show	discussions	of	Back	to	Back	is	how	the	affect	of	wonder	of	the	post-performance	aura	with	which	an	audience	
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invests	performers	is	implicated	with	an	affect	of	guilt	transposed	onto	those	people	perceived	as	the	theatre-makers,	the	non-disabled-director	and	crew.		It	is	as	if	the	audience	wishing	to	give	in	to	both	the	wonder	of	theatre	and	to	the	remarkable	difference	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	then	experiences	guilt	as	in	the	viewing	of	difference	as	spectacle.		Back	to	Back	respond	to	such	comments	in	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich	in	a	performative	discussion	enacted	by	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities	-	only	to	pull	the	rug	from	underneath	the	audience’s	assumptions	of	what	this	discussion	really	concerns.		Grehan	discusses	how	this	concern	appears	to	be	addressed	within	the	rehearsal	narrative	of	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich:	discussions	and	arguments	seem	so	real	and	deal	with	questions	‘we’	(as	non-disabled	spectators)	think	‘they’	(as	a	company	of	artists	with	disabilities)	must	negotiate)	they	leave	spectators	unmoored	and	uncertain.	(198)		The	important	word	in	the	above	is	seem.		Her	analysis	is	that	the	spectators	are	being	drawn	into	this	debate	by	the	production	heuristically.		The	objections	that	Scott	raises	within	the	production	are	very	similar	to	the	objections	raised	at	post-show	talkbacks.	Scott,	however,	is	speaking	from	within	a	piece	of	postdramatic	theatre	and	within	a	narrative	where	the	relationship	between	reality	and	fiction	is	problematized.		For	Grehan	this	apparent	concern	voiced	within	the	dramatic	narrative	for	the	ethics	of	participation	of	people	with	intellectual	disability	is	what	she	calls	a	‘wind’,	or	wind-up,	of	the	audience:	we	want	to	know	whether	or	not	the	performers	understand	what	it	is	they	are	doing.	But	as	we	grapple	with	this	‘want	to	know’	we	realize	how	profoundly	judgmental	it	is.	(204)	
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It	is	not	the	ethics	of	participation	that	is	being	exposed	by	these	discussions	but	rather	the	ethics	of	spectatorship.	The	‘moral	compass’	of	the	audience	is	being	incapacitated	by	the	performance.			The	production	is	relentless	in	the	logic	of	its	supposed	investigation	into	the	ethics	of	the	participation	in	performance	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		The	issue	of	whether	the	performers	understand	the	import	of	what	they	are	representing,	as	exemplified	by	Scott’s	questioning	of	Simon’s	playing	a	Jew	and	Brian’s	impersonating	the	Hindu	God	Ganesh,	is	developed	further	as	Scott	goes	on	to	question	Mark’s	very	right	to	be	onstage	given	that	he	cannot	distinguish	what	is	real	from	what	is	fiction.	For	Grehan	this	questioning	of	the	presence	and	agency	of	the	performers	from	onstage	is	designed	to	create	the	maximum	uneasiness	and	discomfort	for	spectators	in	the	auditorium:	The	uncertainty	we	have	experienced	throughout	the	show	is	revealed	to	be	a	sham	and	a	shame.	(205)	And:		 We	don’t	want	to	be	bad	spectators;	instead	we	want	some	idea	of	what	it	is	we	should	have	been	doing.		There	is	no	resolution.	(206)	Her	sense	of	the	unsettling	of	the	audience	is	heavy	with	the	moral	implications	of	spectatorship:	‘judgmental’,	‘shame’,	we	don’t	want	to	be	seen	as	‘bad	spectators.’	For	Grehan	the	burden	of	uncertainty	and	a	certain	moral	and	ethical	failing	emerges	in	the	act	of	spectatorship	or	what	she	categorizes	as	the	assumptions	of	non-disabled	spectatorship.			For	Anna	Scheer,	however,	this	uncertainty	provokes	a	re-examination	of	the	‘hereditary	health	or	conventions	of	the	theatrical	institution,’	(219)	the	mechanisms	of	theatrical	representation.			Petra	Kuppers,	coming	from	a	
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disability	culture	perspective,	does	not	experience	the	same	shame	at	judgmentalism	that	Grehan	articulates	when	she	offers	her	particular	take	on	the	participation	of	performers	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	and	the	problematic	of	being	caught	up	in	language	in	another	reference	to	a	Back	to	Back	postshow	discussion:		The	talkback	at	the	end	of	the	performance	offers	few	cues	about	how	conscious	the	various	actors	are	of	the	complex	layering	of	cultural	scripts,	of	how	the	show	plays	with	audience	expectations,	or	of	the	representational	strategies	at	work	in	their	script.	All	actors	are	onstage,	and	the	nondisabled	director	of	Back	to	Back	Theatre	offers	the	mike	to	them	all.	But	what	they	say	sounds	rehearsed,	as	it	might	well	be	at	this	point	in	their	world	tour:	two	of	the	five	actors	offer	soundbites	and	explanations,	mostly	swaggering	and	full	of	bravado,	rarely	in	direct	response	to	an	audience	query;	more	often	just	picking	up	a	word	or	two	from	the	questions	and	answering	a	more	generic	question	based	on	those	cues.	Simon	Laherty	.	.	.is	silent.		Mark	only	opens	his	mouth	to	lead	the	audience	in	a	cheer,	his	arms	up	above	his	head,	magnetic,	full-bodied,	present.	(“Outsider	Histories,	Insider	Artists”	40)	Her	response	invites	a	comparison	of	the	Back	to	Back	actors	with	actors	from	any	other	company	on	a	world	tour.			How	articulate	should	any	actors	be	in	the	course	of	a	tour,	immediately	after	a	performance?	In	the	same	article	Kuppers	also	refers	to	the	Ensemble	statement	on	the	Back	to	Back	website31:																																																										31	We	are	the	Back	to	Back	Theatre	ensemble.	We	play	with	intention.	Some	days	we	work	at	headquarters	in	Geelong,	and	some	days	you	will	find	us	on	tour.	Brian	is	our	pop	culture	specialist.	He’s	pretty	strong	as	an	actor	and	as	a	person;	he	is	likely	to	lift	you	off	the	floor.	Simon	is	an	enigma,	and	the	rightful	Captain	of	Quizzes.	Scott	is	like	an	arrow;	he	is	straight	up	like	an	arrow	fired	from	a	bow.	Sarah	is	our	courage.	Mark	is	a	free	spirited	type	of	person,	he’s	King	of	
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It	is	not	hard	to	see	this	statement	as	something	constructed	in	a	theatre	game,	in	play	and	openness.	I	can	see	the	parallel	constructions,	the	side-by-side-ness,	and	the	slightly	different	register	of	the	closing	sentences,	but	I	am	not	sure	if	I	can	make	real	inferences	from	these	observations	as	to	communal	or	individual	authorship.	What	cognitive	differences	in	their	complex	specificities	might	mean	for	textual	authorship	remains	unclear,	and	the	website	statement	plays	with	these	uncertainties	in	ways	that	give	me	pleasures	of	(non)recognition.	(40)	The	statement	is	an	ensemble	–	not	a	collective	–	statement.		The	desire	for	any	
authentic	‘intellectually	disabled’	language	or	communication	is	a	chimera.		Any	performer,	any	person	perceived	to	have	intellectual	disabilities	in	their	‘complex	specificities’	is	likely	to	have	to	negotiate	access,	or	possibly	be	supported	to	negotiate	access,	to	language.		Looking	for	evidence	of	empowered	participation	as	some	guarantee	of	authenticity	risks	essentializing	‘intellectual	disability.’			It	is	possible	to	trace	a	relentless	trajectory	of	development	and	logic	from	Scott’s	questioning	of	Simon’s	and	Brian’s	understanding	of	the	cultural	and	historical	import	of	their	roles	to	Scott’s	questioning	of	Mark’s	very	right	to	be	on	stage.		At	a	certain	point	in	the	intertwining	narratives,	David	in	the	character	of	the	able-bodied	director	calls	all	the	performers	together.			His	reason	is	that	‘Scott	has	aired	a	couple	of	things.’		In	front	them	all,	David	says	to	Scott:	‘	You	said	as	well	you	feel	like	I’m	manipulating	the	group’	and	follows	this	up	by	
																																																																																																																																																														Comedy.	He	likes	birds.	Some	of	us	identify	with	being	outsiders.	Some	of	us	don’t.	We	wonder:	what	would	we	be	outside	of?	We	give	everything,	and	everyone	a	go.	We	hope	you	will	feel	intoxicated	by	our	shows,	that	our	shows	will	entertain	you,	that	our	shows	will	make	you	question	things.	(Back	to	Back	n.d.,	“About:	Ensemble	Statement”)			
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asking	the	question	that	seems	to	bother	spectators	at	the	performance,	and	questioners	in	post-show	discussions:		DAVID:	Do	you	feel	you	are	being	manipulated?	Are	you	in	control	or	not?		SCOTT:	We	think	he’s	God,	but	he’s	not.	DAVID:	No	I’m	not	God;	I’m	just	me.		Scott,	have	you	got	it	off	your	chest?		 SCOTT:	Yeah,	I	have.		(180)	I	think	this	exchange	is	another	example	of	postmodern	parody,	there	is	no	master	discourse	of	truth	here	and	each	viewpoint	is	both	valid	and	problematic.	There	is	a	deliberate	irony	in	David’s	reply	to	Scott’s	intimation	that	they	as	a	group	of	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities	are	giving	the	non-disabled	director	too	much	power,	God-like,	power.		His	response	denying	his	God-like	status	includes	‘I’m	just	me’	an	ironic	reference	to	the	‘I	am	what	I	am’	of	YAHWEH.		David	thus	inadvertently	affirms	his	God-like	status	or,	at	the	least,	affirms	his	certainty	of	his	identity.		In	the	context	of	working	with	this	particular	ensemble	he	does	have	a	highly	privileged	status	as	both	non-disabled	and	director,	which	is	how	many	commentators	see	Bruce	Gladwin’s	position	within	the	power	relationships	of	the	Back	to	Back	ensemble.		Moreover	David	never	actually	answers	Scott’s	challenge	that	he	is	manipulating	them,	he	merely	‘validates’	Scott’s	having	got	something	off	his	chest.		This	is	a	form	of	deflecting	Scott’s	concerns	by	patronizingly	validating	him,	something	that	he	goes	on	to	do	even	more	profusely	in	praising	Scott,	Simon,	Brian	and	later	Mark	for	their	‘special’	and	unique	contributions.		Even	as	David	Woods	delivers	this	praise,	though,	it	is	very	easy	to	read	his	character’s	underlying	resentment	and	frustration.			The	performers,	particularly	Scott,	receive	the	praise	with	a	kind	of	sullenness,	indicative	of	their	not	being	sure	whether	he	is	actually	praising	them	
	 250	
or	making	them	feel	bad	about	themselves	because	of	how	overly	‘understanding’	and	supportive	he	is	being	to	them.		In	David	Woods’	portrayal	of	the	director	aggression	and	brutality	are	never	far	beneath	the	surface	of	his	sentimental	patronization	of	the	performers.		As	Helena	Grehan	observes:		His	parody	of	a	theatre	‘director’	as	someone	we	could	encounter	in	a	community	theatre	context	where	‘empowerment	through	the	arts’	may	be	the	catch	cry	is	both	funny	and	disturbing.	(203)	David	Woods’	characterization	of	the	director’s	relationship	with	the	intellectually	disabled	performers	as	well	as	being	a	parody	of	certain	commentators’	and	critics’	perception	of	Bruce	Gladwin’s	relationship	with	Back	to	Back	performers	(a	parody	which,	of	course,	Bruce	Gladwin	has	been	instrumental	in	constructing)	is	also	a	kind	of	dark,	problematic	version	of	Aldo	Gennaro	and	his	relationship	with	the	residents	of	the	Lorna	Hodgkinson	Sunshine	Home.		David	offers	the	most	fulsome	praise	of	Mark’s	‘presence’:	OK	he’s	getting	himself	together	out	there	and	I’ve	told	him	that	his	presence	in	the	room	is	of	such	a	beautiful,	focused	quality	it	allows	us	all	to	flourish	and	that	what	he’s	doing	out	there	is	amazing,	in	here.	(181)	This	praise	is	rendered	highly	ironic	as	immediately	prior	to	this	we	have	heard	him	offstage	trying	to	persuade	Mark	to	come	out	of	the	toilet	and	to	come	onstage.		He	goes	into	great,	humiliating	detail	as	to	what	Mark	needs	to	do:	wipe	his	bum,	pull	his	trousers	up,	flush	the	toilet,	while	at	the	same	time	stating	that	Mark’s	non-compliance	with	David’s	request	‘is	humiliating	for	me.’		His	comments	about	Mark’s	‘presence’	bear	a	strong	resemblance	to	Bruce	Gladwin’s	
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own	comments	about	Simon	Laherty	in	the	process	of	rehearsing	small	metal	
objects	cited	by	Hargrave	in	‘Pure	Products	Go	Crazy:			There	was	something	so	amazing	about	watching	Simon	standing.	No	matter	what	else	was	going	on	in	the	rehearsal	I	would	be	drawn	back	to	Simon.	When	he	did	stuff,	I’d	say,	no,	just	stand.	Don’t	move.	(46)	The	presence	of	Mark	Deans	that	David	Woods’	director	makes	a	show	of	valuing	is	immediately	questioned	in	terms	which	invalidate	it	in	the	next	scene	t	in	which	Scott	bluntly	states	that		‘Mark	should	be	removed.’	Scott	offers	the	following	justification:	SCOTT:	You	look	at	it.	Mark’s	mind	is	probably,	OK	like,	working	like	a																															goldfish.			Later	in	the	discussion	David	significantly	reformulates	Scott’s	judgment:	DAVID(to	Scott):	I	think	I	can	answer	your	quibbles	with	the	help	of																														Mark.		Mark,	do	you	think	of	yourself	as	having	the	mind	of	a																														goldfish?	(182)	While	the	spoken	text	is	only	one	element	among	many	in	what	Richard	Gough	has	characterized	as	‘the	instability	of	representation’	in	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	
Reich	I	think	it	is	significant	the	precise	way	in	which	David	the	director	mishears	and	mistranslates	the	rather	oblique,	obtuse	and	distinctive	way	in	which	Scott	has	expressed	his	view	of	‘Mark’s	mind.’		SCOTT:	You	look	at	it.		Mark’s	mind	is	probably,	OK	like,	working	like	a																																goldfish.	BRIAN:	A	goldfish?		Does	anyone	ever	call	you	a	dumb	arse?	SCOTT:	I	didn’t	say	it	literally	BRIAN:	What	if	someone	said	you	had	the	mind	of	an	earthworm?		
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As	Scott	points	out,	he	was	not	being	‘literal’,	and	he	is	correct,	he	used	a	simile	which	neither	Brian’s	earthworm	response	nor	David’s	reinterpretation	of	the	goldfish	comment	do,	they	both	leap	straight	to	the	metaphor	which	more	directly	equates	Mark’s	mind	with	a	supposedly	lower	life-form.		To	be	pedantic,	if	Mark’s	mind	is	like	or	working	like	a	goldfish	(not	the	mind	of	a	goldfish)	what	could	that	possibly	mean	in	a	‘non-literal’	sense?		Does	it	move	rapidly	like	a	goldfish,	does	it	look	as	if	it	is	gulping	to	take	everything	in?			When	Scott	tries	to	clarify	to	Simon	what	he	means,	his	phrasing	is	similarly	obtuse	and	oblique:	SCOTT:	Simon,	you	think	about	it	all	right,	his	mental	capacity	is	probably																																like,	going	like	somewhere	else.	BRIAN:	Where	would	that	be?		SCOTT:	I	don’t	know	.	.	.	cyber-space?	(182)	Even	though	Scott	is	calling	for	Mark’s	removal	from	the	stage	–	the	first	reason	he	gives	is	that	‘Like	he	doesn’t	understand	what	is	fiction	and	what	is	not’.		Scott	implies	that	Mark	has	an	over-active	imagination	or	an	ability	to	invest	in	fiction	as	if	it	were	real,	something	which	even	David	points	out	is	highly	desirable	in	a	performer.		David’s	use	of	language	is	different.	He	has	a	habit	of	asking	questions	which	tend	to	foreclose	answers,	or	to	foreclose	any	answer	other	than	the	one	he	wants	to	hear:	‘Do	you	feel	you	are	being	manipulated?’	is	a	question	that	becomes	loaded	when	asked	by	somebody	accused	of	doing	the	manipulating	to	somebody	allegedly	being	manipulated.		‘Do	you	think	of	yourself	as	having	the	mind	of	a	goldfish?’	is	a	different	kind	of	foreclosed	question,	David’s	answer	to		
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which	:	‘I	can	answer	your	quibbles	with	the	help	of	Mark’,	prioritizes	David’s	agency	and	reduces	Mark’s	involvement	to	the	level	of	an	afterthought.		Mark’s	onstage	response	to	David’s	mistranslation	of	Scott’s	comment	is	subject	to	variation	in	performance.		In	the	script	published	in	We’re	People	Who	
Do	Shows,	the	response	is	recorded	as	verbal:	‘Goldfish,	whale,	penguin,	octopus,	seal,	whale,	shark,	Sea	World’	but	in	the	performance	I	saw	in	the	Malthouse	Theatre	his	response	was	gestural	rather	than	verbalized:	he	opened	and	closed	his	mouth	in	mimicry	of	a	goldfish	and	moved	his	hands	in	mimicry	of	a	fish	swimming,	then	looked	at	the	audience	to	take	them	in	and	smiled	as	the	audience	laughed.		In	either	version	Mark’s	presence	remains	humorous.	Is	Mark,	however,	performing,	‘just	being	himself’	or	presenting	a	particular	persona?		I	wish	to	consider	what	may	be	at	stake	in	his	very	particular	presence	by	looking	at	the	concluding	sections	of	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich.		In	the	rehearsal	narrative	David	Woods’s	director	finally	has	enough	of	Scott’s	objections,	his	repeated	abusive	denigration	of	David’s	direction	and	the	play	they	are	producing	and	this	erupts	into	violence	after	Scott’s	recalcitrance	or	refusal	to	perform	‘playing	dead’	to	David’s	satisfaction:		 SCOTT:	Can’t	we	just	fake	it?	DAVID:	Yeah,	we	are	faking	it;.		But	we’re	faking	it	well,	we’re	not	faking	it																	Stupid.	(191)	This	leads	to	a	repetitive	standoff	in	which	David’s	attempts	to	‘direct’	Scott	encounter	Scott’s	resistance	until	he	finally	snaps	at	David:	‘Go	get	fucked,	cunt!’		David’s	reaction	at	first	is	a	highly	restrained	show	of	‘reasonableness’	‘Why	am	I	a	cunt,	Scott?’	Is	it	because	you	want	to	fuck	me	like	a	cunt?.’		Scott	responds	to	David’s	underlying	aggression	by	starting	to	repeat	‘No	No	No’	as	a	kind	of	
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whimpering	repetitive	sound	that	might	be	associated	with	both	fear	and	autistic	stereotypy.		These	noises	are	then	underscored	by	a	repeated	musical	phrase,	the	first	time	that	the	play’s	‘rehearsal	narrative’	has	incorporated	non-diegetic	music	(unlike	the	mythical	Ganesh	narrative	which	is	rarely	without	it.)		The	musical	phrase	is	a	pattern	of	four	notes	repeated	like	a	warning	signal.		Brian	attempts	to	intervene:	‘He’s	not	dealing	with	the	stress’	to	which	David	replies:	‘It’s	fine.		He’s	just	fucking	faking	it.’	(191)	There	is	a	complex	dynamic	at	play	here.	The	rising	intensity	of	the	sounds	Scott	is	producing	and	the	music	contrasts	with	the	simmering,	restrained	anger	of	David	to	create	an	intense	antagonism.	Scott	is	either	faking	his	anxiety,	in	which	case	there	is	nothing	for	the	audience	to	worry	about,	but	equally	no	dramatic	charge	to	the	scene,	or	he	is	not	faking	it,	in	which	case	there	is	something	for	the	audience	to	worry	about,	an	autistic	young	man	is	in	distress	in	front	of	them,	and	the	scene	as	a	piece	of	theatre	collapses	-	or	Scott	is	both	faking	it	as	David	suggests	but	in	the	faking	of	it	works	himself	into	a	state	of	actual	distress.			None	of	these	options	is	particularly	comfortable	for	an	audience	to	observe	and	as	the	music	increases	in	intensity	and	volume	as	David	runs	at	Scott	and	grabs	him	and	the	others	pull	him	off	and	Scott	drops	wailing	and	whimpering	to	the	ground	there	is	a	powerful,	affective	charge	to	this	sequence	in	this	‘story	about	power.’	The	intensity	of	the	driving	music,	the	recurring	outbursts	of	anger	from	David,	the	sounds	of	distress	from	Scott,	the	attempts	by	Brian,	Simon	and	Mark	to	restrain	David	all	go	on	for	what	feels	like	a	long	time.	The	crucial	difference	between	this	scene	of	simulated	violence	to	those	in	Food	
Court	is	that	this	time	it	is	a	‘non-disabled’	character/actor	meting	out	violence	
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on	a	‘disabled’	character/actor.		The	scene	achieves	a	high	degree	of	‘faking	it	well’	but	perhaps	it	gains	in	affective	power	by	referencing	a	recurring	history	of	physical	abuse	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	by	carers	and	others	in	authority.		This	scene	is	immediately	followed	by	a	shift	back	to	the	last	scene	in	the	mythic	narrative	in	which	Brian	as	Ganesh	finally	confronts	Simon	as	Hitler	to	retrieve	the	swastika.		This	he	does,	but	when	he	removes	his	red	armband	with	the	Nazi	swastika	and	gives	it	to	Ganesh	there	is	another	identical	armband	underneath.		Hitler’s	final	words	are	‘Es	wird	immer	mein	sein’	(This	will	always	be	my	sign).	(193)	This	scene	is	realized	‘theatrically’	in	a	spotlight	that	gives	an	ominous	focus	and	intimacy,	underscored	by	music.		The	scene	that	immediately	follows	this	is	played	out	in	open	lights	revealing	the	whole	stage,	set	for	the	rehearsal	setting,	a	setting	that	deconstructs	the	previous	scene’s	mechanisms	of	theatricality.		David	comes	back	on	as	Mengele,	Simon	as	Levi	his	Jewish	assistant	and	Brian	as	‘Ganesh’	or	rather	Ganesh-becoming-Brian	or	Brian-becoming-Ganesh	so	that	when	this	character	roars	at	David’s	character	we	are	not	sure	if	it	is	Ganesh	roaring	at	Mengele	or	Brian	roaring	at	David.		The	roar	is	amplified	and	reverberated	through	the	sound	desk	and	overpowers	David’s	character.		In	a	neat	twist	David	portrays	Mengele’s	death	by	mimicking	the	absurdly	stagey	‘playing	dead’	which	he	so	objected	to	in	Scott’s	misperformance	in	the	previous	scene.		This	gesture	and	his	unengaged	manner	of	playing	this	scene	suggests	David’s	having	given	up	on	his	‘role’	both	as	Mengele	and	as	a	non-disabled	director	attempting	to	create	theatre	with	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities.	
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The	fully	lit	stage	is	then	empty	of	all	but	David,	still	lying	on	his	back	in	the	Mengele	costume	and	Mark	who	is	sitting	upstage	right	at	a	rehearsal	table	on	top	of	which,	at	one	end,	is	the	Ganesh	elephant	head.	The	paraphernalia	of	Mark’s	packed	lunch	are	on	the	table	and	his	backpack	on	the	floor	at	the	other	end.		David	takes	off	his	costume	downstage	right	and	changes	into	his	own	clothes	and	tells	Mark	that	it	is	not	yet	time	for	him	to	go.			David	speaks	of	how	he	is	not	working	here	anymore,	of	how	the	show	didn’t	work	and	that	all	he	wanted	was:		a	believable	moment	–	where	one	person	connected	with	another	person	(194)	During	this	monologue	Mark	has	come	downstage,	he	makes	a	play	of	‘hiding’	from	and	revealing	himself	to	David	behind	a	rolled	up	curtain,	then	goes	over	to	David	and	hugs	him.	David	reciprocates.		During	this	exchange,	left	face	to	face	with	Mark,	David	says:	‘It	was	good	working	with	you,	Mark.		You	were	a	great	Hitler.’			In	this	short	sequence	David’s	character’s	desire	for	one	person	connecting	with	another	is	rendered	ironic	by	David’s	lying	to	and	patronizing	Mark:	praising	a	performance	of	Hitler	that	was	never	achieved.				David	continues	to	express	his	need	to	leave	and	for	Mark	to	stay.		In	a	final	ploy	to	achieve	what	he	wants	–	to	leave	-	David’s	character	suggests	they	play	a	game:	‘let’s	play	hide	and	seek.’		The	game,	associated	with	children,	highlights	the	infantilization	of	Mark.		David	then	exploits	an	element	of	the	game	that	depends	upon	a	display	of	‘bad	faith’	on	the	part	of	the	adult-figure.	The	adult	may	pretend	not	to	be	able	to	find	the	child	in	order	to	increase	the	child’s	pleasure	at	playing	the	game	well,	a	power	play	of	supposed	incapacity	performed	by	the	
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adult	to	give	the	child	a	sense	of	power.		In	this	case	David’s	bad	faith,	his	pretending	not	to	find	Mark,	is	particularly	bad	faith	because	Mark	is	hiding	in	plain	sight	under	the	upstage	table	and	David’s	motivation	is	to	abandon	Mark.			David	as	director	is	seeking	to	wash	his	hands	of	a	failed	collaboration	and	to	abandon	Mark.		Paradoxically	of	course,	by	abandoning	Mark	he	leaves	him	in	the	prominent	and	theatrically	privileged	position	of	being	alone	onstage,	the	last	person	the	audience	sees.			David	calls	out	a	childish	chant	‘Come	out,	come	out	wherever	you	Marky	Marky	Deansy	Weansy’	(194)	and	leaves	the	stage.			Mark	lies	on	his	back	under	the	table.		At	first	he	knocks	on	it	from	below,	ostensibly	still	in	the	game	of	hide	and	seek,	giving	David	a	clue	as	to	his	whereabouts.		As	there	is	no	other	sound	and	the	stage	is	empty	we	become	aware	of	Mark’s	wheezing,	asthmatic	breathing.			Helena	Grehan	refers	to	this	sequence	with	David	and	Mark	in	the	following	terms,	which	I	cite	at	length:	we	are	again	thrust	back	into	the	ambivalent	role	of	the	judging	spectator	–	or	at	least	the	spectator	who	is		empathically	engaged		to	a	degree	that	we	want	to	help	Mark.		.	.	we	are	left	alone	in	the	space	with	Mark	who	performs	as	if	he	does	not	fully	comprehend	what	is	happening	.	.	.	We	do	not	want	to	see	him	(real	or	not)	hiding	under	a	table	waiting	to	be	found.		But	this	is	exactly	where	Back	to	Back	wants	Mark	to	be.	He	is	there	performing	and	despite	our	attempts	to	move	beyond	the	frame	that	has	been	revealed	by	the	performance	to	be	so	limiting	we	seem	
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stuck	because	of	our	emotional	relationship	with	Mark	and	because	we	care	about	him.		(206-7)	her	response	captures	some	of	the	spectatorial	ambivalence	that	the	sequence	and	the	various	framings	of	Mark	may	provoke	but	there	are	other	possible	elements	at	play	in	the	affective	power	of	this	sequence.		After	the	amplification	of	Mark’s	asthmatic	breathing,	an	indicator	certainly	of	vulnerability	or	of	the	untrained	body,	the	second	and	final	use	of	non-diegetic	music	in	the	rehearsal	narrative	(if	that	is	where	we	now	are)	occurs.		This	music	fades	up	supplementing	and	then	superseding	the	sound	of	Mark’s	breathing.	The	initial	phrase	has	a	‘warmth’	of	sound	characteristic	of	the	cello,	and	a	dynamic	range	which	is	suggestive	of	an	Indian	provenance.	A	musical	phrase	is	repeated	and,	to	my	ears	at	least,	suggests	Philip	Glass’s	repetitive	Indian-influenced	compositions.			Amidst	a	number	of	small	gestures,	including	a	waving	to	the	audience,	Mark	changes	his	position	to	lie	on	his	right	side,	leaning	on	his	right	arm	bent	at	the	elbow,	and	he	lifts	his	extended	left	leg	up	and	down.		He	then	changes	position,	going	onto	all	fours	in	a	pose	suggestive	of	the	yoga	position	‘the	cat.’	Then	he	reverts	to	the	previous	position	lying	on	his	side,	his	head	supported	by	his	right	arm	bent	at	the	elbow	and	lifting	his	left	leg	up	and	down.		To	return	to	Grehan’s	specific	comments	that	‘we	want	to	help	Mark’	I	am	not	sure	I	share	this	desire,	or	solely	this	desire.		I	think	that	a	number	of	Mark’s	strategies,	or	the	strategies	of	a	stage	persona	that	Mark	has	developed	since	first	working	with	Back	to	Back	in	1990	are	consciously	employed.	Mark’s	approach	to	David	in	the	final	scene,	the	hugging,	the	‘disingenuous’	waves	and	turns	to	audience	all	fit	the	stereotype	of	the	sincere,	emotionally	open,	and	therefore	vulnerable,	person	with	Down’s	Syndrome.		My	contention	is	that	Mark	
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is	choosing	to	deploy	this	aspect	of	his	stage	persona	in	this	sequence	with	David.		As	to	Grehan’s	comments	that	‘he	performs	as	if	he	does	not	fully	comprehend	what	is	happening’	this	statement	already	contains	an	implication	of	an	awareness	on	Mark’s	part	–‘performs	as	if’	that	contradicts	the	rest	of	the	sentence.	I	think	that	this	ambivalence	is	acknowledged	by	Grehan,	but	whatever	questioning	of	Mark’s	agency	she	implies,	hinges	on	the	phrase	‘	fully	comprehend’	by	which	I	presume	she	means	understanding,	in	the	sense	of	cognitive	understanding.		How	much	does	any	actor	in	the	moment	of	performance	‘fully	comprehend	what	is	happening?’		There	is	another	meaning	of	‘fully	comprehend’	which	means	‘to	take	everything	in’	and	I	believe	that	Mark	as	a	performer	in	a	co-presence	with	the	audience	is	in	a	position,	or	has	been	left	
in	a	position	to	do	this	in	the	last	minutes	of	the	performance.		I	would	seek	to	supplement	Grehan’s	emotional	response		-		‘we	do	not	want	to	see	him	(real	or	not)	hiding	under	a	table	waiting	to	be	found’	with	other	possible	responses.	At	one	level	the	actions	he	performs	continue	one	of	the	theatrical	narratives	of	the	piece.		He	has	been	left	by	David	to	wait	for	his	mother	to	collect	him	at	4.00pm.		Left	with	some	‘free’	time,	like	a	good	professional,	he	takes	the	opportunity	to	keep	fit,	to	stay	in	shape,	or,	simply,	to	keep	performing	something.				At	another	level	he	is	presenting	a	version	of	‘the	cat,’	the	yoga	position.			The	movements	he	performs	when	lying	on	his	side	suggest	the	swimming	of	some	sea	creature:	‘Goldfish,	whale,	penguin,	octopus,	seal,	whale,	shark,	Sea	World’.		There	is	an	elephant	head	placed	on	the	table	directly	above	his	head.	He	is	at	once	potentially	Ganesh,	a	cat	deity	the	nirvana	Buddha	reclining	on	his	side,	a	goldfish,	the	embodiment	of	his	goldfish	mind.			He	is	also	just	a	person	with	Down’s	Syndrome	
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the	table	of	classifications	and	categorizations.	Seeing	him	under	the	table,	left	in	the	place	of	the	child	or	the	domestic	animal	what	do	we	experience,	does	his	presence	enact	a	call	to	respond	to	the	other	in	the	sense	outlined	by	Emmanuel	Levinas	as	any	one	who	‘calls’	me?		Are	we	‘stuck	with	an	emotional	and	caring	reaction’	to	Mark	–	or	is	that	just	another	chimera	or	obstacle	to	seeing	Mark,	to	finding	other	ways	to	react	to,	and	interact	with	Mark?		As	the	music	repeats	its	phrase	and	swells	and	as	he	repeats	his	movement	loop,	going	in	and	out	of	circuits	of	signification	and	affect,	he	calls	us	and	moves	away	from	us.		‘He	is	there	performing’	as	Grehan	acknowledges.		What	is	he	performing?	David	in	the	character	of	the	director	has	just	said	‘I’m	not	working	here	anymore’	and	‘It	didn’t	work.’		Given	that	the	play	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich	still	carries	on	after	David’s	abandoning	of	the	play	within	the	play	there	may	be	a	strange	kind	of	self-reflexivity	to	the	sentence	‘I’m	not	working	here	any	more’,	the	surface	meaning	of:		I	quit,	I	choose	to	leave	this	job,	this	project,	may	carry	another	potential	meaning	‘I’m	not	working	here	anymore’,	I	am	no	longer	functioning	here,	my	function	has	been	superseded,	disabled	or	incapacitated	–	and	with	it	the	whole	project	of	theatre.		A	theatre	where	you	can	get	what	you	want	to	get,	where	moments	of	‘real	connection’	can	be	shown	or	willed	into	being	by	a	process	of	‘faking	well’	is	being	incapacitated	before	our	eyes.		What	is	left	after	this	theatrical	abandonment	of	the	processes	of	theatre?		Mark.		Mark	is	still	performing	and	still	working.		Are	these	last	moments	of	performance	on	Mark’s	terms?		No,	but	they	have	never	been	so.		He	goes	through	his	exercises,	and	as	he	does	so,	spectators	can	read	mythological	figures,	tropes	and	metaphors	into	his	movements,	into	his	position,	framed	under	the	table.		He	is	working	under	the	table,	he	is	playing	under	the	table,	he	has	turned	the	tables	
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on	David’s	director	who	in	the	end,	despite	seeing	him,	pretended	not	to	see	him.	Despite	Mark’s	visibility,	do	the	spectators	ever	really	see	him,	or	do	they	see	the	myths,	the	emotional	affect	and	‘care’	that	become	obstacles	in	the	way	of	seeing	him	as	a	peson	with	intellectual	disabilities.		At	the	end	of	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich,	to	adapt	Nicholas	Ridout’s	phrase,	sparks	of	representational	theatre	are	still	being	generated	before	they	become	extinguished.		In	their	place	the	potential	opens	up	for	different	kinds	of	connection.		Seeing	Mark’s	intellectual	disability	becomes	an	obstacle	to	seeing	Mark	as	a	performer	or	a	performance	artist	or	to	seeing	and	accepting	his	right	to	presence	in	aesthetic	and	social	spheres.		What	becomes	possible	if	spectators	become	aware	of	this	obstacle?		Is	Mark	becoming	Ganesh,	the	Remover	of	Obstacles?	-	only	in	performance,	and	only	at	the	end	of	performance		At	the	end	of	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich	Mark	is	located	in	a	liminal	space	between	a	form	of	representational	theatre	which	has	incapacitated	itself	before	our	eyes	and	a	form	of	performance	in	which	it	seems	his	mere	presence	becomes	theatrically	engaging.		This	liminal	theatrical	space	of	performance	aligns	with	the	turn	to	the	Reality	Trend	or	Citizen	Theatre	of	contemporary	postdramatic	or	even	post-theatrical	theatre.		This	liminal	theatrical	space	is	both	negotiated	and	rendered	problematic	by	the	next	performance	to	be	considered	in	this	thesis:	Jerome	Bel	and	Theater	HORA’s	Disabled	Theater.							
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Disabled	Theater	At	the	end	of	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich	a	non-disabled	director	leaves	an	actor	with	intellectual	disabilities	alone	in	the	theatre	space	in	front	of	an	audience.		At	the	start	of	Disabled	Theater	Jérôme	Bel	a	non-disabled	choreographer	and	director	leaves	the	eleven	members	of	Theater	HORA,	an	ensemble	of	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	alone	for	one	minute	each	in	front	of	an	audience.			An	analysis	of	the	similarities	and	differences	between	these	two	strategies	of	both	incapacitating	theatricality	and	theatricalizing	incapacity	reveals	much	about	the	debates	surrounding	the	current	place	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	contemporary	theatrical	performance.	Just	as	the	fictional	director	David	Woods	abandons	the	attempt	to	construct	conventional	theatre	and	dramatic	narrative	with	an	ensemble	of	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities,	so	Jérôme	Bel,	disillusioned	with	conventional	theatricality,	makes	a	decision,	in	his	case	a	carefully	considered,	artistic	choice,	to	abandon	attempts	to	create	a	‘conventional’	theatrical	dance	piece	and	to	work	with	Theater	HORA,	a	group	of	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities.		He	makes	a	decision	to	let	the	audition	process	or	the	early	exercises	of	the	devising	process	become	the	performance	itself	and	thus	he	too	leaves	the	performers	to	their	own	devices,	to	the	extent	of	letting	them	choose	their	own	music	and	choreography	with	no	input	from	him.				Bel	himself	has	sought	to	construct	and	promote,	and,	in	some	instances,	to	protect,	particular	narratives	of	the	genesis	of	the	project.			This	continuing	fascination	with	the	processes	by	which	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	is	constructed	is	part	of	a	suspicion	of	theatricality	present	in	both	theatre	and	performance	studies	and	in	certain	contemporary	
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theatre	audiences.		There	is	an	expectation	of	this	form	of	theatre	that	what	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	bring	to	theatrical	performance	is	a	refreshing,	non-theatrical,	authentic	presence	or	Lehmann’s	‘irruption	of	the	real’	(99)	into	the	mechanisms	of	theatrical	representation.		Anything	that	renders	this	authenticity	suspect,	specifically	the	presumed	‘manipulation’	and	exploitation	of	non-disabled	directors	and	the	techne	of	theatre	is	viewed	with	suspicion.		This	expectation,	however,	condemns	the	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities	to	being	essentialized	as	Other:	as	enabling	presences	or	discomfiting	disruptors	of	smooth	processes	of	representation.		Conversely	there	is	the	viewpoint	that	what	theatrical	performance	should	bring	to	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	is	a	medium	of	expression,	empowerment	and	emancipation.		This	viewpoint	posits	a	mechanistic	and	unproblematic	model	of	the	efficacy	of	theatrical	performance	that	does	not	address	the	complexities	of	the	entrance	into	symbolic	orders	of	those	with	impaired	access	to	communication	nor	the	complexities	of	what	happens	to	performers	in	performance	and	to	spectators	in	the	experience	of	the	reception	of	performance.				In	the	clash	of	these	expectations	of	efficacy,	Disabled	Theater	has	generated	a	great	deal	of	debate	amongst	audiences,	critics	and	commentators	over	whether	the	performers	have	been	patronized	or	empowered,	whether	they	or	the	audience	are	being	exploited,	or	whether	this	experimental	performance	exposes	the	various	exploitations	implicit	in	all	(theatrical)	representation.	These	questions	could	be	summarized	as:	who	or	what	is	being	‘disabled’	in	
Disabled	Theater?	In	order	to	answer	this	question	I	need	to	provide	some	context	for	the	production.		
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Jérôme	Bel	is	a	choreographer	of	what	has	been	termed	‘non-dance’;	he	is	a	conceptual	choreographer,	often	working	in	ways	that	are	anti-theatrical	and	anti-choreographical	to	stage	and	choreograph	movement	and	dance.		His	work	seeks	to	develop	that	of	choreographers	who	have	influenced	him	such	as	Pina	Bausch	and	Anne	Teresa	de	Keersmaeker	but	with	his	own	particular	twist	of	attempting	to	deconstruct	what	he	views	as	the	narcissism	of	virtuosity.			His	work	has	been	described	as	an	ongoing	project	of	fundamentally	and	conceptually	challenging	‘theatrical	norms	and	convention	in	contemporary	dance.’		This	is	apparent	from	his	first	work	Nom	donné	par	l’auteur	(1994)	in	which	he	uses	eleven	objects	(including	a	book,	a	football,	a	roller	skate,	a	vacuum	cleaner)	which	are	choreographed	in	the	space	by	two	dancers	who	themselves	appear	as	objects	in	an	attempt	to	expose	the	temporal	and	spatial	structures	of	choreograpy.		In	the	self-titled	Jérôme	Bel	(1995)	he	stripped	performance	techne	down	to	a	single	light	bulb	and	two	naked	dancers,	one	of	whom	hums	Stravinsky’s	Le	Sacre	du	printemps	as	a	musical	accompaniment	for	the	movement.		In	Shirtology	(1997)	a	single	performer	takes	off	a	series	of	t-shirts	and	a	narrative	was	created	from	the	sequence	of	slogans	on	the	t-shirts.	André	Lepecki	in	Exhausting	Dance:	Performance	and	the	Politics	of	Movement	analyzes	how	Bel’s	‘critique	of	the	representational’	(45)	and	‘uncovering	of	how	choreography	specifically	participates	in	and	is	an	accomplice	of	representation’s	“submission	of	subjectivity”	under	modern	structures	of	power’(46)	is	explored	in	The	Last	Performance	(1998)	during	which:	four	dancers	continuously	exchange	names,	characters,	subjectivities:	a	body	that	is	not	Jérôme	Bel	opens	the	piece	by	announcing	to	the	audience,	deadpan,	alone	centre	stage,	by	the	standing	microphone,	
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Je	suis	Jérôme	Bel	(I	am	Jérôme	Bel).		After	standing	still	for	a	minute	(measured	by	his	wristwatch)	(he)	exits	the	stage.	(47)	It	is	interesting	to	compare	the	opening	of	this	piece	with	the	opening	sequence	of	Disabled	Theater	in	which	the	HORA	performers	stand	in	front	of	the	audience	for	one	minute	and	a	later	sequence	in	which	they	say	their	name,	profession	and	age.	This	context	indicates	Bel’s	recurring	and	reiterated	concerns	with	representation	and	subjectivity.		For	many	critics	and	commentators,	these	concerns	become	much	more	complicated	and	problematic	by	his	choice	to	involve	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	Disabled	Theater.			The	2001	piece	The	Show	Must	Go	On	has	been	performed	by	companies	of	professional	dancers,	by	groups	of	non-professionals	and	by	‘mixed	ability	groups’	and	thus	connects	in	some	ways	to	Disabled	Theater.	Scott	Wallin	in	“Come	Together:	Discomfort	and	Longing	in	Jérôme	Bel’s	Disabled	Theater”	in	Umathum	and	Wihstutz’s	collection	Disabled	Theater	seeks	to	make	a	direct	comparison	between	the	two,	stating	that	The	Show	Must	Go	On	‘sets	aside	virtuosity	and	showcases	the	untrained	dancer	in	order	to	celebrate	the	beauty	and	joy	of	unprofessional	dancing.’	(62)	In	this	piece	a	crowd	of	dancers	respond	literally	to	the	lyrics	of	a	number	of	songs:	gathering	together	for	the	Beatles’	‘Come	Together’,	dancing	to	David	Bowie’s	‘Let’s	Dance’	and	falling	to	the	floor	for	Roberta	Flack’s	‘Killing	Me	Softly.’		In	another	sequence,	‘Headphones’	they	listen	to	songs	on	headphones	but	what	the	audience	hear	is	their	singing	along,	and	the	singing	along	across	the	individuals	and	groups	onstage	creates	a	kind	of	democratizing	of	responses	to	popular	culture	within	the	generally	elitist	and	virtuosic	space	of	contemporary	dance.			
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Kai	van	Eikels	in	“The	Uncapacitated	Spectator”	in	Umathum	and	Wihstutz	refers	to	how,	in	the	genesis	of	Disabled	Theater,	Theater	HORA	originally	asked	Bel	for	permission	to	stage	The	Show	Must	Go	On,	a	request	that	he	refused,	but	that	this	refusal	led	to	the	development	of	the	collaboration	that	led	to	Disabled	Theater.		Van	Eikels	also	cites	a	post-show	discussion	in	Essen	in	2013	in	which	Bel	commented	on	why	he	had	initially	refused	Theater	HORA	permission	(van	Eikels	refers	to	his	own	transcription	of	the	conversation):	
“The	Show	Must	Go	On	is	about	professional	performers	doing	stupid	things,”	he	said.	“If	they	had	performed	the	piece,	it	would	have	been	stupid	people	doing	stupid	things,	and	that,	you	know,	doesn’t	work.”	(130)	Bel’s	off	the	cuff	-	and	quite	likely	ironic	-	comment	does	indicate	some	of	the	issues	involved	in	seeking	to	open	up	different	meanings	of	‘disability’	or	‘stupidity’	and	how	that	continues	to	generate	controversy	around	the	project.			He	did,	however,	later	revise	this	opinion	by	including	two	HORA	performers,	Damian	Bright	and	Remo	Bruggeman,	in	a	subsequent	restaging	of	The	Show	
Must	Go	On	and	gave	permission	for	CanDoCo,	the	UK’s	leading	integrated	dance	company,	to	stage	the	show	in	2015.		After	The	Show	Must	Go	On	Bel’s	trajectory	of	challenging	expectations	of	performance,	identity	and	subjectivity	continued	with	the	pieces	Véronique	
Doisneau	(2004)	a	documentary	and	performance	in	which	a	Sujet	of	the	Paris	Opera		-	meaning	a	performer	who	can	perform	in	the	corps	de	ballet	or	as	a	soloist	–	becomes	the	literal	subject	of	the	documentary	as	narrator	and	performer.		In	Pichet,	Klunchun	and	Myself	(2005)	Bel	and	a	Khôn	dancer	from	Thailand	interview	each	other	performatively	about	their	practices	and	in	Cedric	
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Andrieux	(2009)	a	former	dancer	with	Merce	Cunningham’s	company	speaks	about	their	experience	of	working	in	the	company.	
Disabled	Theater	can	thus	be	seen	in	the	context	of	the	rest	of	Bel’s	work	as	a	development	or	reiteration	of	his	concerns	with	how	the	aesthetic	processes	of	choreography	are	imbricated	with	political	processes	of	subjectivation.		In	
Disabled	Theater	Bel	reiterates	strategies	previously	developed	in	his	ongoing	project	of	performatively	deconstructing	theatricality	and	virtuosity.	Bel	approaches	Disabled	Theater	as	a	continuation	of	his	project	of	the	critique	of	representation	within	his	own	exploration	of	conceptual	anti-choreography	and	anti-theatricality	without	reference	to,	or	an	awareness	of,	projects	of	a	similarly	aesthetically	and	politically	radical	nature	developed	in	the	work	of	Christoph	Schlingensief	and	Back	to	Back	Theatre.		He		has	been	accused	of	approaching	the	performers	of	Theater	HORA	as	if	he	has	just	discovered	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	and		of	using	them	as	material	for	his	own	creative	praxis.		Some	of	his	comments	in	the	collection	edited	by	Sandra	Umathum	and	Benjamin	Wihstutz,	also	entitled	Disabled	Theater	suggest	that	he	does	not	acknowledge	work	that	had	been	achieved	prior	to	his	collaboration	with	HORA	or	dismisses	such	work	as	community	theatre	with	a	socially	minded	but	aesthetically	and	artistically	limited	agenda	of	inclusion	and	integration.	The	various	contributions	in	this	collection	exemplify	different	positions	taken	in	the	debate	over	Disabled	Theater,	its	ethics	and	efficacy,	and	marks	a	stage	in	the	development	of	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	that	it	is	now,	for	better	or	worse,	more	present	in	academic	analysis	and	central	to	concerns	in	performance	studies	and	performance	philosophy.					
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Theater	HORA	was	established	in	1993	and	has	since	staged	some	fifty	productions,	often	in	collaboration	with	other	theatre	groups	and	artists.		The	company	website	asserts	that	the	aim	of	the	group	is	to:	promote	the	artistic	development	of	people	with	learning	difficulties	.	.	.	to	a	wide	audience	and	at	a	professional	level	.	.	.it	is	the	only	cultural	workshop	for	people	with	learning	disabilities	working	at	a	professional	level	in	Switzerland.	(Theater	HORA	website)			The	company	established	a	theatre	training	programme	in	2009	with	a	two	year	apprenticeship	as	well	as	a	programme	for	children	and	young	people	and	workshops	which	are	taken	into	schools.			In	terms	of	the	stated	aims	of	the	company	the	collaboration	with	Jérôme	Bel	on	Disabled	Theater	could	be	viewed	as	very	successful.		It	raised	the	profile	of	HORA	to	‘a	wide	audience’	at	international	festivals	in	many	different	locations	in	Europe,	the	United	States	and	Asia.		It	was,	in	addition,	a	financial	success.	The	performers	toured	the	piece	to	venues	and	countries	that	they	had	never	previously	visited.	Julia	Häusermann	won	the	best	up-and-coming	actor	award	at	the	Berlin	Theatertreffen	in	2013	and	was	nominated	for	Outstanding	Performer	in	the	Bessie	awards	in	New	York	in	2014.			The	debate,	criticism	and	controversy	surrounding	the	piece	itself	also	had	an	effect	on	the	company.			This	included	the	pronouncement	of	an	embargo	by	Jérôme	Bel	on	staging	the	production	32(which	was	later	lifted).		The	company’s	immediate	response	to	this	embargo	-	due	to	a	controversy	specifically	over	the	perceived	lack	of	agency	of	the	performers	in	the	production			-	was	to	respond	by	developing	their	next	project,	Freie	Republik	HORA,	which																																																									32	Personal	communication.	Yvonne	Schmidt.	
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was	in	some	ways	a	response	by	means	of	performance	to	Disabled	Theater.		Yvonne	Schmidt,	who	worked	with	the	company,	argues	that:		the	piece	(Freie	Republik	HORA)	is	a	critical	response	to	Disabled	Theater,	whose	examination	of	the	condition	of	disabled	performers’	autonomy	and	authorship	it	continues	and	takes	one	step	further.	(228)	She	cites	Michael	Elber,	director	of	Theater	HORA:	the	aim	of	Freie	Republik	HORA	is	to	let	the	ensemble	direct	itself	in	order	to	abolish	the	hierarchy	between	a	non-disabled	director	and	the	disabled	performers.	(228)	The	immediate	reaction	of	Theater	HORA	to	the	phenomenon	of	the	controversy	over	Disabled	Theater	was,	then,	to	develop	a	performance	Freie	Republik	HORA.	They	are	currently	involved	in	a	work	in	progress	based	on	the	principles	of	creativity	constrained	as	laid	out	in	Lars	von	Trier’s	film	Five	Obstructions	(2003).	33	Both	are	attempts	to	push	the	company	further	down	the	path	of	exploring	the	‘autonomy’	of	the	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities,	they	are	ongoing	experiments	in	‘democratizing’	the	creative	process,	which	have	subsequently	proved	to	be	highly	problematic,	but	which	indicate	a	radical	attempt	to	deal	with	the	questionof	the	agency	of	the	actors	which	arose	in	the	performance	and	reception	of	Disabled	Theater.			The	arguments	and	critical	discourse	around	the	production	have	become	quite	involved	and	complex.	They	concern	Bel’s	methodology,	the	presence	and	participation	of	the	performers,	the	disconcerting	or	discomfiture	of	spectatorship	and	a	more	fundamental	questioning	of	if	and	how	Disabled	
Theater	is	political.		It	is	a	consideration	of	these	arguments	that	I	will	now																																																									33	Personal	communication.	Yvonne	Schmidt	
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address	as	they	develop	the	discourse	of	the	aesthetics	and	politics	of	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	both	as	it	has	emerged	to	date	and	how	it	might	yet	emerge.		One	crucial	question	is	whether	Bel’s	methodology	in	creating	Disabled	
Theater	emancipates	and	empowers	the	participation	and	agency	of	the	HORA	performers	or	whether	it	exploits	and	exposes	them.		The	structure	of	the	performance	is	on	one	level	very	simple.		Sandra	Umathum	and	Benjamin	Wihstutz	in	the	Prologue	to	Disabled	Theater	summarize	it	thus:	Eleven	actors	with	cognitive	disabilities	appear	as	themselves	before	a	mostly	non-disabled	audience	and	do	nothing	particularly	sensational.	They	merely	respond	to	six	different	tasks:	1)	standing	in	front	of	an	audience	for	one	minute,	2)	telling	their	name	age	and	profession	3)	identifying	their	disability	4)	presenting	a	dance	solo	they	have	prepared	to	a	song	of	their	own	choice	5)	saying	what	they	think	about	the	piece	6)	bowing	to	the	audience.	(7)	Part	of	Bel’s	skill	that	should	be	acknowledged	is	that	such	an	apparently	simple	format	has	generated	so	much	interest,	controversy	and	debate.		It	could	be	argued	that	Bel	merely	‘curates’	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	the	exploitative	manner	of	Gino	De	Dominicis’	exhibition	of	a	person	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	the	Venice	Bienniale	of	1972.		What	Bel	in	fact	curates	is	a	provocation	to	debate.		His	project	is	akin	to	Duchamp’s	provocation	with	
Fountain:	a	deceptively	simple	conceptual	provocation	that	generates	argument,	irritation	and	admiration,	and	of	course	throws	a	lot	of	the	‘work’	of	the	work	of	art	on	to	the	spectator	aho	is	required	to	be	a	performative	spectator.	In	“It’s	All	
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About	Communication”	an	interview	with	Umathum	and	Wihstutz	,Bel	himself	acknowledges	the	influence	of	Duchamp	on	this	and	other	of	his	projects:	A	normal	dance	production	takes	three	months	of	rehearsals,	whereas	
Jérôme	Bel	has	been	done	in	two	weeks,	Disabled	Theater	in	five	weeks,	and	Pichet	Klunchun	and	Myself	in	four	days.	That’s	why	I	have	chosen	the	conceptual	approach.	It	comes	from	Duchamp.	I	don’t	want	to	repeat	and	improve.	The	idea	is	more	important	than	the	making,	which	was	his	strategy.	The	idea	is	more	important	than	the	craft.	(171)	The	counter-argument	could	be	made	that	there	is	a	difference	between	Jérôme	
Bel	and	Pichet	Klunchun	and	Myself	on	the	one	hand,	and	Disabled	Theater	on	the	other,	in	that	in	the	former	two	productions	the	assumption	is	made	that	the	‘idea’	is	being	explored	with	performers	about	whose	‘craft’	as	dancers	or	choreographers	there	is	no	question,	whereas	with	Disabled	Theater	Bel’s	prioritizing	of	his	idea	over	craft	can	result	in	a	confusion	over	which	‘craft.’	Is	it	the	craft	of	the	choreographer/director	or	the	craft	of	the	performers?	His	strategy,	because	it	involves	the	HORA	performers,	becomes	more	complex	in	its	implications	and	opens	up	the	possibility	of	a	variety	of	different	mis-readings,	specifically	that	this	elementary	form	of	performance	is	all	that	these	performers	have	the	capacity	to	achieve.		It	could,	of	course,	be	argued	that	Bel	seeks	to	provoke	such	a	variety	of	mis-readings	but	is	this	done	in	some	way	at	the	‘expense’	of	the	HORA	performers?	Responses	to	Bel’s	strategy	are	summarized	by	Umathum	and	Wihstutz	in	their	Prologue:		Audiences	and	critics	either	praised	the	stage	presence	of	the	actors	and	the	concept	of	Disabled	Theater,	or	they	accused	Jérôme	Bel	of	holding	the	members	of	HORA	up	to	ridicule	and	exposing	
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them	as	amateurs,	freaks,	and	exotics.	Representatives	from	inclusive	theater	groups	and	from	Disability	Studies	voiced	the	majority	of	the	criticism.	(7)	The	format	of	the	piece	is	deceptively	simple	but	deeply	provocative:	it	is	actually	difficult	to	describe	without	invoking	discourses	of	judgment	that	it	seeks	to	problematize.	In	the	description	Umathum	and	Wihstutz	offer	almost	every	phrase	in	the	first	sentence	is	open	to	contention.		Leaving	aside	any	terminological	issues	over	‘actors	with	cognitive	disabilities’,	do	these	actors	‘appear	as	themselves’?		As	is	apparent	from	his	earlier	work,	Bel	explores	the	problematic	notion	of	‘identity’	ironically.	Disabled	Theater	is	a	reiteration	of	Bel’s	investigation	of	the	performativity	of	identity	but	it	is	complicated	by	the	involvement	of	‘actors	with	cognitive	disabilities.’	This	is	because	of	a	particular	‘problem	of	the	non-disabled’:	the	perception	by	certain	non-disabled	spectators	that	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities	are	only	capable	of	self-presentation	-	‘These	people	will	only	play	themselves.’34		The	evidence	from	an	analysis	of	the	work	of	Schlingensief,	Back	to	Back	and,	as	I	hope	to	show,	of	
Disabled	Theater	itself	is	that	the	situation	is	more	complex	than	this	and	often	indicates	that	the	performers	are	operating	at	a	subtle	and	sophisticated	level	of	theatricality	in	which	they	consciously	play	themselves	or	their	personae	and	
play	with	the	perceptions	of	their	disabilities.		That	Disabled	Theater	plays	before	‘a	mostly	non-disabled	audience’	is	on	one	level	an	acknowledgement	of	the	composition	of	most	audiences,	which	may	well	not	include	people	with	disabilities	due	to	economic	restrictions	and	the	
																																																								34	‘I	was	told	very	early	on	in	the	process	that	these	actors	will	only	play	themselves’	an	interview	with	dramaturg	Bridget	Foreman	Cited	in	Hargrave	“Pure	Products	Go	Crazy”(48)	
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physically	and	socially	inaccessible	configurations	of	many	theatre	spaces.		The	danger	is	that,	in	terms	of	audience	response,	criticism	or	commentary,	the	non-disabled	voice	is	the	only	one	that	is	heard	or	valued.		Positing	a	binary	of	‘non-disabled’	and	‘disabled’	voices	is	also,	of	course,	part	of	the	problem,	as	this	reinforces	the	essentialization	of	each	‘state’	in	which	binary	one	is	privileged	over	the	other.		The	simple	point	is	that	a	greater	diversity	of	responses	could	be	taken	into	account.				Another	attempt	to	deconstruct	the	problem	of	the	‘non-disabled	audience’	is	to	reconfigure	the	audience	themselves	as	in	some	ways	disabled	or	incapacitated	-	either	in	their	ability	to	perceive	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	or	in	the	processes	of	perception	of	theatre	and	spectacle	per	se.		A	number	of	critics	in	their	analyses	of	the	work	of	Schlingensief,	Back	to	Back	and	Jérôme	Bel	in	Disabled	Theater	make	use	of	terms	such	as	disability	or	disabling.	The	use	of	disability	as	a	metaphor	for	the	processes	of	spectatorship	of	post-theatrical	theatre	or	for	the	social	construction	of	the	subject	under	late	capitalism,	while	appearing	to	offer	a	level	playing	field	or	democratic	approach	to	the	breaking	down	of	the	dis/abled	binary	is	also	fraught	with	the	dangers	of	equating	a	more	conceptual	notion	of	disability	with	an	embodied	lived	experience	of	impairment.		The	danger	of	the	use	of	this	metaphor	is	that	it	elides	specific	differences	and	diversity.			In	terms	of	the	wider	academic	context	this	use	of	‘disability’	and	‘disabled’	has	exposed	divisions	in	the	responses	to	the	production	by	theatre	and	performance	studies	scholars	on	the	one	hand	and	disability	studies	scholars	and	disability	culture	artists	and	activists	on	the	other.		The	structure	of	Bel’s	project	appears	so	simple	that	it	is	easily	possible	to	misperceive	it.		Umathum	and	Wihstutz	list	‘six	different	tasks’	whereas	there	are	
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in	fact	seven,	as	Andre	Lepecki	points	out	in	his	article.		This	addition	is	because	task	4)	is	the	presentation	of	a	dance	solo	by	seven	of	the	eleven	performers	as	chosen	by	Bel.		Between	what	Umathum	and	Wihstutz	list	as	5)	and	6)	comes	another	task	in	which	Bel	decides	to	include	the	dance	solos	of	those	four	who	were	initially	excluded.			The	simplicity	of	the	format	is	the	result	of	Bel’s	careful	conceptualization	of	the	piece,	which	is	as	much	about	what	has	been	excluded	as	what	has	been	selected	for	inclusion.		Whatever	seemingly	simple	elements	have	been	included	take	on	a	high	degree	of	significance.			For	some	commentators	this	care	in	the	conceptualization	of	the	piece	was	not	matched	by	the	same	care	in	Bel’s	approach	to	the	performers’	participation.		What	some	see	as	his	careful	Duchamp-like	curation	of	just	enough	elements	or	dispositifs	of	theatrical	performance	to	question	the	expectations	of	theatrical	performance,	others	see	as	an	abnegation	of	the	responsibilities	of	the	role	of	director	and	choreographer	in	collaborating	with	the	HORA	performers.		Some	see	Bel	disabling	the	theatricality	of	theatre,	some	see	him	disabling	the	normative	expectations	of	the	spectators’	perception	of	disabled	performers,	others	see	him	disabling	the	performers.			In	order	to	investigate	this	constellation	of	possible	interpretations	of	the	project	it	is	instructive	to	look	at	various	accounts	of	the	development	of	the	work.			In	the	case	of	Disabled	Theater	it	could	be	argued	that	the	process	became	the	performance.		Scott	Wallin	describes	how	Marcel	Bugiel	of	HORA	approached	Bel	with	a	proposal	to	create	a	show	that	was	declined,	but	that	Bel	did	ask	for	some	dvds	of	the	company’s	work.		Bel	later	referred	to	his	reaction	to	these	dvds	as	one	reason	for	reconsidering	his	initial	refusal:		
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I	was	crying	watching	them	perform.		I	couldn’t	explain	this	emotion	to	myself,	so	I	needed	to	work	with	them	to	try	to	understand	this	totally	unexpected	reaction.	(65)	This	is	Bel’s	own	account	in	which	he	creates	a	myth	of	the	point	of	origin	of	his	involvement	as	an	artist	with	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities,	just	as	Robert	Wilson	did	with	his	own	involvement	with	Raymond	Andrews	and	Christopher	Knowles.	Wallin	then	continues	this	account	of	the	project’s	genesis	with	reference	to	the	specific	periods	of	time	in	which	Bel	sought	to	meet	and	get	to	know	the	HORA	performers:		The	next	time	he	was	in	Zurich,	Bel	asked	to	meet	with	the	company	for	three	hours.	After	that,	he	requested	five	days.	Bel	reports	that	Disabled	
Theater	is	the	result	and	reconstruction	of	that	week	when	he	attempted	to	get	to	know	the	cast.	(65)	In	Bel’s	own	account	it	was,	in	fact,	more	than	five	days:	Most	of	what	you	see	in	the	piece	was	made	in	five	days.	But	unfortunately,	I	still	had	four	more	weeks	for	rehearsals.	So	what	I	tried	in	the	following	three	weeks	was	to	turn	the	piece	around.	Instead	of	the	performers	choosing	their	own	music	and	working	on	their	own	choreography,	I	made	them	listen	to	my	taste	of	music	and	watch	dance	pieces	that	I	like.		(165)	In	Bel’s	account	his	process	becomes	a	veering	between	losing	or	relinquishing	control	and	regaining	or	reasserting	of	control.		The	initial	loss	of	control	in	the	response	to	the	HORA	dvds	led	to	a	desire	to	‘work	with	them’	but	this	desire	was	parceled	out	in	relatively	short	time	spans.		When	the	time	span	of	this	working	process	expands	Bel	again	finds	himself	incapacitated	in	this	
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process	both	by	his	adherence	to	a	particular	version	of	the	performance	principle	and	by	trying	to	impose	his	own	methodology	and	‘tastes’	on	the	performers:		I	just	could	not	get	rid	of	the	thought	that	I	had	to	produce	something;	after	all	this	was	what	I	was	being	paid	for.	So	they	were	watching	Pina	Bausch	and	Trisha	Brown	performances	on	my	computer,	and	they	were	listening	to	contemporary	classical	music	or	to	Gustav	Mahler’s	“O	Mensch!	Gib	acht!”	(166)	In	effect	Bel	at	this	point	was	replicating	Aldo	Gennaro’s	method	of	working	with	the	Sunshine	Home	residents.		Bel,	however,	went	on	to	recognize	the	incapacitation	of	the	performers	in	this	process	of	imposing	his	tastes:		And	suddenly	I	felt	that	I	was	alienating	them	just	the	way	they	are	alienated	in	everyday	life	when	people	make	them	do	things	they	don’t	want	to	do.	(166)		In	this	respect	Bel’s	realization	is	akin	to	Robert	Wilson’s	realization	that	the	O.D.	Heck	school	was	diminishing	the	potential	of	Christopher	Knowles	by	rejecting	his	way	of	expressing	himself	and	disciplining	him.		Wilson	then	adopted	a	process	of	‘negative	capability’	with	regard	to	Christopher	Knowles.	Jérôme	Bel,	adopted	a	similar	process:	I	just	had	to	accept	that	my	job	was	to	stand	back,	not	to	bring	them	anywhere	else	but	back	to	what	they	are,	to	the	way	that	is	not	accepted	by	society.		I	remember	clearly	that	one	night	in	Zurich,	I	told	myself,	OK,	that’s	it,	that	is	your	job,	Jérôme,	not	to	work.		(166)	
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Bel’s	first	five	days	of	contact	with	Theater	HORA	resembles	Levi	Strauss’s	‘first	impressions’	of	the	anthropologist35.		There	is	a	kind	of	Romanticism	in	Bel’s	seeking	to	restage	or	reenact	this	initial	encounter	with	the	HORA	performers,	an	attempt	to	get	back	to	the	simplicity	of	the	encounter	in	this	period	before	there	was	time	for	his	own	tastes	and	ways	of	working	to	inflect	the	process.				How	did	Bel	recast	this	process	of	the	first	five	days	as	theatrical	performance?				On	one	level	he	did	it	very	transparently.		Each	section	of	the	performance	is	introduced	by	and	framed	by	an	announcement	made	by	a	translator/assistant	seated	in	front	of	a	microphone	behind	a	desk	on	the	downstage	right,	first	in	English	and	then	translated	into	German.	The	exact	wording	of	the	announcements	is	taken	from	a	video	provided	to	me	by	Theater	Hora	of	a	performance	on	3rd	November	2012	in	the	HAU1	in	Berlin:				 1:	The	first	thing	Jérôme	asked	the	actors	was	to	enter	the	stage	one	by								 					one	and	to	stay	in	front	of	the	audience	for	one	minute.		2:	Then,	Jérôme	asked	the	actors	to	enter	the	stage	one	by	one	and	to													introduce	themselves	by	giving	their	name,	age	and	profession.	3:	Then,	Jérôme	asked	the	actors	to	name	their	handicap.			4:		After	that,	Jérôme	asked	the	actors	to	prepare	a	dance	solo.	Each	actor																					chose	his	own	music	and	made	his	own	choreography.	Jérôme	chose									 					seven	out	of	them.				 5:		Then,	Jérôme	asked	the	actors	what	they	think	about	this	piece.		6:	After	that,	Jérôme	finally	decided	to	show	the	four	solos	he	didn’t							 					choose.		7:	Now,	Jérôme	would	like	the	actors	to	bow	for	the	audience.																																																										35	See	Tristes	Tropiques		
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In	‘What	Difference	Does	It	Make?:	From	Difference	to	In-Difference	Disabled	
Theater	in	the	Context	of	Jérôme	Bel’s	Work’	in	Umathum	and	Wihstutz,	Gerald	Siegmund	refers	to	the	stereotyped,	ritualistic	‘commands’	of	Bel	as	‘demands	clearly	marked	as	performative	utterances,	which	by	virtue	of	being	articulated	aloud,	actually	create	the	scene	they	speak	of.’	(21)	If	these	commands	or	demands	are	performative	utterances,	however,	then	they	are	performative	utterances	of	a	particular	kind.			There	is	a	split	between	the	utterer	and	the	performer.	Bel	utters	–	or	uttered	originally	in	the	rehearsal	process	–	and	now	reiterates	this	utterance	through	the	translator	-	and	the	actors	perform.		Lepecki	in	Umathum	and	Wihstutz	notes	that	in	the	French	of	Bel’s	original	the	show	of	politeness	implied	in		‘Jérôme	asked’	would	have	been	rendered	‘Jérôme	Bel	a	demandé’:	The	ambiguity	of	the	verb	“demander”	in	French,	meaning	both	request	and	demand,	announces	already	the	commanding	tension	implicit	in	the	choreographic	utterance.	(Footnote	25	152)	The	announcement	is	also	a	command	from	one	in	authority	to	one	subject	to	that	authority	-	unless	it	can	be	established	that	it	is	the	assemblage	of	Disabled	
Theater	that	is	speaking	and	‘Jérôme	asked’	or	‘Jérôme	a	demandé’	is	a	kind	of	‘Simon	says’	to	which	everyone	has	agreed	to	comply.	This	is	possible,	but,	as	Siegmund	also	notes,	the	translator	is	not	only	speaking	to	the	actors	to	cue	their	first	action	in	the	performance	they	are	also	speaking	to	the	audience	and	thereby	positioning	the	actors	as	subject	to	these	announcements.			Even	if	Jérôme	Bel	is	being	ironic	in	using	his	name	and	persona,	‘Jérôme’,	as	an	exalted	version	of	a	choreographer/director	whose	word	is	the	actors’	command	–	
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which	in	the	context	of	his	previous	work	is	highly	likely	–	how	is	that	irony	affected	by	being	applied	across	the	bodies	of	the	actors	of	Theater	HORA?		Siegmund	does	acknowledge	that	the	command,	demand	or	request	is	part	of	a	wider	acknowledgment	in	the	piece	of	the	power	relations	between	a	non-disabled	director	and	performers	with	disabilities:	The	production,	I	would	like	to	argue,	does	not	hide	the	issue	of	power.		Rather	it	addresses	it	by	making	it	a	part	of	the	performance	itself.	It	literally	plays	with	the	power	relations	inherent	in	the	performance,	thus	making	them	negotiable.	(20)	Is	it	possible	by	playing	with	power	relations	to	materially	affect	them	or	to	render	them	negotiable,	even	within	performance?		Robert	Wilson,	in	a	kind	of	attempt	to	be	‘stupid	before	the	Other’	tasked	his	actors	with	mirroring	the	actions,	movements,	gestures	and	speech	of	disabled	young	men.	Does	playing	with	power	relations	ever	materially	affect	them	or	does	it	merely	reinforce	them?		This	question	is	of	crucial	concern	to	theatre	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	and	connects	to	questions	that	have	been	formulated	within	other	critical	discourses:	in	terms	of	post-colonialism:	can	the	subaltern	speak?	or	in	Judith	Butler’s	previously	cited	questions:	How	does	the	unspeakable	population	speak	and	make	its	claims?		What	kind	of	disruption	is	this	in	the	field	of	power?	(Butler	“Performativity”	xiii)	In	all	of	these	instances	the	question	is	left	open,	suggesting	that	the	question	is	heuristic	and	needs	to	be	explored	reiteratively.		Siegmund	reads	the	first	action	Jérôme	demands	that	the	actors	perform	in	the	following	way:							
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Before	we	learn	who	they	are	and	what	they	do	(namely	acting),	the	members	of	the	audience	are	confronted	with	their	gaze	that	looks	back	at	them	confronting	them	with	their	own	gaze	and	its	implicit	prejudices	of	how	we	perceive	disabled	people.	(19)	If	I	read	this	correctly	the	first	‘their’	in	‘their	gaze’	is	the	gaze	of	the	actors	(as	it	aligns	grammatically	with	the	‘they’	of	‘who	they	are’	and	‘what	they	do’)	but	that	subsequently	the	‘they’	understood	in	‘looks	back	at	them	confronting	them	with	
their	own	gaze’	is	each	time	referring	to	the	audience.		Later	on	Siegmund	appears	to	contradict	this	assertion	of	the	return	of	the	gaze	of	the	actors:	When	they	appear	one	after	the	other,	it	very	quickly	becomes	apparent	that	not	all	of	them	can	bear	to	stand	in	front	of	the	audience	for	a	full	minute.	Some	have	their	eyes	closed,	some	look	down,	others	stare	the	audience	out.	(20-21)		I	think	Siegmund’s	analysis	indicates	a	confusion	over	the	agency	of	the	actors	–	and	this	may	well	be	a	confusion	that	Bel’	s	various	strategies	of	presentation	of	the	performers	encourages.			Elsewhere	Siegmund	states:		The	actors	are	asked	to	perform	certain	actions,	e.g.	to	stand	in	front	of	the	audience	for	one	minute,	but	the	way	in	which	they	perform	them	is	
completely	up	to	them	(my	emphasis)	(20)	My	understanding	of	what	he	means	by	this	phrase	is	that	in	response	to	Bel’s	first	instruction	it	is	up	to	the	actors	to	choose	who	comes	out	when.			It	is	also	up	to	the	actors	to	interpret	‘one	minute’	as	a	notional	amount	of	time	and	up	to	them	how	they	choose	to	enter	and	leave	the	space	and	how	they	choose	to	stay	in	front	of	the	audience.			To	suggest,	however,	that	it	is	‘completely	up	to	them’	how	they	perform	these	actions,	unless	this	is	a	rhetorical	suggestion,	involves	
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ascribing	a	lot	more	agency	to	the	actors	than	the	constraints	of	Bel’s	instruction	and	the	context	allows.			Within	the	dispositional	framework	of	the	piece:	the	presence	onstage	of	the	announcer,	the	chairs,	the	microphones,	the	spotlight	and	Bel’s	announcements,	the	actors	have	not	been	given	any	conventional,	directorial	instructions	as	to	what	to	do	in	this	one	minute	sequence.		In	that	sense	it	has	been	left	up	to	them	what	to	do	with	what	is	actually	a	very	difficult	instruction.		Are	they	meant	to	‘act’	in	this	minute	or	to	‘be’	in	this	minute	or	some	combination	of	the	two?		One	of	Stanislavski’s	early	exercises	for	trainee	actors	demonstrates	the	impossibility	of	succeeding	at	this	task	of	being	in	front	of	an	audience	without	having	objectives	and	performing	actions	by	which	the	actor	earns	the	right	to	be	in	front	of	the	audience.		This	then	raises	the	question	of	who	or	what	Bel	is	setting	up	to	fail	or	incapacitating	in	this	opening	minute?		Is	it	the	actors,	or	the	audience,	or	the	mechanisms	of	theatricality,	or	perceptions	of	intellectual	disability?			Scott	Wallin,	with	a	background	in	disability	studies	as	well	as	performance	studies,	gives	a	different	reading	of	these	‘one	minute’	sequences	in	the	performance.		He	does	not	see	the	return	of	the	gaze	but	rather	a	gaze	at	isolated	individual	specimens,	what	he	terms	Foucault’s	medical	gaze:	Instead	of	the	actors	proffering	ideas	or	intentional	actions,	the	scene	established	a	unilateral	act	of	looking	at	isolated	people	who	were	to	be	silently	regarded.	(66)	Rather	than	Bel’s	offering	disability	as	potential	or	even	as	‘commotion’	Wallin	argues	that	the	piece:	
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wrangles	disability	into	a	struggling	or	submissive	object	of	the	normative	gaze	in	order	for	Bel	and	his	audience	to	comprehend	it.		(67)	What	becomes	clear	in	the	difference	between	Siegmund’s	and	Wallin’s	reading	of	these	one	minute	sequences	is	that	there	is	no	consensus	as	to	what	an	audience	thinks	it	is	seeing	and	how	it	judges	the	HORA	performers’	compliance	with	Bel’s	instruction	to	stand	in	front	of	the	audience.	This	is	not	a	strategy	that	Bel	has	employed	previously	in	his	work	with	non-disabled	performers	or	even	non-disabled,	non-trained	performers.		There	is	an	attempt	to	open	the	performance	with	some	kind	of	bare	minimum	or	degree	zero	of	theatricality	that	connects	with	a	kind	of	democratic	space	or	level	playing	field	in	which	people	without	disabilities	(which	is	the	assumed	composition	of	the	audience)	get	a	chance	to	be	face	to	face	with	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		The	opening	of	the	performance	is	also	about	the	impossibility	of	that	happening	because	the	theatrical	space	and	formations	(the	announcement,	the	arrangement	of	chairs,	microphones,	lights)	however	minimal	are	still	mediating	the	encounter	between	audience	and	performer	theatrically.		The	process	of	viewing	the	‘one	minute’	sequences	is	also	influenced	by	the	atomization	of	the	structure	in	which	the	audience	sees	each	of	the	eleven	HORA	performers	one	after	the	other,	and	by	the	fact	that	this	process	takes	some	eighteen	minutes.		As	André	Lepecki	points	out:	.	.	.in	the	opening	section,	each	one	minute	facing	the	audience	oscillates	unpredictably,	from	twenty	seconds	to	three	and	half	minutes.	In	the	case	of	actor	Peter	Keller,	his	very	long	one	minute,	has	to	be	politely	interrupted	by	the	assistant/	translator:	“Thank	you,	Peter”,	we	hear	him	say,	way	into	the	fourth	minute.		(154)		
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Scott	Wallin	reads	a	possible	trajectory	of	response	from	the	audience	that	begins	with	a	perception	of	Peter	Keller’s	incapacity	that	leads	to	a	threat	of	the	breakdown	of	the	theatrical	contract,	which	threat	is	resolved	in	a	kind	of	dialectic	of	incapacity	and	theatricality:		When	the	first	scene	instructs	each	actor	to	stand	onstage	for	one	minute,	Keller	enters	and	then	stands	there	far	beyond	his	allotted	time.	Once	the	audience	realizes	that	he	should	have	left	by	then,	a	moment	of	uncertainty	arises	in	the	theater.	The	audience	must	ask	itself,	Can	he	tell	time?	If	not,	what’s	going	to	happen	with	the	performance?	Keller	continues	to	remain	onstage	until,	after	three	and	a	half	minutes,	the	translator	gently	says,	“Danke,	Peter.”	Keller	then	amiably	exits.	He	therefore	does	not	truly	disrupt	the	production,	but	Bel’s	simple	structure	allows	Keller’s	cognitive	difference	to	begin	to	gently	push	against	traditional	theater	expectations.	(77)	Benjamin	Wihstutz	in	“.	.	.	‘And	I	Am	an	Actor’:	On	Emancipation	in	Disabled	
Theater”in	Umathum	and	Wihstutz	reads	these	same	moments	in	Keller’s	performance	as	evidence	that	the	performance	is	working,	and	that	Peter	Keller	is	working,	because	this	apparent	derailment	of	the	performance	works	the	same	for	each	performance,	it	is	reiterable:	when	Peter	Keller	is	prompted	to	look	into	the	audience	for	one	minute	and	loses	his	sense	of	time	every	evening—(he	is)	simply	doing	(his)	job.	(37)	This	reading	both	asserts	Keller’s	agency	and	capacity	in	the	performance	of	the	overlong	one	minute	but	at	the	same	time	problematizes	that	agency	or	capacity	by	referring	to	his	‘losing	his	sense	of	time.’		Yvonne	Schmidt’s	account,	that	she	
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states	is	taken	from	‘the	descriptions	of	those	involved	in	the	production’,	indicates	that	this	misperformance	was	controlled	by	Bel.		According	to	Schmidt,	at	the	beginning	of	the	rehearsal	process:		Keller	actually	remained	on	the	stage	far	too	long,	only	to	walk	off	after	almost	exactly	one	minute	at	the	next	rehearsal.	But	Bel	chose	to	keep	the	first	version.	Keller	was	supposed	to	stand	and	wait	until	he	was	prompted	to	exit.	Thus,	the	audience	has	the	impression	that	Keller	is	incapable	of	correctly	estimating	the	duration	of	one	minute.	(233)	What	the	references	to	Peter	Keller’s	distinctive	contributions	to	the	one	minute	sequences	does	indicate	is	a	process	of	negotiation	in	Disabled	Theater,	of	what	Siegmund	describes	as	‘constant	doing	and	undoing	of	form,	of	control,	the	loss	and	regaining	of	control’	which	because	the	production	involves	performers	with	intellectual	disability	becomes	quite	complex	in	terms	of	the	ascription	of	agency.		It	should	be	remembered	that	Jérôme	Bel	is	not	working	with	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	with	no	experience	of	the	requirements	of	performance	but	with	members	of	Theater	HORA,	and,	as	Sandra	Umathum	in	“Actors	nonetheless”	points	out:	.	.	.the	performers	of	Disabled	Theater	are	real	actors	with	a	two-year	basic	training	and	several	years	of	stage	experience.	(106)	This	further	complicates	the	issue	of	the	participation	of	these	performers	in	
Disabled	Theater:	are	they	being	presented	as	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	or	as	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities?		Given	the	positioning	of	the	piece	itself	as	a	performative	deconstruction	of	theatricality	what	kind	of	‘acting’	is	it	that		they	are	performing?		
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How	the	HORA	actors	are	presented	on	stage	is	at	the	crux	of	much	of	the	criticism	of	Disabled	Theater	and	it	is	important	to	investigate	this	criticism	and	also	how	Bel’s	responses	to	this	criticism	serves	to	locate	the	play	of	expectations	or	lack	of	expectations	in	Bel’s	encounter	with	the	actors.		Umathum	also	refers	to	‘panel	and	stay-late	discussions’	in	which	the	accusation	was	made	that:	Jérôme	Bel	had	not	properly	worked	with	the	HORA	performers,	failing	therefore	to	bring	their	acting	potential	to	fruition.		“They	are	capable	of	much	more”,	ran	the	criticism	that	was	voiced	by	those	making	theatre	with	disabled	persons.	(103)	Umathum	mentions	specific	criticisms	from	Gisela	Höhne,	head	of	the	integrative	theatre	group	RambaZamba	from	Berlin	who	was	‘dissatisfied	with	the	“state	of	dramatic	art”	that	Disabled	Theater	presented,	situating	the	piece	in	the	context	of	previous	and	ongoing	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	Germany:		In	this	respect,	theatre	with	disabled	persons	in	Germany	is	already	a	few	steps	ahead.		(103)		To	many	people	familiar	with	working	in	theatre	with	people	with	intellectual	disabilities,	at	first	sight	Disabled	Theater	resembles	the	audition	process	or	early	devising	period	of	a	piece	of	community	theatre	work.		Umathum,	in	response	to	Hohne’s	accusation,	defends	Bel’s	practice	and	methodology	by	comparing	it	to	the	work	of	Christoph	Schlingensief:	Bel’s	and	Schlingensief’s	approaches	are	comparable	in	that	they	abstain	from	subjecting	their	disabled	performers’	performances	to	the	regime	of	mastery	and	sophistication,	or	from	holding	them	to	the	ideal	of	perfect	
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repetition	of	what	has	been	rehearsed.	If	properly	working	is	understood	as	a	practice	session	or	rehearsal	that	uses	these	criteria	as	benchmarks,	then	both	Bel	and	Schlingensief	can	be	accused	of	neglecting	their	jobs	as	choreographer	and	director,	respectively.	(103)	Umathum	contrasts	both	Bel’s	and	Schlingensief’s	processes	with	‘the	regime	of	mastery	and	sophistication’	and		‘an	ideal	of	perfect	repetition	of	what	has	been	rehearsed.’	that	she	equates	with	Gisele	Höhne’s	methodology:		For	Gisela	Höhne,	for	example,	working	on	a	production	is	“a	continuous	process	of	artistic—and	also	of	artistic-technical—qualification,”	enabling	actors	“to	‘freeze’	what	has	been	rehearsed,	and	have	it	down	pat.”	(105)	Jérôme	Bel	seems	to	have	a	similar	view	of	‘integrated	or	inclusive	theatre’:	They	say	the	disabled	actors	could	do	better	than	this.	Yes,	but	what	I	have	seen	from	these	companies	did	not	impress	me.	They	are	just	reproducing	the	normal	theater	that	I	don’t	like.	I	actually	don’t	give	a	shit	about	it.		(171)	His	view	of	those	longstanding	practitioners	of	disability	theatre	who	criticized	
Disabled	Theater	is	exemplified	in	the	comment:		The	directors	of	these	companies	may	be	artists,	but	they	are	also	social	workers.	(170)	Both	Umathum	and	Bel	seek	to	justify	Bel’s	process	on	Disabled	Theater	by	setting	up	in	opposition	a	kind	of	earnest,	do-gooding	form	of	inclusive	or	integrative	theatre	that	is	more	social	work	than	art.		This	view	does	not	take	into	account	the	layered,	anti-theatrical	and	deconstructive	work	of	Back	to	Back	and	a	number	of	other	companies.			
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It	is	somewhat	unclear	whether	Bel	regarded	the	HORA	performers	as	performers	or	people	with	intellectual	disabilities:			And	when	people	now	say	about	Disabled	Theater,	they	can	do	much	better,	I	have	to	say	I	have	never	been	interested	in	this.	I	am	interested	in	what	you	are	with	your	vulnerabilities	or	incapacities	(171)	This	recalls	his	comment,	cited	earlier,	that:		I	just	had	to	accept	that	my	job	was	to	stand	back,	not	to	bring	them	(the	HORA	performers)	anywhere	else	but	back	to	what	they	are	(my	emphasis)	(166)	Both	of	these	comments	imply	a	returning	of	the	performers	to	a	kind	of	essential	non-performed	presence	that	Bel	is	attempting	to	achieve	by	deconstructing	the	mechanisms	of	representation	of	theatricality	and	choreography.	In	this	sense	he	sees	his	job	as	standing	back	to	reveal	this	presence,	but	does	his	‘not	working’	as	a	choreographer	and	director	have	the	same	implications	if	he	is	working	by	‘not	working’	with	a	group	of	trained	dancers	as	it	is	with	a	group	of	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities?		He	equates	his	deliberate	‘not	working’	with	the	HORA	performers	on	Disabled	Theater	with	his	process	of	deliberately	not	choreographing	members	of	the	Lyon	Opera	Ballet	in	The	Show	Must	Go	On,	dancers	whom	he	describes	as	having	the	capacity	to	‘dance	anything.’		Is	there	a	difference	between	Bel	asking	the	members	of	the	Lyon	Opera	Ballet	not	to	dance	and	his	asking	the	performers	of	Theater	HORA	not	to	act?		Perhaps	this	is	a	difference	in	audience	perception.	How	many	people	who	saw	Disabled	Theater	were	aware	that	this	was	a	group	of	trained	and	experienced	actors?		Given	what	the	production	asked	the	performers	to	do,	the	
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confusion	between	the	person	and	performer	with	disabilities	was	likely	to	persist.			Bel	himself	has	stated	that	at	the	same	time	his	project	on	Disabled	
Theater	was	to	‘take	power	away	from	theatre	until	the	point	where	it	resists’	and:	 the	big	success	of	Disabled	Theater	can	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	on	stage	these	performers	are	not	disabled	at	all.	Theatrically	speaking,	they	are	super-strong.	On	stage	their	presence	is	phenomenal.	Thus,	Disabled	
Theater	is	in	fact	a	very	abled	theater,	because	the	strength	of	theater	is	to	be	in	the	present,	to	perform.	(172)	When	questioned	on	what	this	being	in	the	present	or	presence	is,	Bel’s	response	was	to	refer	to	the	HORA	actors	in	the	following	terms:	They	walk	on	stage	and	if	there	is	a	different	shadow	because	of	a	projector	or	something	else,	they	look	at	it.	If	there	were	a	technician	backstage,	they	would	look	at	him,	too.	A	professional	dancer	would	never	do	that,	because	he	would	try	to	stay	focused	on	what	the	director	wants	him	to	do.	But	being	in	the	present	is	the	best	thing	that	can	happen	to	theater.	(172)	This	freedom	on	stage	of	the	actors	seems	to	resemble	the	unselfconsciousness	of	Kleist’s	marionette,	a	lack	of	self-consciousness,	which	is	present	‘in	the	puppet	and	in	the	god.’	Bel	seems	to	be	referring	to	the	kind	of	presence	that	performance	art	seeks	to	generate	as	opposed	to	representational	theatre.			As	Lepecki,	points	out,	though,	in	“Yes	Now	It’s	Good	Theater,”	in	Umathum	and	Wihstutz,	‘presence’	can	be	a	problematic	term	when	applied	to	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities:			
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Thus,	discourses	on	Disabled	Theater	seem	to	end	up	rotating	around	the	still-disturbing	spectacle	of	alterity	with	which	the	actors	and	their	
handicaps	interpellate	the	audiences’	ableism	simply	by	being	present.		(144)	Bel	makes	repeated	reference	to	the	particular	quality	of	presence	that	he	finds	in	the	HORA	actors.		The	problem	is	that	the	term	‘presence’	applied	to	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	the	context	of	theatre	conflates	the	kind	of	auratic	presence	of	the	performer	with	an	essentializing	authenticity	of	the	presence	of	‘disability.’		Lepecki	reconfigures	this	idea	of	presence	by	referring	to	the	tension	between	the	actors’	supposed	aptitude	for	presence	in	the	present	(the	ongoing	mutable,	the	continuously	variable)	with	their	ability	to	re-present	this	presence	night	after	night	and	that	this	tension	can	only	be	resolved	by	acknowledging	the	actors’	work.		Umathum	in	“Actors	Nonetheless”	similarly	acknowledges	that	the	actors	have	skills	beyond	their	presence	as	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	but	hers	is	an	acknowledgement	couched	with	a	number	of	reservations	as	to	what	kind	of	‘acting’	is	going	on	in	this	ability	to	repeat:		Their	acting	skills	and	professionalism	come	into	play	all	the	same,	as	becomes	evident	from	the	precision	with	which	they	repeat	their	answers	to	Bel’s	six	requests	evening	after	evening.	They	are	capable	of	giving	their	outbursts	of	euphoria,	sadness	or	even	tears	such	a	convincing	impression	of	spontaneity	at	identical	points	each	night	that	one	wonders	whether	these	emotional	outbreaks	are	the	effect	of	a	successful	self-enactment	that	displays	itself	anew	every	time,	or	whether	the	scenes	themselves	are	responsible	for	provoking	the	same	sudden	emotional	reactions	in	every	new	performance.		(107)	
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Umathum	both	acknowledges	that	the	performers	have	‘acting	skills’	but	also	questions	if	these	‘acting	skills’	are	not	‘self-enactment	that	displays	itself’	or	the	‘scenes	themselves’	both	of	which	interpretations	seem	to	deny	the	agency	of	the	performers	in	the	process.		Lepecki’s	analysis	seeks	to	ascribe	an	agency	to	the	performers	through	their	work	and	lifts	them	out	of	their	subjectivation	either	as	representatives	of	‘	intellectual	disability’	or	merely	as	metaphors	of	our	own	sense	of	incapacity	or	as	representing	limit-humans	who	need	to	be	included	again	in	the	fold	of	humanity,	in	need	of	an	eternally	recurring	salvation	we	are	not	capable	of	providing:		we	have	to	move	away	from	the	habitus	of	investing	identitary	exceptionalities	as	the	main	force	driving	Disabled	Theater.	We	have	to	move	away	from	redemptive	descriptions	of	mentally	handicapped	individuals	accessing	presence	and	the	present.		(147)		The	‘presence’	of	the	disabled	performers	is	for	Lepecki	better	redefined	as	the	
work	of	the	performers	and	their	working	against	or	reworking	of	some	of	the	customary	mechanisms	of	theatrical	representation:		It	is	not	at	all	then	a	question	of	presence	or	of	being	in	the	present,	but	one	of	short-circuiting	the	times	and	terms	of	representation	and	the	times	and	terms	of	presence.		(152)	It	is	in	this	process	of	the	incapacitating	of	the	times	and	terms	of	representation	and	presence	that	something	emerges	akin	to	what	Féral	terms	‘theatricality.’	It	is	this,	rather	than	any	explicit	activist	or	inclusive	agenda,	that	reveals	the	political	potential	of	Disabled	Theater.		As	Rancière	states	in	Thesis	Three	of	“Ten	Theses	on	Politics”:	
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.	.	.politics	does	not	simply	presuppose	the	rupture	of	the	‘normal’	distribution	of	positions	between	the	one	who	exercises	power	and	the	one	who	is	subject	to	it.		It	also	requires	a	rupture	in	the	idea	that	there	are	dispositions	'proper'	to	such	classifications.		(30)		This	fundamental	reconfiguring	of	power-relations	emerges	in	the	assemblage		of	discourses	that	comprises	the	performance	of,	the	reception	of	and	the	criticism	of	Disabled	Theater.		This	assemblage	is	a	kind	of	unruly	assembly:	its	characteristic	feature	is	dissensus.		This	dissensus	is	evident	in	the	many	critical	accounts	of	what	might	be	termed	the	discomfiture	of	the	audience,	or	the	disruption	of	the	notion	of	the	audience	as	a	consensus	of	an	ethical	and	aesthetic	community.		The	question	then	arises:	what	emerges	from	this	dissensus?		
Disabled	Theater	throws	much	of	the	burden	of	performance	on	the	audience.			The	audience	is	required	to	be	performative:	to	make	their	own	sense	or	judgment	of	the	performance	and	to	be	aware	of	their	processes	of	perception	of	both	‘theatre’	and	‘disability.’		For	a	number	of	critics	the	audience,	which	includes	the	critic,	is	found	wanting,	or	is	reduced	to	an	incapacitated	audience.		In	Scott	Wallin’s	view	the	distancing	mechanisms	that	Bel	applies	–	the	use	of	the	translator,	the	announcements,	the	atomization	of	each	performer	in	the	dance	solos	while	the	rest	of	the	ensemble	sit	in	the	background,	themselves	a	kind	of	onstage	incapacitated	audience,	tapping	their	feet	or	playing	with	their	hands	–	leaves	the	audience	wanting	to,	but	unable	to	connect.		His	reading	of	audience	response	particularly	problematizes	the	audience’s	applause,	a	critique	taken	up	in	different	ways	by	a	number	of	commentators:		
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Because	the	audience	is	not	allowed	to	express	its	own	pleasures	and	idiosyncrasies	and	thereby	a	sense	of	collectivity	with	the	actors,	it	is	reduced	to	communicating	its	interest	and	valuation	of	the	actors	through	applause	that	felt	to	me	at	best	like	paternalistic	approbation	and	at	worst	patronization.	(73)	Wallin’s	specific	reference	to	the	applause	of	Disabled	Theater	is	in	the	context	of	his	comparison	between	The	Show	Must	Go	On	and	Disabled	Theater.		He	notes	how	in	The	Show	Must	Go	On	during	the	‘Let	the	Sun	Shine	In’	sequence	the	house	lights	come	up	and:		the	dancers	become	spectators	while	the	audience	looks	around	at	itself.		In	the	show	I	attended,	many	people	at	that	point	got	up	and	began	to	dance,	erasing	the	difference	between	stage	and	house.	(72)	He	notes	the	contrast	to	the	staging	of	the	dance	solos	of	the	HORA	performers:	While	the	dance	solos	in	Disabled	Theater	also	encourage	empathy,	no	one	dances,	even	though	some	audience	members,	including	myself,	reported	such	a	desire.		(73)	He	reads	this	as	a	strategy	of	Disabled	Theater	to	maintain	barriers	or	distance	between	performers	and	audience	and	hence	between	people	with	and	without	disabilities.		While	the	comparison	is	interesting	it	in	effect	essentializes	the	HORA	performers	as	representatives	of	the	disabled.	His	comments	that	Bel	isolates	each	performer	never	allowing	them	to	dance	with	each	other,	while	having	some	validity,	also	reinforces	this	essentializing	of	the	HORA	performers:		by	depriving	the	cast	of	the	chance	to	dance	together	or	engage	in	any	joint	choreography	that	would	suggest	a	collectivity	of	goals,	values,	and	
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shared	perceptions,	Bel	reinforces	the	idea	that	disability	is	not	only	marginalized	but	also	lacks	its	own	culture	and	group	identity.	(73)	In	this	reading	‘the	cast’	syntactically	becomes	equated	with	‘disability.’				When	he	refers	to	audience	response	to	Lorraine	Meier’s	solo	to	‘Dancing	Queen’	he	raises	an	interesting	question:		As	Meier	finished	her	dance	and	sat	down,	quite	winded,	in	her	seat,	I	looked	over	to	my	right	to	find	two	audience	members	wiping	tears	from	their	eyes	as	they	smiled	and	applauded.	What	politics	and	emotions	were	at	work	to	produce	such	an	affective	response?	(75)	This	is	a	question	that	opens	up	a	number	of	possibilities	of	reading	the	encounter	between	performers	and	audience	and	people	with	and	without	disabilities	but	his	answer	to	it	is	in	the	following	quite	restrictive	terms:	It	seems	to	me	that	those	in	the	audience	who	have	had	as	little	exposure	to	disability	as	Bel	might	receive	Meier’s	dance	as	a	touching	moment	of	liberation	from	their	own	discomfort.	(75)	This	response	reiterates	the	criticism	of	Bel	for	spending	so	little	time	with	the	HORA	performers	and	includes	certain	members	of	the	audience	in	this	criticism,		but	the	encounter	between	director	and	performers	becomes	recast	as	‘exposure	to	disability’	in	which	again	the	HORA	performers	serve	to	represent	or	essentialize	disability.		In	addition	Wallin	adjudges	the	audience	response	to	be	a	kind	of	self-satisfied	short	circuit	characteristic	of	a	dilettante	experience	of	disability.	He	passes	a	kind	of	damning	moral	judgment	of	the	project	of	Disabled	
Theater’s	ability	to	provoke	audience	sentimentality	in	the	following	description:			Neurotypical	audiences	who	desperately	want	to	connect	with	disabled	people	but	don’t	know	how	end	up	settling	for	rather	mawkish	
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sentiments,	which	they	erroneously	understand	as	deriving	from	a	significant,	honest	encounter	with	disability.	(74)	I	think	that	Wallin’s	analysis	conflates	the	theatrical	encounter	with	other	forms	of	encounter.		This	confusion	is	evident	from	his	reading	of	the	house	lights	coming	on	in	The	Show	Must	Go	On	as	erasing	the	difference	between	‘stage	and	house.’		It	could	equally	be	argued	that	the	houselights	coming	on	apparently	erases	the	difference	and	at	the	same	time	reinforces	the	difference	in	that	this	is	a	temporary	reversal	of	the	performer-audience	configuration	sanctioned	as	part	of	the	dramaturgy	of	the	production.		It	is	also	deployed	as	a	reference	to	the	early	stagings	of	Hair	and	might	imply	how	this	strategy	has	subsequently	become	a	cliché	of	the	promise	of	audience	interaction.		Wallin’s	reference	to	‘little	exposure	to	disability’	is	also	problematic	as	it	suggests	a	kind	of	hierarchy	of	disability	awareness	or	sensitivity	in	which	those	with	a	little	exposure	will	be	a	lot	less	aware	of	the	problem	of	perception	of	disability	than	those	who	have	had	longer	exposure.	What	the	comment	really	implies	is	that	there	is	the	‘right’	kind	of	exposure	to	people	with	disabilities	and	the	‘wrong’	kind.		The	begged	question	in	this,	in	terms	of	both	Wallin’s	judgment	of	Bel	and	the	audience,	is	how	this	exposure	and	encounter	with	disability	–	meaning	specific	performers	with	disabilities	–	is	affected	in	theatrical	performance.		Wallin’s	comment	about	‘neurotypical	audiences’	confusing	mawkish	sentimentality	with	an	‘honest,	significant	encounter	with	disability’	totalizes	the	HORA	performers	as	disabled	people	or	disability	rather	than	allowing	for	their	diversities	as	performers	and	people	with	disabilities.		Wallin’s	judgment	negates	the	HORA	performers’	work	as	performers	just	as	it	accuses	Jérôme	Bel	of	doing	the	same	thing.			
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Wallin	does	certainly	identify	and	attest	to	the	discomfiture	of	the	audience	and	he	connects	this	uncomfortableness	to	the	audience’s	incapacity	to	deal	with	the	affective	charge	experienced	in	the	encounter	with	the	performers,	(Bel’s	crying	on	seeing	the	HORA	dvds,	the	two	women	crying	after	Lorraine	Meier’s	solo.)	He	seeks	to	ascribe	a	specific	explanation	for	this	discomfiture:										the	audience	remains	unable	to	address	the	true	causes	of	their	discomfort:	society’s	devaluation	and	fear	of	cognitive	difference	and	our	general	lack	of	experience	and	knowledge	of	how	one	should	or	may	intimately	and	fully	interact	with	mentally	disabled	people.	(68)	While	this	observation	may	capture	part	of	the	‘politics	and	emotions	at	work’	in	the	audience’s	discomfiture	with	Disabled	Theater,	other	analyses	suggest	a	wider	constellation	of	concerns.		Benjamin	Wihstutz	articulates	how	theatre	practitioners	and	critics	are	currently	reconfiguring	the	aesthetic	space	of	the	stage	inflected	by	the	‘reappearance	of	social	questions,	a	re-entry	of	the	social’	in	the	Reality	Trend	or	Citizen	Theatre	genre	of	performance	in	which:	people	with	disabilities,	unemployed	or	homeless	people,	asylum	seekers,	delinquents,	and	terminally	ill	people,	are	no	longer	represented	by	actors,	but	act	themselves.	(36)	In	this	context,	he	argues,	‘reviewers	relate	to	the	events	on	stage	as	a	purely	social	encounter’	and	he	cites	as	one	example	of	this	the	closing	lines	of	Siobhan	Burke’s	review	of	Disabled	Theater	in	the	New	York	Times:			After	90	minutes	with	the	cast	members,	you	almost	wish	you	could	go	with	them.	(37)		Scott	Wallin	also	cites	Burke’s	comment	as	well,	but	his	response:	
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But	such	longing	is	unnecessary	and	ultimately	unproductive	because	those	with	whom	we	desire	to	connect	are	living	right	in	our	own	communities.		(80)		could	be	paraphrased	as	Susan	Burke	should	get	out	more,	both	out	of	the	theatre	and	out	into	the	community	to	encounter	people	with	disabilities.		I	think	her	comment	could	be	read	either	as	a	desire	for	theatre	to	be	more	‘social’	or	more	‘real’	or	it	could	be	judged	as	a	kind	of	dilettante	expression	of	desire	to	know	or	hang	out	with	people	with	disabilities	more.		‘You	almost	wish	you	could	go	with	them’	is	still	on	one	level	a	kind	of	Aristotelian	identification	with	the	performance:	engaged	but	ultimately	knowing	when	to	‘switch	off’	identification.	Both	Wihstutz	and	Wallin	discern	a	kind	of	‘social	romanticism’	or	sentimentality	in	her	response	that	is	similar	to	the	two	women	weeping	after	Lorraine	Meier’s	solo.			
Disabled	Theater	seems	to	provoke	discomfort	in	critics	over	how	to	deal	with	the	affective	responses	of	others	around	them,	reiterating	Wallin’s	question	‘What	politics	and	emotions	are	at	work?’		The	politics	and	emotions	need	to	be	considered	dialectically	to	explore	what	might	be	at	stake	in	the	affective	charge	of	such	performance	and	the	politics	that	emerges	from	this.	This	kind	of	performance	provokes	an	investigation	of	both	affective	politics	and	what	has	been	termed	‘political	affects.’	In	“The	Incapacitated	Spectator,”	in	Umathum	and	Wihstutz,	Kai	van	Eikels	pursues	this	kind	of	investigation	but	in	the	process	comes	up	against	various	impasses	and	aporia.		His	analysis	of	Disabled	Theater	opens	in	a	kind	of	dialectics	of	discomfort.	He	describes	how	usually	when	he	is	in	an	audience	observing	dance	on	stage	he	experiences	a	desire	to	dance	that	persists	despite,	
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or	perhaps	because	of,	the	restriction	on	doing	so	of	the	‘theatrical	regime.’		For	him,	though,	in	the	case	of	Disabled	Theater	he	does	not	experience	this	desire:	his	body	‘acquiesces	in	its	deactivation’:		I	let	the	dances	pass	before	my	eyes,	laughing	along,	more	often	than	not,	with	the	crowd,	clapping	hands	mechanically	whenever	there	is	applause.	I	notice,	oddly	conscious	of	it,	to	what	degree	my	behavior	imitates	the	behavior	of	other	spectators.	(117)			His	disengagement	unites	him	mechanically	with	the	rest	of	the	audience	but	at	the	same	time	he	feels	neither	part	of	the	performance	nor	of	the	audience:		My	responsiveness	fails	to	conceive	of	the	occurrences	as	a	coherent	whole	asking	me	to	be	part	of	it;	neither	do	I	manage	to	lean	back	and	feel	my	shoulders	rubbing	against	the	collective-singular	body	of	the	audience.	(117)	He	then	locates	the	source	of	his	discomfort	with	the	performance	and	the	audience:		And	if	I	dare	inquire	into	the	reasons	for	this	handicap,	the	answer	is:	disabled	people.	(117)	Van	Eikels	is	made	aware	of	his	‘handicap’	from	the	outset.		In	the	context	of	the	rest	of	his	argument	‘disabled	people’	refers	not	only	to	the	performers	on	stage		but	also	to	those	in	the	audience	who	have,	like	him,	been	disabled	in	their	responses,	and,	possibly,	to	those	others	in	the	audience	who	have	had	their	critical	faculties	‘disabled’	in	favour	of	an	emotional	or	sentimental	response	to	the	performers.		
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Like	Wallin,	van	Eikels	is	uncomfortable	with	the	responses	of	some	in	the	audience	around	him.		He	also	refers	to	two	females	and	their	behaviour	at	the	end	of	the	performance:	Two	ladies	in	the	row	before	me	explode	into	frantic	ovations,	whispering	into	each	other’s	ears,	stroking	arms	and	shoulders	as	though	looking	for	excuses	to	fill	up	the	kinesphere	between	them	with	tokens	of	having	been	touched.	On	our	way	out	after	the	show	I	overhear	them	saying,	“They	had	a	matchless	energy!”—“Yes,	matchless!”		(119)		Van	Eikels	distinguishes	these	reactions	from	the	enthusiastic	response	of	theatre-goers	at	any	theatrical	performance	as	he	equates	their	particular	enthusiasm	with	feelings	of	guilt,	‘which	forces	them	to	name	a	more,	an	affluence	that	compensates	for	what	they	may	perceive	as	a	deficiency	in	the	dance	performance.’		Van	Eikels	also	refers	to	another	type	of	response,	not	citing	any	specific	source,	emerging	in	the	post-show	mingling	during	which	he	observed	the	two	enthusiastic	females:	Others,	less	sensitive	or	better	versed	at	explaining	away	misdemeanor,	laugh	heartily	about	the	dance	solos’	crude	choreographies,	the	clumsy	execution,	the	corny	music.	(119)		As	one	of	the	announcements	in	the	performance	makes	clear,	Bel	left	the	choice	of	music	and	the	choreography	up	to	the	individual	HORA	performers.		Should	the	audience,	therefore,	be	judging	the	performers’	choreography	or	Bel’s	strategy	in	delegating	the	choreography	to	them?			Both	of	the	audience	responses	van	Eikels	mentions	suggest	that	Disabled	
Theater	offers	a	troubling	of	both	ethical	and	aesthetic	community.		There	is	a	split	between	the	kind	of	‘ethical’	response	of	the	two	females	who	praise	the	
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matchless	energy	of	the	performers	and	the	negative	response	to	the	aesthetics	of	the	piece	of	those	who	laughed	at	the	crude	choreography.	His	analysis	exposes	how	Disabled	Theater	reveals	the	incapacity	of	ethical	or	aesthetic	community	as	a	‘communauté	désoeuvrée,’	a	community	that	no	longer	works.		This	deconstruction	of	ethical	and	aesthetic	community	brings	with	it	a	sneaking	suspicion	that	Bel	is	dishonouring	what	van	Eikels	terms	the	‘theatrical	pact.’		Benjamin	Wihstutz	captures	something	of	this	suspicion	that	still	underlies	many	responses	to	Bel’s	Duchamp-like	strategy:			Using	the	disabilities	of	performers	for	the	sake	of	shaking	up	paradigms	of	skill	and	the	fundamental	principles	of	judgment	is	highly	cynical;	and,	yet,	it	is	brilliant	at	the	same	time	insomuch	as	something	is	achieved	here	that	triggers	an	interminable	process	of	reflection	and	judgment.	What	appears	objectionable	and	debatable	from	an	ethical	or	social	point	of	view	might,	on	the	level	of	aesthetic	judgment,	be	highly	effective	in	political	terms.		(50)	Van	Eikels	reiterates	this	accusation	of	cynicism	in	Bel’s	strategy,	and	implies	that	Bel’s	artwork	or	experiment	may	not	have	succeeded:		The	stability	of	the	aesthetic	regime	enabled	artistic	practice	to	question	the	frames,	the	scope,	and	the	very	nature	of	art.			Bel’s	work	acknowledges	a	situation	where,	on	the	contrary,	the	aesthetic	mode	has	become	extremely	unstable.	And	in	Disabled	Theater	he	goes	to	great	lengths	to	reconstruct	it	under	unlikely	conditions,	succeeding,	if	he	does,	thanks	to	a	deliberately	cynical	horse-trade	with	the	audience’s	inability	to	take	a	disabled	performer	for	anything	but	a	disabled	performer—a	horse-trade	that	surreptitiously	re-establishes	the	theatrical	pact.	(135)	
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Van	Eikels	seems	to	be	suggesting	that	Bel	takes	a	group	of	performers	(who	happen	to	be	disabled)	and	dis-ables	them	in	performance	that	deconstructs	expectations	of	performance	in	terms	of	what	is	generally	perceived	as	virtuosity.	The	HORA	performers	are	required	to	go	through	the	motions	of	a	series	of	instructions	to	perform	on	stage	what	appear	to	be	very	simple	actions,	although	not,	as	in	the	case	of	standing	on	the	stage	for	one	minute,	very	easy	to	achieve.			The	part	of	the	performance	that	appears	to	make	the	most	demands	of	the	performers,	the	dance	solos,	is	where	their	training	as	actors	is	not	needed:		when	called	upon	to	name	their	profession	they	all	say	‘And	I	am	and	actor’	not	‘and	I	am	a	dancer	or	choreographer.’		In	the	dance	solos	they	are	both	dis-abled	as	performers	because	this	is	not	what	they	are	trained	to	do	or	experienced	in	doing	and,	at	the	same	time,	they	are	dis-abled	in	that	Bel,	a	renowned	choreographer	and	dancer,	gives	them	no	assistance	or	guidance.		This	section,	though,	is	the	part	of	the	performance	that	presumably	feels	the	most	like	performance	to	the	HORA	performers	and	the	audience	alike	(which	‘re-establishes	the	theatrical	pact’)	but	it	is	in	the	performance	of	this	section	that	it	is	most	likely	the	HORA	performers	appear	as	disabled	performers,	performers	whose	incapacities	mark	them	as	disabled.			Gerald	Siegmund	refers	to	specific	moments	of	incapacity	in	the	performance	of	the	dance	solos:	When	Lorraine	Meier	amidst	the	never-ending	swirls	of	spiraling	strings	in	“Dancing	Queen”	has	to	stop	momentarily	to	catch	her	breath,	or	when	Julia	Häusermann	cannot	connect	her	Michael	Jackson	crotch-grip	pose	to	her	next	move,	the	actors	put	their	performance	at	risk.	(27)	
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Whose	or	what	performance	are	they	putting	at	risk?		They	are	not	putting	their	own	performance	of	their	own	choreography	at	risk	because	they	are	in	control	of	that	and	who	is	to	say	that	these	fits	and	starts	are	not	part	of	their	choreography?		They	are	not	putting	Jérôme	Bel’s	performance	at	risk	because	he	has	delegated	the	choreography	and	choice	of	music	to	the	performers,	let	happen	what	may.		The	only	performance	being	put	at	risk	is	an	audience’s	expectation	of	performance,	the	idea	of	dance	performance	of	the	audience,	an	idea	that	assumes	that	the	choreography	will	be	seamless	and	operate	according	to	certain	aesthetic	rules.		Siegmund	uses	this	example	to	support	his	argument	that	Disabled	
Theater	explores	the	tension	between	what	Christoph	Menke	in	Die	Kraft	der	
Kunst	has	termed	Kraft,	‘force,’	the	state	of	undoing	that	produces	transformations	and	Vermögen,	‘power,’	the	capacity	of	humans	to	learn	or	become	experts.	The	moments	of	incapacity	in	Lorraine	Meier’s	and	Julia	Häusermann’s	solos	become	for	Siegmund:	the	ongoing	and	relentless	force	behind	the	power	to	master	the	form	that	becomes	paramount.	(27)	He	also	characterizes	the	whole	project	of	Disabled	Theater	as	one	which:	shifts	away	from	the	regulation	mechanisms	that	produce	difference		(training,	repetition,	the	power	of	the	director	or	choreographer)	to	a	state	where	difference	does	not	matter	and	jouissance	sets	in	.	.	.	jouissance	is	a	surplus	of	meaning,	a	state	beyond	meaning	where	meaning	collapses.	.	.	Jouissance	is	a	highly	ambivalent	response	that	is	produced	by,	and	answers	to,	the	ambiguity	of	the	performance	undoing	itself.	(27)	
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This	is	Siegmund’s	attempt	to	think	beyond	judgments	or	evaluations	of	the	participation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	Disabled	Theater.		He	characterizes	as	jouissance	an	ambivalence	of	response	that	is	both	‘a	perverse	enjoyment’	and	is	‘unpleasant	and	disturbing.’			This	would	then	account	for	both	the	ambivalence	and	the	polarization	of	response	across	different	sections	of	the	audience	and	within	individual	members	of	the	audience,	Wallin	and	van	Eikels’	responses	being	examples	of	the	latter.			I	think	it	is	instructive	at	this	point	to	make	a	direct	comparison	between	
Disabled	Theater	and	FreakStars	3000.		Wihstutz,	cited	above,	refers	to	the	former	in	the	following	terms:		What	appears	objectionable	and	debatable	from	an	ethical	or	social	point	of	view	might,	on	the	level	of	aesthetic	judgment,	be	highly	effective	in	political	terms.		(50)	and	this	might	equally	well	apply	to	the	latter.		I	think,	though,	that	there	is	one	marked	and	crucial	difference	between	the	two	projects	that	materially	affects	the	discomfiture	of	the	audience.	In	terms	of	Siegmund’s	citation	of	Menke’s	concepts	of	‘force’	and	‘power’	the	residents	of	Thieler	Winckler	Haus	may	not	be	trained	singers	(they	do	not	have	that	‘power’)	but	they	have	a	compelling	energy	and	sense	of	fun,	a	‘force’	if	you	like	that	is	enabled	in	the	fun	that	Schlingensief	is	so	obviously	also	having	in	his	deconstruction	of	the	‘power’	of	the	television	documentary	and	talent	quest	formations.		The	‘force’	that	the	HORA	performers	apply	to	Jérôme	Bel’s	deconstruction	of	the	‘power’	of	the	formations	of	theatricality	and	virtuosic	choreography	is	no	less	engaged	but	they	seem	less	enabled	in	terms	of,	quite	simply,	having	fun.		Audiences	are	sensitive	to	this	and	I	would	contend,	unlike	van	Eikels,	that	part	of	the	reason	of	
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the	discomfiture	of	the	audience	is	a	desire	to	compensate	for	this	affective	‘short	changing’	with	responses	that	are	either	over-enthusiastic,	sentimental	or	cynical.		Jérôme	Bel	in	an	interview	with	Marcel	Bugiel	states:	It	is	precisely	the	intertwining	of	handicap	and	theatre	that	interests	me,	this	couple	handicap/theatre.		How	theatre	is	modified	when	it	is	practised	by	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities,	and	what	theatre	produces	for	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities.		My	artistic	project	is	the	theatre,	to	try	to	understand	its	structure,	its	functioning,	its	power)	(My	translation)	and	in	the	same	interview	he	goes	on	to	say:	these	actors,	who	are	depreciated,	are	capable	of	enriching	experimental	theater,	that	their	singularity	is	filled	with	promises	for	theater	and	dance	–	as	should	be	their	humanity	for	society	in	general.	(transl.	Christoph	Nothlings)	In	the	first	quotation	the	pairing	of	handicap	and	theatre	is	reflexive	in	that	theatrical	representation	is	in	some	way	a	handicap,	and	so	by	combining	this	handicapped	form	with	people	who	are	handicapped	a	kind	of	negation	of	negation	or	critique	of	critique	occurs	that	leads	to	a	different	experience	of	performance.			All	of	this	might	be	said	to	occur	within	the	frame	of	the	theatre,	or	of	theatre	incapacitated	in	its	encounter	with	performance	that	Féral	has	termed	‘theatricality’.			At	the	same	time	‘handicap’,	‘disability’	and	‘disabled’	are	terms	that	are	obviously	and	oppressively	in	operation	outside	the	theatre.		To	reframe	Bel’s	words,	what	does	Disabled	Theater	produce	for	actors	who	are	
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people	with	intellectual	disabilities	and	how	does	it	affect	the	perception	of	the	‘promises’,	or	potential	and	capacity,	of	their	humanity	for	society	in	general?		In	‘The	Incapacitated	Spectator’	van	Eikels	reconfigures	this	couple	of	handicap/theatre	into	dialectical	play.	For	van	Eikels	for	theatre	to	function	as	a	work	of	art	the	spectator	needs	to	be	reduced	to	the	level	of	idiocy	or	dumbness:	For	a	performance,	be	it	acting	or	dancing,	to	become	theatrical	art,	the	situation	must	disable	interaction.	(127)	Van	Eikels	goes	to	the	extent	of	creating	metaphors	that	equate	spectatorship	of	theatre	with	paraplegia:		In	the	case	of	theater	it	means	that,	physically,	I	mutate	into	a	creature	whose	legs	have	gone	limp	as	though	severed	or	palsied	from	paraplegia.	Arms	won’t	escape	paralysis	either,	except	for	the	applause.	My	tongue’s	been	anaesthetized	as	well	for	the	hours	I	spend	in	the	audience:	I	may	utter	brief,	compact	sounds	that	testify	to	my	being	affected,	but	not	articulate	ones.	(124)	Leaving	aside	his	fairly	outrageous	metaphorization	of	disability,	this	is	provocative	in	other	ways:	Disabled	Theater	makes	us	aware	of	the	dis-abled	audience	for	conventional	theatre	and	a	lot	of	avant-garde	theatre.	Van	Eikels	contends	that	Bel’s	strategy	is	both	conservative	and	radical.		Bel	reduces	the	actions	of	performance	to	such	a	minimum:	walking	across	the	stage,	speaking	into	a	microphone,	dancing	a	self-devised	solo,	yet	by	doing	this:	Thanks	to	this	reduction	(and	regression)	the	performers	are	aglow	with	an	aura.	(135)		In	van	Eikels’	view	this	aura	is	generated	by	spectators	who	are	stupefied	both	by	the	incapacitation	of	the	configuration	of	audience	to	performance	in	a	
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conventional	theatre	space	and	by	the	simplicity	of	the	performance	they	are	viewing.	How	is	this	stupefaction	affected,	though,	by	the	presence	of	performers	with	intellectual	disability?		Van	Eikels	contends	that	Bel	does	not	offer	up	the	performers	for	aesthetic	contemplation	because:	.	.	.he	never	takes	the	aesthetic	credibility	of	(the)	work	for	granted.	(135)		In	yet	another	twist	Bel	thus	emerges	as	an	incapacitated	artist,	incapacitated	to	the	extent	that	he	is	not	making	a	claim	that	Disabled	Theater	is	art	or	theatre	because	it	is,	of	course,	dis-abled.		He	has	put	his	name	on	it,	like	Duchamp	on	the	urinal,	and	his	name	and	words	are	referred	to	in	the	performance	but	it	is	up	to	the	spectators	to	judge	if	this	is	art	or	theatre.		Van	Eikels’	argument	is	that	they	are	likely	to	judge	it	as	art	or	theatre	because	they	and	others,	critics	and	scholars,	have	put	so	much	work	into	it.					 Van	Eikels	offers	this	figure	of	the	incapacitated	spectator	as	a	provocative	corrective	to	Rancière’s	formulation	of	the	emancipated	spectator	and	he	refers	to	a	specific	and	much	cited	passage	in	The	Emancipated	Spectator	in	which	Rancière	questions	the	assumed	passivity	of	the	audience	faced	with	the	activity	of	the	performance.		Rancière’s	argument	is	that	the	audience	relationship	to	the	performance	does	not	need	to	be	reconfigured	by	audience	participation	or	narrative	didacticism	because	in	the	audience	engagement	in	the	aesthetic	experience	of	theatre:		The	spectator	is	active,	just	like	the	student	or	the	scientist:	He	observes,	he	selects,	he	compares,	he	interprets.	He	connects	what	he	observes	with	many	other	things	he	has	observed	on	other	stages,	in	other	kinds	of	spaces.	He	makes	his	poem	with	the	poem	that	is	performed	in	front	of	him.	(Rancière		Artforum	277)	
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Van	Eikels	finds	this	idea	of	the	poem	of	the	subject	of	aesthetic	experience	incompatible	with	Rancière’s	definition	of	the	subject	of	aesthetic	experience	as:	not	the	population	in	its	entirety,	the	intermingling	of	all	classes,	but	a	subject	without	particular	identity,	whose	name	is	‘anybody.’	(124)	Van	Eikels	draws	from	this	anybodyness	a	kind	of	assumption	of	a	dumbness	or	idiocy	of	the	aesthetic	subject	(‘In	the	aesthetic	state	then	Man	is	null’)	a	kind	of	suspension	of	intellect	and	intelligence.			To	let	the	artwork	or	the	theatre-work	operate	on	the	subject	in	the	exceptional	–	and	economically	-	non-productive	ways	it	does	–	it	requires	a	kind	of	stupidity	before	the	other:			What	is	commonly	referred	to	as	aesthetic	experience	denotes	a	moment	of	identification	between	me	and	mankind	in	a	state	of	unknowing	apprehension,	where	form,	the	object	of	aesthetic	pleasure,	is	different	from	any	recognizable	shape	because	I	am	too	much	of	a	total	idiot	to	have	any	particular	recognition	of	it.	(127)		Unlike	Van	Eikels	I	do	not	see	incompatibility	between	Ranciere’s	‘poem’	and	his	formulation	of	the	‘exceptional	dumbness’	of	the	spectator	in	the	face	of	theatre	that	induces	‘a	response	more	inarticulate,	more	mushy,	more	distorted,	in	short,	more	idiotic	than	a	reaction.’		What	van	Eikels	is	referring	to	is	an	affective	response,	which	at	some	level	is	what	is	in	operation	in	Rancière’s	metaphor	of	the	‘poem’	as	a	response.		I	take	the	meaning	of	Rancière’s	‘poem’	that	the	spectator	makes	to	be	a	use	of	language	that	plays	with	the	distribution	of	space	and	time,	that	does	not	necessarily	follow	the	linearity	of	narrative,	that	has	about	it	something	of	the	arresting	or	suspending	of	time	in	the	contemplation	of	an	artwork,	which	operates	by	parataxis	rather	than	hypotaxis.		
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This	‘poem’	however	does	not	need	to	be	expressed	in	verbal	or	written	language	only.			 In	the	case	of	Disabled	Theater	the	spectator	creates	their	poem	of	response	out	of	an	assemblage	that	might	include	Bel’s	arrogance/idiocy	before	the	other	of	the	HORA	performers,	the	performers’	resistance	or	re-evaluation	of	Bel’s	commands,	demands	and	instructions,	the	performers’	work	in	recreating	the	expected	moments	of	interaction	in	response	to	audible	and	affective	response	from	the	audience.	The	poem	includes	moments	of	acknowledging	incapacity:	self-doubt,	self-questioning	as	well	as	the	questioning	of	the	whole	theatrical	project	and	related	social	and	aesthetic	projects	of	integration	and	inclusion.		This	questioning	may	remain	with	the	spectator	long	after	the	exit	from	the	theatre.		The	variety	and	polarization	of	response	to	Disabled	Theater	indicate	that	ultimately	the	performance	and	the	phenomena	of	the	critical	discourse	and	commentary	generated	around	the	performance	hits	various	spots	–	sore	spots,	blind	spots	-	in	what	might	be	termed	the	politics	of	the	aesthetic	experience	of	theatrical	performance.			André	Lepecki	seeks	to	deal	with	these	issues	of	agency	and	efficacy	by	recomposing	the	political-compositional	structure	of	Disabled	Theatre	not	as	an	‘authoritarian/submissive	polarization’	but	rather	as	a	‘collective,	impersonal	and	ethical	surrendering	to	the	joint	task	of	bringing	a(n)	(urgently)	necessary	work	into	the	world.’		He	goes	on	to	say	that		‘As	long	as	choreographer,	actors	and	audience	work	for	the	work,	power	(potestas/pouvoir)	will	always	be	replaced	by	potentiality	(potentia/puissance).’	(153)		In	contrast	to	van	Eikels’	judgment	that	Disabled	Theater	requires	both	too	much	work	from	the	spectator,	and	at	the	same	time	incapacitates	the	spectator,	Lepecki	recasts	this	work	of	the	
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spectator	as	part	of	a	greater	whole.		In	Lepecki’s	reading	of	the	piece	he	assigns	agency	to	the	actors	as	part	of	a	larger	assemblage:		
Disabled	Theater	.	.	.	starts	with	actors	immediately	undoing	its	compositional	premises.		(154)		For	him	the	binaries	of	non-disabled/disabled,	director/choreographer,	actor/audience	are	recomposed	in	an	assemblage	that	requires	the	complicit	work	on	the	work	to	make	Disabled	Theater.		For	him	the	actors	have	autonomy	but	it	is	an	autonomy	that	still	avows	heteronomy	and	which	is:		ethically	bound	to	the	fact	that	something	must	be	built,	that	something	will	be	built-with	the	author,	the	assistant/translator,	the	audience,	the	chairs,	the	water	bottles,	the	scores	requests,	the	stage	apparatus,	the	world	.	.	.	A	something	called	Disabled	Theater.	(155)	The	challenge	the	piece	offers	to	what	is	considered	theatre	is	so	great	that	it	can	be	said	to	‘disable’	theatre	and	the	argument	is	made	that	it	lays	to	rest	the	notion	that	the	theatre	of	people	with	disabilities	need	to	forever	strive	for	a	replica	of	‘good	theatre’	either	as	adjudged	to	be	good	theatre	by	an	aesthetic	community	–	theatre	that	‘feels	good’	or	theatre	that	heals	rifts	in	the	social	bond	–	theatre	that	‘does	good’.		Commenting	on	Bel’s	reference	in	‘Entretien	sur	Disabled	Theater,’	his	interview	with	Marcel	Bugiel,	to	‘the	community	which	these	actors	represent’	Lepecki	reformulates	this	phrase	as	a	‘paradox	of	community’	as	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	‘inevitably	find	themselves,	despite	themselves,	
representing	a	community	–	even	though	this	community	is	not	at	all	one,	and	even	though	they	are	not	its	(juridico-political)	representatives.’			His	way	
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through	this	impasse	of	representation	of	the	unrepresented	(the	unrepresentable)	is	to	adapt	Gilles	Deleuze’s	concept	of	minorization:	a	process	of	extracting	becomings	from	historical,	cultural	and	dogmatic	conditions	.	.	.	(142)	Lepecki’s	analysis	also	attempts	to	move	away	from	concepts	of	cause	and	effect	in	terms	of	directorial	intention	and	spectatorial	perception	by	referring	to	a	different	conceptual	topology:		to	a	reading	of	events	taking	place	on	Disabled	
Theater’s	planes	of	composition	and	planes	of	expression:				We	have	to	attend	to	those	moments	when	the	work,	even	in	is	most	structuring	dispositifs	undoes	itself	or	disables	itself	from	being	a	work	defined	by	identity,	trapped	by	identity	politics,	stifled	by	what	Deleuze	once	called	“the	strange	operation”	through	which	minorities	are	captured	into	identities	that	sap	all	their	singular	force	and	force	them	to	be	“integrated	into	the	majoritarian	fact”	as	identities.	.	.		it	is	in	its	capacity	to	transcend	the	bond	disability	=	intense	presence	that	the	political	work	of	the	piece	actually	takes	place.	(147)	The	reference	to	‘planes	of	composition’	is	from	A	Thousand	Plateaus:	There	are	only	haecceities,	affects,	subjectless	individuations	that	constitute	collective	assemblages.	[...]	We	call	this	plane,	which	knows	only	longitudes	and	latitudes,	speeds	and	haecceities,	the	plane	of	consistency	or	composition	(as	opposed	to	a	plan(e)	of	organization	or	development).	(266)	Lepecki	refers	to	the	scenic,	the	score	and	the	translation	dispositifs	that	Bel	has	set	in	place.		The	performers	have	limited	capacity	to	make	their	own	adjustments	to	the	scenic	dispositif:	they	either	operate	within	the	layout	of	
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chairs,	water	bottles,	lighting	and	microphone	or	not.		In	terms	of	the	score	dispositif	there	is,	however,	some,	limited,	freedom	for	haecceities	to	emerge.		One	example	he	gives	of	this	is	Peter	Keller’s	response	to	the	announcement	for	the	performers	to	give	their	name	age	and	profession.		Whereas	all	of	the	other	performers	say	‘and	I	am	an	actor’	Peter	Keller	instead	in	a	six-minute	sequence	introduces	his	own	discourse	which	includes	references	to	Rütti,	flowers,	the	Benissimo	Lottery,	yes	no	good	theatre.		Lepecki	reads	this	as:		Before	the	call	of	identity,	before	the	call	for	self-representing,	rather	than	
saying	“actor”	Keller	opts	for	doing	acting	and	making	this	doing	quite	clear	to	the	audience.		(158)		When	they	are	‘naming	their	handicap’	there	is	a	wide	range	and	diversity	of	responses	amongst	the	HORA	performers,	some	poignant,	some	dismissive,	some	apologetic	but	Peter	Keller	again	takes	the	opportunity	to	take	off	into	his	own	discourse	of	‘Yes	now	good	theater’	and	Rütti	and	the	Benissimo	Lottery.			Lepecki	in	the	concluding	section	of	his	essay	returns	to	Peter	Keller	characterizing	both	the	force	and	singularity	of	his	contribution:	Keller’s	interventions	in	Disabled	Theater	are	crucially	important.	I	can-	not	really	imagine	the	piece	executing	its	critical	task	so	well	without	his	monologues	and	sense	of	duration.	Both	co-compose	truly	schizo	lines	of	flight	.	.	.	We	may	find	in	each	evasive	detouring,	not	just	an	escape	from	identity-bound	questions,	but	the	path	towards	a	weapon	of	choice,	the	actualization	of	potentialities	and	singularities	where	the	actor	appears	above	all,	as	actor,	agent	of	actualizing	events	and	minorizing	representation.		(159)		
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Lepecki’s	reference	to	Peter	Keller’s	performance	in	Disabled	Theater	referring	to	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	‘lines	of	flight’	is	particularly	apposite	and	affords	a	possibility	of	folding	the	concepts	of	Deleuze	and	Guattari	back	into	the	lived	experience	of	other	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		Deleuze	and	Guattari	acknowledge	the	debt	in	the	development	of	concepts	such	as	‘lines	of	flight’	and	of	the	rhizome	to	the	work	of	Fernand	Deligny	with	young	autistic	people.	These	are	concepts	of	spatiality	that	play	across	aesthetics	and	politics,	topologies	of	movements	of	thinking	and	feeling.		In	A	Thousand	Plateaus	they	first	make	reference	to	the	work	of	Deligny	in	the	context	of	the	contrast	between	the	tree	and	the	rhizome.	For	them	the	tree	and	the	process	of	arborification	is	associated	with	solidified	structure,	hierarchy	and	the	death	of	desire	whereas	it	is	by	the	rhizome	‘that	desire	moves	and	produces’:		
Plug	the	tracings	back	into	the	map,	connect	the	roots	or	trees	back	up	with	a	rhizome.	.	.	The	same	applies	to	the	group	map:	show	at	what	point	in	the	rhizome	there	form	phenomena	of	massification,	bureaucracy,	leadership,	fascization	etc.,	which	lines	nevertheless	survive,	if	only	underground,	continuing	to	make	rhizome	in	the	shadows.		Deligny’s	method:	map	the	gestures	and	movements	of	an	autistic	child,	combine	several	maps	for	the	same	child,	for	several	different	children.	(14)	
Deleuze	and	Guattari	apply	the	concept	of	tree	and	rhizome	to	movements	in	the	psyche	and	the	socius	that	form	‘massification,	bureaucracy,	leadership	and	fascization’	topologies	of	totalizing	power	and	domination	that	they	associate	with	the	structuration	of	the	tree,	but	at	root	is	‘rhizome’	a	more	diverse,	dynamic,	centreless	matrix	of	outgrowths.			The	maps	that	Deleuze	and	Guattari	
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are	referring	to	are	the	tracings	of	the	movements	of	autistic	children	and	young	people	(many	of	them	without	access	to	spoken	language)	that	Fernand	Deligny	traced	in	a	unique	living	arrangement	and	practice	of	a	non-dogmatic	therapy	in	the	hills	of	Cévennes	in	south	eastern	France.	This	was	an	attempt	at	a	rhizomatic	non-institution.	Deligny’s	work	and	the	work	of	those	who	came	to	visit	or	stay	was	to	trace	the	movements	of	the	autistic	young	people,	individually	and	overlay	tracings	of	one	over	another	to	delineate	patterning	of	intensities	in	space	and	time.			Deleuze	and	Guattari	refer	to	some	of	these	lines	later	in	A	Thousand	Plateaus:	
Fernand	Deligny	transcribes	the	lines	and	paths	of	autistic	children	by	means	of	maps:	he	carefully	distinguishes	“lines	of	drift”	(lignes	d’erre)	and	“customary	lines”	(le	coutumier).		This	does	not	only	apply	to	walking;	he	also	makes	maps	of	perceptions	and	maps	of	gestures	showing	customary	gestures	and	gestures	of	drift.		(202)		
In	Deligny’s	anti-psychiatric,	anti-institutional,	anti-concentration	camp,	he	wished	to	live	outside	language,	not	only	not	naming	or	codifying	problems	but	against	what	he	termed	‘le	projet	pensé’	the	though	out	or	thought	through	project.		He	opposed	the	being	of	reason	(raison)	with	the	being	of	the	network	(reseau)	and	was	resistant	to	concepts	of	identity,	even	for	himself.	His	project,	a	kind	of	post-therapeutic	practice	resembles	a	kind	of	postdramatic	theatre.		Alongside	the	mappings	and	the	tracings,	a	kind	of	collective	idiolect	developed,	a	vocabulary	of	immanence,	with	an	attempted	rhizomatic	syntax	of	agency	and	subjectivity.	As	Nietzsche	said,	we	are	trapped	in	the	prejudice	of	grammar	that	every	verb	requires	a	subject.		In	an	unpublished	letter	to	Althusser	written	in	
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1976	and	cited	by	Sandra	Alvarez	de	Toledo	in	Cartes	et	Lignes	d’Erre/Maps	and	
Wander	Lines,	Deligny	indicates	a	kind	of	Foucauldian	exposure	of	the	analyst	in	the	face	of	the	other,	the	confounding	of	subject	and	object	of	‘us’	and	‘them’:	
In	our	practice,	what	is	the	object?		This	or	that	child,	a	psychotic	‘subject’?		Certainly	not.		The	actual	subject	that	has	to	be	transformed,	is	us,	us	there,	close	to	these	‘subjects’	who,	so	to	speak,	are	not	really	subjects	and	that	is	the	reason	why	THEY	are	there.	(5)	
‘They’,	the	othered,	the	autistic,	the	intellectually	disabled	allow	us	to	try	to	transform	not	them	but	ourselves,	which	resonates	with	Cassavetes’	‘the	problem	is	us.’				The	maps	were	at	once	a	kind	of	ritual	practice,	not	an	end	product.		As	Bertrand	Ogilvie	in	the	Afterword	to	Cartes	et	Lignes	d’Erre/Maps	
and	Wander	Lines	articulates,	they	were	merely	part	of	a	process	towards:	The	constitution	of	a	commons	which	was	the	great	task	both	from	an	ethical	and	political	point	of	view	of	this	small	network	of	resistance	formed	around	these	children	who	had	been	universally	rejected.	(407)	They	were	a	way	of	not	foreclosing	in	diagnosis	and	symptomology	the	non-	identitarian	presence	of	the	autistic	young	people	and	of	living	with	them	and	learning	from	them.			Within	the	group	idiolect	that	developed	in	Cévennes	agir	‘to	act’	was	the	infinitive	of	the	out-of-language	child,	of	actions	not	the	product	of	any	intention	or	will	and	not	demanding	any	reciprocity.			Faire	‘to	do’	was	peculiar	to	the	speaking	subject	and	le	projet	pensé,	the	thought	out	project.	(12)	Agir	was	more	associated	with	the	autistic	young	people	and	was	opposed	to	faire,	more	associated	with	the	non-disabled	adults,	agir	is	potentiality,	force	or	Kraft	as	
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opposed	to	the	definite	power	of	faire	or	Vermögen.		Deligny’s	project,	a	network	of	con-viviality	or	living	together,	serves	as	a	paradigm	that	might	inform	the	most	aesthetically	and	politically	radical	ways	of	working	to	negotiate	theatre	involving	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities.	
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Conclusion	
	I	would	connect	Peter	Keller’s	lines	of	flight	with	those	of	Mark	Deans	at	the	end	of	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	Reich,	with	the	sheer	force	and	inventiveness	of	the	residents	of	Thieler	Winckler	Haus	in	FreakStars	3000	in	their	own	devised	riffing	on	popular	culture	and	mediatized	discourses,	the	distinctive	appropriation	of	gesture	and	spoken	and	written	language	that	was	Christopher	Knowles’	reaction	to	his	extraordinary	education,	the	becoming	and	potentialities	of	Chris	Dobbins	and	Romayne	Grace	in	the	shadows	of	institutions	in	Stepping	Out	and	the	lines	of	flight	from	the	nativity	play	and	the	dispositif	of	the	institutional	theatrical	of	the	uncredited	children	in	A	Child	is	Waiting.		What	implications	do	these	tracings	of	transversal	connections	have	for	the	current	situation	and	the	potential	future	development	of	this	field?		The	path	of	development	of	theatre	involving	actors	with	intellectual	or	developmental	disabilities	is	problematic	for	a	number	of	reasons.			The	case	studies	I	have	chosen	represent	a	genealogy	not	a	history	because	throwing	“a	spotlight	on	the	subject	of	retardation”	has	been	a	practice	that	has	been	reiteratively	reenacted	over	the	last	fifty	years.		During	this	period	a	variety	of	theatre	practitioners	have	each	in	turn	‘discovered’	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	meaning	that	a	chronological	‘history’	of	this	theatre	would	resemble	reiterated	colonial	accounts	of	the	discovery	of	newfound,	exotic	Others.			How	is	it	possible	to	shift	this	perspective	away	from	the	emphasis	on	the	non-disabled	facilitators	to	include	the	voices	of,	and	to	acknowledge	and	celebrate	the	contributions	of,	the	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	themselves?		How	is	it	possible	to	acknowledge	the	substantial	part	these	actors	
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have	played	in	the	emergence	of	this	form	of	theatre	from	its	origins	in	segregated	institutions	to	its	much	greater	visibility	and	prominence	in	the	second	decade	of	the	twenty	first	century?			This	thesis	can	acknowledge	this	contribution	but	as	it	is	part	of	a	critical	discourse	this	thesis	will	inevitably	be	primarily	addressed	to	a	readership	that	is	assumed	not	to	be	intellectually	disabled,	in	the	generally	accepted	meaning	of	this	term.			Critical	discourse	can,	however,	make	a	contribution,	however	limited,	to	delineating	the	territory	that	has	been	explored	in	previous	theatrical	performance	and	in	indicating	the	potential	ground	that	might	be	covered	in	future	exploration.		Theatrical	performance	itself	is	a	practice	and	discourse	in	which	people	with	intellectual	disabilities,	for	all	the	shortcomings	of	non-disabled	facilitators,	have	now	been	meaningfully	engaged	for	the	past	fifty	years	at	least.	The	more	recent	work	of	Back	to	Back	Theatre,	Disabled	Theater	and	to	a	certain	extent	Christoph	Schlingensief’s	FreakStars	3000	are	all	performances	in	some	ways	engaged	with	critical	discourse.			The	theatrical	performance	by	the	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	A	
Child	is	Waiting	emerged	amidst	dialogue	and	dispute,	argument	and	counter-argument	over	the	treatment	of	the	‘subject	of	retardation’	that	resonate	still.		This	included	the	tension	between	Stanley	Kramer’s	desire	to	treat	the	subject	with	a	sentimental	“spotlight”	and	John	Cassavetes’	desire	for	a	more	immanent	approach	through	the	chiaroscuro	and	POV	shots	of	cinema	verité.		In	a	wider	historical	context,	the	performance	and	presence	of	the	children	is	caught	between	Kramer’s	messianic	hope	to	redeem	the	falling	into	inhumanity	of	the	Muselmanner	of	the	camps	and	Cassavetes’	self-deprecating	or	pessimistic	acknowledgment	that	the	problem	is	not	retardation,	the	problem	is	“us.”		
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Regardless	of,	or	perhaps	because	of,	this	tension	in	its	genesis,	the	performance	of	“the	children”,	however,	remains	arresting	and	affecting.		Their	performance	arrests	the	flow	of	time	of	the	representational	cinematic	narrative	and	disrupts	the	intended	meta-narrative	of	the	social	issues	film	of	a	progessive	journey	towards	inclusion.		This	arresting	and	disruptive	force	is	achieved	by	a	presentation	of	the	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	that	is	sensitive	enough	to	allow	their	humour	and	their	anxieties	to	peep	through	the	various	narrative	frameworks	imposed	upon	them:	a	presentation	that	allows	for	their	affective	presence	as	well	as	their	mediated	presence.	Cassavetes’	film	does	not	present	the	theatrical	or	the	cinematic	performance	as	a	seamless	process	of	representation	and	communication.	The	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	are	allowed	to	find	theatrical	performance	itself	at	once	amusing,	anxiety-provoking	and	strange	from	within	the	performance.	This	performativity	of	their	performance	anticipates	much	later	developments	in	the	concept	of	theatricality.			 The	 stated	 intention	 of	 the	 documentary	 Stepping	 Out	 is	 to	 chart	 the	“birth	of	a	theatre	of	the	mentally	handicapped”	but	a	close	analysis	reveals	how	the	performance	that	eventually	arrives	on	the	stage	of	the	Sydney	Opera	House	is	 implicated	 in	 a	 number	 of	 other	 social	 performances.	 These	 include	 the	performance	 of	 the	 institution	 and	 other	 related	 organizations	 as	 being	progressive	 and	 enlightened	 in	 the	 treatment	 of	 people	 with	 intellectual	disabilities.	These	include	the	specific	performance	of	Aldo	Gennaro,	the	director,	as	 an	 artist,	 therapist	 and	 outsider	 whose	 liminality	 qualifies	 him	 to	 be	 a	facilitator	 of	 the	 creativity	 of	 the	 disadvantaged.	 These	 include	 the	 social	performances	of	difference	 in	 the	world	outside	 the	 institution	 that	are	 clearly	meant	 to	 call	 attention	 to	 the	 documentary	 spectators’	 own	 perceptions.	 They	
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also	of	 course	 include	 the	performance	of	 the	 residents:	 as	 cheerful,	 compliant	members	of	the	institution	and	as	self-deprecating	Australians.	At	a	deeper	level	than	 these	 performances	 of	 “passing,”	 the	 documentary	 implies	 another	performance	required	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities:	the	self-policing	of	their	desire.			The	performances	of	the	body	in	desire	in	the	documentary	include	the	performative	veiling	of	that	desire	in	drag	and	camp.				 What	remains	through	the	various	 levels	of	performance	and	mediation,	is	 the	 distinctive	 voice	 of	 Romayne	 Grace,	 the	 female	 narrator,	 the	 distinctive	physical	presence	of	Chris	Dobbins,	his	and	the	others’	intense	relationship	with	Aldo	 Gennaro	 and	 the	 joy	 of	 performance	 of	 the	 other	 residents.	 	 Although	Gennaro’s	methodology	 appears	 to	 be	 the	most	 prescriptive	 of	 any	 directorial	approach	 examined	 in	 this	 thesis	 the	 documentary	 makes	 clear	 that	 in	 that	particular	historical	and	geographical	context	his	approach	to,	and	relationships	with,	the	residents	of	the	Sunshine	Home	was	of	a	different	order	emotionally	to	their	 relationship	 with	 the	 routines	 of	 institutionalized	 care	 in	 the	 Sunshine	Home,	a	home	away	from	all	‘normal’	ideas	of	home	for	the	rest	of	their	lives.				 I	have	made	a	comparison	between	what	the	documentary	shows	of	Gennaro’s	theatrical	and	therapeutic	methodology	with	what	the	archive	shows	of	Robert	Wilson’s	methodology	in	his	collaborations	with	Christopher	Knowles	and	Raymond	Andrews.		The	intention	of	the	comparison	is	to	highlight	how	the	problem	of	the	moral	or	ethical	aporia	highlighted	in	the	analysis	of	A	Child	is	
Waiting	remains	unresolved	in	these	subsequent	theatrical	and	therapeutic	practices.	This	aporia	is,	at	root,	an	inequality	in	the	intersubjective	relationships	between	an	‘us’	meaning	people	without	intellectual	disabilities	and	a		‘them’	meaning	people	with	intellectual	disabilities.		
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	 This	aporia	remains	whether	the	methodology	for	creating	theatre	is	one	in	which	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	mirror	and	are	required	to	emulate	the	aesthetic	palate	and	performance	techniques	of	non-disabled	facilitators	or	whether	this	mirroring	or	emulation	is	reversed	so	that	non-disabled	people	seek	to	inhabit	the	movement	and	language	of	those	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	order	to	understand	or	empathize	with	their	perspectives.	Both	methodologies	are	predicated	on	an	inequality	in	intersubjective	relationships.		While	the	work	of	both	Aldo	Gennaro	and	Robert	Wilson	represent	interesting	stages	in	the	development	of	this	type	of	theatre,	the	basic	assumptions	about	these	intersubjective	relationships	mean	that	the	work	remains	caught	up	in	the	double	bind	of	this	ethical	aporia.		This	is	important	to	identify	because	these	basic	assumptions	of	inequality	continue	to	inform	much	work	in	this	area	to	the	present	time,	often	compromising	overt	intentions	to	empower	and	include.		 The	question	then	needs	to	be	asked	whether	it	is	possible	to	reconfigure	this	intersubjective	relationship	or,	at	the	least,	to	acknowledge	this	underlying	aporia.		I	believe	that	FreakStars	3000,	especially	in	the	wider	context	of	Christoph	Schlingensief’s	work,	marks	a	potential	turning	point	in	the	reconfiguration	of	this	aesthetic	and	political	relationship	between	people	with	and	without	intellectual	disabilities	in	theatrical	performance.		Schlingensief	proceeds	to	negotiate	relationships	in	which,	after	Rancière,	equality	between	people	with	and	without	intellectual	disabilities	is	already	assumed	as	a	starting	point	and	is	not	something	to	be	remediated	or	redeemed.		This	leads	him	to	a	way	of	working	with	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	that	is	equivalent	to	how	he	works	with	any	other	collaborators:	refugees,	drug	addicts,	opera	singers	or	
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film	and	theatre	actors.		A	fundamental	principle	of	his	artistic	methodology	was	what	he	termed	self-provocation,	regardless	of	the	‘self’	concerned	or	indeed,	at	a	deeper	level,	a	provocation	of	the	assumption	of	an	autonomous	self.		A	Nietzschean	questioning	of	all	values	enabled	him	to	afford	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	the	dignity	of	being	undignified.		He	had	a	Rancièrian	suspicion	of	ethics	in	performance	and	the	ethical	treatment	of	publics	and	performers	from	disadvantaged	sections	of	society.	In	this	respect	his	work	anticipates	the	discussions	of	the	ethics	of	the	participation	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	that	has	been	taking	place	from	within	twenty	first	century	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	such	disabilities.	Although	his	work	often	explored	a	fine	line	between	provocation	and	exploitation	and	courted	the	risk	of	‘unethical’	behaviour,	I	believe	that	he	made	a	radical	contribution	to	what	is	becoming	possible	for	this	form	of	theatre.		 The	possibilities	that	the	work	of	Schlingensief	opened	up	have	been	taken	up	by	the	recent	work	of	Back	to	Back	Theatre,	a	company	who	have	developed	a	performance	practice	after	many	years	of	development	within	a	community	and	therapeutic	context	to	a	point	where	they	can	now	afford	the	luxury	of	working	over	a	long	period	of	development	with	a	small	regular	ensemble	of	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities.	Theirs	is	an	ongoing	practice	in	which	within	in	each	new	production	they	can	set	new	challenges	for	particular	members	of	the	ensemble	and	in	which	productions	are	in	dialogue	with	each	other	across	their	oeuvre	and,	with	the	post-show	discussion,	in	a	particular	dialogue	with	audience	responses	and	expectations.	They	are	probably	the	group	working	in	this	area	of	theatre	that	have	afforded	the	most	developmental	practice	to	their	performers	and,	therefore,	to	the	perceptions	of	a	wider	
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audience	of	what	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	are	capable	of	in	performance.					 The	ongoing	development	of	their	oeuvre	is	crucial	to	consider	in	terms	of	the	questions	this	thesis	is	asking.		The	focus	of	my	investigation	has	been	on	close	readings	of	three	recent	productions.		Small	metal	objects	took	this	form	of	theatre	into	a	reconfigured	public	space	to	question	assumptions	of	commonality	between	and	amongst	people	with	and	without	intellectual	disabilities.		Food	
Court	opens	up	the	possibilities	of	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	enacting	abuse,	bullying	and	violence	as	perpetrators	rather	than	the	victims	that	they	are	assumed	to	be.	It	also	develops	the	interrogation	of	the	spectator’s	faculties	of	hearing	and	seeing	that	was	such	a	feature	of	small	metal	objects.	Ganesh	versus	
the	Third	Reich	explicitly	and	performatively	addresses	the	issue	of	who	can	tell	what	stories	and	for	whom,	an	issue	that	continues	to	haunt	this	form	of	theatre.			I	have	in	addition	to	attending	Back	to	Back	performances	and	viewing	and	re-viewing	archive	performance	videos,	had	a	continuing	dialogue	with	members	of	the	creative	team	and	the	performers.	It	is	in	an	analysis	of	Back	to	Back’s	work	that	I	feel	that	my	own	twelve	years	of	experience	of	exploring	theatre	with	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	has	been	most	influential.		This	is	difficult	to	quantify	and	somewhat	out	of	the	range	of	the	intended	scope	of	this	thesis	but	I	need	to	acknowledge	that	this	experience	of	practical	work	that	provided	the	impetus	for	writing	this	thesis	informs	my	reading	of	how	Back	to	Back	explore	the	questions	of	the	agency	of	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities,	their	dramaturgical	strategies	and	use	of	the	techne	of	theatre	and	the	kind	of	theatricality	or	‘performance	theatre’	that	they	have	developed	in	their	making	of	theatre	in	spite	of	and	because	of	their	“issues	with	theatre.”		
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	 Back	to	Back	play	with	audience	concerns	over	the	perceived	lack	of	agency	of	the	performers	with	intellectual	disabilities	in	a	company	directed	and	curated	by	non-disabled	facilitators.		I	argue	that	at	the	end	of	Ganesh	versus	the	
Third	Reich	there	is	a	staging	of	a	kind	of	autonomy	for	Mark	Deans	in	the	closing	minutes	of	the	production.		This	is,	however,	a	highly	theatricalized	autonomy,	dependent	upon	the	support	of	the	preceding	narrative,	the	staging	of	Mark	within	the	scenography	of	that	production	continuing	to	generate	“sparks	of	representation.”		Jérôme	Bel	in	Disabled	Theater	similarly	flirts	with	the	audience	in	terms	of	presenting	the	apparent	autonomy	of	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	and	combines	this	with	a	kind	of	attempted	Duchampian	degree	zero	of	performance	in	the	highly	atomized	structure	of	what	he	requires	the	actors	of	Theater	HORA	to	perform.		For	the	purposes	of	the	subject	of	this	thesis,	Disabled	
Theater	is	particularly	interesting	for	the	debate	that	it	generates	and	for	that	debate	more	thoroughly	entering	the	academy	and	the	indication	that	gives	of	where	this	particular	form	of	theatre	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	is	now	located	in	broader	debates	about	the	politics	and	aesthetics	of	performance,	in	its	broadest	sense,	and	performance	philosophy.		The	question	of	what	contribution	this	theoretical	discourse	can	make	alongside	and	intersecting	with	the	practical	development	of	this	form	of	theatre	remains	open	and	fraught	with	potential,	perhaps	the	potential	of	incapacity,	of	the	intellectually	disabled	‘art	of	failure.’			The	practice	of	this	form	of	theatre	has	seen	recent	experiments	in	reconfiguring	the	creative	autonomy	of	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	of	
Freie	Republik	HORA,	Theater	HORA’s	response	by	means	of	performance	to	
Disabled	Theater,	and	Theater	Thikwa’s	Regie,	in	which	actors	with	intellectual	
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disabilities	take	the	role	of	directors.		For	the	immediate	future	this	form	of	theatre	will	continue	to	be	a	negotiation	between	people	with	and	without	intellectual	disabilities.	Theater	HORA	and	Thikwa’s	recent	work	and	my	own	practical	work	with	Different	Light	Theatre	suggests	that	a	notion	such	as	“creative	autonomy”	for	actors	with	intellectual	disabilities	needs	to	be	tempered	with	the	right	kind	of	support	networks	and	framing	to	give	that	creative	autonomy	any	meaning	and	also	to	acknowledge	the	highly	collaborative	nature	of	theatrical	performance	and	the	mutual	contingencies	and	vulnerabilities	of	making	theatre	in	the	latest	iteration	of	the	recurrent	end	times	of	theatre.	
	
	
Coda:	“A	dance	that	draws	you	to	the	edge	of	your	seat.”	
	
	 I	wish	to	conclude	this	thesis	with	a	coda	that	refers	to	some	very	specific	moments	of	incapacity	and	theatricality	in	a	recent	production	by	Back	to	Back	Theatre.		These	moments	serve	as	a	paradigm	for	the	considerations	of	incapacity	and	theatricality	in	this	thesis	and	what	may	emerge	from	considering	and	practising	theatrical	performance	involving	people	with	intellectual	disabiltities	on	these	terms.			These	moments	reveal	an	affective	network	in	operation	across	all	bodies	present	in	theatrical	performance,	a	network	in	which	the	possibilities	of	a	politics	of	affect	and	affective	politics	emerge.		Sarah	Mainwaring's	palsy	turns	the	task	of	clipping	a	microphone	into	its	stand	into	a	dance	that	draws	you	to	the	edge	of	your	seat.	(Blake)		This	is	how	Jason	Blake,	the	reviewer	for	the	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	describes	the	actions	of	Sarah	Mainwaring	as,	in	fits	and	starts	of	movement,	she	sets	up	a	
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microphone	at	the	beginning	of	Super	Discount	by	Back	to	Back	Theatre,	a	production	that	I	saw	at	the	Wharf	Theatre,	Sydney	Theatre	Company	in	October,	2013.		Super	Discount,	the	production	that	succeeded	Ganesh	versus	the	Third	
Reich	is	typical	of	Back	to	Back	‘s	narratival	and	dramaturgical	strategy	in	that	it	is	an	attempt	at	staging	the	unstageable:	a	comic	book	narrative	of	super	heroes	and	villains	using	a	bare	minimum	of	theatrical	techne.		In	this	work	the	company’s	investigation	of	the	place	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	continues.		Super	Discount	suggests	this	place	is	somewhere	between	the	‘Super’	that	is	the	wonder	of	the	appearance	of	people	with	intellectual	disabilities	on	stage	and	the	playing	on	the	guilt	of	an	assumed	abled	audience	complicit	in	‘dis-counting’	such	people.	This	place	is	somewhere	between	wonder	and	guilt,	and	in	a	tension	between	the	two,	in	which	dialectic	the	possibility	of	a	new	place	emerges,	combining	wonder	and	guilt	and	moving	beyond	them.		This	is	a	new	place	that	beckons	in	the	here	and	now	of	the	encounter	between	people	with	and	without	intellectual	disabilities.						In	the	hands	of	a	stage	hand	the	clipping	of	a	microphone	to	its	stand	might	well	be	an	unremarkable	action,	a	kind	of	‘non-matrixed	performance.’	(Kirby	41)	In	the	hands	of	Sarah	Mainwaring,	however,	it	is	different.		Blake	asserts	that	it	is	her	‘palsy’	that	transforms	the	task	into	something	so	remarkable,	at	an	aesthetic	level	‘a	dance’	-	and	compellingly	theatrical	-	it	‘draws	you	to	the	edge	of	your	seat’:	a	choreograpy	in	operation	across	the	bodies	of	both	performers	and	audience.		What	is	it	about	Sarah	Mainwaring’s	‘palsy’	that	achieves	such	theatrical	effect	and	affect?		As	spectators	we	can	clearly	see	what	she	is	moving	towards	doing:	we	can	see	and	feel	where	the	movement	is	intended	to	go.			In	advance	of	
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its	completion	we	know	the	function	it	is	intended	to	perform.	We	see	her	attempts	towards	the	completion	of	this	action	and	the	involuntary	movements,	which,	despite	herself,	take	her	away	from	it.			You	are	on	the	edge	of	your	seat	caught	between	anticipation	of	her	completion	of	the	action	or	anxiety	at	the	possibility	of	her	failure	to	complete	the	action.			Purposive,	meaningful	movement	is	teetering	on	the	edge	of	collapse,	–	her	progression	towards	completing	the	action	is	threatened	with	its	undoing:		at	times	three	steps	forward	two	steps	back,	at	times	two	steps	forward	three	steps	back.		I	should	add	that	in	the	production	the	microphone	is	switched	on,	so	that	we	also	hear	her	struggle	with	the	object.			At	the	neurological	level	perhaps	the	spectator’s	mirror	neurons	may	be	tracing	synaptic	paths	that	are	modeling	the	completion	of	the	action	for	her:	other	neurons	may	be	firing	in	empathy	with	her.	The	dance	of	her	movements	of	incapacity	and	theatricality	and	the	empathies	of	the	audience	become	a	choreography	that	is	shared	between	performer	and	audience,	a	dance	at	the	level	of	the	soma	and	the	chora.	The	time	she	takes	to	perform	this	action	is	different	to	what	might	be	expected.		There	is	a	durationality	about	it.		But	it	is	a	kind	of	de	facto	durationality.	Whose	durationality	is	it?		Presumably	Sarah	Mainwaring	has	no	choice	over	the	duration:	this	is	how	she	moves.		It	is	the	dispositif	of	the	theatrical	production	that	chooses	to	invite	the	spectator	to	share	this	durationality.			What	might	emerge	in	the	act	of	spectatorship	in	the	time	that	we	are	not	used	to	waiting	for	such	an	action	to	be	completed?	The	spectator	might	question	what	is	at	stake	in	the	allocation	of	this	task	to	Sarah	Mainwaring.		Is	her	‘embodied	difference’	being	curated,	displayed	or	exploited?		The	production,	like	much	of	Back	to	Back’s	recent	work,	invites	this	‘anxiety’	as	it	
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calls	attention	to	the	processes	of	perceiving,	particularly	the	perceiving	of	disability.	
	Sarah	Mainwaring’s	placing	of	the	hand-held	microphone	in	its	stand	also	ends	the	production.	It	is	both	an	undoing	and	completion	of	an	action	she	performed	at	the	beginning	of	the	production.		Her	distinctive	performance	of	these	actions,	therefore,	frames	the	whole	piece.			The	‘super	hero’	strand	of	the	narrative	concludes	in	a	confrontation	between	Mark	Deans,	a	performer	with	Down’s	Syndrome,	as	the	hero,	and	David	Woods,	a	performer	without	disabilities,	as	the	villain.		This	takes	place	in	a	snow	storm	on	top	of	a	table,	a	staging	that	combines	the	spectacle	of	theatrical	performance	with	the	minimalist,	matter-of-fact	mise-en-scène	of	the	production.		Mark	finally	asserts	himself	as	superhero	and	vanquishes	the	villain	by	emitting	an	almighty	roar	of	power	into	the	microphone	he	is	holding	and	then	stands	astride	the	villain	on	the	table.		Grehan	and	Eckersall	describe	what	follows:				As	the	other	actors	begin	to	strike	the	set	around	him,	Mark,	our	superhero,	can’t	get	down	from	the	table.	He	calls	to	another	of	the	cast	–	Sarah	Mainwaring	-	for	help.	The	fragility	of	our	existence	is	captured	in	these	closing	moments.	(Grehan	and	Eckersall	“Review”)		As	she	offers	her	shaking	hand	to	accompany	his	descent	a	shift	occurs	from	a	‘moment	resplendent	with	theatricality	and	drama’	of	the	previous	snow	storm	scene	to	what	feels	like	a	different	mode	of	performance.	Sarah	Mainwaring	falteringly	helps	Mark	Deans	down	off	the	table	and	in	her	distinctive	way	she	replaces	the	microphone	in	its	stand:	a	wavering	of	intended	and	involuntary	movement	that	draws	the	audience	to	the	edge	of	its	seat,	a	
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position	that	suggests	what	is	being	performed	is	both	compelling	and	might	impel	the	audience	into	action.			Incapacity	is	at	stake	in	what	Grehan	and	Eckersall	locate	in	Super	
Discount’s	multilayered	investigation	of	acting	and	role-playing:	‘we	are	on	the	verge	of	questioning	the	limitations	of	theatre	itself.’		Fragility	is,	in	one	sense	then,	the	fragility	of	representation,	the	theatricality	of	theatre	on	the	verge	of	collapse.		Sarah	Mainwaring’s	performance	of	the	actions	of	clipping	and	unclipping	a	microphone	to	its	stand	calls	attention	to	itself.		This	is	a	calling	attention	to	both	the	incapacity	and	the	theatricality	of	the	actions.	In	this	interplay	of	incapacity	and	theatricality	Sarah	Mainwaring’s	movements	emerge	not	as	a	falling	from	the	true	of	a	norm	of	economy	and	elegance	of	movement	but	as	remarkable	and	compelling	in	their	difference.		What	also	emerges	is	a	fellow	feeling,	of	mutual	vulnerability	and	mutual	interdependence,	a	political	affect	that	is	neither	messianic	nor	melancholic	but	that	responds	to	the	precarities	of	the	here	and	now.		In	the	place	that	emerges	in	the	dialectical	interplay	of	incapacity	and	theatricality	can	be	found	strange,	new	and	different	beauty;	strange,	new	and	different	possibilities	for	acting,	braiding	meanings	of	that	term	to	include	performance	on	a	stage	and	in	everyday	life	and	implying	the	potential	for	political	action.			
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